



The Last Crusade in the West

Castile and the
Conquest of
Granada

Joseph F. O'Callaghan

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Joseph F. O'Callaghan

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A Note on Money

In the late twelfth century Alfonso VIII of Castile issued the gold *morabetino* or *maravedí* in imitation of Almoravid gold coinage. By the fourteenth century the *maravedí* was a money of account. Thereafter the principal gold coin was the *dobla*, or double *maravedí*, known as *dobla de la banda* under Juan II, *castellano* under Enrique IV, and *excelente* under Fernando and Isabel. Their respective values were 335 *maravedies*, 435 *maravedies*, and 870 *maravedies*. The standard silver coin was the *real* valued at 30 *maravedies*. Gold coins imitating the Venetian ducat and the Florentine florin also circulated. Many everyday transactions involved *vellón* (copper-silver alloy) coins known as *blancas*, usually two or three to a *maravedí*. For further detail, see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *La hacienda real de Castilla, 1360–1504* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2009), and Angus MacKay, *Money, Prices and Politics in Fifteenth-Century Castile* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981).

Genealogical Tables

Table 1. Kings of Castile-León




Table 2. Kings of Portugal




Table 3. Kings of Aragón





Table 4. The Naşrid Emirs of Granada



Introduction

Castile and the Emirate of Granada

Ever since the Muslim invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in the eighth century, the Christians had fought to expel them. The present volume describes the ebb and flow of that conflict, known as the reconquest, from the middle of the fourteenth century until its completion in 1492. Accorded crusading status by the papacy, the struggle continued long after serious attempts to recover the Holy Land had been abandoned, and so can rightly be called the last crusade in the West.

The Reconquest: From Abeyance to Completion

Not long after the Muslims destroyed the Visigothic kingdom, independent Christians in the northernmost reaches of the peninsula expressed their hope of recovering the land that had been lost. The idea that the kings of Castile-León, as heirs of the Visigoths, ought to reconstitute the Visigothic realm, including the ancient Roman province of Mauritania in North Africa, gained early currency and persisted until the close of the Middle Ages. The achievement of that lofty goal was slow, but in the late eleventh century the balance of power shifted in favor of the Christians who drove the frontier south of Toledo on the Tagus River. Invaders from Morocco, first the Almoravids and then the Almohads, temporarily halted that advance but failed to regain lost territory.

Acknowledging that the war against the Moors (as the Christians called the Muslims) was in the interest of Christendom, successive popes offered participants the crusading indulgence or remission of sins, and various personal and proprietary legal protections. The papacy also provided financial aid from ecclesiastical income. As Portugal and Aragón reached their fullest extent by the mid-thirteenth century, only Castile, after conquering Córdoba and Seville, had a frontier directly abutting Granada, the last bastion of Islamic rule in Spain. In 1246, Ibn al-Aḥmar, the first of the Naṣrid dynasty and the

founder of the emirate of Granada, in order to preserve his autonomy, became a Castilian vassal, promising court attendance, military service, and an annual tribute (*parias*). After the fall of Seville in 1248 the Castilian monarchs strove to consolidate their conquest and to dominate the Guadalquivir River valley to its mouth. Intent on curtailing invasion by the Marinids of Morocco, they tried to wrest control of Algeciras, Gibraltar, and Tarifa, ports giving access to the peninsula. Alfonso XI's victory at the Salado River in 1340 effectively ended Moroccan intervention. Though he conquered Algeciras in 1344, his death in 1350, while besieging Gibraltar, brought the crusade to a halt.¹

Marinid decline isolated the Naṣrids, but, as they posed no significant threat, the Castilians felt no urgency to attack them. Consequently, the reconquest fell into abeyance. No longer troubled by a possible Moroccan intrusion, Pedro I concentrated on war with Aragón and the opposition of his half-brother, Enrique of Trastámara, but never undertook a sustained campaign against Granada. The Trastámara monarchs, concerned to secure their throne, arranged a series of truces with the Naṣrids extending into the early fifteenth century. The rupture of the truce enabled Infante Fernando, as regent for Juan II, to capture Antequera in 1410, but his election as king of Aragón diverted his attention from Granada. Quarrels with the nobility disturbed the long reign of Juan II, who defeated the Naṣrids at La Higuera in 1431 but failed to gain any territory. His son Enrique IV ravaged Granada early in his reign, but increasing discord with the nobility and a dispute over the succession thwarted his efforts to subjugate the emirate. These intermittent crusading efforts are essential to a full understanding of the Castilian conquest of Granada and ought not to be passed over lightly.

After so many years of sporadic military operations, Fernando and Isabel, the “Reyes Católicos” or “Catholic Kings,” made the conquest their chief priority. After bringing the fractious nobility to heel, they provided an outlet for their aggressiveness in the war against the Moors. With public order and the prestige of the monarchy restored, they marshaled the resources of the realm and of the church to support the war. Despite the expense and the exhaustion of their people, the king and queen, armed with crusading bulls, persisted in their task for ten years, using artillery to reduce one stronghold after another. Following the capitulation of Granada in 1491, they entered the city in triumph in January 1492. The reconquest was over. As a political entity Islamic Spain was no more. However, the incorporation of thousands of Muslims into the Crown of Castile proved to be a most arduous task.

Granada Around 1350


Mountain ranges intersected by valleys and plains dominated Naṣrid Granada and impeded the conquest. Dotting the landscape were walled cities, each with

its citadel (*alcazaba*) and a string of dependent castles controlling the surrounding region. Countless watchtowers provided early warning of enemy movements in the contested no-man's land between Castile and Granada.

The Mediterranean Sea defined Granada's southernmost boundary. East of Gibraltar the ports of Estepona, Marbella, Fuengirola, Málaga, Vélez Málaga, Almúñecar, Salobreña, Adra, and Almería marked the coastline until it turned northward to Vera and Aguilas adjacent to Castilian Murcia. North of Gibraltar Castellar, Jimena, and Arcos de la Frontera established the western Castilian border before shifting eastward to Olvera. Opposite that line was Ubrique on the edge of the Sierra de Grazalema. Ronda, adjoining the Serranía de Ronda, was the most important Muslim fortress in the west. Between there and Málaga were Álora and Coín. The deep valleys and inaccessible terrain of al-Sharqiyya (Ajarquía) provided a strong defensive bulwark for Vélez Málaga and Málaga. On its northern edge was Alhama. From Olvera the northern frontier ran eastward through Antequera, Archidona, and Loja and then extended just north of the capital.

Traversed by the Genil and Darro rivers, Granada attained prominence in the eleventh century as the seat of one of the petty kingdoms (*taifas*) emerging from the disintegration of the Caliphate of Córdoba. The Nasrids developed the palace of the Alhambra with its characteristic red walls on a hilltop overlooking the Albaicín, the nucleus of the medieval city. Numerous villages, farms, wheat fields, orchards, and vineyards, nourished by extensive irrigation canals in the *vega* or surrounding plain, provided an abundance of food. The Castilians regularly plundered the *vega*, just as the Moors crossed it to raid Castilian positions. Loja, on the Genil River, guarded access to Granada from the west, while on the north, Montefrío, Íllora, Moclín, Colomera, and Iznalloz formed a buffer against Castilian forays from Alcalá la Real, Priego, and Alcaudete. The Moors similarly raided the Castilian kingdom of Jaén from bases at Cambil and Alhabar in the northeast.

Granada lies in the shadow of the Sierra Nevada, a mountain range stretching eastward about forty-six miles. Spreading southward toward the coast is La Alpujarra or Las Alpujarras, a region of fertile valleys lying beneath sharply rising mountains. The Andarax River, bordering Las Alpujarras and the Sierra de Gador, flows southward to Almería. The principal towns east of Granada were Guadix, often the seat of minor branches of the royal family; Baza, bordered by the Sierra de Baza; Huéscar to the northeast; and Vélez Rubio and Vélez Blanco near the Murcian frontier. South of Baza were the Sierra de las Estancias and the Sierra de los Filabres, separated by the valley of the Almanzora River leading to Vera near the coast.



Map 1. The Castilian-Granadan Frontier, c. 1350

About 300,000 to 350,000 persons resided in the emirate. In the fifteenth century the capital had approximately 50,000 inhabitants, Málaga, 20,000, and Almería, 9,000. The numbers for Guadix, Baza, Loja, Alhama, Ronda, and Vélez Málaga were about 6,000 to 10,000 and for Antequera, Marbella, Coín, Vélez Blanco, Vélez Rubio, and Vera about 2,500 to 5,000. Many smaller places had between 500 and 1,000 residents. In contrast to the majority of Berber origin, the aristocracy claimed descent from the Arabs, but their rivalries often disturbed public order. Even worse were conflicts within the Naşrid dynasty that weakened the monarchy and ultimately led to its downfall. Granada, where most people were Muslims, was hardly a land of three religions. There were only about 3,000 Jews, who were settled in coastal towns and the capital and dedicated to small crafts and commerce. The Mozarabs or indigenous Christian population had long since disappeared. Small numbers of Christian merchants, especially Catalans and Genoese, dwelled in the ports and principal cities. In the fifteenth century Christian soldiers served in the royal guard, but many converted to Islam. Most Christian inhabitants were slaves taken in wartime and put to hard labor in the towns and countryside. Some, in order to ameliorate their condition, became Muslims and rose to prominence in the royal court. There were also many black slaves from Africa.

Agricultural production included wheat, barley, and millet, but as the wheat supply was never sufficient more had to be imported from North Africa. Apples, oranges, and figs were produced in great quantities, as were olives and olive oil. Vineyards were plentiful and, despite the Qur'anic prohibition, wine was consumed regularly. Irrigation canals brought an abundance of water to thirsty fields. Sheep, cattle, and goats were raised especially in mountainous areas, but they were the constant target of Castilian marauders. Although iron, lead, and zinc were mined, there were few important deposits of gold and

silver. Inland transport was difficult where good roads were lacking; mules were particularly useful in carrying goods over mountain passes.

Granada maintained an active overseas commerce with its Christian and Muslim neighbors. Its products could be found in the ports of Valencia, Cádiz, Seville, Lisbon, Tlemcen, and Tunis, and as far north as Montpellier, and Bruges. Dominating that trade were the Genoese, who were prominent in Málaga (where they had a consulate) and Almería. They imported wool and finished woolen cloth from Flanders and Tuscany, as well as cotton, spices, drugs, pearls, silver, oil, and paper from the east. Major exports included sugar, raisins, figs, almonds, and saffron. Exchanges at Málaga, Granada, and Almería regulated the quantity and quality of silk for export. After the fall of Granada many emigrants put their assets into easily transportable silk bundles that could be converted into other forms of wealth.

The tax burden was heavy partly because of the tribute owed to Castile. Although levied spasmodically, it usually amounted to 12,000 gold *doblas* or one-quarter to one-fifth of Naṣrid revenues. Especially important were the alms-tax of one-tenth (*'ushr*, *zakāt*, *aṣaque*), ordinarily payable in coin or wheat, barley, and millet, and a comparable levy on vineyards and olive orchards. *Al-ma'ūna* (*almaguana*) was an annual tax of 2.5 percent on landed property and *al-fiṭra* (*alfitra*) was a yearly head tax of 2 dirhams. Various taxes were imposed on livestock, including migratory sheep, either in coin or one to two head for every forty animals. A sales tax (*magran*) of 10 percent was comparable to the Castilian *diezmo y medio diezmo de lo morisco* of 10.5 percent. Other taxes were collected on fisheries and maritime commerce. Exports were taxed at 2.5 percent and imports at 11 percent. Inheritance taxes ranged from 17.3 percent to 34.6 percent. The Jews paid a poll tax (*jizya*).²

Sources for Study

Christian narrative and documentary sources for this study are much fuller than previously.³ The anonymous *Fourth General Chronicle* continued the history of the Castilian kings down to 1454.⁴ Of greater value are the histories of individual monarchs by several laymen holding prominent positions in the royal court. A soldier, diplomat, and statesman, Pedro López de Ayala (1332–1406) has been called the first Castilian humanist. Initially an adherent of Pedro I, he abandoned him for Enrique II and thereafter loyally served Juan I and Enrique III, who appointed him chancellor. His chronicles of their reigns from 1350 to 1395 constitute a valuable record by a perceptive observer and participant in many events. Though he depicted Pedro I as cruel, he otherwise strove to be objective and generally displayed sound historical judgment. A poet of some ability, in his *Rimado de Palacio* he lamented contemporary immorality, the evils of the Great Western Schism, and government abuses.⁵

The chief falconer, Pedro Carrillo de Huete (d. 1454), chronicled the reign of Juan II from 1420 to 1450. Although his pedestrian style lacks literary grace, he was an eyewitness and utilized many chancery documents. Lope de Barrientos, the bishop of Cuenca (d. 1469) and royal confessor, subsequently amplified his composition.⁶

Appointed the royal chronicler, Álvaro García de Santa María (d. 1460), a convert from Judaism, began the detailed *Chronicle of Juan II*. An eyewitness of many occurrences, for others he secured “certain and complete information from prudent men, worthy of faith.” His assessment of Fernando de Antequera is positive and he normally favored the king. Straightforward and almost journalistic in his recording of everyday happenings, he avoided hyperbole and exaggeration. The first part, covering the years 1406–19, focused chiefly on Fernando’s activities as regent and later as king of Aragón.⁷ The second part spans the years 1420–34.⁸

In 1517 when Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal (d. c. 1530), a member of Fernando and Isabel’s council, revised the *Chronicle of Juan II*, he acknowledged that several others continued Álvaro García’s work down to the king’s death. Chief among them was Fernán Pérez de Guzmán (d. c. 1460), whose reworking of the text is distinguished by its harmonious style and appreciation of the significance of historical events. A nephew of López de Ayala, he was active during the reigns of Enrique III and Juan II, but his opposition to Álvaro de Luna hastened his retirement. In *Lineages and Portraits*, he sketched the leading figures of his time whom he knew personally. His *Praise of the Distinguished Men of Spain* is a poetic description of kings, princes, bishops, and other great men.⁹

Historical works relating to Enrique IV reveal the heated passions that marked the contemporary political arena. Alonso Fernández de Palencia (d. 1492), named the royal chronicler, supported the attempt to make Enrique IV’s half-brother Alfonso king and later took the side of Isabel, who named him ambassador to Aragón. His *Deeds of Spain*, written in elegant Latin, extends from the end of Juan II’s reign to 1481. Known familiarly as the *Décadas*, the work is divided into four decades, and these in turn into ten books, save the incomplete Fourth Decade, which has only six.¹⁰ His relentless hostility toward Enrique IV strongly influenced modern interpreters of the reign.

By contrast, Diego Enríquez del Castillo (d. 1480), the royal chaplain and official chronicler, defended Enrique IV and denounced those who betrayed him. A staunch royalist, he seldom suggested that the king caused his own misfortunes.¹¹ The anonymous *Chronicle of Enrique IV* or *Castilian Chronicle* was once thought to be a translation of Palencia’s *Décadas*, but its independent origin is now recognized. Written about 1481–82 and covering the entire reign, it avoids Palencia’s excessive negativity and is generally favorable to the king.¹² Diego de Valera (d. c. 1488), a nobleman and royal counselor who participated in the Hussite wars and served on missions to France, was highly critical of Enrique IV in his *Memorial of Diverse Events*. Utilizing both

Palencia's *Deeds* and the anonymous *Chronicle of Enrique IV*, he composed his work about 1486–87.¹³ Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal drew upon these authors for his *Chronicle of Enrique IV*.¹⁴

Alonso de Palencia was among several authors who recorded the reign of Fernando and Isabel. His *Narration of the War Against Granada* encompasses the years 1481 to 1489. The Latin text remains unedited, but there is a Spanish translation. An eyewitness of many episodes, he had a positive view of Fernando, but his harsh criticism of Isabel's counselors and eventually of the queen herself cost him her confidence.¹⁵ When recounting the war against Granada in his *Chronicle of the Catholic Kings* (1474–88), Diego de Valera closely followed Palencia. His letters offering counsel to Juan II, Enrique IV, and Fernando and Isabel are also important.¹⁶

Fernando del Pulgar (d. c. 1490), the royal secretary and chronicler, composed a *Chronicle of the Catholic Kings Fernando and Isabel* ending in 1490, but an anonymous author continued it for several years. Pulgar occasionally used public documents but seldom established a clear chronology. In accord with humanist practice, he wrote speeches for his principal characters and offered moral reflections. Clearly favoring Isabel, he even allowed her to review his preliminary text. His *Distinguished Men of Castile*, describing Enrique IV and the principal personages of the late fifteenth century, was dedicated to her. In order to satisfy her curiosity, he wrote a brief *Treatise on the Kings of Granada*.¹⁷ Andrés Bernáldez (d. 1516), the curate of Los Palacios near Seville and chaplain of the archbishop of Seville, authored a *History of the Catholic Kings Fernando and Isabel* down to 1513. Written in a pleasant style and with attention to dates, the *History* recorded many events that he observed.¹⁸

Several nobles also found their biographers. Álvaro de Luna, the dominant personality in Juan II's court, was the protagonist of the *Chronicle of the Constable*, which is attributed to an admiring dependent, Gonzalo Chacón (d. 1507).¹⁹ Pedro de Escabias purportedly wrote the *Chronicle of Miguel Lucas de Iranzo*, a favorite of Enrique IV. Covering the years 1458 to 1471, it described the customs of a magnate residing at Jaén.²⁰ The *History of the Deeds of the Marquess of Cádiz* recounts the career of Rodrigo Ponce de León, one of the principal military commanders in the war of Granada, down to 1489. The author may have been Juan de Padilla (d. 1520), a poet and Carthusian monk.²¹ Fernán Pérez del Pulgar (d. 1531), not to be confused with Fernando del Pulgar, in 1526 wrote a *Brief Account of the Deeds of the Great Captain*, namely, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, in the war of Granada.²²

Portuguese chronicles contain valuable material concerning Castilian-Granadan relations. The royal chronicler Fernão Lopes (d. c. 1459) narrated the reigns of Pedro I, Fernando I, and João I down to 1412 in a simple and engaging style. He frequently quoted official documents and made ample use of oral discourse.²³ In his *Chronicle of João I* Gomes Eanes de Zurara (or Azurara) (d. 1474) concluded his predecessor's incomplete work. Adopting an

adulatory attitude toward Henry the Navigator, the patron of overseas expansion, he recorded the beginning of Portuguese exploration of the African coast in his *Chronicle of the Taking of Ceuta* and *Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea*.²⁴ The *Chronicle of Duarte* by Rui de Pina (d. 1522), the last of the medieval Portuguese royal chroniclers, is of particular interest.²⁵

The narratives described above were written by Christians and reflected Christian opinions of the Moors. Occupying a somewhat intermediate position is Hernando de Baeza's incomplete account of *Events That Occurred Among the Kings of Granada*. Written around 1505, it is a unique source of information concerning intrigue in the Naṣrid court. Acquainted with many Muslims and renegade Christians and fluent in Arabic, Baeza resided in Granada during the final years of Naṣrid rule. He was on good terms with Abū 'Abd Allāh, the last Naṣrid monarch, and served as his interpreter and messenger. He related that the emir knew Castilian but was hesitant to use it, lest he do so incorrectly. He also remarked that "if he [the emir] became a Christian he would be one of the best there ever was."²⁶ In the mid-sixteenth century an anonymous author acquainted with Fernando del Pulgar's work wrote *A History of the Royal House of Granada*.²⁷

In comparison to the relative abundance of Christian chronicles, narratives by Muslim authors are scant.²⁸ Relating the history of the Naṣrids to 1363, the royal vizier Ibn al-Khaṭīb (d. 1374) described each ruler's character and physical appearance, mentioned his officials, and the principal events of his reign. After incurring the displeasure of Muḥammad V, he fled to Morocco where he was assassinated.²⁹ Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), a descendant of a family that emigrated to Tunis after the fall of Seville, returned to serve Muḥammad V but later retired to Egypt. In his *Kitāb al-Ibar* or *Book of Examples*, he devoted two books to the Berbers. Recounting the history of the Naṣrids and their relations with the Moroccan rulers, he displayed the signal traits of attention to detail, balanced presentation, and critical reflection. He is considered one of the most notable of all historians.³⁰

For the fifteenth century two important works are extant. Ibn 'Āsim (d. 1453), in his *Kitāb Ŷunnat al-ridā* or *Book of the Leafy Garden*, written about 1450, related the turbulent reign of Muḥammad IX, whom he served in various capacities.³¹ The anonymous *Kitāb Nubḍat al-'asr fī akhbār mulūk Banī Naṣr aw taslīm ġarnāta wa nuzūl al-Andalusiyyīn ilā l-Maghrib*, or *Fragment of the Age Containing News of the Naṣrid Kings or the Capitulation of Granada and the Emigration of the Andalusians to Morocco*, chronicled the reigns of the last Naṣrids. Writing in exile in Morocco about 1540, the anonymous writer began his account in 1477 and carried it into the early sixteenth century.³²

Although he wrote long after the downfall of Granada, al-Makkarī (or al-Maqqarī) (d. 1631) is a very valuable source. His *Exhalation of the Sweet Fragrance of the Green Branch of Al-Andalus and History of the Vizier al-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb* is an encyclopedic work. The first part, narrating the history of Islamic Spain until the loss of Granada, quoted extensively from medieval

authors, especially Ibn al-Khaṭīb, the focus of the second part of his book.³³

Many episodes described in the historical narratives were retold in poetic form as ballads or romances. Written mainly in the fifteenth century by anonymous authors, they often purport to be spoken by Moors. They usually relate the deeds of great lords along the frontier from about 1407 to the sixteenth century. Initially transmitted orally, they were written down and collected.³⁴

Narrative sources must always be used in conjunction with documents that, in addition to precise chronology, often provide more accurate reports of events. The loss of the Castilian royal archives is partly offset by the recovery of original documents from ecclesiastical, municipal, and noble repositories.³⁵ The *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España* and the *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia* are especially noteworthy.³⁶ Many late medieval documents, especially for the reign of Fernando and Isabel, preserved in the Archivo General de Simancas, were published by Antonio de la Torre, Luis Suárez Fernández, and Juan de Mata Carriazo. Maximiliano Alarcón and Ramón García, Andrés Giménez Soler, Ángeles Masiá de Ros, and Roser Salicrú i Lluch edited letters of the kings of Castile, Aragón, Granada, and Morocco kept in the Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó. Although the Naṣrid archives have disappeared, Mariano Gaspar Remiro published surviving documents and diplomatic correspondence. Papal crusading bulls have also been printed. Many of these documents will be cited throughout this work.

In addition to these texts, some unique visual sources should be mentioned. On the ceiling of the central vault in the Sala de los Reyes in the Alhambra are the portraits of ten figures, traditionally identified as Naṣrid kings, or, more recently, as the royal council. In the great hall of El Escorial an elaborate painting done by Italian artists in 1585 depicts Juan II's triumph at La Higueruela in 1431. Between 1489 and 1494, the German Rodrigo Alemán, commissioned by the archbishop of Toledo, created a pictorial record of the final crusade against Granada by carving scenes of sieges and battles on fifty-four wooden choir stalls in the cathedral of Toledo. The names of many towns were inscribed on their walls.³⁷

Now, let us turn to the Castilian conquest of Granada, the last great crusade waged in western Europe.

Chapter 1

Pedro I: An Era of Ambivalence

After Alfonso XI's death, his only legitimate son, Pedro I (1350–69), not yet sixteen years old, ascended the throne and, in time, gained the sobriquet, the Cruel.¹ Absent the threat of Marinid invasion, he made no attempt to conquer Granada though he intervened in Naşrid civil strife. While he engaged in a frenetic war against Aragón, the bitter hostility of his half-brother, Enrique, the count of Trastámara, eventually plunged the realm into civil war and led to his violent overthrow. That conflict enabled Muḥammad V of Granada, for many years Pedro I's loyal vassal, to recover Algeciras. Both Pedro I and Enrique share responsibility for its loss.²

Pedro I, Granada, and Morocco

At his accession, Pedro I, though faced with internal opposition, was at peace with Granada and Morocco. The emir, Yūsuf I (1333–54), who was anxious to foster the prosperity of his realm, on 17 July 1350 agreed to a truce (including Morocco) running to 1 January 1357. Merchants on both sides were given security to buy and sell goods, except horses, arms, and wheat, and an exchange of captives was arranged. Pedro I also demanded tribute and, when required, the service of three hundred *jinetes* or light cavalry for three months. Although Yūsuf I was recorded as a vassal confirming Alfonso XI's last privileges, Pedro I's privileges do not list his name. López de Ayala remarked that the truce guaranteed the tranquility of the frontier except for about two months when Pedro I intruded into the Naşrid civil war.³

Despite the truce, Yūsuf I's attitude toward his Castilian neighbor was ambivalent. When Count Enrique, soon after his father's death, took refuge in Algeciras, Yūsuf I made no effort to assist him in using it as a base of opposition to Pedro I, whose forces were able to take possession. Like his father, Pedro I included Algeciras in the royal intitulation.⁴ The king soon required a reluctant Yūsuf I to send three hundred *jinetes* to help subdue the

rebel Alfonso Fernández Coronel in his fortress of Aguilar. Coronel's son-in-law, Juan de la Cerda, after unsuccessfully seeking help from the Naṣrids and Marinids, withdrew to Portugal before returning to Castile, where he renewed his allegiance. Appointed governor of El Puerto de Santa María, he executed the traitorous custodians of Algeciras who tried to sell it to the Marinids. Although Yūsuf I outwardly remained a faithful vassal, he privately expressed the hope that God would thwart Pedro I's attempt to suppress his other disloyal half-brother Fadrique.⁵

Meanwhile, civil war in Morocco attracted the attention of Pedro I and Yūsuf I. Though driven from the throne by his son Abū 'Inān Fāris (1348–58), the Marinid sultan Abū l-Ḥasan (1331–48) held on to the hope of regaining power until his death in 1351. Torn between them, Yūsuf I ultimately favored Abū 'Inān. However, when the latter's rebellious brothers, Abū Sālim and Abū l-Faḍl, fled to Granada, Yūsuf I refused to extradite them. Rather, he urged Abū l-Faḍl, the elder of the two, to seek Pedro I's protection. Hoping to "launch an arrow against the Muslims and to unsheathe a sabre for civil war," the king provided a ship to take him to Morocco, but he was captured and strangled in 1354. Abū 'Inān also executed the rebel governor of Gibraltar.⁶

That unrest likely prompted Pedro I to contemplate a Moroccan crusade. Soon after his accession, emissaries from 'Abd Allāh, the ruler of Montes Claros located south of the Atlas Mountains, who had previously informed Alfonso XI that he wished to become a Christian, exhorted Pedro I to intervene in Morocco. 'Abd Allāh, perhaps the son of the lord of Montes Claros who died during Abū l-Ḥasan's siege of Tarifa in 1340, may have been a Marinid prince hoping to make himself sultan with Castilian aid. Forwarding the Muslim's letters to Pope Innocent VI (1352–62) in 1354, Pedro I requested the concession of the crusading indulgence and appropriate financial assistance, as well as a banner as a sign of papal approval.⁷ However, nothing further was heard of this projected crusade. As Abū 'Inān consolidated his rule, the prospect of a successful Castilian incursion waned and Pedro I soon had to contend with other matters.

Although neither the Naṣrids nor the Marinids represented a significant danger, Pedro I's counselors, expressing concern that they might take advantage of his youth, urged him to marry so as to avert possible civil disorder should he die without a legitimate heir. That "would be a great danger for all of Christendom" because the Muslims might assault Castile. Acquiescing, in 1353 he married Blanche of Bourbon, a niece of the king of France, but two days later he abandoned her and returned to the arms of his lover, María de Padilla. Enrique of Trastámara and other nobles attempted to defend Blanche's rights, but soon had to take refuge in Aragón.⁸

Meanwhile, Yūsuf I was assassinated on 19 October 1354 and his sixteen-year-old son, Muḥammad V (1354–59, 1362–91), was acclaimed in his stead.⁹ Determined to remain at peace with his neighbors, he asked Pedro I to continue the truce and agreed to pay tribute, but he was not listed among

those confirming the king's privileges. Perhaps because the two men were near in age, they developed a close friendship.¹⁰ Indeed, Pedro I awarded him the Order of the Scarf or Band, an Order of Chivalry founded by Alfonso XI. The Order's shield appears on the blade of Muḥammad V's sword and also on the wall of the Cuarto de los Leones in the Alhambra. Demonstrating an affinity for Muslim culture, Pedro I employed Muslim workmen in constructing the *alcázar* of Seville in the Mudejar style between 1362 and 1364. His enemies later condemned him for his openness to Islamic cultural influences.¹¹

Muḥammad V also sought closer ties with Abū 'Inān of Morocco. Emphasizing the constant Christian menace, the Naṣrid envoy Ibn al-Khaṭīb pleaded with the sultan: "Deprived of your aid, the people of Spain will not keep their homes or their land. In a word, that country has only one desire: the protection of your majesty." The sultan responded positively and the tension that marked Yūsuf I's latter years seemed to dissipate. In time, however, new sources of friction arose.¹²

However, Muḥammad V's interaction with Pedro IV (1336–87) of Aragón was strained. After Yūsuf I's assassination, the king nullified his ten-year truce with Granada and Morocco. One source of difficulty was the activity of Catalan and Granadan corsairs in the Mediterranean. The emir protested, for example, that Christians from the Balearic Islands had captured Muslims and sold them as slaves in Valencia and elsewhere.¹³

The Castilian-Aragonese War

Intermittent hostilities between Granada and Aragón were soon absorbed in the broader quarrel between Castile and Aragón. Although the two kings ratified a treaty of alliance in 1352, Pedro I of Castile launched an offensive against Aragón in 1356.¹⁴ While Enrique of Trastámara joined Pedro IV of Aragón, Juan de la Cerda and Álvaro Pérez de Guzmán stirred up rebellion in Andalucía. When the municipal authorities of Seville executed Juan de la Cerda, Álvaro Pérez fled to Aragón.¹⁵

The Naṣrids and Marinids were also drawn into the conflict, but on opposite sides. As a faithful vassal, Muḥammad V provided Pedro I with three galleys and dispatched troops to harry the frontier between Murcia and Valencia. Conversely, Abū 'Inān of Morocco and Pedro IV agreed to collaborate against Castile in the Strait of Gibraltar. The sultan also urged Muḥammad V to cease paying tribute, but the emir, while acknowledging that payment was repugnant, asserted the importance of maintaining good relations with Castile. Irritated by that rebuff, Abū 'Inān complained that Muḥammad V failed to show proper deference by not congratulating him on his recent conquests in Africa. Moreover, according to Ibn Khaldūn, Abū 'Inān decided to invade Spain and make himself master of al-Andalus, as the Moors

called the peninsula.¹⁶

With that in mind, Abū 'Inān, in July 1357, concluded a five-year pact with Pedro IV, but, as the latter had reached a truce with Castile in May and also with Granada, he could only promise neutrality in a Moroccan war against either of them. However, he denounced Pedro I for launching an unjust war and allying himself “with Moorish kings and other persons quite contrary to our religion.” A month later, at the sultan’s request, Pedro IV extended the pact to ten years and granted a similar extension to Granada. Even though the Marinids controlled Gibraltar and Ronda, it was unlikely that the sultan would be able to expand his peninsular holdings. Admonishing Pedro IV for his alliance with the Marinids, Innocent VI queried: “What Catholic prince today would presume to treat of such matters with the infidels?” In reply, the king blamed Pedro I for aligning himself with the Naṣrids, who dispatched two thousand Saracens to invade the kingdom of Valencia. Charging Pedro I with having twice violated his pledge of alliance, he questioned whether any infidel ruler could be more faithless.¹⁷

Despite his truce with Aragón and the treaty between Morocco and Aragón, Pedro I attempted to induce Abū 'Inān to join an offensive against the lands of Pedro IV’s half-brother, Fernando, marquess of Tortosa. Pedro IV had always resented his stepmother, Leonor, a sister of Alfonso XI, and her efforts to aggrandize her son, Fernando. At the outset of the war Fernando sided with Castile, but, fearing for his life after Leonor and his brother Juan were executed by Pedro I, he renewed his allegiance to Pedro IV. As neither Fernando nor his lands in Murcia were included in the treaty between Morocco and Aragón, Pedro I argued that both the Marinids and Naṣrids could participate in an assault without violating the truce. Upholding the opposite view, Pedro IV emphasized that now that Fernando had returned to his service, the truce precluded the Moors from attacking him. He also complained that Muḥammad V failed to adhere to their truce.¹⁸ Abū 'Inān, realizing that if he invaded Granada, a Castilian fleet might cut off his communications with Morocco, soon abandoned his aspirations in the peninsula.

In 1359 a papal legate sent to arrange a truce between Castile and Aragón affirmed that the pope regarded Pedro I “as the shield and defender of Christendom because he maintained war against the Moors on both sides of the sea. For that reason his ancestors were always very much esteemed among the other kings of Christendom.” Nevertheless, the pope was distressed because the conflict with Aragón interrupted the struggle against “the Moors, enemies of the faith of Jesus Christ,” and could lead to great trouble for Christendom. Notwithstanding that plea, Pedro I did not abandon hostilities against Aragón. In order to counter him, Pedro IV vainly attempted to persuade the Naṣrids and Marinids to join an anti-Castilian coalition. Pedro I of Portugal (1357–67) also refused and, opting for a Castilian alliance, deployed ten galleys for service against Aragón. Utilizing those ships and three provided by Granada, Pedro I of Castile threatened Barcelona and then Ibiza in April 1359.¹⁹

Dynastic Upheavals in Morocco and Granada

Dynastic upheavals among the Marinids and Naṣrids altered their involvement in the war of the two Pedros. Abū 'Inān's death in December 1358 threw the Marinid realm into disarray, but by July 1359 his brother Abū Sālim Ibrāhīm (1359–61) had emerged as the new ruler. While exiled in Granada, he heard of his brother's death, but the Naṣrids would not permit him to cross the strait. He then persuaded Pedro I to provide him with a vessel to return to Morocco. Once in power, he exiled several opponents, including princes of the blood, sequestering them in Ronda. One of them, his nephew Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, escaped to Granada and then took refuge in the Castilian court, where he remained until he seized the Moroccan throne in 1361. On the pretext of shipping the exiles from Ronda to the East, Abū Sālim loaded them on a ship and had them thrown overboard. "Thus he was delivered from all his rivals. He remained the sole master of the empire. God's will rules events!" He quickly concluded an alliance with Muḥammad V.²⁰

Shortly after, Muḥammad V was overthrown by his half-brother, Ismā'il II (1359–60). Escaping to Guadix, he appealed to Pedro I for asylum, but the latter, needing troops for his Aragonese war and unimpeded passage along the Mediterranean coast, acknowledged the new emir. Abū Sālim, promising to restrain the deposed emir from attempting to regain his throne, brought him to Morocco. In exchange, Abū Sālim demanded that Ismā'il II imprison his potential opponents, namely, the Marinid princes living in Spain. Fearing Ismā'il II's wrath, the *shaykh al-ghuzāt* or commander of the Marinid volunteers in Naṣrid service fled to Castile. As Pedro I was unwilling or unable to assist him, he appealed to Abū Sālim, who allowed him to use Ronda as a base for opposing Ismā'il II.²¹

An ineffectual ruler, Ismā'il II reigned for less than six months before he was assassinated in June 1360 through the machinations of his cousin, Muḥammad VI (1360–62), known to the Castilians as "el Rey Bermejo"—"the Red King," so-called because of his red hair. After describing the beheading of Ismā'il II and his younger brother, whose naked bodies, covered only with rags, were exposed to the crowd, Ibn al-Khaṭīb remarked: "What happened to them offers much matter for meditation."²² El Rey Bermejo's first act was to align himself with Pedro IV but he would not side with Aragón against Castile. Although he refused to pay tribute to Pedro I, he decided to establish friendly relations with him, lest he assist Muḥammad V in reclaiming his throne. Still at war with Aragón, the king accepted a truce, but in the long run regarded Muḥammad VI as an enemy. Concluding that he could not carry on a war on two fronts and leave Andalucía exposed to Naṣrid attacks, Pedro I reluctantly made peace with Aragón in May 1361. Nevertheless, Pedro IV assured Muḥammad VI of his continued friendship.²³

Pedro I and the Restoration of Muḥammad V

The cessation of hostilities with Aragón enabled Pedro I to intervene in the Naṣrid civil war and to undertake his first campaign against the Moors, but he apparently did not ask the pope to declare a crusade. Blaming el Rey Bermejo for forcing him to make peace with Aragón, he appealed to Abū Sālīm to allow Muḥammad V to return to Spain. Though the sultan initially refused, he relented and ceded Ronda to Muḥammad V to enable him to recover Granada. Pedro I provided 30,000 dinars as financial assistance. In the late summer of 1361 the king reminded his Aragonese namesake of his obligation, according to their recently concluded pact, to provide six galleys for service against the Moors. As an excuse for not doing so, Pedro IV declared that he understood that Castile and Granada were at peace. Denying that, Pedro I announced his intention to invade Granada in September. Nevertheless, Pedro IV delayed compliance lest he be drawn into the war.²⁴

With six thousand knights and *jinetes* from Andalucía, Pedro I planned his assault on Granada in conjunction with Muḥammad V, who had four hundred knights. After an unsuccessful attempt to seize Antequera northeast of Ronda, the king withdrew, but his troops joined Muḥammad V in a foray into the plain of Granada. A few miles south of Moclín, they encountered el Rey Bermejo's cavalry and drove them southward toward the capital, but none of the Moors went over to Muḥammad V as he expected. Toward the end of the year, Diego García de Padilla, master of the Military Order of Calatrava, and Enrique Enríquez, *adelantado mayor de la frontera* or governor of the frontier, wiped out a force of six hundred Moorish knights and two thousand infantry near Huesa south of Quesada. Pleased by this news, Pedro I, promising to pay 300 *maravedíes* for each prisoner, asked that they be surrendered to him, but his failure to pay angered his troops, who expected to profit by selling the captives into slavery or holding them for ransom.²⁵

In January 1362, the master and the *adelantado*, with one thousand horse and two thousand foot, advanced toward Guadix. Giving the impression that it was undefended, six hundred Moorish knights and four thousand infantry remained quiet behind the walls. Nevertheless, the Castilians, still smarting because the king had taken their prisoners without payment, were loath to attack because the omens were unfavorable. López de Ayala remarked that the local military people were customarily guided by such signs and to act against them was foolish. When the Castilians divided their forces by sending a raiding party to a nearby valley, the Moors attacked and captured the master and many knights. Expecting to persuade Pedro I to abandon Muḥammad V, el Rey Bermejo decided to release the master, the brother of the king's mistress. However, the king, believing that the master's ineffective generalship led to the defeat at Guadix, was not mollified and seized Iznajar, Cesna, Zagra, and Benamejí northwest of Granada.²⁶

Just as French and English knights had joined Alfonso XI in the siege of Algeciras, so too Pedro I received reinforcements from abroad. Among them were Jean I, count of Armagnac, the Englishman Hugh de Calveley, and the Aragonese noble Pedro de Exérica. When el Rey Bermejo protested, Pedro IV explained that Aragonese nobles could serve other monarchs if they wished and Pedro de Exérica was not in his pay. However that may be, Pedro de Exérica died shortly thereafter but left his troops to serve Pedro I. The count of Armagnac and Hugh de Calveley probably served only briefly as Muḥammad VI was soon deprived of his life and kingdom.²⁷

As the Naṣrids lacked a fleet and Pedro I had sufficient galleys of his own, he asked Pedro IV for six hundred knights instead of six galleys for three months' service. Reluctant to comply, Pedro IV noted that both kings were mutually required to accept the friends or enemies of the other. Whereas Pedro I supported Muḥammad V and Pedro IV was allied with el Rey Bermejo, Pedro IV argued that, until he broke with the latter, he was not obliged to send troops to Castile. Nevertheless, he decided to do so in the expectation that so long as Pedro I was preoccupied with Granada he would not attack Aragón. Before their arrival, however, Pedro I announced that he had made peace with Granada, though that proved to be short-lived.²⁸

In the interim, Muḥammad V, based in Ronda, occupied Málaga and was acknowledged by several other important places. Resuming his campaign, Pedro I seized El Burgo, Cañete, Ardales, Las Cuevas, Turón, and other castles in the vicinity of Antequera. El Rey Bermejo, fearful of growing unrest among his people who murmured that Granada would soon be lost, appealed to Pedro I for mercy on 13 March 1362. As he was a good knight who could do good service, he hoped that the king would accept him and reject Muḥammad V. Collecting a large quantity of jewels, he made his way with three knights and two hundred foot to Seville, where the king received him. A Moorish interpreter, affirming that the Naṣrids had always been Castilian vassals paying tribute, implied that el Rey Bermejo was prepared to accept that status. Yet, should the king decide in favor of Muḥammad V, el Rey Bermejo asked to be transported overseas. When Pedro I expressed his pleasure at being asked to resolve the issue, the elated Moors bowed their heads, saying "May God sustain you." As the king's guests, they were lodged in the Jewish quarter adjacent to the *alcázar*.²⁹

Commenting that "avarice is the root of all the evils in the world," López de Ayala observed that Muḥammad VI's rich jewels and precious stones attracted Pedro I's attention. Rather perversely, the king also noted that his visitor had not received a safe-conduct, though ordinarily everyone in the royal court enjoyed the king's protection. He invited Muḥammad VI and fifty companions to a banquet, and arrested them when they finished their meal. The Moors remaining in the Jewish quarter were also arrested and their treasures were brought to the king. The prisoners were lodged that night in the *atarazana* or shipyard.

Two days later, the king had them taken to Tablada, a great field outside the city. El Rey Bermejo, dressed in scarlet, was mounted on an ass. Striking him with his lance, Pedro I cried out, “Take that, because of your evil pact with the king of Aragón and for the loss of the castle of Ariza!” As he fell to the ground Muḥammad VI lamented: “O, how little chivalry you display!” Thirty-seven of his followers were also killed. About three hundred other Moors were imprisoned. The royal herald cried out: “Our lord the king orders this justice to be done to these traitors, who took part in the death of King Ismā‘īl, their king and lord.” Although Pedro I justified the execution on the grounds that el Rey Bermejo and his companions had rebelled against their legitimate ruler, López de Ayala emphasized that the real reason was Pedro I’s desire to seize their riches. He added that “everyone thought this was not right and wished that the king had not done that.”³⁰

Ibn al-Khaṭīb remarked that Muḥammad VI had come “to the strange resolution of throwing himself on the mercy” of Pedro I, but “might just as well have thrown himself into the mouth of a hungry tiger thirsting for blood.” As soon as “the infidel dog cast his eye over the countless treasures” that Muḥammad VI had brought with him, he decided to murder him. The execution took place on 27 April 1362. Ibn Khaldūn explained that in killing Muḥammad VI, Pedro I intended to demonstrate his esteem for Muḥammad V, whom he had placed under his protection.³¹

While el Rey Bermejo was still in Pedro I’s custody, Muḥammad V made his triumphal entry into Granada on 16 April and thus entered on the second and longest phase of his reign (1362–91). In a gruesome gesture, Pedro I sent him the heads of el Rey Bermejo and the other Moors. Still draining blood, they were affixed on the walls as a visual lesson to spectators. In exchange for this barbarous gift, Muḥammad V released some of the captives taken in the battle of Guadix. Restored to power, he determined to maintain peace with his Christian neighbors and thwart any Marinid intrusion into the peninsula. Concluding that the *shaykh al-ghuzāt* and Marinid warrior volunteers were untrustworthy, he expelled them.³²

The Castilian Civil War

Grateful for Pedro I’s assistance, Muḥammad V provided six hundred knights to support his invasion of Aragón in July. As a countermeasure, Pedro IV, offering troops and ten galleys at a monthly cost of 1,000 *doblas*, proposed an alliance with the Naṣrids and Marinids, but to no avail.³³ Despite that rebuff, he formed a coalition with Pope Urban V (1362–70) and Charles V of France and backed Enrique of Trastámara’s effort to drive Pedro I from his throne.

Muḥammad V, worried lest the coalition undertake a crusade to destroy his realm, tried to assure the unity of his people by offering amnesty to those who

had rebelled against him or protested the imposition of a special tax for “the holy war against the infidels.” In the fall of 1365, on his behalf, Ibn al-Khaṭīb described the potential threat to Granada. He declared that the “chief of the Christians whom they obey docilely”—an apparent reference to the pope—launched armies against Islam and apportioned among them lands and cities, women and children “of this small, pilgrim nation,” which is like “a morsel in the throats of the infidels.” Determined to defend his realm against a swarm of locusts, he called on God’s help and announced that the Marinids had promised their support.³⁴

In a proclamation read by preachers in all the mosques, the emir acknowledged that his people had followed him “in the path of God when we have unsheathed our swords, [when we] have bent down to drink the cup of death in the holy war, and have vowed our souls to God.” In the manner of Christians preaching the crusade, he exhorted them to “turn way from Satan and move toward God” and to give alms “on the path of God” in order to earn a double return. “Fulfill the vow to God that you have promised!” “By merely taking arms,” he cried, “one comes close to God!” He reminded his hearers that even though the country was at peace, it was like “a city under siege facing the mane of a fierce lion.” The enemy beyond the walls controlled the gate and no one could say when peace would end and bloodshed begin. Recalling the fundamental precepts of Islam, namely, belief in God, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage, and holy war, he emphasized that warriors residing in monasteries were dedicated to the defense of the frontiers and the holy war. Indeed, Granada was “the dwelling place of the holy war.” Thus, Muḥammad V, hoping to achieve significant gains for his realm, proclaimed the *jihād* or holy war against Enrique of Trastámara and his allies. The Marinid sultan, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz I (1366–72), summoned the Moroccan tribes to the holy war and Abū Hammū Mūsā II, sultan of Tlemcen (1359–89), supplied gold, silver, horses, shiploads of wheat, and soldiers for the defense of Islamic Spain.³⁵

Early in 1366 Enrique invaded Castile and was proclaimed as king. Supported by French mercenaries commanded by Bertrand du Guesclin, he overran much of Castile, forcing Pedro I to flee to Seville. Rumor had it that when “everyone else abandoned him the Moors would not do so, especially King Muḥammad of Granada, whom he had helped to regain his kingdom.” In a move calculated to frighten the citizenry and turn them against the deposed king, his opponents reported that “the Moors were coming and that the king intended to allow them to enter the city.” Rather than linger in Seville, Pedro I fled to Portugal and made his way to Gascony, where he arranged an alliance with Edward, Prince of Wales, the Black Prince.³⁶

The uncertainty of the situation led Muḥammad V in March 1367 to sign a pact with Pedro IV stipulating that neither one would assist Pedro I and renewing previous arrangements concerning free trade. Although the emir assured the frontier towns that his truce with Pedro I would continue, after Count Enrique occupied Seville in May, he repossessed Iznajar (which Pedro I

had seized earlier), and plundered Utrera southeast of Seville. However, as Pedro I seemed to have been expelled from the throne, the emir, resolved to preserve his kingdom, declared his vassalage to Enrique and concluded a truce on 31 May.³⁷ Pedro I, however, was not yet finished. Together with the Black Prince, he returned to Castile and defeated Enrique at Nájera on 13 April 1367. While Enrique fled, Du Guesclin was captured and eventually ransomed. However, the Black Prince, falling ill, and realizing that Pedro I could not pay him, withdrew to Gascony, leaving the king to his own devices.³⁸

A Wise Moor's Counsel to Pedro I

In the euphoria after the battle, López de Ayala tells us that Pedro I wrote to “a Moor of Granada, in whom he trusted, and who was his friend, a great wise man, a great philosopher and counselor of the king of Granada, whose name was Benahatin.” Only a few historians have attempted to identify the Moor or commented on his lengthy response. López de Ayala also included a second letter from Benahatin that will be discussed later. Constance Lee Wilkins and Heanon Monroe Wilkins saw these letters as an example of López de Ayala's moralizing tendency and declared that Benahatin was a fictitious person. Nevertheless, López de Ayala's description seems to fit a great man of the age, Ibn al-Khaṭīb, historian, poet, physician, and counselor to Muḥammad V. If the final n of Benahatin is changed to b, Benahatib could easily be read as Ibn al-Khaṭīb. Michel García cited a passage in Ibn al-Khaṭīb's history of Granada in which he stated that, with his monarch's consent, he wrote to the Christian king, then in difficulty. Advising him not to trust those around him and to be wary of traps set for him by his brother, he suggested that he select a secure place of refuge for his family and his treasure. Pedro I took his advice and opted for Carmona, a few miles east of Seville.³⁹

The text of the two letters provided by López de Ayala differs from that found in Ms Esp. 216 in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. José Luis Moure argued that someone, perhaps a Jew, who was not entirely proficient in the Castilian language, translated the letters from Arabic. Moure also edited a fourteenth-century version from Ms 9428 in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid that is older than the texts in López de Ayala's *Chronicle* and Ms Esp. 216. He concluded that López de Ayala used both texts but may have altered them to suit his purpose.⁴⁰

In López de Ayala's account, the Moor, after a courteous introduction extolling the king and calling down God's blessing upon him, stressed his own inability, due to other activities and his lack of talent, to satisfy the ruler's request that he comment on his “great affairs.” Arguing, nevertheless, that one might regain one's health if one took the proper medicine, even though it might be bitter and distasteful, he discussed certain issues that resulted in the

king's recent difficulties. Pedro I was faced with two problems: his government and the presence of foreign troops in his kingdom. Although his people acted shamefully toward him, the Moor advised him, now that God had come to his aid, to act toward them in a manner that would not cause them to hate him as before. "Give the people a taste of the bread of peace and tranquility," he counseled. By guaranteeing the security of their property, their towns, and their children, and by honoring the great families, he would recover their good will. If he were seen to act uprightly and to repair what had been destroyed, his people would forget their past grievances. He, in turn, should be prepared to forget their errors and be grateful to those who do him well so that they will continue to serve him.

The Moor then cited several instances in which the king brought harm to himself. If he holds his people in low regard, which is "clear madness," and humiliates them, they will curse him and act in a hostile manner. By seeking to accumulate wealth, he will incur their anger. He should think of himself as a shepherd whose task is to seek the best water and pasturage for his flock and guard them against enemies such as wolves. Should he persist in following his own will, he will inflict injury on himself. If he does not know how to control his own will, he will not be able to overcome his enemy. A king, who is God's lieutenant on earth, ought to conduct himself like "the God whom wise men among the Christians say assumed flesh and the figure of a man in order to save them." The Moor also reminded the king that fornication could bring disaster down on his head, as it did "when Count Julian brought the Moors into Andalucía on account of what the king did to his daughter." Here the Moor was likely referring to Pedro I's numerous love affairs and his harsh treatment of Blanche of Bourbon. The Moors were aware of the legend of the treachery of the last Visigothic king, Rodrigo, who had violated Count Julian's daughter, thereby precipitating the Muslim invasion in 711.

The king also errs by scorning the men of law and the law itself. The law is true and the king is its servant and guardian. If he disdains the law, his people will hate him and will not trust his sworn oath. When that happens it becomes impossible for him to govern. His cruelty will cause his people to flee before him as sheep flee before wolves. By introducing foreign troops he brought great destruction to the realm and aroused the enmity of the people. Taking note of Pedro I's alliance with Granada, the Moor asserted that anyone who wished to attack him would be overcome with God's help. Indeed, God had established a great friendship and affection between the two kings, comparable to that between brothers and family members. "Thank God for that and keep it and that great friendship." In conclusion, the Moor asked the king's pardon for the deficiency of his response and for anything he may have said that the king might find repugnant. Wishing him well, he asked God to bless him. López de Ayala commented that Pedro I was pleased with this letter, but failed to follow the Moor's counsel, and thus brought great harm to himself.⁴¹

The letter reflects contemporary ideas of government, dependence upon

God, and the importance of following the law and ruling with justice. Obviously the Moor was aware of Pedro I's failings and the charges leveled against him and he tried, with all due courtesy, to encourage him to change his ways for the better.

Pedro I and Muḥammad V

After his triumph at Nájera, Pedro I travelled to Seville in June 1367, while Enrique fled to France. Ever attentive to the changing political winds, Muḥammad V abandoned the count and threw his support to Pedro I. However, when the king, suspecting the loyalty of Martín López de Córdoba, master of Calatrava, ordered his execution, Muḥammad V, who liked the master, demanded his release. Despite his annoyance, Pedro I, deciding that it would be unwise to alienate his Naṣrid ally, set him at liberty.⁴²

In the late summer Enrique of Trastámara, pressing his claim to the throne, returned to Castile. When Córdoba recognized him, Pedro I announced that, assisted by three thousand Moorish knights, he would attack the city. Although López de Ayala reported that Muḥammad V had seven thousand knights, eighty thousand foot, and twelve thousand *ballesteros* or crossbowmen, those figures have to be heavily discounted. The Moors seized the castle of La Calahorra on the Guadalquivir River opposite the city and broke into the old *alcázar*, but were soon ejected. According to López de Ayala, the defenders so angered the king that he would have been pleased if the Moors had destroyed the city. Muḥammad V, who recognized that the cathedral of Córdoba was the "head of all their law" because that "most beautiful church was once a mosque," reported that heavy rains compelled them to withdraw.⁴³

While the king returned to Seville, Muḥammad V, seeing this as "an excellent opportunity to undertake the holy war," attacked Jaén, compelling the Castilians to take refuge in the *alcázar*. Lacking sufficient provisions, the defenders gave him money and hostages to secure his departure. Burning the city and razing a good part of its walls, the Moors withdrew, but carried off three hundred Jewish families, who were sold into slavery. Although López de Ayala related that Pedro I and Muḥammad V attacked Córdoba again without success that seems unlikely. After sacking Jaén, the emir seized Priego and plundered Úbeda and Baeza, but he could not take Andújar. The ballad, "Cercada tiene a Baeza," describing the siege of Baeza by Muḥammad V and "the traitor, Pero Gil" (a name used by the Trastámara faction to impugn Pedro I's legitimacy), probably relates to this time. Enrique II later offered compensation for the damage inflicted by "the traitor, heretic, and tyrant, Pedro Gil, [who] caused the destruction of the city of Úbeda with the Moors, who entered and burned and destroyed it entirely and killed many of its citizens." Muḥammad V also occupied Marchena and Utrera near Seville; in

Utrera alone one thousand men, women, and children were seized.⁴⁴

Late in the year Pedro I, noting that the emir had sent three thousand knights to his service, indicated that he intended to attack Córdoba again and once it was taken to carry the war to Count Enrique. As he advanced to Toledo, he urged Muḥammad V to join him in assaulting the city.⁴⁵

The Wise Moor Offers Additional Counsel

While preparing to do so, Pedro I received another undated letter from the wise Moor. Describing himself as “your servant, Benahatin, a minor philosopher, of the council of the king of Granada, your friend,” he again emphasized his limitations and commented that his service might not always honor the king, who had asked for his counsel concerning the following prophecy of Merlin.⁴⁶ A black bird, born in the western regions between the mountains and the sea, would devour all the food and gold in the world. After gorging itself, the bird would vomit and become ill; losing its wings as its feathers withered in the sun, it would go from door to door, but no one would receive it. At last, shut up in the forest, it would die twice, once to the world and again to God. After scrutinizing the text and consulting other wise men, the Moor concluded that the black bird was the king himself, who, contrary to law, allegedly had seized the goods of both his own people and foreigners. Although his people had enjoyed a good life during his father’s reign, and even in his own early years, the king gravely injured them through much shedding of blood, executions, and other untold grievances. The king’s inordinate avarice was such that people regarded him as the greediest king who ever ruled Castile. The Moor interpreted the bird’s loss of plumage as the rejection of the king by the magnates. If he had to flee from place to place because his people did not wish to receive him that was because he had always striven to make himself feared rather than loved. He could not even rely on the loyalty of Seville, where he had taken refuge. From his study of history, the Moor discovered that the forest or *selua* where the bird took refuge was the castle of Silva near Alcaraz, now known as Montiel. There the double death of which the prophecy spoke would occur. Proclaiming that only God knows the truth, the Moor excused himself for his boldness in attempting to interpret the prophecy as the king requested.

Is this another moralizing interlude by Pedro López de Ayala, or an authentic letter written by Ibn al-Khaṭīb? In the passage discussing the king’s pursuit of gold, the Moor, according to one reading, asserted that Pedro I had the reputation of being the greediest king ever “here in Castile.” Another reading simply says “in Castile.” That seems an anomaly if the author were living in Granada as the letter affirms. If, as López de Ayala mentioned, the Moor wrote his letter before the final denouement at Montiel, the

identification of the forest with the castle of Silva or Montiel seems like a great coincidence. Perhaps López de Ayala, with the benefit of hindsight, elaborated Ibn al-Khaṭīb's original text.

The End of Pedro I

In August 1368 Pedro IV concluded a truce with Castile, but Enrique of Trastámara, after assembling a new army, invaded Castile in September and was acknowledged as king by the Cortes of Burgos. As many towns offered their allegiance, he marched southward while Pedro I beat a retreat to Seville. However, with fifteen hundred knights provided by Muḥammad V, Pedro I advanced northward to a fatal encounter with his brother at Montiel, a fortress belonging to the Order of Santiago. In a pitched battle on 14 March 1369 Pedro I was roundly defeated but escaped to the temporary security of the fortress. Hoping to make his escape, he attempted to bribe Bertrand du Guesclin, who informed Enrique. Meeting in Du Guesclin's tent, the two brothers quarreled. Enrique struck Pedro I with his dagger and they fell to the ground wrestling. Enrique struck him again and again until he died on 23 March.⁴⁷ The ballad "Encima del duro suelo" described the elation of many at the news that Enrique had "rid this world of such a cruel tyrant." "No one weeps for him, no one mourns for him."⁴⁸

During his long reign Pedro I maintained amicable relations with Muḥammad V, counting him as an ally in his wars against Aragón, and intervening on his behalf when he was briefly deprived of his throne. At the same time, the emir, while presenting himself as a loyal vassal, used the civil war between the king and his half-brother to seize castles and fortresses won at great cost by Castile earlier in the fourteenth century. Moreover, Pedro I, at the very end of his reign, relied heavily on the emir in an unsuccessful attempt to recover Córdoba from Enrique. The principal beneficiary of Pedro I's policy was Muḥammad V, whose position was strengthened and whose frontiers were largely pushed back to where they had been before the reign of Alfonso XI. The Castilian frontier, rather than being advanced by the acquisition of new territory from the Moors, receded. In summarizing Pedro I's contribution to the reconquest, one must conclude that it was entirely negative.

Chapter 2

The Early Trastámaras: An Era of Peace

In the nearly forty years following the death of Pedro I, the kings of the Trastámara dynasty maintained peace with Granada. Consolidation of their hold on the throne and the annexation of Portugal took precedence over the crusade against the Moors. The division of Christian Europe caused by the Great Western Schism resulted in the anomaly of crusades directed by rival popes against Castile and Portugal. For most of that epoch Muḥammad V reigned in Granada, bringing peace and prosperity to his people. As the fourteenth century drew to a close and a new Naṣrid monarch was proclaimed, hostilities between Granada and Castile erupted again.

The Naṣrid Recovery of Algeciras

After killing Pedro I, Enrique II (1369–79) had to suppress remnants of domestic opposition and secure his throne against a hostile coalition of his neighbors.¹ Ostensibly in support of the last band of *petristas*, the murdered king's followers, Muḥammad V recovered castles taken during Fernando IV's minority and Pedro I's war against el Rey Bermejo.²

As a friend of Pedro I, the emir refused to acknowledge Enrique II and formed an alliance with Fernando I of Portugal (1367–83). Each monarch would retain whatever towns he acquired and would have to pay the wages of troops imported from Morocco or elsewhere. A clause foreshadowing the destruction of Algeciras stipulated that if the emir demolished any conquered town that would not violate the pact. Although Fernão Lopes stated the term of the treaty as fifty years, it was probably five.³ While negotiating with Portugal, Muḥammad V, on 17 November, arranged a five-year alliance with Pedro IV of Aragón and the Marinid 'Abd al-'Azīz I.⁴

Taking advantage of Enrique II's absence from the frontier, "the true believers" planned to recapture Algeciras. The Marinid sultan, faced with rebellion, could not personally intervene but promised to provide a fleet and

pay Muḥammad V's army. "He added," related Ibn Khaldūn, "that he wished to reserve for himself the spiritual merits of such a holy enterprise." Blockaded by Marinid ships and surrounded by Naṣrid troops on 29 July 1369, Algeciras surrendered on 1 August. The victors thus "replaced the doctrines of infidelity and idolatry with the emblems and rites of Islam and God compensated those who labored with a sincere heart to bring about that good action." López de Ayala insisted that the loss of Algeciras, whose conquest had cost Alfonso XI so much time and treasure, weighed heavily on Enrique II, who could do little about it. Lest the Castilians attempt to regain possession, Muḥammad V ordered Algeciras destroyed between 780 and 790 A.H. or 1378–88. When that was done it seemed "as if the town had never been inhabited." The destruction of Algeciras also deprived the Marinids of a potential landing place in the peninsula.⁵

Peace Between Castile and Granada

Those events distressed Pope Urban V, who lamented that the Moors, observing the dissension among the Christians, had seized Algeciras, killed the faithful without regard to age or sex, and profaned holy places. Acknowledging that Enrique II intended to oppose them, the pope declared that Enrique II would be more effective if, for the good of Christendom, he settled his differences with his Christian neighbors.⁶

In April 1370 Enrique II announced his intention to spend the summer on the frontier "to conquer the Moors and to inflict every injury and destruction on them . . . so that they will be very sorry for this madness that they have begun." Although he knew that Pedro IV had signed a five-year accord with the Marinids and Naṣrids, he hoped to disrupt it.⁷ While he was en route to Seville, however, the masters of Santiago and Calatrava, on 31 May, arranged an eight-year truce with Muḥammad V and the Marinids. The settlement enabled the king to crush internal dissent and make peace with the adjacent Christian realms, but he was not yet in the ascendancy, as the pact, according to the Egyptian al-Qalqashandī, did not require Muḥammad V to pay tribute.⁸ Thereafter, despite occasional friction, Castile and Granada enjoyed an extended era of concord, perhaps the longest in the history of the Naṣrid dynasty.

Nevertheless, Enrique II was frequently reminded of the perils of the frontier and the ever present ideal of reconquest. His will of 1374 did not refer to the war against the Moors, but it did provide for the ransom of one hundred captive Christian women under forty years of age.⁹ In the next year, however, he informed Pope Gregory XI (1370–78) that, as soon as he was at peace with his Christian neighbors, he would wage war against "the enemies of the cross." The pope assured him of his support.¹⁰

In 1378 the truce with Granada was extended for two years. Muḥammad V, without identifying himself as a vassal or mentioning tribute, sent 5,000 gold *doblas* in three yearly installments, apparently as a gift, to Enrique II, whom he referred to as “our friend.” Desirous of preserving the peace, he reached an accommodation concerning livestock recently plundered and, in order to avert reprisals, proposed that representatives of both sides resolve this issue. The “adelantado del reyno de Murcia entre los moros e los christianos” mediated such matters on the Murcian frontier.¹¹

Muḥammad V’s relations with Aragón were generally peaceful, despite occasional incidents. A new five-year treaty signed in May 1377 repeated earlier clauses concerning prisoner exchange, security for merchants, and the right of Mudejars (Muslims living in Aragón) to settle in Muslim countries. Muḥammad V pledged to provide four hundred or five hundred knights for Aragonese service, with the restriction that they would not be employed against his allies. Each knight would receive a monthly wage of 7 gold dinars, while the commander would earn 40. Pedro IV promised to supply Granada with four or five ships at a monthly cost of 900 dinars per vessel. The treaty was renewed with the same clauses in 1382 and again in 1386. When Pedro IV died in 1387 his son Juan I (1387–96) indicated his intention to live in harmony with Muḥammad V’s successor, Yūsuf II.¹²

Enrique II died on 30 May 1379 at the early age of forty-six. It was reported that a gift of poisoned boots and jewels sent by a Moorish commander had caused his death. The *Crónica abreviada* attributed to López de Ayala remarked that many mourned his death because, now that he was at peace with his neighbors, he had intended, “if he lived, to arm a great fleet to take the sea of the Strait of Granada” so that the Marinids would be unable to aid the Naṣrids. He also had planned to organize three military divisions (*quadrillas*), one under his command consisting of 3,000 lances, 500 *jinetes*, and 10,000 infantry; his two sons would each command 2,000 lances, 1,000 *jinetes*, and 10,000 infantry. Every quarter of every year from bases at Seville and Córdoba he planned to plunder Granada, avoiding long sieges. Within two or three years he expected that the Naṣrids, reduced to starvation, would sue for peace.¹³

That ambitious plan probably represented the thinking of military men who remembered Alfonso XI’s nearly two-year siege of Algeciras some thirty-five years before. The high cost of maintaining an army of 39,500 men and an armada over several years could only be met by extraordinary taxation that would likely evoke popular protest. Earlier in the century military men had argued that a campaign of pillage was preferable to the more arduous task of besieging fortresses that might drag on for months and even years. Whether such a strategy would compel the Moors to open the gates of their cities and towns to the Castilians, however, is questionable.

Crusades Against Schismatic Rulers

Despite the recently concluded truce, the king's death touched off aggressive activity along the frontier, but Enrique II's son Juan I (1379–90) was unprepared for war with Granada.¹⁴ The rumor that the Marinid sultan and another overseas king, perhaps the emir of Tlemcen, had landed at Málaga with forty thousand knights and countless foot soldiers encouraged him to arrange a four-year truce with Granada, Morocco, and Tlemcen on 31 August 1379. It was renewed for another four years on 15 September 1382 and then to the end of the reigns of Juan I and Muḥammad V.¹⁵

The truce enabled Juan I to concentrate on winning the Portuguese throne. As the schism disrupted the unity of Western Christendom, the Roman pontiff Urban VI (1378–89) declared a crusade against Juan I, while the Avignon pope Clement VII (1378–94) launched a crusade against João I (1385–1433), the newly proclaimed king of Portugal. Urban VI entrusted the leadership of his crusade to John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, who claimed the Castilian throne in the name of his wife, the eldest daughter of Pedro I. Such papal actions fostered a cynicism that undercut whatever sentiments the faithful might have had to participate in the ongoing struggle against Islam. José Goñi Gaztambide remarked: “Thus the crusade and the anti-crusade were employed in a purely dynastic struggle.”¹⁶

Deploring the discord caused by the schism, Pedro López de Ayala commented that “the Moors and Jews are laughing at this conflict and saying among themselves: ‘See what fiction these Christians believe and how well they order their affairs. May God protect them! They tell us every day that we should convert to their holy religion and that we should adore it; but they take care that we not see how they observe it. So we know that we have something better.’”¹⁷

When the two kings met at Aljubarrota in August 1385 all the trappings of crusading warfare were evident. Crusaders wearing the sign of the cross on their breasts received absolution for their sins before engaging in battle. João I's triumph solidified Portuguese independence and encouraged John of Gaunt to invade Castile. In the Cortes of Segovia in 1386 Juan I accused him of offering Muḥammad V a portion of the realm in return for his support. The possibility that the emir would succumb to the blandishments of “wicked persons” and attack his kingdom obviously worried Juan I. Ironically, in Aragón it was believed that John of Gaunt was preparing a crusade against Granada.¹⁸ In 1388, however, Juan I and John of Gaunt yielded their respective claims to Portugal and Castile. The marriage of John's daughter Catherine (Catalina de Lancaster) and Juan I's son Enrique unified the descendants of Pedro I and Enrique II.¹⁹

Persistence of the Crusading Ideal

These dynastic crusades diverted the Christian kings from the age-old battle against Islam. From time to time, however, some recalled the earlier ideal of expelling the Moors. López de Ayala castigated contemporary knights who saw warfare as a means of enriching themselves through plunder: “they have forgotten to make war on the Moors because they find enough to eat in other lands. . . . While the Christians have their wars, the Moors are rejoicing.” Despite his lament, there are a few indications that the war against the Moors was not entirely forgotten. In 1386, for example, Clement VII authorized a crusade for three years to defend the Order of Santiago’s castles.²⁰ Similarly, Alfonso Fernández Barrantes, who had spent many years fighting the Moors, bequeathed 100 *maravedíes* for the crusade.²¹

Though distracted by his Portuguese ambitions, Juan I expressed interest in the fate of the crusader kingdoms in the East. In 1380 he ransomed Leo V (1374–75), king of Armenia, one of the crusading states, who had been dethroned by the Mamlūks of Egypt. In May 1383 the king received Leo V at Badajoz and granted him lordship of Madrid, Villarreal, and Andújar, and an annual pension of 150,000 *maravedíes*. During the Cortes of Segovia, the procurators of Madrid pledged homage to him but also obtained royal assurance that the lordship was limited to Leo V’s lifetime. Two years later Leo V withdrew to France, where he died in 1393.²²

Also at Badajoz were Mamlūk ambassadors, who presented two letters, one from the sultan (29 September 1382) and the other from his vizier; López de Ayala included translations of both in his *Chronicle*. In grandiloquent language the sultan identified himself as Abulanayche Hagi, “king of the Muslim world and of the Moors,” as well as “king of believers,” “defender of the faith,” and “lord of kings and emperors.” More than likely, he was Sālīḥ Sālāḥ al-dīn Hajjī (1376–82), who would soon be overthrown. After an elaborate salutation of Juan I, “defender of Christendom,” he thanked him for his gifts and announced Leo V’s liberation.²³ Juan I’s involvement in eastern affairs was apparently limited to this instance, but Castile was becoming increasingly aware of major changes occurring there and their possible impact on the Byzantine Empire and western Europe.

As his Portuguese aspirations faded, the king remembered the task of reconquest. In 1384, Clement VII had authorized him to appoint the masters of the Military Orders of Calatrava, Santiago, and Alcántara, whenever they fell vacant. In effect, that would give him immediate control over their military and economic resources. Although he was unable to benefit from that concession, it enabled his successors to dominate the Orders in a way previously unheard of. Four years later the pope sanctioned Juan I’s plan to create the Military Order of St. Bartholomew, based at Tarifa, “to defend your realms and the Christian people against the incursions of the infidels.” As the

king was born on the feast of St. Bartholomew (24 August), he placed his new Order under the saint's patronage. His concern to guard the Strait of Gibraltar may have been prompted by rumblings of a possible assault by the Naṣrids or the Marinids. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the proposed Order ever came into existence.²⁴

Juan I's plan perhaps was linked to an even more audacious idea. Still hopeful of wearing the Portuguese crown, during the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390 he proposed to surrender the kingdom of Castile to his son, Enrique, with significant exceptions. Taking the title king of Portugal, he would also retain Seville, Córdoba, Jaén, the kingdom of Murcia, and the lordship of Vizcaya. In addition, he would collect the *tercias* or portion of the tithe used to finance the crusade. Reacting in horror, his counselors recited the many disasters resulting from earlier attempts to partition the realm. They also stressed that Seville and other frontier cities would never agree to be severed from the Crown of Castile and would not obey him if he entitled himself king of Portugal. Furthermore, they argued that "if the Moors should wage war against you, you would not be able to sustain it," especially as needed ships would have to come from Castile. "That the Moors should have such a great advantage over you would result in a great loss for Christendom." With that, the king abandoned the idea. The threat of war was removed, however, when Muḥammad V's envoys appeared at the Cortes to solicit a renewal of the truce.²⁵

During the Cortes, in response to the prelates who complained that laymen were seizing the tithe, the knights asserted that that custom had arisen when their ancestors, taking refuge in mountain fastnesses, first opposed the Moors and required everyone to pay a tithe. As there were no churches there at that time, the money was used to expel the Moors. Neither the pope nor any prelate had previously objected. Ruling in favor of the knights, Juan I ordered the prelates not to bring up the subject again.²⁶

Soon afterward at Alcalá de Henares, he received a company of fifty Christian knights and their families, reportedly descendants of Christians who had remained in Morocco after the Moors had conquered Spain in the time of Rodrigo, the last Visigothic king. According to López de Ayala, the caliph Walid had sent them to Morocco at the request of the legendary figure Count Julian, who supposedly facilitated the Muslim entrance into Spain. In 1386 they had appealed to Juan I to ask the Marinids to permit them to settle in Seville. On the sultan's recommendation, Juan I promised to provide them with estates and Seville assured them that they would be well received. However, on 9 October 1390, as he rode out to meet the *farfanés*, as they were known, he fell from his horse and was killed. He was only thirty-two.²⁷

Four years later Enrique III extended his protection to the "*caballeros farfanés de los godos*," who had opted to leave the land of "the enemies of the faith."²⁸ The patronymic Farfán de los Godos, borne by their descendants, survives today. Whether they had been settled in Morocco since the eighth century or whether they were descendants of Mozarabs deported there in the

twelfth century is unknown. The *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* suggested that *farfān* derived from the Arabic *farfara*, meaning to break away. The word probably meant an exile or a foreigner.

Clement VII praised the deceased monarch as “one of the best princes of Christendom,” who defended the faith against the Moors and pagans of Granada and the Marinids of Morocco. That hyperbole ignored the fact that Juan I, like his father, failed to undertake any major campaign against the Moors.²⁹

Muḥammad V and Morocco

The truce of 1370 allowed Muḥammad V to oust the Marinids entirely from the peninsula and to interfere in Moroccan politics. After his expulsion from Granada in 1359, the Marinids had welcomed him and remained friendly after he regained his throne. Thereafter, their relationship cooled partly because of the rivalry between his ministers, Ibn al-Khaṭīb and Ibn Zamrak, who was renowned as the “poet of the Alhambra.” Thinking that he had lost favor, Ibn al-Khaṭīb, who had encouraged the Marinid alliance, fled to Morocco about 1371. “Wishing to repay his master hatred for hatred,” he urged ‘Abd al-‘Azīz I to conquer al-Andalus. When Muḥammad V demanded his extradition, the sultan refused, asking, “Since you know his crimes, why didn’t you punish him while he was there with you?”³⁰

The prospect of a Marinid invasion ended with the sultan’s death and the accession of his seven-year-old son, al-Saīd II (1372–74). Exploiting the ensuing instability, Muḥammad V backed the pretender, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Alī b. Yaflūsīn, who crossed into Morocco from Spain. Already in control of Ronda, once a Marinid stronghold, the emir invested Gibraltar, the Marinids’ last peninsular outpost, which they surrendered in return for his pledge not to attack Ceuta. Next he abandoned ‘Abd al-Raḥmān and enabled Abū l-‘Abbās (1374–84, 1387–93), son of an earlier sultan, Abū Sālim, to seize the throne. Thus, in the words of Ibn Khaldūn, the Naṣrid ruler “became the supreme arbiter of the affairs of Morocco.” In gratitude, Abū l-‘Abbās arrested Ibn al-Khaṭīb and brought him to trial, but before he could be sentenced he was strangled in prison in 1374. Al-Makkarī described him as “the phoenix of the age, the prince of the poets and historians of his time and the model of the *wizirs*.”³¹

In his remaining years Muḥammad V wielded great influence in Morocco. Ibn Khaldūn remarked that “the principal Marinid officers and the Arabic chieftains all had their eyes fixed on the sovereign beyond the sea and Morocco seemed to have become a province of the empire of Granada.” While the Marinids were attacking Tlemcen they asked Muḥammad V, who “dominated the Marinid government,” to protect their realm and after taking Tlemcen

informed him of their triumph. Discontented with Abū l-‘Abbās, he sent Mūsā b. Abū ‘Inān, a grandson of the great ruler Abū l-Ḥasan, to Ceuta, where he was acclaimed as sultan in March 1384. After surrendering Ceuta to the Naṣrids, Mūsā advanced to Fez, seized Abū l-‘Abbās and sent him to Granada. However, Mūsā did not live to enjoy his triumph as he died in August. Selecting al-Wāṭiq b. Abū l-Faḍl, a docile grandson of Abū l-Ḥasan, Muḥammad V sent him to Morocco, where he was recognized in the fall of 1386. However, al-Wāṭiq’s vizier soon adopted a hostile posture, demanding the surrender of Ceuta and urging “the king of the Alfonsine family ruling Seville and Galicia,” that is, Juan I, to support an assault on Granada. Rather than lose Ceuta, Muḥammad V dispatched Abū l-‘Abbās with a relieving force in February 1387, but once he had possession he refused to hand it over to the Naṣrids. After occupying Fez, Abū l-‘Abbās executed al-Wāṭiq. That ended the Naṣrid dream of dominating both sides of the strait.³²

When Muḥammad V died on 16 January 1391, he was at the peak of his power. His intitulation as emir of Granada, Málaga, Almería, Guadix, Ronda, Baza, Algeciras, and Gibraltar emphasized the extent of his dominions and his most significant acquisitions, namely, the ports giving access to the strait. Aside from a brief interlude when he was driven from power and fled to Morocco, his reign of about thirty-six years was exceptional and brought stability to his people. A skilled diplomat, he utilized his friendship with Pedro I to recover the emirate and later worked the Castilian civil war to his own advantage, recapturing many places previously lost. By virtue of the long period of peace following the truce of 1370 he successfully preserved his autonomy and ushered in an era of prosperity. Although formally a vassal of Pedro I and briefly of Enrique II, during his final two decades he stood on an equal footing with the Castilian kings, no longer a vassal and free of any tribute. The volatility of the Marinid succession enabled him to dominate Moroccan politics for many years. The magnificent palace of the Alhambra initiated by his predecessor Yūsuf I and continued in his reign is a remarkable testimony to the grandeur of the dynasty.³³

Enrique III and the Canary Islands

Castile also experienced a change of rulers when the twelve-year-old Enrique III (1390–1406) succeeded his father, Juan I, but did not assume personal power until 1393.³⁴ While relations with Portugal were unsettled, three other issues arose concerning Castilian aspirations in Africa, the Muslim threat to eastern Europe, and the war against Granada.

Earlier in the century, both Portugal and Castile had attempted to colonize the Canary Islands, situated seventy miles directly west of Africa. In 1370 Fernando I of Portugal ceded the islands of Lanzarote and Gomera to

Lanzarote de França, but he did not effect a permanent settlement.³⁵ In 1393, Gonzalo Pérez Martel of Seville, who had been authorized by Enrique III to occupy the islands, informed the king that “those Islands were easy to conquer, if it should please him, and at little cost.”³⁶ In 1402 the Norman adventurers Jean de Béthencourt and Gadifer de la Salle, backed by Charles V of France, sailed from La Rochelle determined to subdue the islands and “bring the people to the Christian faith.” When most of their company rebelled, Béthencourt asked Enrique III for protection and permission to gather ships, supplies, and personnel to colonize Lanzarote and Fuerteventura. The king agreed in December 1402 and prohibited anyone else from conquering the islands without his express command.³⁷ A year later, Béthencourt offered homage to Enrique III because he was “king and lord of all the neighboring country and the nearest Christian king.” In return, the king granted Béthencourt lordship of the Canary Islands, as well as certain commercial privileges and the right to take arms and equipment there.³⁸ Although Béthencourt presented himself in Seville as “king of the Canaries,” there is no evidence that Enrique III conferred that title on him or recognized him as such. Enrique III probably justified his right to the islands on his belief that they formed part of Africa and that he, as successor to the Visigoths, had dominion over them.

Pope Benedict XIII (1394–1423) lent his support in 1403 by conceding crusading benefits to everyone who collaborated with Béthencourt and de la Salle. The pope also established the bishopric of Rubicón on Lanzarote and, by subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the archbishopric of Seville, acknowledged Castilian claims to the islands.³⁹ Nevertheless, Castile and Portugal continued to wrangle over possession until 1479.

Mission to Tamerlane

For centuries the Castilian kings had expressed interest in the fate of the Holy Land, but preoccupation with the Moors of Spain and Morocco had prevented them from undertaking an eastern crusade. The utter failure of the Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 to halt the advance of the Ottoman Turks into the Balkan Peninsula endangered the existence of the Byzantine Empire and imperiled eastern Europe. However, reports that the Tartar leader, Tamerlane (1370–1405), was marching into Anatolia (modern Turkey) and challenging the Turks from the rear created expectations of a possible Christian alliance with him. His triumph over the Turks at Angora in 1402 slowed their advance for the next twenty-five years. Witnessing that event were Castilian emissaries (Payo Gómez de Sotomayor and Fernán Sánchez de Palazuelos) who had been sent by Enrique III to assess the relative strength of Bayazid, the Turkish sultan (1389–1402), and Tamerlane. Returning home, they were accompanied by Tamerlane’s envoy, Muḥammad al-Qazi. The authenticity of a letter from

Tamerlane (Tabor beymaçian) to Enrique III, wishing him well and announcing his victory over the Turks, has been questioned.⁴⁰

In May 1403 Enrique III reciprocated by dispatching new ambassadors, namely, Alfonso Páez de Santa María, O.P., Ruy González de Clavijo, and Gómez de Salazar. Joining them was Muḥammad al-Qazi. After making their way to Constantinople, where they spent the winter, they sailed to Trebizond on the Black Sea and then traveled overland to Samarkand, where they were cordially received in August 1404. However, when Tamerlane fell ill they were quickly dismissed and began the arduous journey home. In 1405 Enrique III sent Alfonso Ejea, archbishop of Seville, to learn news of his envoys, but, after sailing to Genoa, Sicily, and the Aegean, he returned home empty-handed.⁴¹ Meantime, the royal ambassadors proceeded from Trebizond to Constantinople and arrived in Spain in 1406. Ruy González de Clavijo wrote an account of their embassy entitled *History of the Great Tamorlan*.⁴² The great conqueror's death, however, ended dreams of a Christian-Tartar alliance against the Turks.

Renewal of Warfare Between Castile and Granada

In the interim, the succession to Muḥammad V opened an unsettling era in Naṣrid history and relations with Castile. His son, Yūsuf II (1391–92) and the latter's son, Muḥammad VII (1392–1408), pledged to observe the peace.⁴³ Muḥammad VII also signed an accord with Juan I of Aragón.⁴⁴

Contravening the truce, Martín Yáñez de la Barbuda, master of the Order of Alcántara, invaded Granada in April 1394. He was prepared to give combat if Muḥammad VII refused to acknowledge that “the faith of Jesus Christ is holy and good and the faith of Muḥammad is false and deceitful,” and was convinced by a hermit that he would triumph. The emir, however, arrested his representatives and treated them shamefully. A dismayed Enrique III realized that the Moors could easily overcome the master's small force of 300 lances and 1,000 infantry and ordered him to desist. Raising high the cross and his banner, Martín announced that while he would ordinarily obey the king, this was a matter of the faith and it would be a grave dishonor not to finish his task. The city fathers of Córdoba tried to prevent his progress, but the populace, believing that he was serving God, sided with him and many joined his company.

At Alcalá la Real, about forty miles north of Granada, Alfonso Fernández de Córdoba, lord of Aguilar, and his brother, the marshal Diego Fernández de Córdoba, attempted to dissuade him from his foolhardy enterprise. Acknowledging that he was prompted by religious devotion, they pointed out that, given the king's youth, adherence to the truce was essential. An invasion would have disastrous consequences for Andalucía, which was unprepared for war. Moreover, as the master lacked the equipment necessary to inflict

significant damage, he was in danger of being crushed by a Moorish force of 200,000 infantry and 5,000 knights (figures certainly exaggerated). They also recalled earlier Castilian defeats by the Moors in the plain of Granada in 1280, 1319, and 1361.

To save his honor, the brothers suggested that he wait a day or two on the frontier and, if the emir did not accept his challenge, he could withdraw without disgrace. Rejecting their advice, he advanced to the gates of Granada, confident that God would work a miracle and grant him victory over “the Moors, renegades of the faith.” Though his knights realized that this was a reckless mission, the simple foot soldiers were content to say “Let’s go with the faith of Jesus Christ.” In the meantime, Muḥammad VII summoned all able-bodied males between the ages of sixteen and eighty and sent 120,000 foot and 5,000 cavalry (again, unlikely figures) to slaughter the Castilians, including the master. About 1,500 infantry escaped while another 1,200 were captured. The Moors lost 500 foot.⁴⁵

This irresponsible venture, according to Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, exemplified the crusading ideal as well as the populist zeal unleashed in pogroms directed against the Jews in 1391. Luis Corral Val cited the “blind obedience” of the knights who followed their master to the point of death. Carlos de Ayala Martínez described the expedition as chivalrous and bold, though uselessly so, and commented that “the master seemed to be deprived of the most elementary common sense.”⁴⁶ Surely he was moved by religious zeal, but one may wonder whether he was deranged.

This ill-fated campaign raised fears of an all-out war. Rumors that the emir was preparing to invade Valencia prompted Martín I of Aragón (1396–1410) to strengthen fortifications on the frontier. Prior to the master’s death, when Muḥammad VII’s emissary protested the violation of the truce, Enrique III emphasized his peaceful intentions. Wary, however, of possible reprisals, he prepared for war, but Muḥammad VII declared that he would observe the truce and in the following November asked for an extension.⁴⁷

Three years after this disaster, Granada was exposed to an incursion of an entirely different character. For centuries Spanish Christians made no concerted effort to convert the Muslims, but in the thirteenth century, under the inspiration of St. Francis, the mission to Islam was born. In May 1397 a band of Franciscan friars went to Granada to preach and, despite Muḥammad VII’s prohibition, persisted. When whipping failed to deter them, he had them beheaded and their bodies dragged through the streets. Later, some of their bones were brought to Seville and Córdoba for veneration by the faithful who believed that they worked miracles.⁴⁸ Missionary work, however, quickly gave way to armed conflict.

Enrique III Prepares a Crusade

For the moment, persistent hostilities between Castile and Portugal made impossible any military action against Granada. The continuation of the schism further complicated the situation. In 1398 the Roman pope Boniface IX (1389–1404), rather than calling for an assault on Granada, preached a crusade in Portugal against Castile and declared Enrique III deposed.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, João I and Enrique III agreed to a truce in 1398. In recompense for damages inflicted by the Portuguese, Enrique III requested the assistance of ten galleys for three years at Portuguese expense, so that “the faith would be exalted and the evil sect of Muḥammad would be put down.” The Portuguese refused, however, and Enrique III did not engage the Moors until several years later.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, frequent border incidents troubled relations between Castile and Granada. The municipal council of Morón de la Frontera recorded several incursions by Moorish raiding parties between 1402 and 1404. Emilio Mitre Fernández has commented that nearly constant friction along the frontier gave rise to an entire class of men living from one daily adventure to the next.⁵¹ Now, however, Enrique III, at twenty-eight years of age, was reasonably secure on his throne and free to contemplate a crusade against Granada.

His brother Fernando also had the struggle against the Moors in mind. In 1403, for example, he founded the Orden de la Jarra y del Grifo, or Order of the Jar and the Griffin. A jar with white lilies symbolized Fernando’s devotion to Mary while the griffin, a mythological being, half eagle and half lion, was believed to be the most powerful of the animals. While the Order included both men and women, one of its goals was the prosecution of the war against the pagans and the defense of the church. Although that language did not specify Granada, it reflected the ideology of reconquest and crusade. This was not a Military Order like the Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, but a noble association embodying the chivalric and religious ideals of the day.⁵²

In 1404 Enrique III planned to meet Martín I of Aragón and Carlos III of Navarre (1387–1425) at Logroño to discuss a possible coalition against Granada. However, Martín I, intent on problems in Sicily and Sardinia, was unwilling to become involved in a peninsular war and concluded a five-year pact with Muḥammad VII on 4 May 1405. The treaty provided for commercial interchange and the exchange of prisoners. Martín I also promised to supply 4 or 5 armed galleys, each with 30 crossbowmen and 220 seamen, to aid the emir against his enemies, excluding Castile as a friend of Aragón. Muḥammad VII would bear the monthly cost of 900 gold *doblas* per galley or 3,600 *doblas* in all. Conversely, he would provide Martín I with 400–500 knights and would pay their captain 40 *doblas* every month and each man 7 *doblas*, or a monthly total of 2,840 to 3,540 *doblas*. The treaty of 1376 between Aragón and Granada stated these numbers as gold dinars, essentially the same coin. Although Enrique III expressed concern, at best he could only expect that Aragón would remain neutral in the upcoming conflict.⁵³

Carlos III, worried about the potential increase in Castilian power if the Moors were overcome, informed Muḥammad VII, whom he called “my

brother,” of the projected meeting at Logroño to organize “certain movements against you” and promised to notify him of the outcome. Urging the emir to fortify the frontier, Carlos III promised to provide three hundred siege machines (*ballestas*) and three ships (*naos*) loaded with wheat. Attempting to conceal his purpose, his ambassador traveled in the guise of a merchant, but he was intercepted near the Granadan border by Alfonso Fernández of Aguilar. When Enrique III learned of the Navarrese’s treachery, he canceled the meeting at Logroño.⁵⁴ In the spring of 1405 the Naşrids seized the castle of Ayamonte in the kingdom of Murcia and, despite Enrique III’s protests, violated the truce again in the following year.⁵⁵

A truce for two years was agreed upon at Madrid on 6 October 1406. Pledging to maintain the peace, Enrique III and Muḥammad VII promised not to allow the enemy of one to use the other’s territory as a base for attacking his opponent. Nor would they admit rebels seeking asylum, but they would attempt to mediate the dispute if it were minor; otherwise they would expel the rebels. Recollection that Pedro I had welcomed dissidents from Granada was the likely reason for these clauses. Moreover, if tax collectors charged with embezzlement fled to either kingdom, the rulers would try to resolve the matter if the amount was small; if not, they would eject the embezzlers and compel them to make restitution. In contrast, escaping captives would be welcomed but would have to abandon stolen property. Judges would be appointed to resolve border conflicts. Merchants were assured of free access to markets.⁵⁶

At that very time, the Moors pillaged the vicinity of Quesada and Baeza and engaged the Castilians in a bloody battle near Los Collejares, but neither side could claim victory. That proved to be the last straw in an accumulation of hostile encounters, whether initiated by Muḥammad VII or tolerated by him.⁵⁷

Accusing Muḥammad VII of breaking the truce, and of refusing to surrender Ayamonte and to pay the tribute that he owed, though it was demanded several times, Enrique III decided to embark on his first campaign against the Moors. He appealed to Benedict XIII to proclaim a crusade and provide financial assistance. Announcing his determination to wage war against the “Moors, the enemies of the faith,” the king, in order to obtain necessary military and financial support, summoned the Cortes to Toledo in December 1406. However, he soon fell ill and entrusted his brother Fernando with the task of dealing with the Cortes. After blaming Muḥammad VII for refusing to restore Ayamonte and persistent violations of the truce, he urged the Cortes to provide troops, supplies, artillery, ships, and money to carry out this “very just war in the service of God.” Speaking for the prelates, the bishop of Sigüenza also declared that the war was just. A later version of his speech described the war as “holy and just.” While the question whether warfare was justified had long been debated, the idea that the war against the Moors was holy was expressed more frequently during the fifteenth century.⁵⁸

Although the municipal procurators acknowledged that the war was just,

they asked for a detailed statement of needs. In reply, Fernando specified the following: 10,000 lances; 4,000 *jinetes*; 50,000 foot soldiers, including archers (*ballesteros*) and lancers, besides the infantry in Andalucía; 30 armed galleys; 50 *naos* or sailing ships; 6 cannons (*lombardas*); 100 shots of gunpowder (*tiros de pólvora*); 2 siege engines; 12 trebuchets; pikes, shovels, and hoes; 12 pairs of blacksmith's bellows; 6,000 stones; carts and oxen for transport; and sufficient funds to pay the troops for six months. Those figures were a clear sign that a major campaign was planned. As he did not suggest the cost, the procurators made their own accounting for six months:

- = 10,000 lances paid 15 *maravedíes* each day
- = 4,000 *jinetes* at 10 *maravedíes* each day
- = 50,000 foot soldiers at 5 *maravedíes* each day
- = 50 cannons and 30 galleys
- = Supplies, carts, catapults, siege engines, carts
- = Total, 200,000

Also to be summoned were the “men of Andalucía,” whose number was fixed at 1,500 *jinetes* by the *Ordenamiento de las lanzas* enacted in the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. Arguing that it was impossible to raise such an enormous sum in a short time, the procurators urged the king to draw 60,000,000 *maravedíes* from revenues such as the *alcabala*, a sales tax, and the *almojarifazgo*, a duty on imports, and the remainder from his treasury at Segovia. The *alcabala* had been granted originally to Alfonso XI for the war against the Moors, but kings had continued to collect it as a matter of right. Furthermore, the procurators asked that prelates, clerics, and religious orders contribute financially “as they have not served thus far in this war.”⁵⁹

When the prelates responded that they were not legally bound to do so, the urban procurators protested that they must help finance the war “against the infidels.” The addition to the *Chronicle of Enrique III*, after referring to “the infidels, enemies of our Holy Catholic Faith,” cited “ancient histories” that told of prelates who had served in war against the Moors, even engaging in combat like energetic and loyal knights. Churchmen ought to provide financial support, argued the procurators, because this war would be carried out “for the service of God, the increase of the Catholic Faith, and to recover lands that the Moors had usurped.” Those words recalled the ancient notion that the intruding Muslims had usurped Christian territory and had to be expelled.⁶⁰

Given those objections, Fernando stated that only 45,000,000 *maravedíes* would be required and asked the procurators to raise it in six months. If more were needed, he proposed that he be free to collect it without asking their consent. After much debate the procurators agreed. That constituted a major limitation on the right of the municipalities to be summoned to consent to taxation. Planning for the war was soon interrupted, however, and the Cortes dissolved when an ailing Enrique III died on Christmas Day 1406.⁶¹ On that

very day his son Juan was proclaimed as king and Fernando instructed the marshal of Castile to be prepared for the imminent outbreak of hostilities.⁶²

An Intermission in the Crusade

From the accession of Enrique II until the death of his grandson, Enrique III, Castile enjoyed nearly forty years of peace with Granada, especially following the truce of 1370. Muḥammad V, whose reign coincided with the three Trastámara monarchs, endeavored to keep the peace while also strengthening his realm. His seizure and dismantling of Algeciras was intended to secure Granada against Castile and Morocco. Even so, both Enrique II and Juan I stated their intention to wage war against the Moors, but battles with Aragón, Navarre, and Portugal prevented them from doing so.

Throughout that era border clashes continued, but they intensified when Muḥammad VII came to power. His belligerent attitude finally roused Enrique III, who was preparing to go to war when death intervened. It fell to his brother, Fernando, to take up that charge during the minority of Juan II.

Chapter 3

The Crusades of Antequera and Ceuta

In the decade following Enrique III's death, his brother Fernando executed the first major offensive against Granada since the end of Alfonso XI's reign more than half a century before. As regent for his nephew Juan II (1406–54), Fernando, with scarcely any letup, pressed forward, conquering Antequera a few miles west of Granada, whence he gained his sobriquet, Fernando de Antequera. His election as king of Aragón, however, added to his responsibilities and distracted his attention from the struggle against the Naşrids. If he had lived longer he might have used the resources of both realms to gain additional territory from the Moors. Meantime, the Portuguese, who on earlier occasions had collaborated with Castile against the Naşrids, seized Ceuta on the Moroccan coast, thereby challenging traditional Castilian claims to North Africa.

Preparations for War: The Cortes of Segovia

As Juan II was only two at his accession, a long minority of thirteen years ensued. His mother, Catalina de Lancaster, and his uncle Fernando served as regents, but jealousy often tainted their relationship. In accordance with Enrique III's will, they agreed that the queen would administer the more settled northern regions while Fernando took charge of Toledo, Extremadura, and the frontier zones of Murcia and Andalucía.¹

After long years of comparative peace, Fernando prepared for war against Muḥammad VII.² Although the Cortes of Toledo had approved 45,000,000 *maravedies* for the enterprise, money was needed immediately to pay three months' arrears in wages owed to the soldiers on the frontier and to support a fleet in the strait. Though reluctant to deplete the treasury, Catalina authorized the withdrawal of 20,000,000 *maravedies* provided that the amount was replenished from the usual tax collections. While 5,000,000 was sent to sustain the troops and the fleet and 2,500,000 was used to equip two galleys at

Santander, the remainder would be spent to ready the army. In the absence of detailed financial records it is impossible to say what proportion of the royal budget was assigned to the war against Granada.³

Convoking the Cortes of Segovia in February 1407, Fernando announced his determination to wage war against “the enemies of our faith,” who had failed to surrender Ayamonte as they had promised. Emphasizing that it was a “just and reasonable” war, he resolved to subject Granada to “the sovereignty of our Lord Jesus Christ and of the king.” As the war would contribute to the “exaltation of the Catholic faith, the service of our lord the king and the increase of his realms,” he appealed to his listeners “to undertake this holy work, with the help of God.” In so doing, he said, “We will save our souls, serve our lord the king, and honor ourselves and this realm. Our good fame will remain forever and never perish.” By engaging in a just and holy war, the participants could gain salvation. Now he asked that taxes be collected diligently to pay his soldiers and acquire needed supplies.⁴

Fernando’s oration, recorded by Álvaro García de Santamaría, may have consciously borrowed the wording of Benedict XIII’s crusading bull. José Goñi Gaztambide was unable to find the bull, but Isaac Vázquez Janeiro suggested that Fray Diego Moxena de Valencia de Alcántara, a member of the papal household, presented it to Fernando early in 1407. Vázquez Janeiro identified Fray Diego with the Franciscan theologian and poet Diego de Valencia (d. 1418?).⁵ On the occasion of Juan II’s birth in 1405, he voiced the hope (one that proved vain) that he would be “a hardy conqueror of the Moors” and “a very fine warrior against the Moors.” Lamenting Enrique III’s demise, he decried the sorrowful state of Castile, whose “servants do not want to come / to fight against the Moors, to conquer or to die / in a war, so just, so very holy and worthy.” He suggested, however, that foreigners might do so because the pope proclaimed “a very worthy crusade,” offering absolution to “those who died with the renegades, the infidel vassals of the king of Granada.”⁶ Fray Diego’s language coincides with Fernando’s description of a just and holy war leading to salvation and likely reflects the phrasing of the papal bull.

Responding to Fernando’s exhortation, various individuals underscored the religious character of the war. Queen Catalina articulated her desire that he might subjugate “these infidels” and recover the land taken from her son. Sancho de Rojas, bishop of Palencia, spoke words probably used by preachers to rouse the faithful. Proclaiming that “the enemies of the Catholic faith unjustly held the land of the Christians and of the king,” he argued that everyone was obliged to fight for the faith. Christians suffered many offenses at the hands of Moors, who blasphemed the name of Jesus Christ every day, seizing Christians, many of whom then abandoned their religion, raping young girls, and killing others. The municipal procurators, affirming their concern for the “exaltation of the Catholic faith and increase of the royal crown,” agreed that taxes should be collected promptly, but demanded that the 45,000,000 *maravedíes* already granted should be expended only on the war. They also

asked that Enrique III's ordinances concerning the military obligations of the Military Orders, the clergy, and the laity should be observed and that there should be an accounting of royal revenues. Fadrique, count of Trastámara, also spoke in support of the war.⁷

In his version of the *Royal Chronicle*, Fernán Pérez de Guzmán reported that Bishop Sancho de Rojas asked the assembly to aid the war "as true Christians zealous in the service of God and the king and for the common good of these realms." The procurators commended Fernando's desire to take part in "such a holy and praiseworthy enterprise" and hoped that he could achieve "victory over the enemies of our holy Catholic faith." Similarly, Fadrique endorsed Fernando's "holy proposal" and emphasized the importance of supporting him in "such a just and necessary war." These descriptions of the war as holy and just may be more reflective of the later fifteenth century and of Pérez de Guzmán's tendency to embellish the speeches of his characters.⁸

In anticipation of the campaign, Benedict XIII authorized the crown to collect the *tercias* for three years and renewed that concession in 1410 and again in 1412.⁹

The Crusade of 1407

As military preparations were set in motion armed conflict was already taking place along the frontier. Eight galleys and six *naos* left the Bay of Biscay for Seville while supplies of wheat and barley, siege machines, mantles to protect the besiegers, cranes, and carts were also readied. In mid-April Fernando performed the vigil of arms in the cathedral of Toledo, but soon after arriving at Córdoba in June, he fell ill and the campaign had to be postponed. While regaining his health, he discovered widespread fraud as soldiers who failed to appear still received their wages. For example, a commander paid for three hundred lances would only bring two hundred, and one responsible for three hundred foot soldiers would only have one hundred. Fernando also realized that the magnates were not enthusiastic about the expedition. While his restless troops pillaged the countryside, in late July three thousand Moorish knights and thirty thousand foot soldiers (questionable numbers) attacked Lucena some miles south of Córdoba, but the Castilians forced them to withdraw. In a series of encounters in the strait from 22 August to 26 August, thirteen Castilian galleys engaged twenty-three galleys bringing supplies to Granada from Morocco, Tunis, and Tlemcen. The Castilians seized eight and sank two, but the Moors burned thirteen large galleys and some smaller ships, lest the Castilians capture them. The victory demonstrated Castilian control of the Strait and effectively eliminated the possibility of relief for Granada from North Africa.¹⁰

In the past, French knights, following the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem,

found an outlet for their crusading zeal in Spain. Now, Jacques II, count of La Marche, who was captured by the Turks during the Crusade of Nicopolis but later ransomed, arrived at Seville in July with seventy knights.¹¹ Whether Fernando addressed a general appeal to France is uncertain, but he did ask Martín I's permission to acquire arms, harness, and victuals in Aragón. Although Martín I congratulated him on defeating the enemy fleet, he had his own concerns and did not wish to become involved in the crusade against Granada.¹²

Meanwhile skirmishes continued. Spurred on by an appeal to God and Santiago, men from Carmona, Écija, and Osuna drove off Moors from Málaga and Ronda and raided the neighborhood of Antequera. In late August, Muḥammad VII, with 7,000 horse and 100,000 foot (unbelievable numbers), besieged Jaén, threatened Baeza, and plundered Bedmar before Castilian reinforcements compelled him to retreat. In the romance "Moricos, los mis moricos" he summoned his warriors to attack Baeza and to seize the *alcaide* and his sister, "the lovely Leonor," whom he proposed to make his lover.¹³

In early September, Fernando, restored to good health, knelt in prayer before the high altar of the cathedral of Seville, as the canons called down God's blessing. Entering the chapel of the kings, he took the sword from the hand of the statue of Fernando III, the conqueror of Seville. His son Alfonso X had constructed an elaborate tomb there for his parents and covered their statues in silver. Pedro I reportedly stripped off the silver because he needed money to overcome Enrique of Trastámara.¹⁴ Pledging to return the sword safely, Fernando set out on 7 September for Ronda, the western outpost of the emirate of Granada, and the nucleus of a network of adjacent castles.¹⁵

On 26 September he laid siege to the castle of Zahara, perched on a hill a few miles north of Ronda. As three large cannons broke through the walls, the defenders offered to surrender if Muḥammad VII did not come to their aid. When Fernando refused to grant a delay, they yielded on 30 September. A crucifix and his standard were placed on the castle tower. The crucifix was later carried to the mosque, which was consecrated as a church. The Moors, leaving their weapons behind, departed under safe-conduct for Muslim territory. Next, Fernando dispatched two thousand lancers to probe Ronda's defenses, but they reported that it was too well-fortified to be taken without a lengthy siege. Although he wished to attack, the magnates argued against it. Thus, despite his better judgment, on 5 October he turned to Setenil, a stronghold a few miles north of Ronda. As he advanced, his troops ravaged the villages in the Sierra de Grazalema and seized several nearby castles that Alfonso XI had captured years before, after which Muḥammad V had repossessed them.

In recounting the transfer of Castilian forces from Zahara to Setenil, Álvaro García described the *impedimenta* of a well-equipped army: carts, oxen, and various supplies; five *lombardas* or cannons mounted on their carriages; protective mantles for sieges; *mina*, a type of explosive; *alquitrán*, a mixture of

pitch, grease, oil, and resin, used to set fire to enemy positions; gunpowder; stones for firing at the enemy; strongboxes; blacksmiths' forges; fifty *quintales* of iron (a *quintal* was about one hundred pounds); pickaxes, hoes, stone hammers, mattocks, and hatchets; iron staves, bags of nails, bolts, metal plates, levers, and whetstones; wads made for cannons; wood; a great engine with a shaft; sixteen cannons (*trueños*); coal; axles for wagons; axes; leather to make straps to bind up supplies; and ropes and ladders. All of this was borne by pack animals. Accompanying them were drovers and craftsmen who were needed to guarantee that everything worked properly: turners, rope makers, coalmen, carpenters, stonemasons, cartwrights, and toolmakers.¹⁶


For twenty days Fernando bombarded Setenil. At first his bombardiers had difficulty in finding the range. Some projectiles missed their targets and others, in an early instance of friendly fire, injured his own men. Exhausting the supply of stones to launch against the walls, others had to be gathered from the neighborhood. While the siege was in progress Muḥammad VII, reportedly with six thousand horse and eighty thousand foot (unlikely numbers), attacked Jaén for three days, but he withdrew when Fernando sent reinforcements. Castilian troops seized the castle of Ortejícar on 12 October, while others raided the villages north of Málaga. A planned assault on Setenil failed when the wheels of a wooden tower being moved up to the wall were caught in a ditch, rendering it immobile. Arguing that Setenil was too strong and pointing out that many soldiers had deserted for lack of pay and the scarcity of food, the magnates urged Fernando to abandon the siege. Although he insisted that it would be shameful to withdraw, he concluded that the prospect of taking Setenil was remote, especially as winter was approaching. Thus, he abandoned the siege on 25 October.

On his return to Seville, knights and officials came out to greet him. Mounted on a handsome chestnut steed and wearing a tunic embroidered in gold and attended by many magnates and knights, he dismounted at the Puerta de San Agustín to pray and venerate a silver cross. Amid a great procession of people singing hymns of thanksgiving for his victory over "the enemies of the faith," he entered the cathedral. After praying again and venerating the cross, he went to the high altar as the clergy sang the *Te Deum*. Then, entering the chapel of the kings, he prayed before the image of the Virgin Mary and replaced the sword of Fernando III in the hand of the royal effigy. He kissed the feet and hands of the statues of Fernando III, Alfonso X, and Queen Beatriz.

Following his ceremonial entrance, Fernando informed the city fathers that his campaign was "a just war against those infidels who say that Jesus Christ is not the Son of God, and who do not believe in the Holy Trinity, believing in their false prophet, the deceiver, Muḥammad." Though the onset of cold weather had forced him to withdraw from Setenil, he announced his resolve to resume the campaign in the summer. Meantime, two thousand horse and fifteen thousand to twenty thousand foot were needed to guard against hostile

enemy action. Grouped in tens with a *quadrillero* commanding every ten men, and another commanding every one hundred, soldiers equipped with horses and arms had to respond immediately when summoned. No one would be excused.¹⁷

Despite Seville's warm welcome, Fernando had to be disappointed at the outcome of the campaign. A large army, a fleet, and great quantities of supplies including siege machinery had been assembled for an assault on Ronda. Although his fleet routed the Moors in the strait, his protracted illness delayed his departure until summer was almost over. Yet he never attacked Ronda and became bogged down before Setenil. His failure to capture it can be attributed to the delay caused by his illness and the consequent shortage of money to pay the troops, and the depletion of his resources. However, the magnates must be faulted too for their negligence in executing his orders and for their general lack of support.



Map 2. The Conquest of Granada West, 1407–87

A Hiatus in the Crusade

Addressing the Cortes of Guadalupe in February 1408, Fernando recalled the

recent campaign against the “enemies of the Catholic faith” and emphasized the recovery of Ayamonte, “the cause of this war.” Resolved to take up arms again, he needed 60,000,000 *maravedies* to pay back wages and finance the anticipated summer operation. Although the procurators protested that that sum was excessive, they eventually gave their consent.

Muḥammad VII, meanwhile, with 7,000 cavalry and 120,000 infantry (implausible numbers), laid siege to Alcaudete, about twenty-four miles southwest of Jaén. While cannons bombarded the fortress, wave after wave of soldiers vainly attempted to scale the walls or to undermine them. After losing more than 2,500 men, the emir withdrew after four days. Angered by that assault, the urban procurators in the Cortes demanded that steps be taken to defend the frontier. Fernando announced that he would need 3,000 lancers from Castile together with the knights on the frontier, as well as 20,000 infantry, 12,000 from Andalucía and 8,000 from Castile. Many of Catalina’s counselors, however, argued to the contrary. Finally, Fernando acquiesced in the decision to halt hostilities in the current year and to expend on the defense of the frontier 50,000,000 *maravedies* of the 60,000,000 already granted. If necessary, the remaining 10,000,000 would be spent without summoning the Cortes.¹⁸

In the ensuing weeks municipal militias laid waste the region about Gibraltar, Estepona, Marbella, Medina Sidonia, and the Sierra de Grazalema, and raided as far as Ronda. Near Setenil, the Castilian commander reminded his men that they were fighting “in the service of God for our faith” and that with the help of God, “the conqueror in battles,” they would be victorious. Pointing to the twin ideals of martyrdom and eternal glory, he declared that if they should die, “death will be eternal life for us” and “we will enjoy great fame in the world.” Muḥammad VII, realizing that the Marinid sultan, Abū Sa’īd ‘Uthmān III (1398–1420), was not likely to intervene, requested a truce. Fernando limited it to seven months from 15 April to 15 November 1408. When the urban procurators insisted, therefore, that there was now no need to spend 50,000,000 *maravedies* on defense, the regents reduced the total to 40,000,000 and reserved 10,000,000 for the following year. Malicious persons meanwhile warned Catalina that the war was enhancing Fernando’s power and that it would be better to extend the truce.¹⁹

Although Muḥammad VII’s death on 13 May 1408 technically dissolved the truce, his successor and elder brother, Yūsuf III (1408–17), intended to adhere to it.²⁰ Just before Muḥammad VII died, perhaps a victim of poison, he ordered his brother’s execution. When the executioners came, he was playing chess and asked permission to conclude the game. Thus he gained time until the chief men of the realm announced the emir’s death and offered him the throne.²¹ Disinclined to continue the truce, Fernando argued that he would be able “to conquer much more territory and inflict greater damage on the emirate of Granada.” He also objected that the Naṣrid ambassadors negotiating the truce were spies scrutinizing the state of the realm and observing his debates with

the queen mother. Nevertheless, the truce was extended to 1 April 1409.²²

In January 1409 the regents informed the Cortes of Valladolid that they required six thousand lances, two thousand *jinetes*, and twenty thousand foot soldiers (12,000 from Castile and 8,000 from Andalucía), as well as galleys, sailing ships, and other war materials. In order to cover the expense they requested a levy in addition to the 40,000,000 *maravedíes* granted in the previous year. Noting the suspension of military operations in that year, the procurators were reluctant to authorize any subsidy. After an accounting revealed a balance of 16,000,000 *maravedíes* remaining from the 40,000,000, they relented and consented to a levy of 40,000,000 for the current year.

As negotiations continued, the regents rejected the Naṣrid request for a two-year truce. Presenting charters sealed with the seals of earlier emirs, who had declared themselves vassals of Castile and paid tribute and sent their sons to the Cortes when summoned, they demanded that Yūsuf III accept his vassalage and tributary status. After the truce was extended from 1 April 1409 until 31 August and eventually to 1 April 1410, the regents sent an envoy to Granada to require him to pay tribute and acknowledge his vassalage. Meantime, a former Muslim, relating several rumors of questionable authenticity, warned Fernando to guard against the possibility of assassination. For example, Yūsuf II was said to have been poisoned by herbs sewn into a rich robe, the gift of the Marinid emir. Muḥammad VII supposedly died when he donned a poisoned shirt and Enrique II was believed to have been poisoned by boots sent by Muḥammad V. Poisoned herbs were also suspected of killing Alfonso XI. Obviously gossip of this kind had been circulating for years.²³

During those years, Fernando, by taking steps to advance the fortunes of his family, sowed the seeds of future contention within the dynasty. In 1408 he persuaded the knights of Alcántara to elect his son, Sancho, then only eight years of age, as their new master. Until such time as Sancho reached his majority all the revenues of that office would be expended on the war. Similarly, in 1409 he arranged the election of his nine-year-old son, Enrique, as master of Santiago. Although Álvaro García de Santamaría explained that Fernando hoped that, by providing for his sons in this way, he would not burden the realm, he obviously intended to secure direct control of the financial and personnel resources of the Orders.²⁴

About that time northern Europeans proposed to participate in the crusade as “it was both just and holy.” Louis II, duke of Bourbon, and his son Jean, count of Clermont, planned to travel by sea so as to arrive quickly with 1,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers for six months’ service at their own expense. Noting that the truce was in effect, Fernando promised to notify them when hostilities resumed. Although he intended to undertake the war with his own people, if they wished to assist him, he preferred that they transport necessary food supplies by sea and remarked that their fleet could protect the coast against Muslim attacks. The overland journey was long and arduous and, as he needed all his own horses, he could not provide them to the French. Though

they were dumbfounded, thinking they were not wanted, the duke and the count promised to come, but never did. “As the whole world seemed to know that the king of Castile was waging war against the Moors,” on 11 April 1409 envoys of two German nobles, Duke Leopold IV of Austria and Count Jobst of Luxembourg, announced that they too wished to serve at their own expenses. While thanking them for their interest, the regents again pointed out that the truce precluded any action against the Moors during that year. The deaths of the dukes of Bourbon and Austria and the count of Luxembourg in 1410 and 1411 ended their interest in the Spanish crusade.²⁵

The Crusade of Antequera

Although hostilities were suspended during 1409, Fernando informed Martín I that he expected to take up arms again on 1 April 1410 when the truce expired. The Naṣrids, also ready for war, sacked Zahara on 5 April, taking many captives, but the defenders successfully held out in the *alcázar*.²⁶ Alerting the frontier towns to prepare for war, Fernando summoned the urban procurators to Córdoba to solicit their advice and support.²⁷ After listening to various opinions, he decided to assault Antequera, a formidable bastion strategically situated northeast of Ronda, northwest of Málaga, and directly west of Granada. He probably hoped to cut off the southwestern segment of the emirate and to seize Ronda as he had planned in 1407. Inez Macdonald emphasized that “if it had not been for [Fernando’s] tenacity the campaign of 1410 would have degenerated into a series of purposeless raids.”²⁸

Álvar García, an eyewitness, provided a detailed account of the siege and Alfonso Fernández de Castalles also wrote a report. The Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla (d. 1457), though he never lived in the peninsula, produced a reasonably accurate relation, based apparently on the recollections of personages in the court of Fernando’s son, Alfonso V of Aragón.²⁹

Setting out from Córdoba on 21 April, with 2,500 men-at-arms, 1,000 *jinetes*, and 9,000–10,000 infantry arranged in five divisions, Fernando reached Antequera five days later. Symbolic of his determination was the sword of Fernando III, which was presented to him as he made his way; alighting from his horse, he venerated it with a kiss. When he decided to occupy the nearby hills some counseled him to wait for reinforcements and others protested that this division of the army posed a great risk. Insisting, he remarked: “Surely we have need here of my great-grandfather Don Juan Manuel.” His advisers, reminded of that redoubtable warrior, capitulated and the hills were seized. Meantime, siege engines, towers, and scaling ladders loaded on 360 carts and accompanied by 1,200 foot soldiers were brought from Seville. The Muslim garrison numbered about 1,500.³⁰

The romance “De Antequera partió el moro” related Yūsuf III’s distress on

learning that Antequera was under attack. After weeping and tearing his clothes, he summoned his two brothers to Archidona to deliver “Antequera, the key to my kingdom.”³¹ Fernando welcomed their approach because he hoped that, with God’s help, he could more quickly achieve his goals by victory on the battlefield. The Moors, supposedly numbering five thousand cavalry and eighty thousand infantry, took up their position at Boca del Asno, a few miles north of Antequera on 5 May. On the following day, the Moors, thinking that a contingent commanded by the bishop of Palencia was the main body of the Castilian army, began to skirmish. When it seemed that the Castilians would take flight, Fernando’s forces, until then hidden from view, entered the fray, quickly overcoming the Moors, who panicked and fled. In addition to the usual banners, a Cistercian monk raised a crucifix to remind the troops, “Just as [Jesus] died for us, so we ought to die for him and for our faith, destroying the heresy and sect of the infidel Moors.” This may have been the first time that a Spanish writer described Islam as a heresy, though John of Damascus did so in the seventh century. At this time Diego López de Estúñiga, attracted by the papal crusading indulgence, arrived with two hundred lances. The plunder was considerable, but the casualty figures (fifteen thousand Moors were killed but only 120 Christians) are unbelievable. Returning to his camp, Fernando gave thanks to God and the Virgin Mary.³²

Announcing his triumph (a miracle he called it) to Catalina de Lancaster and all the cities and towns of the realm, he asked that solemn processions be held in thanksgiving. Although he did not specify the number of Moors who lost their lives, he reported that only ten Christians died. Inez Macdonald suggested that the discrepancy might lie in the fact that the Christians wore protective armor but the Moors did not. The clash at Boca del Asno on 6 May was one of the few major pitched battles between Christians and Muslims in the fifteenth century prior to the accession of Fernando and Isabel.³³

Though disheartened by the rout of the Naṣrid reinforcements, the Moors of Antequera continued to put up a strong resistance. While skirmishes and raids took place, siege engines bombarded Antequera and Fernando took the lead in filling in a moat so that wooden towers with protective mantles could be moved up to the walls. The Castilians carried out a general assault on 27 June, but the Moors broke their scaling ladders and sprayed them with *alquitrán*. In mid-July a Castilian detachment laid waste the countryside near Málaga. The romance “Buen alcaide de Cañete” recounted a raid carried out near Ronda by the *alcaide*, who wished to avenge the death of his young son in a foray at Setenil. Such raids not only served to inflict damage on the enemy but also to relieve the monotony of the siege.

Following the battle of Boca del Asno, Yūsuf III requested a truce for two years. Fernando countered by demanding that the emir declare himself a vassal, pay tribute as his ancestors had done, and liberate all Christian captives. The Naṣrid envoy, meantime, conspired with several Moors in the service of Castilian knights to set fire to Fernando’s camp, but Rodrigo Vélez, a

convert from Islam, revealed the conspiracy. The plotters were arrested, tortured until they confessed, and hung. The informer, rewarded with 10,000 *maravedies*, by Fernando's decree was to be known henceforth as Rodrigo de Antequera.³⁴

As the siege wore on, Fernando ordered his men to build huts for themselves and to construct two walls encircling Antequera. This process of contravallation and circumvallation was intended to prevent the defenders from escaping or bringing in supplies and to protect the Castilians against possible attack from the rear. Yūsuf III planned a counterattack but thought better of it. By now Fernando's treasury was running very low, so he appealed to Seville and Córdoba, and the Jewish and Mudejar communities to lend him money. He assured them of full repayment during the first quarter of the coming year. Although many did so, he still required additional funds and asked Catalina de Lancaster to provide 6,000,000 *maravedies* from the royal treasury.³⁵

A great distraction now loomed as Fernando learned that his uncle Martín I had died without children and without a designated heir. Although Fernando emerged as a leading candidate for the Aragonese throne, the issue was not formally resolved until two years later. As the siege continued into September, Gaston, the second son of the count of Foix, appeared, asking to be made a knight, just as Fernando had knighted his older brother Jean at Zahara in 1407. Hoping to lift his men's spirits, Fernando ordered the banner of St. Isidore brought from León. Known also as the *pendón de Baeza*, it depicted the saint mounted on a horse with a cross in his left hand and a sword in his right. On the right side of the banner an arm, purportedly that of St. James, and bearing a sword, reached down from the clouds. Fernando clearly hoped that, under the patronage of the two saints, his determination would be rewarded by the fall of Antequera.³⁶

Then on 16 September the Castilians assaulted Antequera, seizing a tower and gaining entrance to the fortress. The banners of Santiago and St. Isidore, as well as those of Seville and Córdoba, were placed on the tower. As the Castilians poured in, the Moors took refuge in the *alcázar*. Recognizing that further resistance was futile, they asked permission to leave with their property, but Fernando demanded that they become his prisoners and release all Christian captives. When the Moors, declaring that they would rather die, threatened to burn the town, Fernando's counselors urged him not to tempt God because the Moors might be able to hold out for another month. Bad weather might prolong the siege even more. At length he agreed that if they surrendered the *alcázar* and all their arms, and liberated all their captives, he would give them safe-conduct to Archidona with 1,100 pack animals to transport their movable goods. Yielding the fortress on 24 September, 2,528 Moors, including 895 soldiers, 770 women, and 863 children, departed for Archidona. Fifty Moors died in the defense and others who had fallen ill died in Archidona. An accounting of the provisions abandoned by the Moors was

undertaken and three dependent castles controlling access to Antequera were occupied. Accompanied by the magnates, Fernando, on 1 October, led a great procession of clergy and friars bearing crosses and relics, the banners of the crusade and of Santiago and St. Isidore, and his personal banners, to the *alcázar*. The mosque was sanctified under the patronage of San Salvador, mass was sung, and a sermon preached.³⁷

Dejected by the fall of Antequera, Yūsuf III sent two thousand horsemen and infantry to pillage about Alcalá la Real. The ballad “La mañana de San Juan” described a festive scene as Moorish knights, bearing pennants that had been decorated by their sweethearts, jostled in the fields outside Granada, as their admiring lovers looked on from the walls of the Alhambra. Suddenly a Moor, his face all bloodied, came to announce the loss of Antequera. When the emir heard the news, “his face changed color,” and he summoned his men to arms. A thousand knights advanced upon Alcalá la Real, destroying vineyards and wheat fields and defeating a large but disorderly Christian force, but that was small consolation.³⁸

The fall of Antequera was the most notable Christian success since Alfonso XI’s victory at Salado in 1340 and capture of Algeciras in 1344. A key fortress, it pointed directly eastward to Granada. The verse “Si ganada es Antequera, ojalá Granada fuera”—“If Antequera is taken, may Granada be next!”—expressed the high hopes stirred by the conquest. Its loss, according to Rachel Arié, revealed “the vulnerability of the Nasrid kingdom.”³⁹ Fernando informed Charles VI of France of his “glorious triumph over the king of Granada, who had refused to pay the ancient tribute.” In language reminiscent of earlier historians, Álvaro García emphasized that Fernando’s feat was all the greater because, aided only by his own people, he achieved it without the participation of foreign knights.⁴⁰

Fernando left Antequera on 3 October and a week later, accompanied by prelates, magnates, and knights, made a grand entrance into Seville. Despite the heavy rain, the archbishop and municipal officials welcomed him, while the populace danced and played games “in the manner customary on the reception of kings.” Seventeen Moorish captives carried banners taken in battle. Next came the crucifix and two crusading banners, one red and the other white, the sword of Fernando III, the banners of Santiago, St. Isidore, the Order of the Jar and the Griffin, and those of the magnates and knights. The archbishop and clergy, singing *Te Deum*, received the victors at the Puerta del Perdón. After venerating the cross, Fernando placed the sword of Fernando III in the hand of the effigy whence it had been taken.⁴¹ His achievement resonated over the centuries and in the seventeenth century inspired the composition of an epic poem.⁴²

The Truce of 1410

In the meantime, Fernando and Yūsuf III agreed to suspend hostilities as of 6 November while a truce, much desired by both sides, was worked out. The war had caused great destruction and exhausted the country. In addition to various taxes and loans, the towns had had to provide a constant supply of war materials: food, leather to cover shields, wood, siege towers, hemp, barrels, mattocks, staves, and pack animals. Knights and townsmen were required to render military service and many were killed or wounded. In their absence, fields and vineyards were abandoned or burned by marauding Moors. Property of all sorts was plundered, and famine began to stalk the land. The cost of providing for defense would amount to an additional 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 *maravedies*.⁴³

Though tempted to press on, Fernando was anxious to advance his claims to the Aragonese throne.⁴⁴ His principal challenger, Jaume, count of Urgel, reportedly urged Yūsuf III to wage war “with all his power . . . against the Infante of Castile.” Jaume asked him to provide a certain number of troops and galleys for four months’ service and proposed that neither party make a separate peace. Two of his letters to Yūsuf III were intercepted and made public in an attempt to discredit him. Roser Salicrú i Lluç’s detailed critique, however, casts doubt on the reality of this episode.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Yūsuf III, knowing that Fernando had far greater resources than the count, would have agreed to such an alliance.

The truce concluded on 10 November 1410 would run until 10 April 1412. Specially commissioned *alfaqueques* (*al-fakkāk*) or ransomers were authorized to arrange the ransom of captives on both sides. Neither ruler would provide refuge to the other’s enemies or accept a rebellious town or castle. If a fugitive from justice fled to another kingdom, each monarch would endeavor to determine why he had done so and could intervene on his behalf. If the fugitive had taken another’s property, it would be restored to him, and the fugitive could be charged with theft. In order to adjudicate these issues and other frontier crimes, special judges, known as *alcaldes de la frontera*, would be appointed. Within ten days they would proceed to the site of the crime. If they were unable to recover stolen goods, the local people would have to pay the cost and a substantial fine of 40 gold *doblas*, and suffer the confiscation of their property if the criminal could not be found. Yūsuf III pledged to free three hundred prisoners in three installments within six months; if he failed to do so, he would have to pay 10,000 gold *doblas* to Juan II. Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān III, the Marinid sultan, was included in the truce and Yūsuf III was expected to secure his adherence within sixty days. Nevertheless, Yūsuf III was not required to become a Castilian vassal or to pay tribute; nor did the treaty provide for free trade between Castile and Granada as was customary. Inez Macdonald suggested that “this ‘honourable truce’ seems a poor return for all the expense and effort of the 1410 campaign.”⁴⁶

In December, in fulfillment of the truce, the first one hundred Christian captives were delivered to Seville and the second one hundred on 5 January

1411. Received in the cathedral, they were presented at the offertory of the mass and provided with new red clothing.⁴⁷

Although the Marinid sultan was a party to the truce, his relationship with Yūsuf III was frayed. The Moors of Gibraltar, calculating that Abū Saʿīd could better guarantee their security, threw off their allegiance to Granada. Attempting to foment civil war among the Marinids, Yūsuf III liberated the sultan's brother and sent him to Morocco. As a countermove Abū Saʿīd informed Fernando of his desire to maintain friendship with Castile and his willingness to aid him against the Naṣrids. Next Yūsuf III besieged Gibraltar, but as his food supplies began to dwindle in February and March, it seemed that he would have to withdraw. His fleet, however, intercepted three Moroccan ships bringing food to the defenders, enabling him to continue the siege and eventually recover Gibraltar.⁴⁸

The truce of November 1410 ushered in a long interval of peace between Castile and Granada, though that was not Fernando's initial intention. Expecting to resume the war once the truce expired, he summoned the Cortes to Valladolid in the spring of 1411 to request an additional 45,000,000 *maravedies* for an army of five thousand men-at-arms, one thousand *jinetes*, twelve thousand lancers and archers, an armada of twenty galleys and other ships, and necessary supplies. A further 3,000,000 *maravedies* was needed to pay the magnates, knights, and squires who had served in the crusade of Antequera. Recognizing that this war "is such a holy and noble conquest," the municipal procurators granted the amount requested, provided that it not be expended on anything else. They also asked for an accounting of 48,000,000 *maravedies* spent over the last four years. Declaring that "the conquest of these infidels is so holy and so just that all three estates of the realm ought to serve and aid it," they insisted on the observance of Enrique III's ordinance concerning the obligation of the bishops and clergy to do so.⁴⁹

When the truce expired on 10 April 1412 Fernando renewed it for another year, though Yūsuf III hoped for a longer term. He was required to release 150 Christian captives, including two nobles who were ransomed for 19,000 *doblas*. As an extension was being negotiated at the end of the year, Fernando alerted the frontier towns to the possibility of surprise attacks. A new treaty, in the name of Juan II, Fernando I, now king of Aragón (1412–16) but still regent for his nephew, and Yūsuf III was signed on 31 May 1413 and would expire on 13 April 1414. The Marinid sultan Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān III was also included. Many of the clauses in the pact of 1410 were repeated: for example, the ransom of captives, the refusal of either king to shelter enemies of the other, and the adjudication of frontier disputes by special judges.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, there were frequent violations of the truce by both sides, as the poet Ibn Furkūn related. Yūsuf III complained about them on more than one occasion.⁵¹ Toward the end of the year, the frontier towns were advised again to be on the alert, but after hostilities were suspended for two months until 13 June 1414, the truce was renewed in 1415 until 17 April 1416 and again

until 16 April 1417. By then Fernando I was dead.⁵²

While busy securing the Aragonese throne and attempting to end the Great Western Schism, Fernando I was unable to undertake military operations against the Naṣrids. His unwillingness to grant Granada a truce for more than a year at a time indicated his determination to renew hostilities as soon as feasible. As evidence of that intention, Salicrú i Lluç cited his request to Benedict XIII to grant the same indulgences for the war “against the infidels of the sect of Muḥammad” that he had granted to Juan II on 3 February 1412. Moreover, in 1414 Fernando I informed Simon de Cabrenys, a Catalan knight who offered to serve in the war, that, because of the truce, fighting had been suspended for a year, but when the conflict was resumed, he would summon him. He made a similarly gracious reply to Jean I, count of Foix, who had pledged his service and that of his brothers. Finally, a royal review of lands to be given to the Military Orders once they were taken from the Moors suggests his future purpose.⁵³

The Beginning of Portuguese Overseas Expansion

Before Fernando I could undertake any operations in Morocco and much to his great surprise, Portugal seized Ceuta, thereby advancing claims to Africa, which the Castilians had long regarded as theirs. Afonso IV signaled Portuguese interest there in 1341 when he obtained a crusading bull directed against Granada or Morocco. Thereafter successive popes authorized the use of half of the *decima* or tenth of ecclesiastical revenues for war against the Marinids. That raised the question whether the conquest of either realm pertained solely to Castile. Conflicting Portuguese and Castilian claims to the Canary Islands were highlighted in 1412 when Jean de Béthencourt, who had established a colony there, declared himself Juan II’s vassal.⁵⁴

A treaty signed in 1411 ended the long-standing conflict between Portugal and Castile and raised the possibility of a joint operation against Granada.⁵⁵ At that time Fernando, anticipating that “the wicked sect of Muḥammad might be brought low,” proposed that Portugal, at its own expense, provide three galleys for three years’ service. Although João I rejected that suggestion, after the treaty was signed, his sister-in-law, Catalina de Lancaster, asked him to reconsider. Responding courteously, he pledged to do so when the occasion arose.⁵⁶

According to Gomes Eanes de Zurara, João I was prepared to collaborate with Castile and acknowledged that the kings of Castile held Granada “almost in subjection, saying that it was their conquest, and therefore that no one ought to wage war [against it] without their authority and mandate.” Fernando, however, was unable to accept his offer because of his pursuit of the Aragonese throne, and the recently concluded truce with Granada.⁵⁷ Writing

many years later, Zurara may have transposed this negotiation to the period following the treaty of 1411 when, perhaps, it actually occurred after the fall of Ceuta. In any case, João I recognized Castile's exclusive right to conquer Granada.⁵⁸

The postponement of a joint crusade caused João I to turn his attention to Morocco, where strife among the Marinids invited intrusion. In the greatest secrecy he readied an expedition but assured several European monarchs who expressed alarm at this military buildup that they had nothing to fear.⁵⁹

Seeking moral justification for the venture, he consulted theologians and canon lawyers, who declared that the military estate gained the greatest praise by battling the infidels. Acknowledging his "good and holy intention," they concluded that he could fight "any infidels who deny any articles of the holy Catholic faith." In so doing he would "merit a great reward from our Lord God." They also asserted that the pope, "as vicar general over the universal church," had the power of binding and loosing conferred on St. Peter, and thus he could "grant us perpetual absolution when we die rightly fighting against the infidels." That statement suggests that he solicited a crusading bull from Pope John XXIII (1410–15). Although no document has been found, when the armada stopped at Lagos on its way to Ceuta, the royal confessor absolved the soldiers of their sins "by virtue of a letter that the Holy Father granted to the king our lord, seeing his holy desire."⁶⁰

Yūsuf III and Fernando I had the greatest reason for apprehension. Alerted by the Portuguese Mudejars that João I planned to attack Granada, Yūsuf III emphasized his desire for peace. Perhaps in reaction to João I's order of 1414 prohibiting the transport of foodstuffs, steel, iron, and arms to Moorish lands, Yūsuf III pointed out that merchants from Granada were fearful of trading in Portugal.⁶¹ Hoping to soften the king's heart, he had one of his wives offer a beautiful wedding trousseau to Queen Philippa's daughter. She avowed, however, that she did not meddle in her husband's affairs and that her daughter would have whatever she required for her wedding. The Naṣrid ambassadors, stung by that rebuff, also appealed in vain to Duarte, the king's oldest son.⁶²

Fernando I, still regent for Juan II, worried that the Portuguese were preparing an offensive against Castile. In April 1415, his agent, Ruy Díaz de Vega, provided official information that João I had raised 5,400 men-at-arms, 1,900 mounted archers, 3,000 unmounted archers, 9,000 footmen, or a total of 19,300 men. In July, João Gomes da Silva, the Portuguese *alferes mor*, or royal standardbearer, stated that a fleet of 270 ships would transport 7,000 to 7,500 men-at-arms, 5,000 archers, and 20,000 foot soldiers, or approximately 32,000 to 32,500 men. Ruy Díaz remarked that João I was going "to Fez to the king of Belamarin, who has written that he wished to become a Christian and to assist him in conquering the land beyond the sea," apparently an allusion to the lost crusader kingdom of Jerusalem. The Marinid sultan, Abū Sa'īd 'Uthmān III, confronted by fierce opposition, probably turned to Portugal for help and may

have used the possibility of his conversion as a ploy to win over João I. Still another rumor that must have perturbed Yūsuf III identified Málaga as the target. Protesting that he could not guarantee the certitude of the most frightening rumor of all, Ruy Díaz reported that Catalina de Lancaster, in frequent correspondence with her sister, Queen Philippa, expressed her discontent with Fernando I and sought a closer relationship with Portugal. In order to achieve that goal, João I would sail to Sanlúcar de Barrameda and make his way to Seville to assume the co-regency with Catalina in place of Fernando I. The marriage of Catalina's younger daughter and João I's second son, Pedro, would link the two families. Then, commanding the united forces of Castile and Portugal, João I would conquer Granada and install Pedro as its first Christian king.⁶³ Given those intolerable prospects, Fernando I, according to Antoine de La Salle, a Frenchman who participated in the expedition to Ceuta, prohibited the Castilians from supplying the Portuguese.⁶⁴

When the Portuguese fleet set sail from Lisbon, more precise, but hardly reassuring, information was forthcoming. Whereas João Gomes affirmed that the expedition was directed against the Marinids, Ruy Díaz pointed to Gibraltar or Ceuta as the objective.⁶⁵ A Portuguese assault on Ceuta in a zone that Castile habitually claimed for future conquest was disturbing, but even more so was the idea that the Portuguese, perhaps using Ceuta as a base, might seize Gibraltar. That would give Portugal control of both sides of the strait and would challenge Castile's traditional claim to Africa.

Zurara attributed the initiative for this expedition to the desire of the king's three sons, Duarte, Pedro, and Henrique (Henry the Navigator), inspired by the chivalric ideal, to distinguish themselves in combat before receiving knighthood.⁶⁶ Both nobles and merchants were attracted by the possibility of enriching themselves; the desire to propagate the Christian religion and eradicate Islam also played a part. The armada, however, would have to cover about 450–500 miles before reaching Ceuta. The defense of an outpost so far from the Portuguese mainland posed further difficulties.⁶⁷

The Crusade of Ceuta

The fleet of about two hundred ships sailed from Lisbon on 25 July 1415 and stopped briefly at Lagos at the southern tip of Portugal. There, as already mentioned, the royal confessor, in virtue of John XXIII's bull of crusade, granted general absolution to the crusaders. Continuing to Tarifa, the fleet sailed to Ceuta at the eastern end of the strait. Landing there on the morning of 21 August, the Portuguese easily repulsed the Muslims and occupied the city. The great mosque was ritually cleansed with salt and water and consecrated as a Christian church. As the clergy chanted the *Te Deum* and trumpets blared, a triumphant João I knighted his sons. Two church bells that

the Moors had carried off from Lagos were discovered and hung in the mosque.⁶⁸ Leaving a garrison to hold Ceuta, the king sailed for home early in September. Much to the chagrin of the Castilians, Portugal had its first foothold in Africa.

While Christian Europe expressed its elation, the Muslims on both sides of the strait were stunned. Yūsuf III, who had intruded into Moroccan affairs and had thrown his support to a rebel sultan, was especially annoyed. However, his death in 1417 impeded him from taking any action to expel the Portuguese.

Only a few months after the seizure of Ceuta, João I, on 20 October, congratulated Fernando I for battling the Moors and now proposed a joint effort to conquer Granada. The time was propitious inasmuch as Castile, Aragón, and Portugal were at peace and the Naṣrids could not depend on relief from the Marinids, who were weakened by famine and pestilence. From their newly acquired base at Ceuta, the Portuguese would be able to support the Castilians. Fernando I's delay in replying five months later was probably due to his efforts to negotiate an end to the Great Western Schism. Meanwhile he complained to Abū Sa'īd 'Uthmān III about the harsh treatment of Christian merchants from Aragón and Castile and the loss of their property.⁶⁹

On 29 March 1416, an increasingly ill Fernando I commended João I's "great, holy, and noble intention" to cooperate in the conquest of Granada "for the service of God and the extirpation of the enemies of the faith." "Other than the salvation of our soul there is nothing closer to our heart than that conquest," he affirmed, while pointing out that the matter principally concerned his nephew, Juan II, and that he had to consult his co-regent. As he was indisposed, his oldest son signed the letter. On the same day Queen María stated that, once her husband regained his health, he intended to journey to Castile to discuss the matter with Catalina de Lancaster. Perhaps Fernando I, for all his courteous language, was wary of Portuguese involvement in the war against Granada and wished to put off João I with fine words. He surely realized that if the Portuguese participated in the conquest of Granada they would expect some territorial compensation, most probably Gibraltar, which Castile was unlikely to yield. However, his death, four days later, on 2 April 1416, brought those plans to naught. João I subsequently reiterated his offer to Catalina de Lancaster, but she replied that, as a woman, matters of war were not within her province and her son was still under age.⁷⁰

The Achievement of Fernando de Antequera

Had he not been elected king of Aragón in June 1412, it seems reasonable to believe that Fernando de Antequera, who retained the regency for Juan II, would have pressed the war against Granada and perhaps achieved other successes. Fernán Pérez de Guzmán was convinced that "he would no doubt

have conquered” Granada. He added: “If the sins of Castile had not provoked the indignation of our Lord . . . there is little doubt that this noble infante would have put an end to the war and restored Spain in her ancient possession, expelling the Moors and restoring it to the Christians.”⁷¹

Speculation as to what might have been is, however, futile and contributes little to our understanding of historical events. The record tells us that Fernando displayed great resolve in organizing, financing, and sustaining a military operation against Granada for nearly four years from the death of Enrique III until the fall of Antequera. The effort drained the resources of the kingdom and manifested that the conquest of Granada, if it required the siege of one fortress after another, would not be easy. In order to allow Castile to recover from such enormous exertion, he had to conclude a truce with the Moors and, following his election as king of Aragón, extend it for the remainder of his life. The truce also made it impossible for him, even had he wished it, to collaborate with João I against the Moors of Granada or Morocco. Whether anyone realized it or not, by honoring the truce Fernando provided an opportunity for the Portuguese to seize Ceuta. Traditional Castilian claims to hegemony over Granada and Morocco were now seriously in peril. The Portuguese not only began the exploration and colonization of West Africa, but also, from their base at Ceuta, maintained the threat of intrusion into the emirate by the conquest of Gibraltar or Málaga.

Chapter 4

The Failed Crusades of Juan II

During his long reign, Juan II (1406–54), after the death of Fernando I, made only one significant assault on Granada. Although he triumphed on the battlefield of La Higuera in 1431, he failed to reap any benefit. Disinclined to pursue serious warfare, he was distracted by palace intrigues, rivalry among members of the royal family, and discordant relations with the magnates. Even if he had wished to do so, he could not take advantage of Naşrid dynastic upheavals. Despite truces extending over many years, life on the frontier was stressful and uncertain because of raids carried out by both sides. In the absence of strong royal leadership, the war against Granada became a war of pillage and devastation waged by frontier lords, often acting autonomously. For the Naşrid monarchs the period was, as Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada put it, “three quarters of a century between life and death.”¹

Juan II assumed personal responsibility for his kingdom after the death of his regents, Fernando I in 1416, and Catalina de Lancaster two years later. Only thirteen years of age in 1418, he came to be regarded as a man of weak character who had neither aptitude nor interest in government. Although Juan de Mena hailed him as “the great king of Spain, the new Caesar,” Fernán Pérez de Guzmán remarked that “he did not wish to involve himself or to labor for one single hour in governing his realm.”² Eloy Benito Ruano characterized his reign as “a sort of perennial minority” as he submitted to the tutelage of successive magnates whose competition for influence threatened to plunge the kingdom into civil war. Especially troublesome were Fernando I’s sons, the so-called Infantes of Aragón, namely, Juan, who by marriage became king of Navarre in 1420 but spent most of his time in Castile, and Enrique, master of the Order of Santiago. Their older brother Alfonso V (1416–58) had succeeded to the Aragonese throne but was prepared to intervene in Castile whenever they needed him. Standing against them, as a proponent of the untrammelled authority of the crown, was Álvaro de Luna, who steadily gained ascendancy over the king.³

Castile and Granada at Peace

A series of truces extending from 1411 to 1428 assured Castile and Granada of a long interval of peace, interrupted from time to time by border clashes. During that era, Granada was in disorder and decline. Five emirs governed from 1417 to 1454, but in the absence of clearly defined rules of succession rival noble factions took violent action against the reigning monarch and in favor of candidates who seemed most likely to foster their interests.⁴

In 1417 Yūsuf III and Catalina de Lancaster, the surviving regent, agreed to a truce for two years until 16 April 1419. In addition, one hundred Christian captives would be released, “as a present,” but “it should not appear that they were given as tribute.” Fernán Pérez de Guzmán explained that as Fernando I had died, the Moors were no longer fearful of Castilian reprisals. At that time neither Catalina nor her son were prepared to attack Granada. A Castilian representative observed the emir’s oath accepting the accord and received the first group of captives who were to be liberated in three stages.⁵ Yūsuf III’s death in November brought to the throne his eight-year-old son, Muḥammad VIII, al-Sagīr, “el Pequeño,” “the Little One” (1417–19, 1427–29).⁶ His vizier promptly renewed the truce and a similar pact with Alfonso V of Aragón.⁷ Nevertheless, hostile confrontations continued and Juan II complained that ships from Morocco and Granada had attacked Castilian vessels in the strait.⁸

In March 1419 Muḥammad VIII was driven into exile by Muḥammad b. Naṣr, al-Aysar, “el Izquierdo,” or “el Zurdo,” “the Left-handed,” a grandson of Muḥammad V. Fearful of his ambition, Yūsuf III had confined him in the castle of Salobreña.⁹ Francisco Vidal Castro emphasized that this coup ushered in “a period of continuous expulsions, revolts, assassinations, imprisonment of sultans and political instability that added up to a permanent crisis of government in Granada.” The new sultan gained power with the support of the Banū l-Sarrāj family or Abencerrajes, who controlled Guadix and Íllora.¹⁰ The most notable Naṣrid ruler of the fifteenth century, el Izquierdo or Muḥammad IX, reigned in four distinct periods (1419–27, 1429–31, 1432–45, and 1447–53). Although he occupied the throne for nearly thirty years, that was hardly a sign of stability, as adversaries ousted him several times. In order to consolidate his position, he renewed the truce from 18 April 1419 to the same date in 1421.¹¹

Muḥammad IX’s Attack on Ceuta

While committed to peace with Castile, Muḥammad IX, expecting to enhance his stature both at home and in Morocco, determined to expel the Portuguese from Ceuta. From Ceuta Portuguese corsairs raided shipping in the western Mediterranean and also landed troops on the shores of Granada and Morocco

to seize persons, livestock, and property. In 1419, for example, Portuguese vessels returning from Ceuta attempted to sack Cádiz.¹²

Resolved to stamp out this nuisance, el Izquierdo, considering the loss of Ceuta “a dishonor, inasmuch as he was a Moor,” urged the Marinids, who were engaged in civil war, to put aside their differences. According to Zurara, he persuaded them to acknowledge his lordship of Ceuta because it had always belonged to the Naṣrids. In mid-August 1419 his fleet of sixty-four ships landed soldiers who attempted to seize Almina, the eastern sector of the city, while the Moroccans attacked by land. Alerted to the danger by the Castilian *alcaide* of Tarifa, João I dispatched a fleet commanded by his son Henry the Navigator to repel the enemy. In panic, the Granadan ships put out to sea, abandoning the forces on land, who were wounded or put to the sword. In September Henry decided that the security of Ceuta could be assured by seizing Gibraltar on the opposite side of the strait. While he devoted three months to the necessary preparations, his counselors objected, emphasizing that winter was coming on and, most importantly, that Gibraltar pertained “to the conquest of Castile.” Undeterred, Henry proceeded with his plan, but a storm scattered his fleet and forced him to desist. If he had taken Gibraltar, Portugal would have controlled the strait and relations with Castile would have been greatly exacerbated.¹³

Whether Juan II formally protested is unknown but orders were given in 1420 to ready ships in Cádiz for a possible attack on Gibraltar. However that may be, Henry’s exploration of the west coast of Africa in search of a route to Ethiopia was motivated in part by a desire to attack Morocco from the rear. In the meantime, Muḥammad IX, “a man of honorable heart,” was greatly distressed by the failure to regain Ceuta, but he was unable to mount another expedition. In 1421 he appealed to Abū Faris ‘Abd al-Aziz II (1394–1434), the Ḥafṣid emir of Tunis, probably to obtain funds to pay the Castilian tribute, but perhaps also to enlist his aid in recovering Ceuta. Three years later, Ḥafṣid troops advanced to the Marinid frontier while a fleet appeared in the strait, but nothing further was attempted.¹⁴

Martin V’s Crusade

Castile, meanwhile, was in the throes of a dynastic quarrel as Infante Enrique seized the king in the summer of 1420. In November, however, Juan II, through the agency of Álvaro de Luna, regained his freedom. In 1422 Álvaro, intent on thwarting the Infantes of Aragón, ordered Enrique’s arrest on the grounds of treasonable correspondence with the Naṣrids and confiscated his estates. Together with Ruy López Dávalos, constable of Castile, he was accused of encouraging the emir to invade Castile and of ordering the *adelantado mayor* of Murcia to lend his support. Should the Moors threaten Jódar, the *alcaide*

was ordered to make a show of opposition but also to release forty-two Moorish captives.¹⁵ Alfonso V described the charges as “abominable” and “false.”¹⁶ In 1428 Juan II ordered the execution of a scribe accused of falsifying correspondence with Granada and absolved Enrique of any guilt. This episode illustrates the toxic atmosphere of the royal court. Rewarded by appointment as constable of Castile with command over the royal armies, Álvaro, from then on, rather than the king, determined royal policy.¹⁷

During a lull in these familial quarrels, Juan II informed Pope Martin V (1417–30) of his desire to resume the war against Granada. In October 1421 the pope appointed the archbishops of Toledo and Compostela and the bishop of Burgos to preach the crusade; to give the crusader’s cross to all who requested it; and to encourage the faithful to take up arms against the Saracens.¹⁸ Anyone who contributed 8 ducats (approximately 584 *maravedíes*) could also gain the indulgence. Should Juan II grant a truce of no more than six months, the graces of the crusade would continue to be available. The contribution of 8 ducats was a novelty, but as the amount was beyond the reach of ordinary people, Eugene IV (1431–47) reduced it to 5 ducats in 1433 and Nicholas V (1448–55) to 3 ducats in 1448.¹⁹ According to Pedro Carrillo de Huete, the bull declared that anyone who died while serving in the crusade at his own expense would be absolved of both the guilt of sin and the penalty for it. Anyone unable to serve personally who contributed 12 florins (approximately 624 *maravedíes*) would be absolved of his sins.²⁰ Martin V also authorized the use of the *tercias* for defense of the faith, provided that the money was not diverted elsewhere.²¹ Lest the kings assert a perpetual claim to the *tercias*, he required that every twenty years half the amount collected be sent to the papal treasury and the other half to the churches.²² Although the chroniclers do not mention it, it seems likely that the king and his courtiers formally took the cross about this time.

Despite the concession of the crusade, Juan II was in no hurry to act. For his part, Muḥammad IX wished to remain at peace, but given the recent friction in Castile, he asked for a truce for a longer term than usual and for a lesser amount of tribute. As the previous truce expired in April 1421, both sides likely agreed to a suspension of hostilities until a new pact could be drafted. After difficult negotiations, a truce was arranged for three years from 16 July 1421 to 15 July 1424 and the annual tribute was fixed at 13,000 gold *doblas* (about 1,222,000 *maravedíes*). The Marinid emir was included and within six months was expected to submit his written adherence. As before, however, hostile encounters continued. The “Romance de la pérdida de Ben Zalema” related the Castilian victory over Moorish raiders near Antequera.²³

The Cortes of Ocaña in 1422 asked the king to use the Naṣrid tribute to repair fortresses. Complaining, moreover, of continued pillage by the Moors, the procurators requested that local warriors be permitted to keep captured raiders, presumably to be sold as slaves or ransomed, rather than hand them over to the king.²⁴ The truce, renewed for two years from 15 July 1424 to 16

July 1426, repeated many of the terms of the truces of 1410 and 1413, though it allowed free trade between both realms except for the export to Granada of horses, arms, and wheat (the traditional *cosas vedadas*).²⁵

In preparation for his eventual crusade, in January 1425 the king ordered the construction of galleys at Santander. Rather than summon the Cortes to sanction a levy of 1,395,532 *maravedíes*, however, he requested the towns ordinarily represented in the Cortes to do so individually. In October, when he asked the Cortes of Palenzuela for funds, the procurators, after protesting that the towns were impoverished by the king's conflict with the nobles, authorized 12 *monedas* and 1.50 *pedidos* or a total of 38,000,000 *maravedíes* to be spent solely on the crusade.²⁶

Nevertheless, the resumption of fighting within the royal family and war with Aragón and Navarre delayed any crusading effort. When order was restored in 1427, the king directed Enrique, master of Santiago, and the *adelantado mayor* of Murcia to halt Moorish depredations in violation of the truce.²⁷ When the truce expired in July 1426, it was likely renewed for two years until July 1428.

Another Naşrid Alteration of Power

Castile's dynastic upheavals during these years were mirrored in Granada. In January 1427 Muḥammad VIII, el Pequeño, who had been driven from power and imprisoned eight years before, recovered the throne, forcing his adversary, Muḥammad IX, el Izquierdo, to flee to Tunis.²⁸ When el Pequeño sought Castilian recognition, Juan II, concerned about war with Aragón, renewed the truce from 16 February 1427 to 16 February 1429. Early in December 1428 he alerted Murcia to the possible resumption of hostilities.²⁹ In order to avert a war that might cost him his throne, el Pequeño, in April 1429, requested a truce for four or five years and proposed an alliance against Aragón and Navarre. Juan II, unwilling to grant him a respite in a time of perceived weakness, demanded the release of all Christian captives and offered a truce of only six months to a year. His councilors asserted that the projected war was "good and holy and would fulfill the service of God and the king." The royal accountants estimated that, in addition to 30,000,000 *maravedíes* required for other royal obligations, 45,000,000 would be needed for the wages of troops, supplies, weapons, and materials, and to arm a fleet. The Cortes of Valladolid granted 15 *monedas* and 1.50 *pedidos* or 45,000,000 *maravedíes*.³⁰

Given the threat of war with Aragón and Navarre, however, the royal council advised the king to grant el Pequeño a truce for the shortest possible term. Commercial interchange between the two realms was reopened and steps were taken to collect the *diezmo y medio diezmo de lo morisco*, that is, 10.5 percent levied on livestock and merchandise (excluding the *cosas vedadas*)

traded with Granada.³¹

Meanwhile, Muḥammad IX's supporters were working to bring about his restoration. His former vizier, Yūsuf b. al-Sarrāj, in November 1428 persuaded Juan II to appeal to Abū Fāris of Tunis to permit the exile to return to Spain. Moreover, Alfonso V, who had enjoyed close relations with the deposed monarch, turned a deaf ear to Muḥammad VIII's pleas for recognition and facilitated el Izquierdo's restoration. In May 1429 he crossed from Oran to Vera, near Huércal, on the eastern coast, where he was acknowledged as emir. As he advanced on Granada at the end of December, el Pequeño took refuge in the Alhambra, where he was besieged for the next six months. Both men turned to Juan II, who affirmed that because Muḥammad IX delayed his return he had granted a truce to el Pequeño and could not violate it. The matter was resolved when Muḥammad VIII surrendered the Alhambra in March 1430. He and his brother were incarcerated at Salobreña, the customary prison for dissident Naṣrids.³²

Muḥammad IX now began the second stage of his reign (1429–31).³³ At the end of April he requested a truce and offered assistance in Juan II's war against Aragón and Navarre. Pedro Carrillo de Huete explained, however, that as "God would not be pleased if the king received help from the enemies of the faith" in the shedding of Christian blood, Juan II and Álvaro de Luna, who were intent on waging war against Granada, rejected the proposal. Concluding a truce on 16 July with Alfonso V and the Infantes of Aragón, Juan II was free to deal more harshly with Granada.³⁴ Offering a truce of one year, he demanded that Muḥammad IX pay a tribute greater than any paid in the previous twenty to thirty years, acknowledge his vassalage, and liberate all Christian captives. He fully expected the emir to object to those terms, but put them forward in order to have a cause for war. As expected, el Izquierdo rejected those onerous demands and aligned himself with Aragón. As it was August and too late to mount an offensive, the king instructed his frontier commanders to prepare for war and to enforce Enrique III's ordinance of 1396 concerning the maintenance of horses for combat. He also summoned his vassals for the following March.³⁵

Both sides agreed to a brief truce in 1430, but Juan II and Álvaro de Luna, taking advantage of the absence of the Infantes of Aragón in Italy, planned an offensive in the following spring "against the enemies of our holy Catholic faith." In addition to truces with Aragón and Portugal, Juan II persuaded Abū Fāris of Tunis to remain neutral and to halt the shipment of food to Granada. Chastising el Izquierdo, the emir urged him to pay tribute to Castile as his ancestors had done. The Marinid emir, 'Abd al-Haqq II (1420–65), also vowed neutrality.³⁶

The urban procurators summoned to Salamanca in the fall of 1430 declared that the war was just and approved a levy of 45,000,000 *maravedies* in the form of 15 *monedas* and 1.50 *pedidos*. In January 1431 the Cortes of Palencia, complaining of fraud, urged the king to demand that the required number of soldiers summoned should arrive on the assigned date.³⁷ While banning the

export of contraband goods to Granada, the king authorized Álvaro de Luna to proceed to the frontier.³⁸ Fadrique, admiral of Castile, who was ordered to deploy twenty galleys in the strait, performed a vigil of arms in the cathedral of Seville, and, receiving the royal standard, pledged homage and fealty to the king. Further reports of the fleet's activities are lacking, probably because the Marinids made no attempt to assist the Naṣrids.³⁹ The Castilians raided the plain of Granada and the vicinity of Ronda in the fall of 1430, but a harsh winter forced them to defer hostilities until the end of February 1431. In March they seized Jimena de la Frontera, a fortress strategically situated several miles directly north of Gibraltar. El Izquierdo, angered by that loss and fearful that the Castilians would attempt to restore Muḥammad VIII, ordered his execution at Salobreña.⁴⁰

The Crusade of La Higuera

Eugene IV, responding to Juan II's plea, proclaimed a crusade on 13 June 1431. As Granada was a grave affront to Christendom, he declared that Christians everywhere should strive to subjugate it to the true faith. He appointed Cardinal Alfonso Carrillo as his legate to lead a crusade "for the acquisition of the emirate of Granada" so that "this impediment would be removed from the midst of the faithful" and the infidels would be converted to the true faith. The notion of conversion (expressed here for the first time that I know) placed a new emphasis on the purpose of crusading. In earlier centuries kings had spoken of expelling the Moors, but now the pope was calling for their conversion.⁴¹ The cardinal was also instructed to preach the crusade throughout Castile and to remind public officials to assist the king. Crusaders could gain the indulgence granted for the crusade to the Holy Land and would enjoy papal protection and immunity. An indulgence of forty days was offered to listeners of crusade sermons. Moreover, the bishops would be asked for a subsidy of 100,000 florins of Aragón (about 5,200,000 *maravedíes*) to be used solely for the crusade. Should the Christian kings of Spain quarrel, the legate and Cardinal Domingo Ram, another Spaniard, were commissioned to arrange a truce so the crusade might continue.⁴²

The campaign was carried out in two phases, an initial incursion by Álvaro de Luna in the spring, followed by a joint operation under the king's titular leadership in June-July. In mid-April Juan II performed the vigil of arms in the cathedral of Toledo before the altar of Our Lady of the Pillar. After mass the next day, Álvaro's sword and coat of arms, the royal standard, and the banners of Santiago and the Order of the Band or Scarf were blessed. In early May, the constable, with three thousand *rocines* and *jinetes* (heavy and light cavalry) and five thousand foot, marched from Córdoba to Alcalá la Real, a few miles north of Granada. Passing by Íllora, he entered the plain of Granada. As

raiders plundered and burned the surrounding fields, he challenged Muḥammad IX to meet him. Ignored by the Naṣrid, he despoiled the valley of the River Genil as far as Loja and Archidona. After celebrating Easter (1 April) at Antequera, he planned to move against Málaga, but, as supplies were running low, he returned to Córdoba.⁴³

There, on 3 June, Eugene IV's crusading bull was read in the cathedral and the symbol of the crusade, a white flag with a red cross, was blessed. After listening to a sermon, the king placed the crusader's cross on his breast and gave it to forty or fifty knights. As he deliberated about possible objectives, a renegade Christian assured him that if he advanced on Granada, Yūsuf ibn al-Mawl, a grandson of Muḥammad VI, el Rey Bermejo, would welcome him. Leaving Córdoba on 13 June, he proceeded to the village of Atarfe, about three miles west of the capital. There Ibn al-Mawl kissed his hand in homage and promised to serve him as his vassal, if he helped him gain the Naṣrid throne to which, he alleged, he had a better right than el Izquierdo.⁴⁴

Skirmishes tested both sides, but on 1 July a large Moorish force of cavalry and infantry came out of Granada to give battle. While Álvaro de Luna commanded the vanguard, the king held the center, and other contingents guarded the flanks. Shouting "Santiago," the Castilians, with trumpets blaring, and the banners of the king, the crusade, and the Order of the Band leading the way, advanced "to strike the enemies of the holy Catholic faith." As cavalry clashed, Álvaro broke through the enemy ranks and the Moors, quickly overwhelmed, fled in all directions with the Castilians on their heels. "If night had not fallen," remarked Álgar García, "the massacre of the Moors would have been much greater." When the king and the constable returned to their encampment the clergy, with crosses held on high and singing the *Te Deum* and *Vexilla regis prodeunt*, came in procession to meet them. Dismounting, the king venerated the cross and thanked God for the victory. Later he ordered all the cities and towns to hold processions in thanksgiving for the victory God had given him over "the enemies of the faith."⁴⁵

The battle occurred at La Higueruela near Atarfe, where a municipal park was dedicated to the victory in 2007. Carrillo de Huete estimated the Castilian army at ten thousand knights and fifty thousand foot soldiers, plus one thousand knights and five thousand foot soldiers from Seville. Pérez de Guzmán asserted that the Naṣrids had five thousand knights and two hundred thousand infantry; the latter, an impossible number, may have been closer to twenty thousand. Muḥammad IX did not participate in the battle.⁴⁶

Most of Juan II's councilors, convinced that the Moors were thoroughly cowed, urged him to remain before Granada for two or three months in the expectation that Muḥammad IX would submit. Others argued that a protracted siege would require immense resources of money and men and that it made better sense to withdraw and resume the campaign later. The magnates' animosity toward Álvaro de Luna flared up again and the rumor spread that the Moors had bribed him to pull out. An earthquake that shook the royal

encampment and the city probably also convinced the king to retreat. Álvaro García commented that he withdrew lest “the war within his host should be worse than [the war] against the enemy.” Entering Córdoba on 21 July, he was greeted with great joy by the bishop, clergy, and citizenry, and gave thanks for his triumph. A few weeks later he received a similar welcome in Toledo.⁴⁷

Juan II informed the pope of his triumph but also explained why he could not continue the crusade. Eugene IV authorized a religious celebration throughout Castile on 1 July in commemoration of the victory, which even attracted the attention of the Byzantine historian Laonicos Calcocondylas.⁴⁸ More than a century later Philip II had a fresco depicting the battle painted in the Sala de Batallas in El Escorial. Sketches from the fifteenth century apparently were used.⁴⁹ While Juan II and Álvaro de Luna gained a measure of glory, the battle had scant strategic importance. Neither the king nor the constable ever again participated directly in the reconquest. Henceforth their policy was to encourage division among the Naṣrids, demanding tribute and an acknowledgment of vassalage, and keeping the frontier in a constant state of tension by granting truces for limited terms.

The Brief Reign of Yūsuf IV

Juan II, who had resolved to keep Granada in an unsettled state that would eventually lead to its collapse, acknowledged Ibn al-Mawl as emir and as a royal vassal.⁵⁰ At Ardales on 16 September, the pretender recognized the king as his suzerain, promising, as a faithful vassal, to render three months’ military service with 1,500 knights. If the king personally commanded his army, he would serve but would not owe tribute during that year. He also pledged to attend the Cortes if it were held south of Toledo or, if north of the city, to be represented by his son. He would also pay an annual tribute of 20,000 gold *doblas*, liberate all Christian captives within a month, and deter them from converting to Islam.⁵¹

With the aim of installing Ibn al-Mawl on the Naṣrid throne, the master of Calatrava and the *adelantado de la frontera* received the submission of several villages south of Jaén and in the region of Antequera and Ronda. After a stiff resistance, Loja, directly west of Granada, recognized Ibn al-Mawl on 3 December and neighboring Iznajar and Archidona did so on the next day. An uprising in Granada impelled Muḥammad IX to flee, while Ibn al-Mawl entered in triumph on 1 January 1432 to reign, however briefly, as Yūsuf IV (1432). Thanking Juan II for his support, he also reported that the *adelantado de la frontera* soon expected to have el Izquierdo in custody. Castilian vessels in the strait were alerted to prevent his escape by sea. The ousted monarch had decapitated two sons of the dead Muḥammad VIII, lest they challenge him at a later date.⁵² Confirming the treaty concluded at Ardales, on 27 January Yūsuf

IV promised to pay an annual tribute and to fulfill his duties of vassalage.⁵³

The story of Yūsuf IV's installation was recounted in the ballad "Abenámar, Abenámar." The romance begins with a dialogue between Juan II and Abenámar or Ibn 'Umar, an emissary of Ibn al-Mawl. When the king inquired about the gleaming castles in the distance, Abenámar identified them as the Alhambra and the palace of Alijares. Addressing Granada as a beautiful woman, Juan II asked her to be his bride and offered Córdoba, Seville, Jerez, and much more as her dowry. She replied, however, that she was already married and the Moor, her husband, was prepared to defend her. When Juan II's cannons bombarded the walls, the Moor had to surrender. Pledging vassalage and tribute, he sent three cart-loads of gold to the king, who returned to Castile. The poem, of course, fails to distinguish between Muḥammad IX and Yūsuf IV, but it does affirm the latter's acceptance of vassalage and promise to pay tribute.⁵⁴

Yūsuf IV's reign was short-lived. Alfonso V offered to assist Muḥammad IX in recovering his throne.⁵⁵ When Abū Fāris of Tunis asked Juan II to reconsider his position, the latter pointed out that el Izquierdo had refused to negotiate and had turned to his enemies.⁵⁶ Meantime, Gibraltar, Ronda, and Setenil returned to their previous allegiance to the exiled monarch. In February 1432 el Izquierdo's nephew, Yūsuf b. Aḥmad, known to the Castilians as "el Cojo" or "the Lame," advanced on Granada. Yūsuf IV, faced with revolt, appealed for help to the Castilians, but in March el Cojo routed the *adelantado mayor de la frontera* near La Higuera and also repulsed the master of Calatrava.⁵⁷ Yūsuf IV was soon overcome and handed over to el Izquierdo, who ordered his execution in April. Muḥammad IX now began his third reign (1432–45).⁵⁸

A Crusading War of Attrition

In the ensuing years both sides waged a war of attrition until a truce was concluded in 1439. Juan II, still determined to prosecute the war, persuaded the procurators assembled at Medina del Campo in October 1431 to grant a subsidy of 45,000,000 *maravedíes*, distributed in 15 *monedas* and 1.50 *pedidos*, payable in the first four months of the coming year and used only for the crusade. The king also farmed out for three years the collection of the *alcabala* and the *tercias*. Fourteen tax farmers promised to pay the crown 5,000,000 *maravedíes* more than was customary for one year.⁵⁹ In January 1432, Juan II, responding to a petition of the Cortes of Zamora, agreed to use the Naṣrid tribute solely to repair the walls of frontier towns and castles. The Cortes also regulated the obligation to render military service and provide war materials, and the repayment of loans taken by the crown to finance the war.⁶⁰ Even though the subsidy previously approved was not spent on the war, the Cortes of Madrid in January 1433 granted an additional 45,000,000 *maravedíes*.⁶¹

Lest the benefits of the crusading bull be diminished, the king, on 4 April 1433, instructed the prelates and municipalities not to request any other papal indulgence. In further support of the crusade, Eugene IV, on 1 May, ordered the clergy to contribute 100,000 gold florins of Aragón; reduced to 5 ducats the contribution needed to gain the indulgence; extended the validity of the bull during a truce to a full year; and forbade the preaching of other general indulgences while the crusade was in progress. Furthermore, he condemned merchants trafficking in arms and other war materials with the Moors.⁶² In June 1435 the pope sent a golden rose to the king, perhaps as a goad to get on with the crusade. In August, Rupert, lord of Walsau in Switzerland, hoping to gain the crusading indulgence, arrived with a company of knights. After engaging the Moors, he knighted twenty of his men and then returned home.⁶³

The crusade, a minor affair in which neither the king nor the constable participated, was reduced to skirmishes, raids, and the seizure of a few places. In the summer of 1433, frontier captains pillaged the countryside about Guadix and Íllora. As they approached Granada, they challenged Muḥammad IX to give battle, even offering him 20,000 *doblas*. As he ignored them, they continued their rampage toward Málaga. Other contingents seized Benamaurel and Benzalema near Baza on the northeastern edge of the Naṣrid realm, and destroyed several towers and fortresses.⁶⁴ In 1434 the Moors repulsed the Castilians at Álora between Ronda and Málaga where Diego Gómez de Ribera, *adelantado mayor de la frontera*, was killed.⁶⁵ The romance “Álora, la bien cercada” relates that a Moor, standing on the walls and armed with a crossbow, offered to surrender. When Diego lifted his visor, the Moor fired a bolt that pierced his head. Menéndez Pidal praised the “imaginative and emotional simplicity” of this romance, whose swift narration brings the episode to life. Suárez Fernández remarked that “these years are the golden age of the frontier romances, a mirror of a situation that converted the frontier into a practical school of war.”⁶⁶ In November the Castilians seized Huéscar near the Murcian border, but in the following March the master of Alcántara suffered a grievous defeat near Écija. The Castilians responded in May by pillaging about Guadix. In 1436 they seized Vélez Blanco and Vélez Rubio west of Lorca, and Galera and Castillejar south of Huéscar. However, their failure to capture Huelma southeast of Jaén and the defeat of the knights of Alcántara at Ubrique west of Ronda offset that success.⁶⁷

In the meantime, the appearance of Portuguese ships before Gibraltar prodded Enrique Pérez de Guzmán, count of Niebla, to attempt to wrest the port from Naṣrid hands. While his son, with two hundred knights and one thousand foot, attacked by land, the count sailed with two thousand men from Sanlúcar de Barrameda to Gibraltar. He stormed the beach at low tide on 31 August 1436, but as the tide came in he withdrew to his ships and died trying to save some of his men from drowning. The romance “Dad me nuevas, cavalleros” recorded that “the good count of Niebla has drowned in the waves” as his boat capsized.⁶⁸

Although Muḥammad IX's position seemed to be improved when the last partisans of Yūsuf IV left the Castilian court and withdrew to Tunis, he still had to contend with opposition closer to home. Disgruntled Moors in Baza and Guadix, angered by his inability to halt Castilian raids, appealed to Juan II to appoint another ruler. They were clearly disappointed, however, when he demanded that they surrender and admit his troops. He also instructed his frontier commanders to resume the devastation of Granada and ordered towns to prepare their militias and gather necessary food and supplies.⁶⁹

Eugene IV's Crusade

Informed of the ongoing struggle, in 1437 Eugene IV granted the *decima* and appointed Cardinal Giordano of San Lorenzo in Damaso as his legate to preach the crusade, offering the indulgence, the traditional privileges of papal immunity and protection, and freedom from usury. The legate and his deputies were authorized to celebrate the divine office in places under interdict, to absolve crusaders for illicit trade with the Saracens, striking the clergy, committing the crimes of arson and sacrilege, and failing to fulfill vows to visit the Holy Land. They could also permit clergy to receive sacred orders even though subject to ecclesiastical censure. In each case the interested parties had to satisfy those they had injured and to serve personally in the crusade or send substitutes. Preachers could also resolve disputes over benefices, commute vows of fasting and pilgrimage, and oblige crusaders to fulfill their vow or redeem it in case of an impediment.⁷⁰

Despite those concessions, the crusade accomplished little, although Castilian marauders pillaged the plain of Granada at will.⁷¹ However, as recurring opposition by the Infantes of Aragón made it impossible to take action against Granada, the king agreed to a truce.⁷² In his name, Iñigo López de Mendoza, the future marquess of Santillana, arranged an accord on 4 April 1439, whereby Muḥammad IX pledged to pay 24,000 gold *doblas* as tribute and to free 550 captives, 30 of whom would be designated by Juan II. Payment of the tribute and release of the prisoners would take place in three stages in Granada in the presence of Castilian emissaries.⁷³ The truce (which included the Marinids) would extend from 15 April 1439 to 16 April 1442. Traditional clauses provided for the settlement of frontier disputes, the disposition of escaped captives, and commercial exchange. Castile promised to permit free trade through Huelma, Alcalá la Real, Zahara, and Antequera, and also to allow one thousand cattle and seven thousand sheep to cross the frontier every year. Castilian representatives traveled to Granada to witness el Izquierdo's oath of ratification.⁷⁴ The sultan paid the tribute in three installments of 8,000 gold *doblas* each on 30 July 1440, 22 April 1441, and 30 December 1441. Captives similarly were released in 1439, 1440, and 1441.⁷⁵

As the expiration date approached, in October 1441 Juan II warned the frontier towns to prepare for war.⁷⁶ Considering that possibility, Muḥammad IX appealed to the Egyptian sultan for help in the “holy war.” Given the distance from Al-Andalus, the sultan declined to provide military or naval assistance, but he did send money and weapons. Nevertheless, in February 1442, el Izquierdo, still anxious for peace, requested an extension of the truce for four years. Although Juan II was hardly disposed to take up arms, he delayed his response for a year. Thus, the truce evidently lapsed after 16 April 1442, but, aside from minor confrontations, neither side took the offensive.⁷⁷

In March 1443 Juan II announced the prolongation of the truce for three years until 15 April 1446. El Izquierdo promised to pay 32,000 gold *doblas* as tribute in four installments of 8,000 each (July and October 1443, October 1444, and October 1445). In 1439 the amount had been 24,000, but the new treaty stipulated that the “*doblas valadíes buenas de peso*” of 1439 would be replaced by “*doblas de la banda*” coined by Juan II in 1442. In addition to the release of 733 prisoners, “all the Christians living in the land of the Moors who wish to depart for the land of the Christians shall be given permission to do so.”⁷⁸ Those Christians obviously were not captives. Many Christians lived in Granada, including merchants and soldiers who formed a guard in the service of the emirs. Perhaps some were renegades who had abandoned their faith but had since changed their minds and wanted to return home. José Enrique López de Coca Castañer suggested that some might have been followers of the Franciscan Friar Alonso de Mella, who rejected his faith and went into exile to Granada.⁷⁹ Muḥammad IX apparently fulfilled his tributary obligation, except for the final payment because he was overthrown in 1445.

That year witnessed Álvaro de Luna’s triumph over the Infantes of Aragón at Olmedo. When Infante Enrique died of his wounds, Álvaro claimed the mastership of Santiago, which Enrique had held for many years. Soon, however, new challengers to Álvaro’s supremacy appeared and the regime of intrigue and conspiracy that had disturbed the peace for so many years continued.⁸⁰

The Question of Portuguese-Castilian Collaboration Against Granada

As Juan II and Álvaro personally disengaged from the crusade and settled into a prolonged truce with Muḥammad IX, Portugal presented an unexpected challenge to Castilian aspirations in Granada and Africa. Initially, after settling long-standing differences in 1431, João I proposed a combined effort against Granada.⁸¹ His son Henry the Navigator was especially eager to mount an expedition. However, Duarte, the king’s eldest son, who assumed greater responsibility as his father aged, was reluctant and solicited the opinions of his

brothers João and Afonso, count of Barcelos (the king's illegitimate son), and the latter's sons, Afonso, count of Ourém, and Fernando, count of Arraiolos. In the spring of 1432 they responded. No written opinion by Infante Pedro, the king's second son, is extant, but in 1425 he had expressed the view that Ceuta was a "sewer draining off men, arms, and money." In 1436 he indicated his opposition to Henry's plans.⁸²

Infante João emphasized that an expedition would require heavy taxation that would be unpopular given the poor economic situation. Arguing that rulers ought not to burden their people unduly, especially if the war was unjust, he asserted that a crusade was justifiable only when the crusaders acted solely out of spiritual motives. Personal glory or financial gain could not justify Christians killing Moors. Moreover, he doubted that there was any biblical foundation for the argument that the pope, out of the plenitude of his power, could dispose of lands never under Christian rule that were held by infidels posing no threat to Christians. The infidels could only be converted by persuasion, not by force. Given the excessive expense of maintaining Ceuta, other conquests in Morocco would only worsen the financial burden. He also wondered whether Castile might intervene in Portugal while the Portuguese were busy in Morocco. On the other hand, he acknowledged that the chivalric ideal might attract men to a crusade. As the conquest of Granada pertained to Castile, however, he contended that Portugal should confine itself to Morocco. In view of the complexity of the matter, he concluded that Duarte ought to decide it himself.

Afonso, count of Barcelos, emphasized the harmful impact on the economy, the disruption of overseas trade, and the diversion of farm laborers to service in the army. In addition, he noted that the financial drain of sustaining Ceuta would be exacerbated by further intervention in Morocco. Questioning whether a Moroccan crusade might succeed, he argued that an unprovoked assault could not be pleasing to God, especially as it would greatly injure the Portuguese people. On the other hand, he suggested that God might be served by the destruction of Naşrid Granada, the cause of so much strife in the past. His son Fernando of Arraiolos also rejected further intrusion in Morocco, principally on financial and economic grounds, but he agreed that if Henry collaborated with Castile, he might be able to subjugate Granada and also obtain a clear title to the Canary Islands. If Henry undertook any action in Morocco, particularly an assault on Tangier or Arcila, Afonso of Ourém proposed that he do so at his own expense. He preferred joint action with Castile against Granada, arguing that God would be content, provided that the Portuguese did not demand any recompense and handed over whatever places were taken to Juan II. His suggestion that Duarte should lead the Portuguese forces participating in such a campaign reflects a lack of confidence in Henry's political or military abilities, apparently shared by all the respondents.

In the end, a Moroccan expedition was set aside. In July 1432 João I proposed to collaborate with Castile in the conquest of Granada, but Juan II

failed to respond positively. After the death of his father, Duarte (1433–38) made a similar offer in the spring of 1434, with no greater success.⁸³ Although both kingdoms had cooperated in the past, times had changed and the Castilians feared that the Portuguese, with a foothold in Ceuta, intended to seize Gibraltar. Castile's rejection of Portuguese assistance in conquering Granada left only Africa and the Canary Islands as a zone for Portuguese exploitation.

Portuguese Plans for an African Crusade

The ongoing exploration and settlement of the Canary Islands raised questions as to the ultimate rights of Castile and Portugal in Africa. The efforts at settlement by Béthencourt and de la Salle ultimately proved unsuccessful, opening the way for other adventurers. Thus, in 1418 Enrique de Guzmán, count of Niebla, purchased a share in the Islands. Two years later Juan II granted Alfonso de las Casas the right to conquer any islands not already occupied by other Christians.⁸⁴ In the expectation that the Islands would be “reduced to the Catholic faith” and that the king would “recognize that supreme dominion over [them] belongs to the said Roman see,” Martin V confirmed the royal concession in 1421.⁸⁵

Recognizing the importance of the Canaries as a base for exploring the African coast, Henry the Navigator asked Juan II's permission to occupy those islands not previously settled. In so doing, he implicitly acknowledged Castilian rights to certain islands, but Alfonso de Cartagena, Juan II's ambassador to Portugal, insisted on Castile's sovereignty over all.⁸⁶ Responding to complaints that the Guanches or native Canarians were being enslaved, Eugene IV in 1434 demanded their liberation and required all Christian rulers to prohibit future enslavement.⁸⁷ Although no papal bull banning all attempts at conquest is extant, the Portuguese seem to have believed that Eugene IV had issued such a document. Hoping to change the pope's mind, Duarte's envoys in 1436 argued that the Guanches lived like wild animals, without religion, law, or polity, and that Henry intended to convert them and provide them with civil laws and government. Citing the papal plenitude of power, Duarte requested the pope to permit the conquest of those islands not yet occupied by Christians and to confirm Portuguese rights to those already under their control.⁸⁸ In effect, Portugal would undertake not only to convert the pagan Guanches but also to civilize them, whether they wanted it or not.

Duarte also sought the pope's counsel concerning a crusade against Tangier in North Africa. Once it was taken, Portugal would control the two seaports traditionally used by the Moroccans to invade Spain. Justifying an African crusade, Henry declared that a war undertaken in God's service was

just, right, and reasonable. In response to the royal query, Eugene IV affirmed that he could authorize an attack on lands once belonging to Christians but now ruled by infidels; but lands never held by Christians could not be occupied if the infidels did no harm to Christians. Nevertheless, for the salvation of souls, the pope could empower a Christian prince to dispossess an infidel ruler. Thus, he proclaimed an African crusade on 8 September 1436.⁸⁹ He also authorized the conquest of islands in the Canary archipelago still inhabited by pagans. When Juan II protested that the Canaries pertained to Castile, the pope restricted his concession so as not to derogate from Castilian rights.⁹⁰ Furthermore, Eugene IV acknowledged Juan II's claim that as his ancestors had once possessed many African castles and cities their conquest belonged to him. Reissuing the crusading bull on 30 April 1437, the pope declared that he did not intend to prejudice Castilian rights in Africa.⁹¹

Castilian Rights in the Council of Basel and the Crusade of Tangier

Thwarted by papal ambiguity, Duarte requested the Council of Basel to grant the crusading indulgence to the inhabitants of Ceuta and other African places that might be conquered. When Juan II insisted on his rights, the Portuguese stated that they would not interfere with any conquest belonging to Castile.⁹²

The task of articulating Castilian rights before the council fell to Alfonso García de Santa María, better known as Alfonso de Cartagena, bishop of Burgos (1435–56). In 1434, in a dispute over precedence with the English representative, he repeated a thirteenth-century argument that the kings of Spain had never been subject to the Roman Empire and had ripped their kingdoms from the teeth of the infidels.⁹³ By warring incessantly against the Moors, the Castilian monarchs extended the bounds of Christendom, exalted the Catholic faith, and destroyed the cursed sect of Muḥammad. Persuaded by his arguments, the council awarded precedence to Castile.⁹⁴ Declaring that the kings of Castile, as heirs of the Visigoths, could rightfully claim supremacy over the entire Iberian Peninsula, Alfonso also asserted that “the conquest of that overseas region of Africa, formerly called Tingitana [whose capital was Tangier], and today Benamarín [a reference to the Marinids], and of . . . the Canary Islands pertains” to the king of Castile and “no one else may justly undertake it without his permission.” Therefore, he urged the pope to revoke all concessions to Portugal.⁹⁵

Alfonso's reference to Tangier was timely because Henry the Navigator proposed a crusade against that port. Once again Duarte sought his brothers' opinions. Infante João argued that, whereas “the conquest of Granada pertained to the king of Castile,” a war against the Marinids was “reasonable, convenient and legitimate.” In contrast, the count of Barcelos opposed the

expedition. Infante Pedro also acknowledged Castile's prior right to conquer Granada. A war against the Moors, the enemies of the faith, was good in itself, he admitted, provided that it did not cause greater damage to the Portuguese, whose resources were severely limited. Warning the king "not to become involved at any time in this war in Africa," he averred that it was a certainty that "Portugal would be lost and Africa would not be gained." Despite that, the king gave his consent.⁹⁶

Accompanied by his youngest brother, Fernando, who had not participated in the crusade of Ceuta because of his age, Henry sailed from Lisbon in August 1437, landing at Ceuta early in September. As he advanced westward to Tangier, the Marinids cut him off from his ships and he had to surrender on 16 October. Though allowed to depart, he had to promise to yield Ceuta and, as surety, leave Fernando in Marinid custody.⁹⁷

Hoping to liberate Fernando, Duarte appealed to the Council of Basel to renew thirteenth-century crusading privileges. However, Alfonso de Cartagena protested that "all the lands which the Saracens and other infidels hold in the regions of Spain on this side of the sea and also beyond in that province . . . formerly called Tingitana and today Benamarín, and the islands adjacent to it, belong to the most serene king of Castile and León." In effect, he denied any Portuguese right to the conquest of Granada, Tangier, and the Canary Islands. In May 1438 a commission appointed by the council rejected Duarte's request and urged him to engage the Saracens elsewhere so that he would not intrude on Castilian rights.⁹⁸ Neither the council nor Eugene IV made any further pronouncement on the matter.

Whereas Fernando urged Duarte to surrender Ceuta so he could be set at liberty, others, including Henry, and the Cortes of Leiria in 1438 insisted on retaining it. In the end, the king acquiesced in that view. Muḥammad IX sent his envoys to Fez in 1441 to guarantee the surrender of Ceuta in return for Fernando's liberation. Nevertheless, Fernando remained a prisoner at Fez, where he toiled as a slave until his death eleven years later.⁹⁹ Duarte died in September 1438, a victim of the plague, and left the throne to his six-year-old son, Afonso V (1438–81).

Despite the catastrophe at Tangier, Henry continued to press the exploration and colonization of the Atlantic islands and the west coast of Africa. At his urging, the regent, his brother Pedro, duke of Coimbra, asked Eugene IV to proclaim a crusade against the Moors in Africa. While acceding to that request, the pope again upheld Castilian rights. As a countermove, in 1449 Juan II granted Juan de Guzmán, duke of Medina Sidonia, dominion over the West African coast directly opposite the Canary Islands from Cape Aguer to Cape Bojador.¹⁰⁰ The king also protested Portuguese activities in the Canary Islands because they belonged "to our dominion and the royal crown of our kingdoms."¹⁰¹ When Afonso V responded that he could do nothing, Juan II repeated his claim and complained that the Portuguese plundered Castilian merchants bringing merchandise from Guinea, which, he said, was also "our

conquest.” He did not intend to yield either the Canary Islands or Guinea, but his death three months later altered the situation.¹⁰²

Tumult in the Emirate of Granada

Just as Castile was torn apart again by civil war, so too was Granada. In 1445 Muḥammad IX’s autocratic rule roused the opposition of Yūsuf b. Aḥmad, el Cojo, governor of Almería. Until recently el Cojo, on the basis of Castilian sources, had been described as Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān, ruling as Muḥammad X (1445/1446–47), but Roser Salicrú i Lluch and Francisco Vidal Castro have shown that to be erroneous.¹⁰³ They based their judgment on an eyewitness account by Ibn ‘Āsim (d. 1453), written about 1450 and dedicated to Muḥammad IX.¹⁰⁴ El Cojo, according to Ibn ‘Āsim, was Muḥammad IX’s nephew, Yūsuf b. Aḥmad. The sultan, angered by el Cojo’s increasingly independent conduct, laid siege to Almería but had to withdraw. Proclaiming himself as sultan, Yūsuf V (1445–46) was soon acknowledged by Guadix and other towns, and he quickly recognized Juan II as his suzerain. Muḥammad IX abdicated, but his nephew allowed him to dwell in the Alhambra and to retain possession of Salobreña and Motril.¹⁰⁵

In the summer the Naṣrid prince Abū l-Walīd Ismā‘īl, a refugee in the Castilian court, where he was known as Ismael, challenged Yūsuf V. Contemporary Castilian historians mistakenly identified Ismā‘īl as Yūsuf V. Invited by the Abencerrajes, Ismā‘īl, after asking Juan II’s permission and promising to acknowledge his vassalage, went to Cambil southeast of Jaén but then had to retreat to Castile.¹⁰⁶ In February 1446, however, Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abd al-Barr, a former vizier of Muḥammad IX, welcomed him to Guadix and within a few days Yūsuf V took refuge in Almería while Muḥammad IX withdrew to Salobreña. Thus, in the space of a year, Granada had its third monarch, Ismā‘īl III (1446–47). Little is known of his background, but he may have been Yūsuf V’s uncle.

Despite his ouster, Yūsuf V recovered Benamaurel and Benzalema near Baza, both of which had been seized by the Castilians in the previous decade. According to Pérez de Guzmán, those towns were lost because of insufficient funds to maintain a garrison and the failure of Jaén, Úbeda, and Baeza to send aid. Rumor also had it that Enrique, Prince of Asturias, who quarreled with his father, ordered those towns not to send relief. Perhaps there was some truth to that, as Juan II, responding to Ismā‘īl III’s pleas, indicated that “some Christians, my rebels,” were aiding Yūsuf V. The rumor may have been intended to blacken Enrique’s character, but, if true, it betrays a lack of responsibility on his part. Taking advantage of the turbulence in Castile, Yūsuf V’s soldiers in 1447 recovered Arenas, Huéscar, Vélez Blanco, and Vélez Rubio, all of which had been previously occupied by the Castilians. Given the

expense, the king had neglected to fortify many places and some of his councilors argued that it was better to lose them than to incur the cost of retention.¹⁰⁷ Thus the eastern frontier returned to where it had been at the death of Fernando I.

Persistent border warfare required the continual outlay of funds. In January 1447 the Cortes of Madrigal granted Juan II 20,000,000 *maravedíes* for several purposes, including assistance to King “Ismael” of Granada, “your vassal” against the “Infante Coxo of Granada,” that is, Yūsuf V, who was supported by “some Christians, your rebels from your realms.” A few months later, at Valladolid, on 12 April, the procurators authorized 60,000,000 *maravedíes*, including the aid requested by King “Ismael” against el Cojo. The procurators at Madrigal on 5 December 1448 made the same grant but did not mention Ismā‘il III, whose reign had ended in the previous year.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the Naṣrid dynasty suffered another violent alteration in late August 1447 when Yūsuf V was assassinated at Almería. Muḥammad IX regained the throne in September and Ismā‘il III, whose reign had lasted little more than a year and a half, fled to the Castilian court.¹⁰⁹

As el Izquierdo now entered the fourth and final stage of his reign (1447–53), pillaging expeditions continued under his son Muḥammad, “el Chico,” “the Young One.” Especially notable was his victory at the Río Verde near Marbella on 17 March 1448.¹¹⁰ The opening lines of the romance “Río Verde, Río Verde,” described the slaughter:

Green River, Green River!

Río Verde, Río Verde!
 In you are castred so many bodies
 Of Christians and Moors,
 Killed by the dark swordspada!
 Making yonder cristalline waves
 Shine with a red blood. esmaltan.¹¹¹

Clashes of this kind were marked by vicious brutality. When the Castilians repulsed a Moorish raiding party and dismounted to despoil the defeated enemy, the Moors, “realizing that they were men who knew little about warfare,” turned about and destroyed them.¹¹²

Nicholas V and the Crusade

News of that event distressed Juan II and perhaps on that account he thought again about undertaking a crusade. He informed Pope Nicholas V that he had taken the cross and intended to invade Granada for the exaltation of the divine

name, the increase of the orthodox faith, and the recovery of towns and castles recently seized by the Saracens. The crusading bull of 30 May 1448 offered the indulgence to participants and to those who contributed 3 Aragonese gold florins. All other plenary indulgences were revoked so as not to interfere with the economic success of the crusade. As a sign that bishops were beginning to oppose the crusade, probably because of the diversion of funds from their sees, they were forbidden to impede the preaching and execution of the crusade.¹¹³

Despite the king's expressed purpose, hostility toward Álvaro de Luna fomented by the magnates and the revolt of Toledo made it impossible for him to begin a crusade. Attempting to benefit from Castile's travails, Muḥammad IX sent troops to plunder about Baena and Jaén. Proposing to besiege Córdoba, he offered an alliance to Juan of Navarre, who encouraged him, but, perhaps wary of a negative reaction among the Castilians, he was careful not to commit himself fully. In the event, el Izquierdo did not move against Córdoba, but his troops raided the vicinity of Seville.¹¹⁴ In reaction, Seville decided to organize its own crusade under the leadership of the archbishop, Cardinal Juan Cervantes. Nicholas V offered the plenary indulgence and permitted the celebration of mass on the battlefield. As the Moors continued to ravage the region, the pope, relaxing the canonical prohibition, authorized members of the clergy to take up arms, invade enemy territory, and maim and kill the Moors. Those who, after confessing their sins, died fighting the Moors or were on the way to the frontier would be entitled to the indulgence. Anyone providing financial support would also enjoy it.¹¹⁵

In order to counter these assaults, the king appealed to the Cortes of Olmedo in 1450 for funds to oppose "the Moors, the enemies of our holy Catholic faith, who, every day, invade, rob, and damage our realms." The Cortes responded with a grant of 10,000,000 *maravedies*. The procurators of Seville requested that 100,000 *maravedies* of that sum be expended in repairing the town of Turón, which had recently been reconquered from the "enemies of our holy faith," so that it would not fall into their hands again.¹¹⁶

As the struggle involving Juan II, Álvaro de Luna, and Juan of Navarre continued, the king had little option but to seek a truce with Muḥammad IX, who had his own reasons for suspending hostilities. In March 1450 Ismā'il III, hoping to regain the throne, seized the *alcazaba* of Málaga and was proclaimed once more. Thus, Juan II and Muḥammad IX agreed to a truce, though it proved to be of short duration. The king also granted a five-year truce to Ismā'il III on 6 April. Suárez Fernández viewed these decisions as a "confession of failure" that left the frontier to its fate.¹¹⁷ Secure in Granada, Muḥammad IX turned against his opponent and seized Vélez Málaga just east of the city in late May and occupied Málaga a month later. Ismā'il III fled to the *alcazaba* of Gibralfaro overlooking the city, but when Juan II failed to come to his aid, he surrendered on 28 June. He died two days later, probably at the hands of the executioner.¹¹⁸ Once again sole master of the realm, Muḥammad IX resumed his offensive on the Murcian frontier. In response,

Juan II, in March 1451, asked the Cortes of Valladolid for 50,000,000 *maravedíes*, including wages for troops, supplies, the repair of castles, and other matters, and pledged not to use the money for any other purpose.¹¹⁹

Responding to the king's appeal, Nicholas V, on 20 November, refined his earlier instructions concerning the crusade. For example, although the expedition was postponed, anyone who died en route to the frontier or contributed 3 Aragonese gold florins or 200 *maravédies* could gain a plenary indulgence. Those recovering from illness could only earn the indulgence at the time of death. Collectors of crusading funds were commanded to deliver all the money to the king. Traitorous Christians allied with the Moors, serving under their command, assisting them in capturing castles and other places, providing them with hospitality, supplying them with food and weapons, or buying plunder taken from Christians were subject to excommunication and the loss of civil rights. The bishops were instructed to denounce them publicly until they repented. Removing all impediments to the crusade, in 1452 the pope suspended all other indulgences and released the king from all accords for the pacification of the realm so that he could devote his energy to the crusade. Goñi Gaztambide commented that the crusading army proved to be a phantasm and that the crusade was merely a means of raising money to be used as the king wished.¹²⁰

As the king was distracted by internal disturbances, the defense of the frontier fell to the people themselves. Sacking and burning Cieza in the kingdom of Murcia, the Moors massacred more than one hundred citizens and carried off five hundred men, women, and children into slavery. On that account Nicholas V granted a partial indulgence to those who gave alms to ransom captives.¹²¹ On the southwestern frontier, Juan de Guzmán, duke of Medina Sidonia, was one of the most aggressive opponents of the Naṣrids. Praising his "holy proposal" to exterminate the Saracens and to propagate the faith, in 1452 Nicholas V granted the crusading indulgence to those "intrepid athletes of the faith," both laity and clergy, who took up arms against the Moors.¹²²

Although their raids had some success, the Moors suffered a grievous defeat at the hands of the count of Arcos at Mataparda near Marchena on 9 February 1452.¹²³ Alfonso Fajardo el Bueno, *alcaide* of Lorca, trounced twelve hundred Naṣrid knights and six hundred foot soldiers at Alporchones on 17 March.¹²⁴ The battle was commemorated in the romance "Alla en Granada la rica." Described as a "valiant Moor," Abd al-Barr escaped the slaughter only to be beheaded by an angry sultan, but whether he actually participated in the battle has been questioned.¹²⁵ Without dwelling on the details, the poet al-Bastī recorded the calamity that reduced al-Andalus to tears.¹²⁶ As a consequence, Muḥammad IX and Juan II now agreed to a five-year truce from 1 September 1452 to 1457.¹²⁷ As violations occurred, Juan II directed Seville on 14 April 1454 to observe the truce.¹²⁸

The End of Muḥammad IX, Álvaro de Luna, and Juan II

Before the expiration of the truce, the three major protagonists of this era, Muḥammad IX, Álvaro de Luna, and Juan II, passed from the scene. The Naṣrid sultan, who ruled for almost thirty years, interrupted three times by rival challengers, died in July 1453 and was succeeded by Muḥammad X (1453–54, 1455), “el Chiquito,” the son of Muḥammad VIII. His vizier quickly emphasized his desire to maintain the truce.¹²⁹ El Chiquito was unable, however, to provide Granada with what it most needed, a stable monarchy.

For much of the reign of Juan II, Álvaro de Luna, given the king’s disinterest, was responsible for the government. Although he aimed to bring about the destruction of the emirate, the opposition of the Infantes of Aragón made it impossible to establish internal tranquility, the necessary precondition for a prolonged assault on the Naṣrid realm. Accompanied by his constable, Juan II undertook only one major campaign and gained the distinction, shared with only a few of his predecessors, of overcoming the Moors on the battlefield. Whereas Alfonso VIII’s victory at Las Navas de Tolosa and Alfonso XI’s triumph at Salado had a decisive impact on the progress of the reconquest, the same cannot be said of Juan II’s victory at La Higuera. Rather than press his advantage, the king abandoned the frontier, contenting himself with the imposition of a vassal king in Granada. In the remaining twenty years of his reign as frontier commanders ravaged the plain of Granada and the region about Ronda and Málaga at will, it seemed that the Granadan economy would collapse and the city would have to surrender. However, Muḥammad IX, during his fourth and last reign, was able to undo much of that work and to carry the war to the vicinity of Jaén and Seville.

Despite Álvaro’s triumph over his enemies, the Infantes of Aragón, at Olmedo in 1445, intrigue continued to disturb the realm until 1453 when the king, bowing to the demands of his new queen, ordered the constable’s arrest and execution. Just a year later, however, Juan II died, leaving Castile impoverished and her government in ruins. Her future prospects seemed dim as his son Enrique IV (1454–74) ascended the throne. At his side stood Juan Pacheco, marquess of Villena, who was prepared to assume the mantle of Álvaro de Luna.

Chapter 5

The Intermittent Crusades of Enrique IV

Enrique IV (1454–74), who was twenty-nine at his accession, has long been regarded as one of the worst Castilian kings. As Luis Suárez Fernández remarked, “There are few figures more unanimously vilified than he.”¹ The persistent hostility of the chronicler Alonso de Palencia and the partisans of Isabel the Catholic did much to blacken his memory and minimize his achievements. Recently, historians have attempted to rehabilitate his reputation, arguing that at least initially he tried to execute the crusading policy of Fernando de Antequera.² During his early years he launched a methodical campaign of destruction against Granada, but the nobility turned against him because the campaign did not produce spectacular victories. The crusade was abandoned and Castile was plunged again into a cycle of intrigue and rebellion resulting in a mock deposition and a crisis over the succession. Reflecting the generally negative view of Enrique IV, José Goñi Gaztambide referred to his “sham crusades.” Ana Echevarría Arsuaga, in contrast, emphasizing the high hopes for a revitalized monarchy that attended his accession, argued that resumption of the crusade was a deliberate effort to fulfill those aspirations.³

Disarray in Naşrid Granada

Although the new king commanded the nobles and frontier towns to observe the five-year truce concluded by his father and to guard against a possible Moorish attack, the Naşrids were in no position to take the offensive. The volatility in the royal succession that had troubled Granada during the first half of the century continued.

Soon after his elevation Muḥammad X, “el Chiquito,” was challenged and driven from power in August 1454 by Abū Naşr Sa’d.⁴ The new sultan, Sa’d (1454–55, 1455–63), was a grandson of Yūsuf II and had resided at the Castilian court.⁵ He was recorded as a royal vassal in February 1455.⁶ When el Chiquito

regained possession of the Alhambra, however, Enrique IV ordered Seville and Jerez to support Sa'd militarily.⁷ As a pledge of allegiance, Sa'd sent to the Castilian court his oldest son, Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī (known to the Christians as Muley Hacen), with 300 knights, 150 foot soldiers, and leaders of three principal families: the Abencerrajes, Banū al-Qabšanī, and Mufarrij. The king provided them with money and clothing, but their presence caused numerous complaints.⁸ Nevertheless, Enrique IV decided to restore Sa'd and asked the pope to declare a crusade.

Preparations for Enrique IV's First Crusade

Overshadowing the Granadan crusade was the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Ottoman Turks, which put an end to the Byzantine Empire. Recognizing the threat to Christendom, Nicholas V proclaimed a crusade against the Turks, but western Christian monarchs were not disposed to respond.⁹ For his part, Enrique IV linked the fate of Constantinople to the long dormant crusade against Granada.¹⁰

In September 1454 he informed the Cortes of Cuéllar of his intention to engage the Moors in the following spring. Recalling the ancient Romans, he commented that war oftentimes was less dangerous than peace because idle warriors neglected to practice the military art, no longer aspired to win fame in battle, and pursued private interests rather than the common good. In contrast, by conquering their enemies they would advance the well-being of the republic. Pronouncing this "a just and necessary affair," he proposed to destroy the "enemies who persecute our faith, to fight against the Moors who usurp our land. . . . A just cause prompts us. . . . Our intention is holy and zeal for God guides us. . . . We will fight for the truth, and they for a lie, we to glorify God, they to offend him. . . . Our Redeemer will give us victory, so that we will return with honor and recover what our ancestors lost." Given his experience of his father's last years, he saw the war as an opportunity to divert an unruly nobility from the conspiracies to which they had become accustomed.¹¹

Diego Arias, the royal accountant, suggested that the war would silence the grumbling of the people and the nobility. Moreover, if the king imposed a new personal apportionment of taxes and persuaded Nicholas V to grant the crusading indulgence to those who contributed 15 silver *reales* (about 225 *maravedies*), he would likely turn a profit. Alonso de Palencia, ever anxious to condemn the monarch, described these ideas as "perfidious counsels" that led to "all sorts of wickedness." Royal emissaries to the papal curia contended that whereas the projected crusade against the Turks was doomed to fail, a crusade against the Moors would not, and once the Moors were expelled, the king would endeavor to halt the Turkish advance. By contrast, they asserted,

neither the Genoese nor the Venetians, with long-standing interests in the eastern Mediterranean, were likely to do so.¹²

Nicholas V's successor, Calixtus III (1455–58), a member of the Borja (Borgia) family of Valencia, on 20 April 1455 issued a crusading bull valid for the next four years. Commending the king for his resolve to achieve the final expulsion of the “wicked Saracens,” he expressed the hope that the name of Christ would be heard throughout the peninsula, which St. James the Apostle had converted to the true faith. This was the first mention of Santiago in a crusading bull. Anyone dying on the crusade or en route to it or contributing 3 Aragonese florins (about 300 *maravedís*) would gain the indulgence. The bishops of Segovia, Salamanca, and Mondoñedo were designated to collect the money to be used solely for the crusade. All other indulgences were suspended for the time being.¹³ The pope also granted Spanish crusaders all the privileges authorized by his predecessor for the Turkish crusade.¹⁴

The Crusade of 1455

In April, with the enthusiastic support of the magnates, Enrique IV, after summoning the frontier militias, set out from Córdoba on his first crusade.¹⁵ Rather than engage in costly prolonged sieges, and knowing the uncertain outcome of pitched battles, he chose to avoid direct confrontation and prohibited his men from participating in skirmishes in which more Christians than Moors were likely to be killed. Though sparing fruit trees, he decided to devastate the land for three years in the expectation that the ruination of the economy would force Granada to its knees.¹⁶

The royal army included three thousand men-at-arms or heavy cavalry, seven thousand *jinetes* or light cavalry from Andalucía, and ten thousand to thirty thousand foot. Palencia stated that, according to “the ancient discipline,” Castilian kings, generals, and knights were prohibited from riding *a la jineta*, that is, lightly armed and mounted on smaller horses built for speed and mobility, but residents of Andalucía could do so. Accompanying the crusaders was Sa’d’s son Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī (Muley Hacen), then dwelling at the royal court, and a troop of three hundred *ginetes moros*. Soon after the army entered Muslim territory, he informed his fellow Moors of the size and movements of the Castilian force.¹⁷ Entering the plain of Granada, “more to contemplate the city than to attack it,” as Palencia put it, the king pillaged the countryside for four days before retreating to Alcalá la Real, where he dismissed his forces. Diego de Valera commented that “most of the nobles were astonished” on seeing that, despite such great preparation, so little was accomplished. Meanwhile, Muḥammad X, after trying unsuccessfully to dislodge Sa’d from Almería, attacked Castilian frontiersmen plundering about Guadix, but failed to overcome them.¹⁸

The king carried out his second incursion into enemy territory between 25 April and 13 May. Setting out from Écija with three hundred knights, he attempted unsuccessfully to take Archidona. Returning to Écija, he ordered the Murcian municipal council to mobilize its militia.¹⁹ Next, on 30 April, with eight hundred men-at-arms, eight hundred *jinetes*, and six thousand knights and twenty thousand infantry from the frontier towns, he marched to Lora and then to Antequera. After ravaging the countryside around Archidona, he moved southward to Álora on 1 May and thence toward Málaga. During the following week the Castilians destroyed crops, skirmished with the Moors, and burned several nearby strongholds. At that point Sa‘d, whose son Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī acted as his interpreter, visited the court “to do reverence,” a phrase suggesting that he made a formal pledge of vassalage. Rather than waste manpower in further skirmishes, the king returned to Écija by 15 May. As the nobles had no opportunity to cover themselves with glory in the clash of arms, they were very much surprised. Some, who were especially disgruntled, conspired to seize him, but the plot was discovered before they could act. The royal chaplain Diego Enríquez del Castillo decried the “false disloyalty of vassals.”²⁰

The third and final military operation of the year extended from 6 to 29 June. Leaving Córdoba about 6 June, with three thousand men-at-arms, eight thousand *jinetes*, and twenty thousand infantry, Enrique IV marched toward Moclín, where he was struck by a bolt from a crossbow. From there, by way of Íllora, he entered the plain of Granada on 11 June for some minor skirmishing. Although Muḥammad X proposed a truce, Enrique IV made that impossible by presenting unacceptable demands. As his supplies dwindled, however, he retreated on 29 June to Córdoba. Goñi Gaztambide remarked that the result of the crusade was “naught” as the king, opting to cause the least possible damage to the Moors, avoided any face-to-face conflict.²¹

When the king requested additional financing of the Cortes at Córdoba, the procurators noted that 35,000,000 *maravedies* granted to his father in 1454 had not yet been fully collected. Affirming that there was no war “as holy and just as this one,” they asked him to use the revenues of the Orders of Santiago and Alcántara, especially since they were endowed “to wage war against the Moors, the enemies of our holy Catholic faith.” The procurators also asked him to present a budget. Whether he complied is unknown, but on 3 June the Cortes approved a levy of 70,000,000 *maravedies*. Thirty million would be collected during the current year and 40,000,000 in the following year. An additional 1,000,000 was granted as an endowment for Juana of Portugal, whom he had just married.²²

In November he ordered public officials to oversee collection of those funds, to publicize the crusading indulgence, and to prohibit preachers from soliciting money for other causes. As the Murcian municipalities had yet to pay their share of the subsidy voted by the Cortes, he demanded that they do so within six days. Cities and towns were required to select a third of their

best artillerymen, physicians, surgeons, lancers, ragmen (*traperos*), and others, all with the equipment appropriate to their functions, to respond immediately to his summons. A similar order was directed to knights and squires, royal vassals and others receiving stipends. Failure to respond was punishable by confiscation of property.²³

The royal council assembled at Ávila in December voiced displeasure that the Castilian clergy were being taxed for the Turkish crusade and argued that those funds could be better spent on the Granadan crusade. The council resolved that the king should undertake a major expedition “to recover the land in Spain that the Moors have usurped to the injury of the kings, his ancestors.” Declaring that his intention “was holy and good,” the council urged him to ask Calixtus III to grant the crusading indulgence “for the living and the dead” and also to draw on the wealth of the church to finance the crusade.²⁴ Reflecting his antagonism toward the king, Palencia remarked that the councilors lauded him because he proposed “to wipe away the ignominy of the nation resulting from the apathy of kings, the revolts of the magnates, and the negligence of the people, who not only tolerated the Moors in the heart of the peninsula but also allowed them to gain preponderance.” Overcoming the negligence of the Goths, a small clutch of infidel barbarians had occupied the country. All of that would change, so it was believed, now that Enrique IV, by the will of God, had ascended the throne.²⁵

Calixtus III’s Crusading Bulls of 1456

The royal ambassador, Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, who had been instructed to take up the matter with Calixtus III, in January 1456 pledged obedience to the pope in the king’s name, but he also declared that the crusade against the Moors should take precedence over the Turkish crusade, worthy as that might be. In defending his realm against the Moors in Spain and Africa, Enrique IV raised and equipped armies and built ships to guard the strait, and, the ambassador implied, to protect western Christendom against Islam.²⁶

Calixtus III, extolling the king’s efforts to subdue the “perfidious infidels of the emirate of Granada” and to suppress the “impiety of the sect of Muḥammad,” on 14 April 1456, reiterated the principle that any faithful Christian who contributed financially to or personally participated in the crusade and confessed his sins would gain a full remission of sins at the time of death. For the first time the pope also stated that donors could apply the indulgence to their loved ones in purgatory. Anyone trafficking with the enemy or failing to pay the tithe was excluded. Summarizing the bull, the anonymous *Castilian Chronicle* declared that a faithful Christian serving under the banner of the crusade at his own expense could gain the indulgence. So too could anyone who contributed 200 *maravedíes* and confessed to a priest;

a dying person who could not speak but could make a sign of contrition could be absolved from his sins. One could also attribute the indulgence to those who had died so that they could be released from the pains of purgatory and received into the glory of paradise.²⁷

The papal extension of the indulgence to the dead caused consternation among many theologians, some of whom declared that he had no authority to grant it.²⁸ Thirteenth-century theologians such as Thomas Aquinas had suggested that he could do so, but no pope prior to Calixtus III had made that declaration. Nevertheless, some preachers falsified papal letters saying that they were authorized to release from purgatory the souls of parents and friends of contributors to the crusade. Although Nicholas V had explicitly condemned this practice in 1453, Calixtus III affirmed that the indulgence could be applied to the dead.²⁹ The *Castilian Chronicle* explained that the theologians eventually decided that the power of binding and loosing given by Jesus to Peter included purgatory and that the pope, as Peter's successor, possessed that authority. Little more than sixty years later, Martin Luther denounced abuses concerning indulgences and condemned the preaching of Friar John Tetzel, who allegedly said that "as soon as the coin in the coffer rings the soul from Purgatory springs." One may suspect that preachers of the crusading bull of 1456 made similar appeals.

The money raised by the indulgence for "the living and the dead" during the next four years was so enormous that, after paying expenses, the royal treasury netted more than 100,000,000 *maravedies*, but of that very little was spent on the crusade. When Palencia stated that Calixtus III granted "the indulgence for the deceased," he evidently confused the crusading bull of 1455, which made no mention of it, with the bull of 1456. Although he judged that it brought 1,000,000 ducats (or 800,000 *aureos* or gold *doblas*) into the royal treasury, he remarked sarcastically that the money "was destined to the ruination of virtue rather than the extermination of the Moors."³⁰ At Christmastime the papal bull "for the living and the dead" was published in the city of Palencia in the king's presence. Preaching on that occasion, Fray Alonso de Espina emphasized the special favor given by the pope, as "no similar indulgence" had ever been granted. He also warned the king that, under pain of excommunication, the money could only be expended on the crusade against the Moors.³¹

In addition to the indulgence, Calixtus III supported the crusade in other ways. Although he imposed a tenth (*decima*) for the crusade against the Turks, in consideration of Castilian concerns, he reduced the amount to 200,000 florins and ceded 100,000 to the Granadan crusade. He also pronounced anathema against anyone trafficking with the enemy or plotting to impede the crusade.³² That condemnation was clearly aimed at recalcitrant magnates, unhappy with the king's conduct of the war and his advancement of young men of humble background to positions of prominence.

The pope also permitted the king to use the financial resources and

manpower of the Military Orders as he saw fit. The Cortes of Córdoba in 1455 had proposed that the sums contributed by the municipalities might be reduced if the king could utilize the revenues of the Orders. Ever since the twelfth century the Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara had constituted the front line of defense against the Moors. With the passage of time they became wealthy and powerful, so much so that, from the time of Alfonso XI, kings attempted to control them by securing the election of their sons or allies as masters of the Orders. In response to Enrique IV's request, the pope, in January 1456, entrusted him with the administration of the Orders of Santiago and Alcántara for terms of fifteen and ten years respectively. In each case, the office of master was vacant. In recognition of his services to Christendom, the pope authorized him to wear the cross on his breast and the habit and insignia of Santiago, the patron of the Spains (a reference to the Roman Hispania Citerior and Ulterior), and to enjoy all the spiritual benefits of crusaders, masters, and knights of Santiago.³³ As the years passed contention over control of the Orders intensified. Pedro Girón, a brother of Juan Pacheco, marquess of Villena and one of the king's principal councilors, held the mastership of Calatrava until his death in 1466.³⁴ The king's inclination to appoint his favorites to the other masterships ultimately contributed to his downfall.³⁵

The Crusade of 1456

In the interim, a further upheaval occurred among the Naṣrids. In August 1455, the people of Granada ousted Muḥammad X as a result of Castilian intervention and their own unhappiness with the terms of the truce, and they acknowledged Sa'd, who now began his second reign (1455–64). In order to safeguard his position, he ordered the execution of Muḥammad X and his sons.³⁶

Although Sa'd owed his triumph in part to Castile, he did not submit docilely to Castilian demands. That became clear when the count of Cabra, acting in the king's name, demanded the restitution of a castle southeast of Jaén. Emphasizing his desire to live at peace, Sa'd responded that the castle had been seized without his consent and he was unsure whether the Moor who had taken it could be persuaded to give it up. The Castilians were insistent, however, and also required Sa'd to accept the obligations of vassalage, including the payment of tribute and attendance at the royal court. He would have to appoint an official at the Elvira gate of the city to collect, on behalf of Castile, the *diezmo y medio diezmo de lo morisco*, a duty of 10.5 percent on commercial transactions between Granada and Castile. Moreover, he would have to surrender 1,000 Christian captives and 333 more in each of the three following years for a total of 2,000. When summoned to the royal host

anywhere south of Toledo, he would be obliged to bring 2,000 knights for a month's service at his own expense; thereafter, he would be paid according to Castilian custom. Finally, he would have to restore all places seized during the reign of Juan II. If he accepted those conditions, peace would be guaranteed for ten years.³⁷

As Sa'd rejected those demands, Enrique IV resumed the war. In May 1456, with eight hundred men-at-arms, three thousand *jinetes*, and twelve thousand to thirteen thousand foot he ravaged the plain of Málaga, though sparing orchards and vineyards. However, this strategy again roused the hostility of the nobles, who had hoped for a greater display of aggression. Their suspicion was heightened by a rumor that he was acting in concert with the Moors who chose not to attack as he proceeded along the coast from Marbella and occupied Estepona, which the Moors had abandoned. Continuing on to Gibraltar, he was received courteously by the Moorish *alcaide*. Then, despite the protests of his councilors who stressed the danger, with a small company he crossed the strait to Ceuta, where he was welcomed by the Portuguese. He even went hunting lions in the region, but when a large band of Moors appeared he hastily returned to Ceuta and thence to Tarifa.³⁸

In mid-June, after a brief respite in Seville, he recovered Jimena de la Frontera.³⁹ When a great comet was seen in the sky for more than a month, people speculated whether he would lose his crown or his life, or whether the Moors would win a great victory. Those interested in such prognostications pointed to the capture of Juan Manrique, count of Castañeda, at Cambil on 13 August by a Moorish force of twenty-five hundred horse and four thousand foot under the command of Sa'd's son Ismā'īl.⁴⁰

The Crusade of 1457

The war of skirmishes was renewed in the following year but with little success. Acknowledging that the king had undertaken the crusade against "the barbarous and perfidious dogs, the Saracens of Granada and Africa," Calixtus III, on 25 February 1457, authorized him to wear the sign of the cross on his shoulder and to have his troops carry the crusading banner. Alfonso Fonseca, archbishop of Seville, was designated to invest the king and to offer the cross to others wishing to participate in the crusade. To assist the archbishop, the pope sent a copy of the ritual used to bless those enlisting in the crusade against the Turks. Everyone could gain the same indulgence.⁴¹ Hearing that money intended for the crusade was being used for other purposes, the pope dispatched a special collector and appointed the bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo as his legate. In 1458 the pope refused consent to several royal petitions probably because they related to the collection and distribution of funds for the crusade.⁴²

Intending “with the help of God to enter the land of the Moors, enemies of our holy Catholic faith,” the king again summoned his magnates, frontier captains, and urban militias to Córdoba.⁴³ Nevertheless, ongoing tension between the marquess of Villena and Archbishop Alfonso Carrillo of Toledo became evident in planning the campaign. Perhaps hoping to expand the lordship of the *adelantamento* of Cazorla that his predecessors had enjoyed since the thirteenth century, Carrillo proposed to attack Baza and Guadix and to use money raised for the crusade to pay his troops. Villena and Archbishop Fonseca of Seville, however, attempted to divert him. Enrique IV, lauding his desire to bring about the “extermination of the infidels, whose shameful occupation of Andalucía had left such a stain on the majesty and grandeur of the crown,” asked him to reconnoiter Málaga and to determine the number of siege machines and other war materials needed to take it. Carrillo willingly accepted this responsibility, though Palencia, who was utterly dismissive of the king’s crusading zeal, believed he was being fooled.⁴⁴

The royal army of twenty-five hundred men-at-arms, three thousand *jinetes* and twelve thousand foot soldiers advanced to Alcalá la Real, but after two weeks of pillaging the plain of Granada and engaging in minor skirmishes, the king returned to Jaén in late July 1457. Declaring that the campaign accomplished nothing memorable, Palencia characterized it as a “mock war, from which only disasters and dishonor could be expected,” and “a childish war that wasted time in burning harvests and in skirmishes as dangerous to us [the Castilians] as advantageous to the Moors.” He also remarked that the king seemed to have a “decided inclination for the Moors,” and that, after a secret conference with the Moors of Colomera, he spared their town and forbade the burning of the harvest. In gratitude, the Moors made him a present of hawks.⁴⁵

On the feast of Santiago (25 July), for the pleasure of his new bride, Juana of Portugal, Enrique IV carried out another incursion as far as Cambil. Astride a sturdy horse, the queen was accompanied by ten ladies-in-waiting similarly mounted and prettily adorned. Some wore strongly woven protective material on their arms; others had armlets and tall feathers on their headdresses; still others wore tunics and chiffon bonnets so that they might be identified with the men-at-arms or the *jinetes*. The queen even shot several bolts from a crossbow against the walls of Cambil. As an everlasting memory of the event, they called the place La Hoya de la Reina—the Queen’s Pit or Cave. Returning to Jaén, the knights joked that the affair was more of a war against Christians than Moors; others laughingly compared it to the wars of the Cid. Whether the queen was miffed is unknown, but the arrival of a rich present of clothing, harness for a *jinete*, and various perfumes sent by the Marinid emir surely gladdened her heart. It was also a sign that the Marinids could be counted upon to remain neutral in the crusade. Palencia, however, affirmed that those gifts increased the suspicion that the king favored the enemy.⁴⁶

Enrique IV carried out two additional raids of about five days each into the plain of Granada on 10 August and on 5 September.⁴⁷ As the campaigning

season drew to a close, a truce was arranged for five months from 31 October 1457 to 31 March 1458. The brevity of that term signaled his resolve to return in the spring.⁴⁸

After inflicting the greatest damage that he could “on the Moors, the enemies of our Catholic faith,” the king summoned the Cortes of Madrid in January 1458.⁴⁹ As it appeared that the 71,000,000 *maravedies* approved in 1455 had been spent chiefly for ordinary expenses, the Cortes granted 40,000,000 *maravedies* for the crusade. Reports that reinforcements from Tunis and Morocco were coming prompted the procurators in April to consent to an additional levy of 32,000,000, in part to prepare a fleet to guard the strait and also to ransom the count of Castañeda.⁵⁰

Although the nobles grew ever more discontented with his strategy, Enrique IV gained fame abroad because his crusade seemed to compensate in some measure for the loss of Constantinople. Wishing to honor him beyond all others, Calixtus III, at Christmas in 1457, blessed and sent to him a ceremonial hat and a sword in recognition of his “defense of the Catholic faith” and in the hope that he would continue “his holy plan.” Perhaps the pope, who announced that he was sending a fleet to combat the Turks, hoped that the king would eventually take up the eastern crusade.⁵¹ In a ceremony in the royal palace in Madrid on 25 March 1458 the king received “the sword brought from the body of the blessed Apostle St. Peter, prince of the Apostles and head of the Church, and an imperial hat (*ynsula o sombrero cesáreo*).” The blade of the sword, with the inscription, “May your Castilian Majesty accept this sword, a gift from God by which you may cast down the adversaries of my Christian people,” is preserved today in the Royal Armory in Madrid.⁵²

Enrique IV’s Final Crusades

As the end of the five-month truce approached, Enrique IV again summoned his vassals to join in “this just and holy enterprise.”⁵³ In early June 1458 he spent a week sacking the plain of Granada, but dissension among his vassals distracted from the crusade. The marquess of Villena, angered by the king’s advancement of younger men, resented the recent appointment of Miguel Lucas de Iranzo as constable of Castile. A fight among their partisans compelled the king to separate them, but it was evident that worse trouble was to come. The attempt to defame the king by suggesting that he secretly favored the Moors was revealed by the discovery of letters forged in his name and that of the constable and addressed to the emir of Granada and the Abencerrajes. The traitor who bore them was executed.⁵⁴

In July Enrique IV plundered the neighborhood of Baza and Guadix. There, in a skirmish with the Moors, one of his vassals was killed by a poisoned arrow. Seeking to vilify the king further, Palencia related that he took time to

observe the effects of the poison on the dying man, much to the distress of his friends and relatives. The king spent the remainder of the summer in Andalucía, without undertaking any further military action. Nevertheless, Sa'd, "fearing the fury of the king," asked for a truce.⁵⁵ As before, the pact, drawn up in December, was for five months from 1 January 1459 until May 31, and required Sa'd to pay 12,000 *doblas* in tribute as a sign of vassalage and to release six hundred captives.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, a grave rebellion flared up in the kingdom of Murcia. There, Alfonso Fajardo provoked the king's ire by reason of his tyrannical government of Lorca and his close alliance with Sa'd. Confiscating the rebel's property in June 1458, Enrique IV ordered his cousin, Pedro Fajardo, *adelantado* of Murcia, to subdue him and to wage "cruel war" against the Moors despite a truce that Alfonso had concluded with them.⁵⁷ In accordance with Calixtus III's crusading bull, a priest granted absolution to the *adelantado*'s, forces. Although Sa'd aided Alfonso, who sent his wife and son to Granada as hostages, the people of Lorca compelled the rebel to submit in August. However, the conflict briefly erupted again in 1460.⁵⁸

After the king's withdrawal from the frontier, Sa'd attempted a bold stroke against Jaén on 10 August 1459. Surprised, the defenders neglected to close the city gates, but the Moors, thinking it a ruse intended to lure them to destruction, refused to enter and, instead, pillaged the environs. As a consequence, Miguel Lucas, to whom the king entrusted the city, took steps to provide for a more effective defense.⁵⁹

Pius II: The Turkish and Castilian Crusades

In October 1458, the new pope, Pius II (1458–64), summoned church officials and representatives of secular rulers to Rome to discuss a crusade against the Turks. Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, the Castilian ambassador, emphasized that Enrique IV, while encouraging the papal plan, was involved in a continuing struggle against the enemies of the Catholic faith in the Iberian Peninsula. At a subsequent gathering at Siena in February 1459, after quoting Vincentius Hispanus, a thirteenth-century canonist who asserted that the Castilian kings had wrested their realm from the jaws of the infidels, he concluded that Enrique IV's struggle against the Moors was as worthy as the eastern crusade. In May at the Council of Mantua, he directed attention to Enrique IV's annual expeditions against the Naşrids and indicated that previous popes had acknowledged that participants in the Granadan crusade were entitled to the same privileges as crusaders going to the east. Although Rodrigo urged secular rulers to support the Turkish crusade, he left little doubt that Enrique IV intended to focus on the war in Spain. Pius II had high expectations for the success of his projected crusade, but ultimately it proved a dismal failure.⁶⁰

Whereas Enrique IV demurred, Afonso V of Portugal responded positively to the papal appeal and set about collecting the tenth of ecclesiastical revenues authorized by Calixtus III in February 1456. He even issued a new coin, known as the *cruzado*, as a sign of his intentions. Yet, as he realized that other European rulers were averse to committing themselves to the recovery of Constantinople, he directed his attention closer to home. Identifying Alcácer Seguir on the west coast of Africa as his objective and accompanied by Henry the Navigator, his uncle, he sailed from Setúbal in late September 1458 and landed at Alcácer on 21 October and quickly compelled the Moors to surrender.⁶¹ From November to early January 1459, and again in July and August the Marinid emir ‘Abd al-Haqq II failed to dislodge the Portuguese. In 1464, dreading an attack on Ceuta by the emir of Tunis, the Portuguese appealed to the *alcaide* of Tarifa, who, in turn, asked Seville for help, but the assault did not materialize.⁶² Alcácer Seguir provided Portugal with another important foothold on the Moroccan coast and encouraged the king to plan other attempts. Meantime, Henry’s death in November 1460 closed a significant chapter in the history of Portuguese expansion.

Alfonso V of Aragón, who also ruled Naples and Sicily, disappointed the pope as well. Other than expressing concern about the fall of Constantinople, he made no attempt to recover it. After his death, his younger brother, Juan of Navarre, succeeded him as Juan II of Aragón (1458–79). As he wished to consult the pope concerning the Turkish crusade, he informed Enrique IV in March 1459 that he could not allow publication of the bull of crusade against “the Moors of . . . Granada, enemies of the holy Catholic faith.” Asking to be excused, he promised to respond later.⁶³

That decision no doubt annoyed Enrique IV as did the possibility that the Turkish crusade would divert money from the battle against the Naşrids. In his desire to further the Turkish crusade, Pius II had suspended all other indulgences, but when Enrique IV protested, he upheld the validity of the Castilian crusading indulgence. Acclaiming the king as “a true warrior and defender of the faith against its enemies,” he renewed crusading privileges on 18 January 1460 but stipulated that the money collected should be expended equally on the two crusades. The collection of funds became a sore spot when it was reported that the king was diverting money to other purposes, including the 100,000 florins that Calixtus III had imposed on the Castilian church for use against the Turks. In 1462 in response to a royal petition, Pius II instructed his nuncio to allot a portion of the money to the war against Granada. He also authorized the Carthusian prior of Seville to absolve the king from any ecclesiastical censures that he may have incurred. He encouraged the king to prosecute the war against Granada while he pressed on with the Turkish crusade.⁶⁴

In November 1458 the pope had declared that collectors of crusading funds were entitled to a moderate share of the money raised. Nevertheless, Fray Alonso de Espina, in his *Fortalitium Fidei*, written between 1461 and 1465,

affirmed that the crusade preacher ought to be content with a heavenly recompense. Condemning the avarice of those who took payment for themselves for every crusading bull that they issued, he declared that they “were rather mercenaries than preachers.” Obviously, the more bulls sold, the greater the profit for the preachers. The business seemed quite mercenary and differed little from the sale of indulgences that Martin Luther protested about sixty years later. On a broader scale, Espina refuted the teachings of Muḥammad and argued for a crusade against the Turks in the east and the Moors in Spain.⁶⁵

An Era of Official Peace

After 1458 Enrique IV delegated the continuing war of devastation to the frontier lords, principally Juan de Guzmán, duke of Medina Sidonia and count of Niebla; Juan Ponce de León, count of Arcos; Diego Fernández de Córdoba, count of Cabra; Alfonso Fernández de Córdoba, lord of Aguilar; and Miguel Lucas de Iranzo, constable of Castile. During the next twenty years the duke of Medina Sidonia and the count of Arcos often quarreled as they attempted to dominate Seville and expand their lordships. The count of Cabra similarly fought with Alfonso de Aguilar over ascendancy in Córdoba. As *alcaide* of Alcalá la Real, just a few miles north of Granada, the count had the closest contact with the Naṣrid emirs. In time he developed a friendship and even an alliance with Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī. Miguel Lucas, from his base in Jaén, frequently acted in concert with Alfonso de Aguilar in opposition to the count of Cabra.

Although Enrique IV did not lead any expedition against the Moors for several years, he kept alive that possibility. In December 1459, for example, he authorized the count of Cabra to arrange short truces with the Naṣrids from 1 January to 31 March 1460 and again from 1 April to 31 May 1460. As the truce was about to expire in March he indicated his wish to resume the crusade by publicizing Calixtus III’s bull of 1457. Nevertheless, tension with the nobles and conflict with Juan II of Aragón compelled him to extend the truce until mid-April 1461.⁶⁶ Even when the “Moors, enemies of our holy faith,” burned Quesada, southeast of Úbeda, the king did not launch a counterattack but only provided funds for the repair of its walls, and arranged another extension of the truce until 15 April 1462.⁶⁷ Renewed in ensuing years, that truce, despite intermittent disruptions, effectively established an official era of peace that endured until Fernando and Isabel reopened hostilities in 1482.

In July 1462 the Cortes of Toledo agreed to a subsidy of 86,000,000 *maravedies* for the war against the Moors, “enemies of our holy Catholic faith.” The procurators also emphasized the need to repair the walls of frontier fortresses and to pay the wages of garrisons so they would not abandon their posts or resort to pillage. Provision was also made for the exchange of

Frontier Clashes

As the truce expired in mid-April 1462, hostilities quickly broke out. At Madroño not far from Estepa, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, heir to the Naṣrid throne, with 1,500 horse, 8,000 foot, and an additional 400 knights, confronted Luis de Pernia, *alcaide* of Osuna, and Rodrigo Ponce de León, son of the count of Arcos, with 300 horse and 600 foot. Despite the odds, Luis proposed to fight and Rodrigo, “whose beard had scarcely sprouted” and who had never fought in a battle, agreed to follow him. As foolhardy as it seemed, on 11 April they vigorously attacked the Moors and broke their lines. Abandoning banners, trumpets, drums, and livestock, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī fled. According to Enríquez del Castillo, 1,400 “infidel Moors” were killed, but the Christians lost only 30 horsemen and 150 infantry. For Palencia, the victory diverted attention from the king’s ineptitude but also prevented the Moors from taking advantage of Castilian confusion and devastating Andalucía.⁶⁹ When Enrique IV learned of “this great and signal victory, he ordered processions and celebrations in his court.” The romance “Aquese moro Albohacen” commemorated the battle.⁷⁰

Miguel Lucas de Iranzo also took the field in April, assaulting Arenas, Cambil, and Alhabar and burning villages in the vicinity of Baza and Guadix in mid-July. Given the excessive heat and the lack of water, he returned to Jaén to be welcomed by the clergy and people chanting *Te Deum*. Marching on Granada in early August, he challenged Sa’d to battle and promised to wait four or five hours for his reply. When Sa’d declined to fight, the constable returned to Jaén, where, “like a triumphant conqueror,” he was “received with such great joy and happiness as the emperors were accustomed to receive in Rome when they returned victorious from their conquests.”⁷¹

The populace of Granada, angered by these attacks, castigated Sa’d for failing to defend them and for using the tribute owed to Castile for his own benefit. Attempting to deflect responsibility, he ordered the execution of his vizier Mufarrij and Yūsuf b. Sarraj, “two of the most powerful knights of the emirate of Granada.” The Abencerrajes, Muḥammad b. al-Sarraj and ‘Alī b. al-Sarraj, with members of other important families, fled to Málaga, where, in August, they proclaimed Ismā’īl IV (1462), whose lineage is unclear. Assured of Castilian support, he occupied Málaga, Ronda, and the southwestern region of the emirate. That event facilitated the Castilian seizure of Gibraltar.⁷²

The Surrender of Gibraltar

Ever since the middle of the thirteenth century, Castilian kings had tried to take Algeciras and Gibraltar, points of entry into the peninsula long used by Moroccan invaders. In 1279 Alfonso X unsuccessfully besieged Algeciras; likewise Fernando IV could not capture it, though he occupied Gibraltar in 1309. The Marinids repossessed Gibraltar in 1333 and Alfonso XI was unable to recover it. After seizing Algeciras in 1344, he died in 1350 while besieging Gibraltar. In 1369, during the civil war between Pedro I and Enrique II, Muḥammad V occupied Algeciras and burned it to the ground, effectively rendering it uninhabitable. Gibraltar, long overshadowed by Algeciras, now assumed greater importance.⁷³

Alonso de Palencia lamented Alfonso XI's death at Gibraltar as "an unfortunate augury for all of Spain, because, following the deplorable loss of such a great king, happiness fled from the kingdoms of Castile and León, for if there was anything seen as a blessing by many, vain though it might be, it was the recovery of Gibraltar, so long wished for and so many times attempted in the past. In the end it was the cause of our great calamities." As an example, Palencia cited the death of Enrique de Guzmán, count of Niebla, before the walls of Gibraltar in 1436. Now in 1462, the Moors of Gibraltar, following the lead of the Abencerrajes, went off raiding, leaving the fortress poorly defended.⁷⁴

According to the *Castilian Chronicle*, the chief men of Gibraltar went to Málaga to acknowledge Muley Muḥammad (correctly Ismā'il IV), who challenged Sa'd's right to rule. Discovering that few people remained in Gibraltar, the *alcaide* of Tarifa summoned the militias of Jerez and other towns, as well as the count of Arcos and the duke of Medina Sidonia. As Castilian ships assailed Moorish vessels in the harbor, the militiamen initiated the assault, but, considering their losses, were on the verge of withdrawing. The defenders were also disheartened, however, and offered to surrender if they were given safe-conduct to Granada. The militiamen replied that they required the consent of the count or the duke, who were on their way from Seville.

When the count's son, Rodrigo Ponce de León, arrived, the Moors offered to surrender to him, but he insisted that the honor of receiving their submission should be reserved to his father and the duke. Suspecting that the Castilians intended to take Gibraltar by force and imprison them all, the Moors, on 24 August 1462, threw open the gates to admit the Castilians, who occupied the town, but not the citadel. When the duke approached, he arranged for the Moors to surrender the citadel to him, especially because his father, Count Enrique, had died in his earlier attempt to capture Gibraltar. Rodrigo, angered by the duke's maneuver, sought to avenge his family's honor by seizing the duke or even killing him. However, his father, while agreeing that vengeance was appropriate, declared that neither God nor the king would be served by acting at that time and place and invited the duke to acknowledge his error in breaking their friendship and alliance. Receiving no response after

three days, he returned to Seville. Thereafter a deep enmity existed between the Guzmán and Ponce de León families. When Enrique IV heard that Gibraltar had surrendered, he ordered the duke to yield it to a royal *alcaide*. Aware that the king was prepared to coerce him, the duke obeyed. First he had the mosque “purified of the profanations of the Muḥammadan sect” and with great pomp interred the bones of his father, which the Moors had placed in an urn as a trophy. Although the king swore never to alienate Gibraltar, “not many days later he did just the contrary.”⁷⁵

Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, the royal ambassador, announced the news to Pius II. Although Gibraltar was taken without any significant clash of arms, he reported that twenty-eight hundred Moors had been captured, that thousands of others had been killed, and that Algeciras had also been occupied.⁷⁶ Rodrigo recorded this event in his history of Spain penned at the pope’s request in 1463. Pius II later incorporated it into his *Commentaries*.⁷⁷ Enrique IV emphasized the magnitude of this new conquest by including Gibraltar in the royal intitution.⁷⁸

The Muslims viewed the loss of Gibraltar as a catastrophe, marking as it did another significant alteration of the political frontiers. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qaysī, “the last poet of al-Andalus,” dedicated one of his most moving poems to the fall of Gibraltar. Also known as al-Bastī, from his birth in Baza, he reported that the Christians forced the people to abandon their homes and burned the harvest. In one such raid he was captured and imprisoned in Jaén, where he composed many of his poems. His experience of captivity forms one of his poetic themes. Also distinctive are his elegies on the loss of cities to the Christians. Noting that the Muslims called Gibraltar *Jabal al-Fath*, the mountain of conquest, Concepción Castillo remarked that it symbolized the Muslim conquest of Spain and its loss disrupted the centuries-old link between Morocco and al-Andalus. In the midst of his tears, al-Qaysī uttered his lamentation for the gravest of wounds that struck his heart. And yet, he refused to despair and called upon God to undo the intensity of that wound by restoring Gibraltar to the Muslims.⁷⁹

The Truce of 1462

The war continued as the count of Cabra raided to the west and northwest of Granada.⁸⁰ A month after the fall of Gibraltar, on 30 September, Pedro Girón, master of Calatrava, seized Archidona, a formidable bastion about forty-eight miles west of Granada. In 1435 the master of Alcántara had died attempting to take it and ten years later the knights were again driven off. Defended by a triple wall, Archidona held out for two months until Girón led a final victorious assault.⁸¹ The poet ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qaysī recognized the loss of Archidona as a sign of destruction and humiliation for Islam and begged God

to restore it to the Muslims. “Wake up! Wake up!” he shouted. “Whoever has only shed tears until now, from now on will weep red blood.”⁸²

Despite past differences, Girón collaborated with Miguel Lucas de Iranzo in an incursion into Moorish territory in October. After raiding southward toward the Mediterranean, the constable joined the master near Granada, where they waited to see whether Ismā‘il IV, who seems to have gained possession of the Alhambra, would give battle. As a vassal of Enrique IV he called for a truce and urged them to desist from their attack, lest Sa‘d regain the throne. However, they argued that as the king’s loyal servant he ought to surrender the city, but he refused. Although Miguel Lucas wanted to continue the campaign and asked the king not to grant a truce, Enrique IV was anxious to settle the frontier so he could pursue his ambitions in Catalonia.⁸³

Girón, authorized by the king, on 20 November arranged a truce with Ismā‘il IV until the end of May 1463, and required the payment of tribute and the release of an unspecified number of captives.⁸⁴ Shortly afterward, however, Ismā‘il IV was driven from Granada and took refuge with the Abencerrajes in Íllora. Taking advantage of Naşrid disarray, the constable unsuccessfully attempted to seize Moclín and to lure the Moors from Íllora.⁸⁵ Still involved in Catalan affairs, Enrique IV on 27 January 1463 instructed Girón to extend the truce, but as a sign of Naşrid uncertainty, he did not identify the emir. Nevertheless, Girón announced on 28 February that he had signed a truce with “King Abulhacen” for eight months, that is, until the end of October. The text of the treaty does not seem to be extant.⁸⁶

The Naşrid monarchy was in a complete disorder. Ismā‘il IV apparently had been dethroned and died sometime thereafter. His removal from the scene, however, did not enhance Sa‘d’s position, who evidently had to share power with his son, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, the “King Abulhacen” cited by Girón. Anticipating that the Castilians would take up arms again when the truce expired, Sa‘d, in January 1464, emphasizing the loss of Gibraltar, Alicún, and Archidona, appealed in vain for help from the Mamlūk sultan of Egypt and the Ḥafsid emir of Tunis.⁸⁷

Enrique IV’s Visit to Gibraltar

After an absence from the frontier of nearly eight years, Enrique IV, intent on affirming his authority over Gibraltar, journeyed to that fortress in January 1464. There Afonso V visited him. The Portuguese king, after taking Alcácer Seguir in 1458, set his eyes on Tangier, although Henry the Navigator’s attempt to take it in 1437 had ended disastrously. Afonso V had no more success in November 1463 and had to retreat to Ceuta. During their week-long visit the two sovereigns affirmed their alliance, to be cemented by the marriage of Enrique IV’s thirteen-year-old sister, Isabel, to Afonso V, a thirty-one-year-old

widower. Although the match had the potential to strengthen relations between the two realms, Isabel had no desire to be handed off in that way. At the same time, by naming the royal favorite, Beltrán de la Cueva, as *alcaide* of Gibraltar, Úbeda, and Huelma, Enrique IV gave him control over the frontier military forces, thus undercutting Pedro Girón and antagonizing the marquess of Villena.⁸⁸

As the truce expired on 31 October 1463 and had not been renewed, Enrique IV planned to resume the war.⁸⁹ When he approached Granada, however, the Naṣrids offered him the customary tribute and other rich presents.⁹⁰ Now able to present himself as a victor who, with little cost, had compelled the Moors to submit, on 14 March he announced that he had concluded a truce for one year. The text is unknown and neither he nor the chroniclers identified the emir, but Sa'd and his son Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī were likely cosignatories. Ever bent on portraying the king in a negative light, Palencia remarked on the insignificant amount of tribute and accused him of breaking the chains of twenty-five Moorish slaves who were given rich garments, horses, and arms and incorporated into his Moorish guard. Soon after the truce expired in March 1465, it was renewed for two years until April 1467.⁹¹ Given the increasing hostility of the magnates during those years, Enrique IV could not go to war against Granada, even if he had wished to do so.

Observance of the truce was also important for the Naṣrids. 'Abd al-Bāsit al-Khalil, an Egyptian traveler visiting Tlemcen in September 1464, reported that the truce was for five years and that Sa'd had quarreled with Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī, who forced him to flee to Málaga and then to Almería.⁹² Other sources related that Sa'd was imprisoned in Salobreña and that after his death on 20 April 1465, his body was interred in the royal tomb in Granada without any pomp.⁹³ Now, Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Sa'd (1463–82, 1482–85), whom the Christians knew as Muley Hacen, began to consolidate his hold on the throne. Yet he had to contend with the opposition of his brother Muḥammad b. Sa'd, al-Zaḡal, who fled to Jaén, where he was welcomed by Miguel Lucas de Iranzo.⁹⁴

The Turkish Crusade

The rivalry among the Naṣrids seemed to invite Castilian intervention, but as before, the Granadan crusade had to compete with the Turkish expedition. Pius II's demand that the clergy contribute 200,000 florins to the latter affair drew a strong royal protest in June 1464. Many preachers, seeking to enrich themselves, made fraudulent claims about the benefits to be gained, and ordinary people, thinking they could earn money as well as the indulgence, left their families and sold their property. Convening a commission of bishops and

scholars to examine the crusading bull, the king simultaneously appealed to the pope to extend the indulgence and other benefits to participants in the war against the Moors, “the enemies of our holy Catholic faith.” In his opinion, that made more sense than to travel long distances at great expense to fight a strange people. Indeed, many crusaders were lost before they ever reached their destination. For the time being, he ordered the bishops to prohibit preaching of the Turkish crusade. Upon receipt of a new bull, the bishops would commission three or four devout and honest preachers and require current preachers to be instructed by prelates and theologians concerning the terms of the bull. In August, Enrique IV forbade his subjects to participate in the Turkish crusade and commanded his officials to prevent them from leaving the realm.⁹⁵

Palencia, who also condemned preaching abuses, commented that many of those who hastened to join Pius II as he was about to embark on his crusade expected to receive a stipend from the papal treasury so that poverty would not impede them. “Almighty God, irritated by such a farce,” suddenly struck down the pope, scattered the fleet in a storm, and brought the whole affair to a sorrowful end.⁹⁶

The Revolt of the Castilian Nobility

Enrique IV’s crusading expectations soon dissipated as the nobility dared to dispute his sovereignty. As his conflict with Juan II of Aragón soured and his aspirations in Navarre and Catalonia went up in smoke, tensions between him and the magnates quickly exacerbated. The marquess of Villena, who had long presented himself as the king’s most faithful counselor, bore great responsibility for creating the venomous atmosphere that preceded the violence of war. Unwilling to be dominated by Villena or anyone else, Enrique IV bestowed his favor on several younger men, especially Beltrán de la Cueva, whom he appointed master of Santiago, an office that Villena had long coveted.⁹⁷

Infuriated, Villena and many of the magnates assembled at Burgos in September 1464 and denounced the king’s presumed failures of government. Recalling that on his accession he swore to defend “the holy Catholic faith,” and, if necessary, to die for it, they accused him of waging war so feebly against the Moors that instead of inflicting damage on them he harmed his own realms. In addition, he punished Christians who burned out the Moors and shed their blood. Furthermore, without consulting the magnates, he often granted truces to the Moors and formed secret friendships with them. The company of Moors serving as his personal guard included many former captives who were given their liberty, provided with arms and horses, and paid a wage twice that of Christians. The money used to recruit them, it was

argued, could better have been spent on ransoming poor Christian captives. Members of the Moorish guard, some of whom were renegade Christians, violated married women and virgins, as well as men and boys, “contrary to nature.” Instead of attending to the complaints of Christians, the king chastised them and even had them publicly whipped. Finally, the magnates proclaimed that the king’s daughter, Juana, born two years before, was the illegitimate child of Beltrán de la Cueva. On that account, she came to be mocked as Juana la Beltraneja. Thus they insisted that the king’s rightful heir was his eleven-year-old brother, Alfonso.⁹⁸

Five judges, appointed by the king and the magnates to adjudicate these complaints, issued their recommendations on 16 January 1465. They determined that the Moorish guard should be disbanded within fifty days, so that his people would not be scandalized. Those who were Mudejars, that is, Castilian residents, had to return to their *morerías*. Free men who had been residents of Granada had to return home; if they were royal slaves, they would be exchanged for Christian captives. Should they return, any Christian could enslave them, and if they resisted they could be killed. The king was forbidden to give former guardsmen any further income. Christians injured by guardsmen could seek judicial redress. Desiring that “our holy faith be exalted and increased and that the Moors, enemies of our holy Catholic faith, should be destroyed,” the judges urged the king, with the “counsel and consent of the *grandes*,” to wage war “powerfully” against Granada in the coming March.⁹⁹ The truce recently concluded implied that he planned to do so, but the conflict with the nobles made that impossible.

The judges’ sentence resolved nothing. Although the king initially acknowledged Alfonso as his heir, he changed his mind. Angered by his about-face, his opponents, meeting at Ávila on 5 June 1465, staged a mock dethronement, declared him deposed, stripped his effigy of all symbols of royal authority, and proclaimed his brother as King Alfonso XII.¹⁰⁰

Anarchy in Andalucía

Although Pedro Girón, master of Calatrava, did not take part in the farce of Ávila, he roused Andalucía in favor of Alfonso XII. The duke of Medina Sidonia, the count of Arcos, and the cities of Seville, Carmona, Écija, Jerez, Córdoba, Murcia, and Lorca threw off their allegiance to Enrique IV. Standing firm in their loyalty were Diego Fernández, count of Cabra, his son-in-law Martín Alfonso de Montemayor, lord of Alcaudete, and Miguel Lucas de Iranzo, who governed Jaén. The failure of Girón’s siege of Jaén prevented the rebels from taking over all of Andalucía and probably encouraged resistance elsewhere.¹⁰¹

As the majority of the people seemed steadfast in their fidelity to the king,

Villena offered to compromise. Pledging to abandon Alfonso of Ávila, he proposed the marriage of his brother, Pedro Girón, and the king's sister, Isabel. Girón's sudden death in May 1466, however, saved her from a union that she regarded with undisguised loathing. Not long after, Villena mendaciously spread the rumor that Rodrigo Manrique, count of Paredes, had proposed that Alfonso XII, while retaining sovereignty over a certain portion of Andalucía and using the title king of Granada, would yield all rights to Castile and León to Enrique IV. By implication, the conquest of Granada would be reserved to Alfonso XII. Denouncing that falsehood, the indignant count challenged to a duel anyone who affirmed it. No one responded.¹⁰²

After Girón's death the noble factions in Andalucía battered one another. Believing that the king had unjustly deprived him of Gibraltar by giving it to Beltrán de la Cueva, the duke of Medina Sidonia besieged that fortress in May 1466. As the siege dragged on, the defenders appealed to Enrique IV for help. Struggling to retain his throne, he turned, ironically, to Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī, who, considering the difficulty of relieving the garrison, and disputes within his own family, decided not to intervene. Deprived of food and constantly bombarded, the defenders surrendered Gibraltar on 15 February 1467.¹⁰³ The duke also seized El Puerto de Santa María.¹⁰⁴

In the king's absence the frontier lords made their own arrangements with Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī. In 1467 the count of Cabra and Alfonso de Aguilar, long-time rivals, agreed to a truce with Granada that was extended until 6 November and then until August 1468 and eventually to the end of the year. Despite the truce, the Moors, apparently encouraged by Alfonso de Aguilar, pillaged the count's domain about Alcalá la Real.¹⁰⁵ Armed conflict resumed early in 1469 as the Moors plundered about Baeza, Úbeda, and Quesada, and the Castilians raided the plain of Granada.¹⁰⁶ Amid this disorder, the people of Jerez and other frontier towns, asserting that the Moors of Granada and Africa often threatened them, appealed to Pope Paul IV (1464–71). In May 1469 he granted a plenary indulgence to those setting out under Jerez's banner to oppose the Saracens. He also permitted them to be buried in any church even though it might be under interdict. Jerez and the other towns, clearly expecting no help from the king, ignored his sovereignty, and induced the pope to concede the crusading indulgence to them.¹⁰⁷

Enrique IV in Andalucía Again

The magnates opposing Enrique IV suffered a serious setback when Alfonso XII died in July 1468. Deprived of their pawn, but still defiant, they intended to recognize Isabel as queen, but she would have none of it. On the contrary, she reached an accord with her brother on 18 September, whereby he acknowledged her as his heir.¹⁰⁸ Determined to reaffirm royal authority, to

receive the submission of his deceased brother's adherents, and to reconcile contending parties, Enrique IV returned to Andalucía.¹⁰⁹

Until then Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī had avoided a formal rupture with Castile. A vigorous monarch, he restored prosperity, strengthened his defenses, and transformed his army into a more effective force. Nevertheless, his strong rule stirred powerful opposition in Málaga and Almería. When Enrique IV came to Jaén in May 1469, the Moors of the nearby fortresses of Cambil and Alhabar sent a deputation to greet him and kiss his hands in vassalage. Moreover, the lord of Almería, Aben Celín or Ibn Sālim al-Najjār, a son of the former emir, Yūsuf IV ibn al-Mawl, dispatched three hundred lancers and five hundred foot soldiers to accompany the king to Córdoba, where he received the obeisance of the magnates. Expressing his gratitude for that service and for al-Najjār's promise to attend upon him in person, should he wish it, Enrique IV pledged to assist him in gaining the throne of Granada.¹¹⁰ Alquirzote, governor (*arráez*) of Málaga, also challenged Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī. In July 1469 Alquirzote, "a famous man among the Moors, who had always shown himself to be his [Enrique IV's] servant," met the king near Archidona and pledged homage as a sign of vassalage. In return, Enrique IV assured him of his protection against the emir "who wished to destroy him and drive him from Málaga where he was very much loved."¹¹¹

Given the division of loyalties in both Castile and Granada, a universal truce seemed impossible. Instead, regional truces were arranged. A three-year truce applicable to the eastern sector of the emirate of Granada and the adjacent kingdom of Murcia was concluded on 29 July 1469.¹¹²

While the king visited Andalucía, Isabel, despite her promise not to wed without his consent, married her cousin, Fernando of Aragón, the son of Juan II, on 19 October 1469. Believing that he had been played falsely, Enrique IV condemned the marriage and proclaimed his daughter Juana as his true heir. Soon the partisans of Isabel and Juana tore the kingdom apart.¹¹³

Chaos on the Frontier

Civil war also threatened to break out among the Naṣrids. The Abencerrajes denounced Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī's repressive regime and proclaimed his brother Muḥammad al-Zaḡal as sultan at Málaga in 1470. Nevertheless, the emir compelled him to submit and wreaked a cruel vengeance on the Abencerrajes. Many were executed, while others sought refuge with Alfonso de Aguilar and the duke of Medina Sidonia.¹¹⁴

The conflict among the Naṣrids encouraged the frontier lords to pillage the emirate, but the bitter enmity between the houses of Cabra and Aguilar made any joint effort impossible.¹¹⁵ Perhaps the strangest episode in their rivalry was the following. In the summer of 1469, Alfonso de Aguilar seized the count's

son Diego and forced him to surrender the tenancy of Alcalá la Real. In the following year, Diego challenged Alfonso to a duel in accordance with the customs of the Castilian nobility, and invited Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī to guarantee a time and place for their encounter. Issuing letters of safe-conduct to both men, the emir set the date for 10 August in Granada. After some delay, Alfonso replied that, as the Naṣrid was a friend of the count and his own capital enemy, he proposed another time, namely 15 August, and another place. Rejecting that idea, Diego appeared before Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī in Granada on 10 August and when Alfonso failed to arrive drew up a public document recording that fact. Then, taking an effigy of Alfonso with its legs in the air and affixing it to the tail of his horse, Diego rode about the field, shouting “this is the traitor don Alfonso de Aguilar.” The emir declared that Diego, in contrast to Alfonso, was a loyal and good knight.¹¹⁶

About that time the emir, in alliance with the count of Cabra, planned an incursion into Miguel Lucas’s domain in Jaén but failed to carry it out. When Miguel Lucas and Alfonso de Aguilar, hoping to take advantage of the animosity of the Abencerrajes toward the emir, entered the plain of Granada, the count on two occasions warned Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī. Nevertheless, Miguel Lucas routed the Moors near Guadix in mid-October and again in December.¹¹⁷ The antagonism between the houses of Aguilar and Cabra was displayed anew in the summer of 1471. Again warned by the count, the emir thwarted Alfonso de Aguilar’s foray into the plain of Granada. Despite that setback, Alfonso and Miguel Lucas laid siege to Montejícar about twenty miles southeast of Jaén, but they had to withdraw in the face of opposition from the count and the emir. In the words of the chronicler, the count and his son-in-law, “not fearing God . . . or the danger to their souls, their honor, estates, and fame . . . allied with the king of Granada and the Moors, enemies of our holy faith in very great and intimate friendship, friends of friends and enemies of enemies.” The count and Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī concluded a friendship pact at Loja on 8 September and then ravaged the countryside about Jaén.¹¹⁸ In December they renewed their alliance for ten years, from 1 January 1472 to 31 December 1481.¹¹⁹

Such was the intensity of feeling that Fernando del Pulgar remarked that the rivalry between the duke of Medina Sidonia and the marquess of Cádiz, on the one hand, and the count of Cabra and Alfonso de Aguilar, on the other, could very well destroy Andalucía and allow the Moors to seize any part of it that they wished.¹²⁰

The alliance of the Naṣrid emir and the count of Cabra greatly distressed Miguel Lucas, who also complained that the count of Paredes and the *adelantado* of Cazorla were on friendly relations with the emir. Seeking money and men to oppose the Moors, he appealed to Enrique IV, but the king’s other troubles precluded him from providing assistance. Therefore, Miguel Lucas wrote to Pope Sixtus IV (1471–84) on 15 October 1471, describing his efforts to defend Jaén. In particular, he complained that wicked Christians aided the

“enemies of Christendom” in their assault on Jaén at Michaelmas past. Not only did they pillage, burn, rape, and kill, but they also slew a priest and a monk after mass, profaned their church, and dishonored the crucifix and sacred images. Contending that if Jaén fell to the Moors the entire frontier would be in their hands, he begged the pope to grant a crusading indulgence for two or three years or as long as needed to those who defended the city for even one month and those who contributed financially. He stressed that the people of Jaén were prepared to spend what little money they had in this “most holy defense . . . of the republic of Christ.” Although no papal bull proclaiming the crusade seems to be extant, it is possible that the pope responded favorably.¹²¹ Torres Fontes commented that his plea was “a sincere confession of his military impotence and demoralization.”¹²²

The Truce of 1472

As the quarrel over the succession to Enrique IV rent the country, he could not think of going to war against Granada. Thus, a three-year truce, from 18 January 1472 until 17 January 1475, was arranged. The count of Cabra, his sons, and Egas Venegas, lord of Luque, who had been hostile to Enrique IV, were protected against royal reprisal. If any punitive action were taken against them and not corrected within forty days, the emir would be free to aid them. Otherwise, neither side would lend assistance to the enemies of the other. As in the past, merchants were permitted to cross the frontiers with full security to engage in trade, subject to the usual customs duties. Neither monarch would accept any castle or town belonging to the other that had been bought, sold, stolen, or acquired by treason. An *almojarife* or other person fleeing to either kingdom with royal treasure or money not his own would be denied asylum and would be required to make restitution. Escaped captives could remain in the realm giving them refuge but would have to restore property belonging to their former masters. Judges would be appointed to adjudicate disputes of this sort.¹²³ The treaty, which extended beyond Enrique IV’s lifetime, is notable because it did not require Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī to pay tribute or release Christian captives, as had been customary. The king’s failure to insist on those points is indicative of his weakened position.

This pact did not put an end to border clashes of greater or lesser importance. When bands of Moors raided the lands of the Order of Calatrava, the king ordered Rodrigo Ponce de León, marquess of Cádiz, to retaliate. In 1472 he made a successful surprise attack on the castle of Cardela, about twelve miles from Arcos de la Frontera, because many of its defenders had gone off to protect Málaga from Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī’s besieging army. However, in the following year, the emir recovered possession. The anonymous *Castilian Chronicle* accused the duke of Medina Sidonia of acting in concert with the

emir and facilitating the fall of Cardela by distracting the marquess. All the sacred vessels and other objects were carried off and the church (originally a mosque that the marquess had converted to Christian use) was restored as a mosque.¹²⁴

In November Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī finally subjugated Málaga and executed Alquirzote, the governor, who had refused to acknowledge his sovereignty. With Málaga firmly in his grasp, only Almería, controlled by Ibn Sālim al-Najjār, challenged his authority. Looking to the future, Ibn Sālim, who had previously courted an alliance with Enrique IV, turned to Fernando and Isabel. Sending them gifts, he also offered friendship and alliance, such as his father, Yūsuf IV, had enjoyed with Juan II. Responding on 27 June 1474, Fernando acknowledged that if there were a war with Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, as Ibn Sālim expected, he would ask his father, Juan II of Aragón, to dispatch troops by sea from Valencia to Almería. Meanwhile, he pledged to review previous pacts between the kings of Castile and Granada with respect to the terms of alliance and vassalage.¹²⁵ Thus, it was clear that Fernando and Isabel, soon to be rulers of Castile, intended to undermine Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī by encouraging Ibn Sālim al-Najjār, a rival candidate for the throne.

Within a few months, Enrique IV, whose last years were slashed apart by the controversy over the succession, died on 1 December 1474. Although Isabel was proclaimed queen, the partisans of her niece, Juana, declared her to be the rightful sovereign, thus continuing the wrangle for several years.¹²⁶

Enrique IV, Crusader King

Enrique IV's reign began with great promise as he executed several crusading expeditions during his first four years with the aim of undermining the emirate's economy. The inability of the Naṣrids to establish a strong monarchy unchallenged by pretenders gave reason to believe that the collapse of Islamic Spain was imminent. The first three emirs of this era, Muḥammad X, Sa'd, and Ismā'il IV, were unable to dominate the realm and to hold the ambitions of the Abencerrajes and other powerful families in check. Given those circumstances, Enrique IV could anticipate that a persistent policy of erosion would result in the final subjugation of Granada. However, the magnates, apparently looking for more spectacular actions, charged him with cowardice and became increasingly antagonistic. His unsuccessful intervention in Navarre and Catalonia, moreover, distracted him from the reconquest in the 1460s and limited his ability to take advantage of divisions among the Naṣrids. His promotion of younger men intensified the animosity of the marquess of Villena and other leading magnates and led to his deposition in 1465 and the proclamation of his younger brother, Alfonso XII.

As the dispute over the succession dominated the remainder of his reign,

he effectively left the struggle against the Moors to the great lords of Andalucía. In the absence of strong royal leadership they concentrated on personal rivalries to the neglect of the reconquest. The principal beneficiary of this situation was Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, whose ruthlessness, despite several challenges, enabled him to retain the Naṣrid throne for more than twenty years. Like several of his predecessors, he knew how to exploit the squabbles among the Christians to his own advantage and could even present himself as a mediator. In the midst of this disorder the Castilians made two important territorial gains in which Enrique IV had no part, namely, the recovery of Gibraltar and the conquest of Archidona.

One of the most severe accusations against Enrique IV was *maurophilia*, a love and admiration of Moorish culture. Even in the twentieth century Goñi Gaztambide complained that he was “the most Islamized king that there had ever been in Castile and the one who contributed the most to the relaxation of customs and anarchy.”¹²⁷ The history of medieval Spain, however, reveals many instances of kings, nobles, and others who, like Enrique IV, were attracted to Islamic civilization but did not abandon their religion on that account. Nor did he. The purpose of that charge was to demonstrate that he was not a true Christian and therefore had no right to rule over Christian people. That indictment reflected the vicious character of political society that Fernando and Isabel would have to overcome.

Chapter 6

Fernando and Isabel's Crusade: From Alhama to Málaga

The distinction of bringing the centuries-long reconquest to a close pertains to Isabel of Castile and her husband, Fernando of Aragón.¹ After overcoming initial opposition to Isabel, they proclaimed their intention to conquer Granada and expel the Moors. The papacy, comprehending that victory over Islam in the Iberian Peninsula would counterbalance the growing power of the Turks, supported the Castilian enterprise with crusading indulgences and financial benefits. The initial phase of the war took place in the western sector of the emirate as the king and queen endeavored to expand the territory acquired by their predecessors. Dissension within the Naşrid dynasty made resistance more difficult and after several years the king and queen conquered the important strongholds of Alhama, Ronda, and Málaga.

Securing the Throne

Although Isabel (1474–1504), just twenty-three years of age, was proclaimed queen in succession to her brother, Enrique IV, a contrary faction recognized the latter's twelve-year-old daughter, Juana, and betrothed her to Afonso V of Portugal. Intent on advancing her claims, he invaded Castile in 1475, but Fernando routed him at Toro in the next year. In the treaty of Alcáçovas signed on 4 September 1479, Afonso V, on Juana's behalf, renounced the Castilian throne. Beyond that, the long-simmering rivalry between Castile and Portugal concerning overseas expansion was resolved. In 1475, Isabel, disputing Portuguese pretensions, had declared that "the conquest of Africa and Guinea," including the Canary Islands, belonged to Castile.² According to the treaty Afonso V yielded all claims to the islands, while Fernando and Isabel acknowledged Portuguese rights in Africa and pledged not to undertake any venture there without Portuguese consent. Afonso V died two years later while

Juana, still styling herself as queen, retired to a monastery, where she died in 1530.³

The subsequent pacification of the realm enabled Isabel to concentrate on the conquest of Granada under the military leadership of her husband, Fernando V of Castile, and now Fernando II of Aragón (1479–1516). Given the title “Reges Catholici” by Pope Alexander VI after the fall of Granada, they have been known thereafter as los Reyes Católicos or the Catholic Monarchs.

The Truce with Granada 1475–81

According to the royal chronicler, Fernando del Pulgar, from the time of their accession, the king and queen, “acknowledging that they ought not to undertake any war except for the faith and for security, always had it in mind to conquer the emirate of Granada and to expel the regimen of the Moors and the name of Muḥammad from all the Spains.” Speaking of this “just and necessary war,” Palencia made the same point.⁴ In the marriage agreement that Fernando signed on 7 January 1469, he declared that he would be “bound to wage war against the Moors, enemies of the holy Catholic faith,” and provide funds to maintain frontier bastions. Nor would he make peace or war with any neighboring monarch without Isabel’s approval.⁵ In the past, failure to pay the wages of frontier garrisons and to secure them with essential supplies had resulted in the loss of more than one stronghold. The pact not only underscored Isabel’s authority as sovereign of Castile but also her insistence that the conquest of Granada was a major priority.

Nevertheless, the need to secure the throne precluded her from taking the offensive for several years. The truce negotiated in 1472 with the Naṣrid emir, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, would expire in January 1475, but the death of Enrique IV, one of the contracting parties, nullified it. Isabel, however, on 30 January instructed the count of Cabra to negotiate an extension and ordered frontier commanders to observe it.⁶ Still, the Murcian towns were commanded to prepare for a possible summons to war and the *adelantado* of Murcia was directed to ready the defenses of the kingdom.⁷ According to a document of 1476, a truce for two years was signed on 11 March 1475, but the text is not extant. As in the past, however, hostile encounters continued.⁸ Meantime, as another indication of the closeness of the count of Cabra and the Naṣrid ruler, the latter extended his protection to the count’s son and his brother-in-law.⁹

Considering the ongoing conflict with Portugal, the king and queen deemed the two-year term insufficient and on 17 November authorized their envoys to ratify “whatever truce” the count had arranged and extend it for as long as seemed appropriate. Signed on 11 January 1476, the truce would be in effect until 11 March 1481. As was customary, merchants were assured of safe-conduct in both realms, subject to the usual duties. Persons stealing royal

treasure on either side would be arrested and punished. Captives who escaped to their homeland were assured of freedom but had to restore any property taken from their owners. Judges would resolve disputes arising during the truce. The pact did not mention the payment of tribute or recognition of vassalage.¹⁰

Nevertheless, both sides violated the truce. In February 1476, for example, the Moors of Guadix and Baza besieged the castle of Huelma a few miles southeast of Jaén. In retaliation for ravages carried out by the *adelantado* of Murcia, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī burned Cieza in April 1477 and forced the neighboring Mudejars to return to Granada.¹¹ In protest, the king and queen demanded the liberation of captives, the settlement of claims for damages, and the restitution of property.¹² While negotiations were in progress, the Moors seized Ortejícar, but the marquess of Cádiz and the count of Urueña, considering that “it was such a holy work and of such service to God and the royal crown,” recovered possession.¹³ As the negotiations dragged on, both sides agreed, on 17 January 1478, that two knights, one chosen by Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī and the other by the count of Cabra, should meet within two months to adjudicate disputes arising from frontier confrontations. Within six months they would render their decisions, which the Catholic Monarchs and the emir pledged to observe. This text was complementary to the truce already established.¹⁴

In a later version of his *Chronicle*, Pulgar affirmed that when Naṣrīd ambassadors asked the king and queen for a truce, they stipulated that Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī should pay tribute as “the Moorish kings were accustomed to pay.” Indignantly, he declared that “the kings of Granada who used to pay tribute were dead” and that in the building where the coin of the tribute was minted lances for defense were now being made. Despite that aggressive reply, the king and queen accepted a truce for three years but did not insist on the payment of tribute because of the war with Portugal.¹⁵ Juan de Mata Carriazo has shown that an earlier text of Pulgar’s *Chronicle* related that the king and queen “did not then demand any tribute from the Moors such as they were accustomed to pay when truces were granted.”¹⁶

Alonso de Palencia, whose historical work is anterior to Pulgar’s, stated that the truce was for three years, namely, until 1481. As he made no reference to the payment of tribute, the account in the later version of Pulgar’s *Chronicle* probably reflected circumstances prevailing later. Ignoring the truce, Castilians and Moors continued to pillage and burn villages and lands on either side of the frontier. In November 1479 the king rebuked Alfonso de Aguilar, an enemy of the count of Cabra, and the master of Calatrava for doing so while the truce was in effect.¹⁷

Sixtus IV and the Crusade

Although the war with Portugal and the suppression of internal opposition was their immediate concern, Fernando and Isabel expected to take up the struggle against the Moors as soon as possible. In response to their appeal, Sixtus IV, on 12 September 1477, indicated his willingness to proclaim a crusade and to allow use of the *decima* to finance it, but he suggested that they send an ambassador to discuss the matter.¹⁸ In the following year, on 1 November, in response to their petition concerning the establishment of the Inquisition, he expressed the hope that they would subjugate the emirate and “and convert those infidels to the right faith.”¹⁹ As a sign of honor, in March 1479 he bestowed a sword on Fernando.²⁰

Two months after the treaty of Alcáçovas ended the war with Portugal, the pope, on 13 November, declared a crusade. As the king and queen were determined to conquer Granada, he conceded a plenary indulgence to those who battled the “infidels” or supported their efforts. The concession of the indulgence for fifteen years revealed that no one expected the conquest to be easy. While the indulgence was welcome, the king asked the pope to extend it to the Canary Islands and to grant a portion of ecclesiastical revenues to finance the crusade.²¹ As the war proceeded the king and queen often requested the grant of the full panoply of crusading privileges.

Nevertheless, they were not prepared to violate the current truce. After the death of his father, Juan II, in January 1479, Fernando had to devote time and energy to securing the kingdom of Aragón. During the Cortes of Toledo in April 1480, the king and queen also revealed their concern about Turkish expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. At that time Alonso de Cárdenas, master of Santiago, asked that, in accordance with the ancient custom of Spain, they confer on him the banners and insignia of his office as a sign that he was “the captain and standard bearer (*alférez*) of the Apostle St. James, the patron of the Spains, for the war against the Moors, the enemies of our holy faith.” During a solemn liturgy, they stated their intention to undertake a crusade against the Moors after their fleet turned back the Turks.²² As the Turks were besieging the island of Rhodes, the seat of the Order of the Hospital, it was feared that they would soon assault the Italian coast. Fernando, as king of Aragón and Sicily, also worried that the Turkish advance would encourage the Mudejars of Valencia to revolt.²³ Despite these concerns, Isabel convinced her husband that the conquest of Granada was a matter of the utmost urgency.²⁴

When the pope appointed an Italian as bishop of Cuenca, the king and queen reminded him, that their “progenitors, as most Christian princes, with great labor and shedding of blood, had conquered the land of the Moors, the enemies of our holy Catholic faith, establishing there the name of our Redeemer Jesus Christ and extirpating the name of Muḥammad.” Therefore, they claimed the right of patronage over all the churches and the nomination of Castilian natives who would be acceptable and faithful to them. As foreigners had little knowledge of the country, it would be foolhardy to give them responsibility for the many fortresses belonging to the church, especially

those on the Granadan frontier.²⁵ In making their argument, the Catholic Monarchs were repeating ideas expressed in the thirteenth century by Alfonso X, who asserted that the kings of Spain had the right to nominate bishops because they had seized the land from the Moors, transformed mosques into churches, and proclaimed the name of Christ instead of that of Muḥammad.²⁶ Sixtus IV eventually bowed to the royal wishes and accepted their candidate.

As the war would entail vast expenditures, the king and queen also requested the concession of the *decima*, the tenth of ecclesiastical revenues. Although Fernando complained in May 1481 to his cousin King Ferrante of Naples (1458–94) about Sixtus IV's delay in extending that benefit, he received authorization a month later. Even so, he was displeased because the pope reserved a portion of the money for the Turkish crusade.²⁷ Meeting at Córdoba on 3 June 1482, royal and papal representatives agreed that the *decima* would be levied on ecclesiastical income in Castile, Aragón, and Sicily for one year, but a third of the amount would be reserved for the Turkish war and would be paid promptly to papal agents. There seems little evidence, however, that the third was ever sent to Rome. As a further sign of his support for the Granadan crusade, the pope yielded the revenues for 1480 of the vacant see of Salamanca, which ordinarily were reserved to the papacy.²⁸ Though unhappy with the pope's decision to claim a third of the *decima*, the king and queen, hoping that he would eventually yield, received the papal nuncio bearing the crusading bull. In a solemn ceremony in Madrid the bull was read and orders were given to preach the crusade.²⁹

José Goñi Gaztambide stressed the distinct character of the bull issued on 10 August 1482. After affirming his duty to uphold the orthodox faith and subject and convert the barbarous and infidel nations, Sixtus IV acknowledged that Fernando and Isabel intended to conquer the emirate, now occupied by the “perfidious Saracens,” and convert them to the Christian faith. Utilizing only their own resources, however, they could not carry out their “pious and laudable plan” and so there was need to seek assistance in men and money from other countries. Thus the pope appealed to all the people “of the nation of Spain” who, “bearing the cross on their hearts,” were prepared with their persons and property to undertake the conquest of Granada for the exaltation of the faith. Like crusaders going to the Holy Land, they would receive “plenary remission and indulgence of all their sins.” Anyone who died after setting out on this “holy expedition” and intent on carrying out this “holy work” would also gain the indulgence. The “gates of paradise would be opened to eternal glory with the holy apostles and glorious martyrs.”

In order to encourage broad participation, the indulgence was offered to religious communities of either sex who provided one soldier for every ten members, or any ten laypersons who did the same. Also eligible were physicians, spice dealers, craftsmen, cobblers, butchers, iron and wood workers, carpenters, machinists, apothecaries, and purveyors of medicine, food, and other necessities; priests who preached, said mass, and heard

confessions for at least three months; women serving the sick and wounded; and anyone who within three years contributed 200 ducats (about 75,000 *maravedíes*) or more. Wives who gave 2 ducats (about 750 *maravedíes*) were also included. Poor people could gain the indulgence if they offered 2 silver *reales* (about 62 *maravedíes*).³⁰

Crusaders were also permitted to choose their own confessors, who could absolve them from many sins reserved to the papacy (simony, ecclesiastical censures, neglect of the canonical hours), and commute vows they might have taken. Crusaders could be buried in places subject to interdict. Anyone contributing 2 additional *reales* to care for ailing crusaders or for the erection of churches in conquered territory was assured of a share in all the good works of the church. Chaplains accompanying the crusaders were permitted to celebrate mass in military camps and were released from the obligation to reside in their benefices, to fast, and to recite the daily office. Soldiers were dispensed from the duty to fast and rest on festive days. Bequests for the ransom of captives would be applied to the crusade. Forbidding anyone to impede the crusade or to use crusading funds for any other purpose, the pope authorized several commissioners to implement the bull, to regularize marriages, and legitimize children of crusaders.³¹

As a sign of his commitment, the pope donated a cross to the king that was carried before him until the surrender of Granada.³² At some time the king and queen probably took the crusader's vow and the king likely wore the emblem of the cross on his garments. By each contributing 100 florins (about 665,000 *maravedíes*), they gained the indulgence and encouraged their people to do likewise. The crusade was preached in Castile, Aragón, Sicily, and Sardinia, and great sums of money were collected.³³

By that time several armed encounters had taken place and led to the outbreak of war.³⁴ A surprise attack on Zahara by the Moors of Ronda, on 26 December 1481, was a particularly telling blow as Fernando de Antequera had taken Zahara many years before. Realizing that its loss would stir the king and queen to destroy the emirate, an adviser to the sultan remarked, "The ancient kingdom of the Moors that we have held for more than 700 years in Spain is finished." Pulgar, who emphasized that Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī had a greater number of troops, artillery, and war materials than any of his predecessors, also accused him of violating the truce. Nevertheless, as the truce probably expired in June 1481, and there is no evidence that it was renewed, a violation seems unlikely.³⁵ When Fernando learned of the fall of Zahara, he remarked that it would soon enable him to set in motion a plan "that we have had in mind."³⁶

Diego de Valera's Military Counsel

Writing to the king in February 1482, Diego de Valera, the *alcaide* of El Puerto

de Santa María, remarked that “even before Zahara was taken by the Moors it was public knowledge in this area that your highness wanted to make war against them in the coming summer.” As “the conquest is so holy and so necessary,” it was important, he argued, to seek counsel to determine how best to bring the greatest honor, glory, and fame to the king, and serve the utility of the crown. In preparation for war, he recommended curtailment of the export of foodstuffs and stockpiling of wheat, barley, wine, and livestock near places likely to be laid under siege. Biscuit also had to be provided for the armada patrolling the strait. Especially important was the pacification of Andalucía, torn by factional conflicts.³⁷

Valera, who had experience of warfare beyond the Iberian Peninsula, also proposed that materials essential to siege warfare, namely, trebuchets, mantles, wood to build siege towers, ladders, and iron, should be shipped by sea from Galicia and Asturias. Masters of artillery, miners, and scalers with their tools should be recruited from Britain, because, in his opinion, they were the best in the world. As the Genoese and Venetians sent their ships through the strait to northern Europe, they should be admonished not to allow Moorish vessels to pass freely; if they did so, their merchants in Spain should be arrested. In addition to the contingents of magnates and towns, foot soldiers should be transported by sea from the Basque Provinces and Asturias.

As to the conduct of the war, Valera suggested that, with the help of God, the Virgin Mary, and Santiago, “patron of the Spains,” after pillaging the countryside, the crusading forces should besiege Málaga, as it would be easy to take. While Málaga was under siege, the *adelantado* of Murcia and forces from Aragón should assault Almería. Optimistically, Valera declared: “Having taken Málaga, the emirate of Granada is yours.”

Finally, turning to finances, he advised the king to obtain papal concession of the *decima*, just as Pope Boniface VIII in 1296 had allowed Philip IV of France to tax the clergy to finance his war with England. In ending his letter, Valera expressed the hope that the Holy Spirit would enable the king to bring to a successful conclusion “this famous and holy enterprise.”

The Fall of Alhama

Fernando did not entirely follow the plan outlined by Valera, who proved to be quite wrong in his prediction that Málaga would surrender easily. The ensuing campaigns were characterized by skirmishes often resulting in the capture of enemy troops, systematic pillaging of the countryside that terrorized the Moors while also disrupting their food supply, and sieges of important fortresses. Neither side wanted to tempt fate by engaging in pitched battles.³⁸

Offsetting the loss of Zahara was the capture of Alhama, a fortress set on a craggy mountain above a fruitful plain about twenty-five miles southwest of

Granada. It was captured by Rodrigo Ponce de León, marquess of Cádiz and *adelantado mayor de la frontera*, with twenty-five hundred to three thousand horse and three thousand to four thousand foot from Seville, Jerez, and other frontier towns. As they cautiously approached, Juan Ortega, an *escalador* adept at scaling fortress walls, led a detachment that gained entry into the citadel in the early morning of 28 February 1482. Surprising the defenders, they opened the gates of the town, but the Moors, using crossbows and handguns (*espingardas*), and expecting that the emir would relieve them, resisted strenuously. From morning to nightfall, however, the Castilians battled through the streets before finally securing possession of Alhama, “the richest piece of its size in the land of the Moors,” on 1 March. More than one thousand men were killed and four thousand were taken prisoner. A rich booty of gold, silver, jewels, silks, household furniture, livestock, and food fell to the victors. A renegade Christian who had inflicted great harm on his fellows was seized and executed. Many Christian captives were liberated from the dungeons. As the stench of death filled the air, corpses were thrown out into the neighboring fields to be devoured by dogs.³⁹

Hailing the marquess of Cádiz as another Cid, Diego de Valera congratulated him for his triumph at Alhama. At the same time, Valera pointed out that it would be difficult and expensive to maintain Alhama, which was situated well beyond Castilian lines. Responding to critics, he reiterated his opinion concerning the best manner of conducting the war. Although he stressed the need to ravage enemy territory, he remarked that the Moors, seeing the destruction of their crops in lowland areas, sowed others in the highlands, and were able to subsist on a variety of grains other than wheat. He also argued that it was essential to occupy systematically an entire area and not leave the Moors behind the most advanced position. That was the problem with Alhama. With Málaga as the prime target, he emphasized that the *tercias* or third of the tithe of the cities and towns of Andalucía should be used to obtain enough wheat, barley, wine, meat, cheese, oil, and other necessities. Once sufficient provisions were gathered in Seville, Tarifa, and Gibraltar, they could be shipped at minimal expense to the coast of the emirate. Overland transport was extremely costly as pack animals and their handlers consumed half the food supplies they carried. As transport by sea was more secure and less expensive, he argued that when troops from the Basque Provinces and Asturias were summoned in the coming April, they should make the journey by sea. He concluded that once Málaga was captured, the nearby ports of Benalmadena, Fuengirola, Vélez Málaga, Marbella, and Almuñécar could easily be taken.⁴⁰ Though his arguments seemed sound, the king chose to act otherwise in some respects.

The Defense of Alhama

Although Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī was too late to prevent the fall of Alhama, on 5 March he came to its relief. Realizing that the Castilians lacked the necessities to withstand a prolonged siege, he attacked immediately and cut off the water supply.⁴¹ When the king learned of the capture of Alhama, he had his clergy chant the *Te Deum*, and now he ordered the frontier captains to hasten to its defense.⁴² Putting aside his enduring antipathy toward the marquess of Cádiz, Enrique de Guzmán, the second duke of Medina Sidonia, gathered a relieving force, while the king made his way to Córdoba. Rather than await their arrival, Abū l-Ḥasan Alī, after a siege of three weeks, withdrew on 29 March. The marquess acknowledged that he and his men owed their deliverance to the duke of Medina Sidonia and declared their feud to be at an end.⁴³

The fall of Alhama, marking the beginning of the struggle that would continue for the next decade, was commemorated in several romances. The duke’s relief was recounted in the romance “Coronaba las alturas.” Another recorded the conquest and Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī’s failed attempt at recovery. Still another, with the refrain “Ay de mi Alhama!” related the fate of the *alcaide*, who, charged with negligence, argued that he had the emir’s permission to be absent for three weeks at his sister’s wedding. Lamenting the blot on his honor, he also mourned the loss of his wife and children, especially his daughter Fátima, a prisoner of the marquess of Cádiz. Although he offered a rich ransom, the marquess would not accept it, and Fátima, taking the name of Mary, became a Christian. The angry emir, rejecting the *alcaide*’s plea for mercy, ordered his head cut off and mounted over the main gate of the Alhambra as a lesson to everyone.⁴⁴ Given Alhama’s strategic location at the juncture of roads leading to Granada, Loja, Málaga, and Ronda, it was imperative that the Moors retake it, but three attempts to do so in the spring and summer were turned aside.⁴⁵

Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī attempted a second siege of Alhama on 14 April, but his assault a week later failed. Pedro González de Mendoza, Cardinal of Spain and archbishop of Toledo, consecrated three mosques as churches and the queen endowed them with sacred vessels for the liturgy.⁴⁶ After reorganizing Alhama’s defenses, Fernando, hoping to subjugate Granada and “restore it to the divine cult,” reconnoitered the region about Loja, an important stronghold standing on the road from Granada to Archidona and Antequera. He then returned to Córdoba, where Isabel, who was pregnant with their second child, awaited him.⁴⁷ Determined to have a part in the conquest of Granada, which she perceived was now underway, she entrusted the administration of the northern sector of the realm to Alfonso Enríquez, admiral of Castile.⁴⁸

When Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī laid siege to Alhama for the third time, some experts in frontier warfare recommended its destruction, given the difficulty of retaining it in the midst of enemy territory. The Catholic Monarchs, realizing that the Moors would see that as a sign of weakness, rejected their advice. Indeed, Isabel ordered the procurement of food, livestock, and siege machines, and summoned royal vassals, knights, and infantry from the northern towns.

Measures to obtain needed funds were also undertaken. Moorish preachers countered by urging their fellows in Spain and in Africa to come to their aid. In order to thwart that possibility, Charles de Valera (Diego's son), and the Basques Martín Díaz de Mena and Garcí López de Arriarán, all experienced sea captains, were ordered to assemble an armada to intercept enemy vessels carrying supplies to Granada. The king directed Seville, Jerez, and Cádiz to demand guarantees of their Genoese residents that they would not supply the Moors with food or weapons.⁴⁹

The Failure of the Siege of Loja

In the expectation that the conquest of Loja, a formidable stronghold situated in rugged country, would provide greater security for Alhama, several miles to the southeast, Fernando set out from Écija on 1 July 1482 and initiated the siege eight days later.⁵⁰ Even though he had four thousand horse and twelve thousand foot they were badly positioned, poorly disciplined, and unable to dominate the surrounding countryside. They also lacked sufficient artillery, provisions, and field ovens for a protracted siege. The *alcaide* 'Alī al-'Attār, "an energetic man well-versed in warfare," engaged them in frequent skirmishes. When a Castilian detachment attempted to occupy a hill overlooking the town on 13 July, the Moors executed a classic maneuver, feigning flight and then wheeling about to massacre their pursuers. Although Fernando tried to rally his men, ultimately he had to withdraw. The romance "De Córdoba partió el Rey" recounted the death of Rodrigo Téllez Girón, master of the Order of Calatrava. Another related that as he died in the arms of Muza, a brother of Abū Abd 'Allāh, whom he had befriended, he urged him to accept Christianity.⁵¹

News of the king's retreat so disheartened the garrison in Alhama that some spoke of surrender. In contrast, the *alcaide* Luis de Portocarrero, emphasizing that surrender brought dishonor, resistance glory, exhorted his men to battle on "in defense of our faith," claiming, "Our holy law is so much truer than their lying sect." He declared his intention "to die defending Alhama rather than live as a captive of the Moors in the corral of Granada." While the siege was in progress Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī raided about Tarifa, most of whose defenders had gone to Loja. Then, in August, with two thousand knights and ten thousand infantry, he advanced on Alhama but withdrew at the approach of Fernando and his army of six thousand cavalry and ten thousand infantry. As Bernáldez remarked, the king, learning from the failure of the siege of Loja, took much greater care in planning future campaigns.⁵²

Consoling the king, Diego de Valera encouraged him to act boldly and besiege Málaga. In order to do so, mariners and archers should be summoned from Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa so that by 15 August he would have twenty ships

capable of bearing one thousand men. Seven ships (*naos*) in El Puerto de Santa Maria were ready to transport equipment, artillery, and provisions anywhere on the coast. Valera was convinced that all the people on the coast would hasten to serve without recompense, other than the plunder taken in the siege. Valera had to be disappointed, however, that nearly five years elapsed before the siege of Málaga was undertaken.⁵³

Recurring familial discord continued to place the Naṣrids at a disadvantage. An aggressive monarch, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, in order to maintain his sizeable army, had to impose new taxes, especially on cereals and clothing, thereby arousing popular resentment. The anonymous Arabic chronicler suggested a highly personal motive for opposition to the emir, namely, the jealousy of his wife, Fāṭima, toward her husband’s Christian slave, Zoraya. Taking their mother’s side, Fēṭma’s sons rebelled. The Abencerraje clan, whom the emir had treated harshly, threw their support to his son Abū ‘Abd Allāh, known to the Christians as Boabdil. On 15 July, the very day on which the Christians fled from Loja, he was proclaimed as Muḥammad XI (1482/1486–92) and occupied the Alhambra. After a bloody battle in the streets, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī retreated to Málaga with his brother, Muḥammad b. Sa’d, and his hated vizier, Abū l-Qāsim Bannigas, whose Christian father and grandfather belonged to the Venegas family of Córdoba. Despite the antipathy between father and son, neither sought Castilian assistance and, in order to win adherents, both continued to attack Castilian positions.⁵⁴ Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī appealed to Morocco for help, but the Castilians intercepted ships carrying reinforcements.⁵⁵

The Rout at al-Sharqiyya

In 1483, the marquess of Cádiz and the master of Santiago planned a raid in the mountains of Málaga to devastate its renowned silk industry, to ease the pressure on Alhama, and to drive a wedge between the domains of the rival Naṣrids. They set out from Antequera on 19 March with three thousand knights and one thousand infantry, an insufficient number, according to Bernáldez, to operate in the harsh terrain.⁵⁶ Guided by scouts who were former Moors, they moved southward into al-Sharqiyya (Ajarquía), an area between Vélez Málaga and Málaga. Alerted to their presence by mountaintop bonfires, the Moors, commanded by Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī’s brother, Muḥammad b. Sa’d, caught them in the maze of jagged hills and valleys on 20 March. Pelted with arrows and stones by the Moors on the surrounding hilltops, the Castilian cavalry was unable to turn about in the narrow ravines. The marquess was cut off from the master of Santiago and the main body of troops. During the night the Moors, in order to conceal their numbers, lit ten thousand candles around the enemy. On the next day, as the Castilians panicked and fled, the Moors

butchered them and captured about two thousand prisoners, including the count of Cifuentes, who had to pay a heavy ransom.⁵⁷ Many who fled had to make their way through dangerous passes with little sustenance other than herbs and water, and in constant fear of marauding Moorish bands.⁵⁸

Whereas, according to Bernáldez, good Christians would prepare for battle by first confessing their sins, receiving communion, and intending to defeat the enemy for the benefit of the holy Catholic faith, most of the participants in this expedition were motivated by greed. Lacking any fear of God, they engaged in a wicked enterprise in search of riches. On that account, in his judgment, God awarded the victory to a small number of Moors (five hundred foot and five hundred cavalry). The master of Santiago, according to Pulgar, lamented that God had turned his wrath against the Christians, using the infidels to punish their sins. While admitting that victory was in God's hands, Pulgar attributed the rout to the pride of the Castilians who minimized the enemy's strength and neglected to place their trust in God. In Palencia's view, aside from the unyielding landscape, the lack of discipline among the troops who were distracted by the opportunity for easy booty was a major factor in the debacle.⁵⁹

Stung by this defeat, the Castilians attempted to constrain the Moors' attempts to reap the benefits of their victory. Strengthening frontier defenses, the Castilians provided sufficient troops and supplies to preclude Alhama from falling into enemy hands. Seville readied ships to prevent the Moors from transporting prisoners taken at al-Sharqiyya to Morocco. On the eastern frontier the Murcians, after routing the Moors at Vera, advanced toward Almería in the expectation of joining forces with Yaḥyā al-Najjār, the son of Ibn Sālim, a former pretender to throne. Heavy rains, however, impeded their march and Muḥammad XI's supporters forced al-Najjār to flee to the mountainous region of Las Alpujarras.⁶⁰

The Battle of Lucena and the Capture of Abū 'Abd Allāh

Intent perhaps on demonstrating that he, as well as his father, could defeat the Castilians, Abū 'Abd Allāh, the emir newly ensconced in the Alhambra, planned a surprise attack on Lucena, about five miles south of Cabra, the seat of Diego Fernández de Córdoba, the second count of Cabra. The count's nephew, the *alcaide de los donceles* (who commanded the royal pages and supervised their military training), was responsible for the defense of Lucena. "Prompted by some divine inspiration rather than any human reason," the count, with two hundred horse and four hundred foot, and the *alcaide*, with seventy horse and a few foot, decided to challenge Abū 'Abd Allāh, who had seven hundred horse and nine thousand infantry. Taking up their position on the surrounding hills and sounding their trumpets, they gave the impression

“that all of Castile was there.” Though exhorted to act as good Christians trusting that God and the Virgin Mary would give them victory, some were disheartened by the disparity in numbers and were ready to flee. The count, however, emphasizing that life was fleeting, reminded them that if they triumphed they would enjoy a “praiseworthy fame and glory if they died.”⁶¹

In similar language the anonymous author of a detailed account of the battle related that the count implored his troops to serve God “as faithful and Catholic Christians, offering their lives for their faith against the Moors, its enemies.” Even though the Moors had superior numbers he trusted that God, the Virgin Mary, and the Apostle Santiago would enable them to triumph. Pronouncing the count a saint, Hernando de Baeza related that after hearing mass, confessing his sins, and receiving communion, the count admonished his men to put fear aside and be assured that the truth of the holy Catholic faith would bring victory. Shouting “Santiago, Santiago, today is our day,” he led his men down the hill against the Moors.⁶²

After the initial clash of arms, the Moors, who overestimated the size of the Castilian forces, suddenly began to flee. One Moor escaping to Loja, when asked what happened, declared that “heaven fell on them and they are all lost and dead.” Among the dead was ‘Alī al-‘Aṭṭār, *alcaide* of Loja, a vigorous warrior who had long waged war against the Christians. Assuming that the Moorish captives would be ransomed, Bernáldez assessed their value as great, medium, or common, though he did not give monetary figures. The anonymous Christian account, declaring that the Moors were defeated “with the help of God, our Lord, who is the victor in battles,” provided the names of the leading Moors who were killed or captured. More than one thousand knights and four thousand foot were taken prisoner or drowned in the river Genil. Moreover, one thousand horses, nine hundred pack animals, swords and shields, clothing, gold, silver, and jewelry fell to the victors.⁶³ An unexpected triumph for the Christians, the battle of Lucena, which took place on 21 April 1483, was a catastrophe for the Moors.

The most prominent captive was the emir, Abū ‘Abd Allāh. Abandoning his horse, he tried to hide, but his white garments and rich accoutrements gave him away. Several foot soldiers intended to kill him, but others intervened. Initially he identified himself as the royal vizier, but eventually he was recognized and shown the respect due to a king. The anonymous Muslim chronicler described his capture as a “shameful disaster” that brought about the “ruin of our homeland.”⁶⁴

Determined to share equally in the glory of having captured him, the count of Cabra and the *alcaide de los donceles* made a sworn agreement on 30 April in Lucena that they would deliver their illustrious prisoner to the king and queen in Córdoba in the following week. Giving thanks to God, the Cardinal of Spain congratulated the count on his victory. Although the count presented to the queen eleven banners taken from the Moors, she returned them to him, saying that it was proper that he should retain them as a perpetual memory of

his achievement. The royal chronicler, Fernando del Pulgar, also thanked the count, whose wife had sent a report of the battle to the queen. Pulgar promised to use it in his own chronicle but always respecting the substance of the original.⁶⁵ Honoring the count, Fernando and Isabel allowed him to use a coat of arms depicting the head of a king on a chain. A plaque on the walls of Baena, one of his fortresses, displayed a shield with a border of twenty-two bands, each symbolizing one of the banners taken in the battle; below them was a crowned Moorish figure with a chain about his neck. Arabic inscriptions on the walls proclaimed: “May our lord the sultan be exalted!” and “May our lord Abū ‘Abd Allāh be exalted!”⁶⁶

Relating the capture of Abū ‘Abd Allāh, “el Rey Chico”—“the Boy King”—the romance “Junto al vado de Xenil” described the lamentations in Granada:

~~The king wept for their good king,
so beloved and cherished.
The queen complained to Mahammad
whose kindness she favored
their enemy and their king,
that was thus destroyed.~~

The Catholic Monarchs conveyed the news to Sixtus IV, who congratulated them and notified the consistory of cardinals. However, when his representative asked the king and queen for the third of the *decima* for the crusade against the Turks, as agreed upon at Córdoba in 1482, his plea fell on deaf ears. It soon became evident that Fernando and Isabel had no intention of allowing that money to be diverted to the East.⁶⁸

Fernando and the Relief of Alhama

Before determining the captive emir’s fate, Fernando prepared to protect Alhama, which was exposed on all sides to the enemy. He required Seville to provide five hundred horses, two thousand foot soldiers, and two thousand pack animals by 2 June. Although Pulgar stated that he assembled ten thousand knights, twenty thousand infantry, another thirty thousand assigned to destroy crops, and many others responsible for artillery, supplies, and eighty thousand pack animals, those figures are excessive. More reasonable are Palencia’s six thousand horse and forty thousand foot. Among them were Swiss mercenaries, “devout and good Christians,” who fought in wars that were “most just” and considered it a great sin to take anything by force. Pulgar probably meant that, although their profession required the use of force, they did not wantonly steal or rob. This appears to be the first reference to their service in the war in Spain. Also participating were sixteen German knights of the Order of the Trinity, which had been founded in twelfth-century France for

the ransom of captives.⁶⁹

Leaving Córdoba on 5 June, the king advanced to Íllora, slightly northwest of Granada. Although the defenders fired arrows, stones, and handguns (*espingardas*), the Castilians bombarded the walls with light artillery (*ribadoquinas*). Infantry systematically destroyed mills, burned orchards, and uprooted trees, leaving nothing standing within six miles of their march. Moving in a southwesterly direction, the royal army attacked Tájara (Huétor-Tájar), about ten miles east of Loja. Retreating from the urban center to the citadel, the Moors showered bundles of linen and hemp soaked in burning oil and pitch on the wooden mantles protecting the besiegers. On the next day, the Moors offered to surrender, but Fernando was only willing to spare their lives. Rather than accept captivity, they continued the struggle until they were overpowered on 14 June. The king, after setting fire to the town and tearing down the walls of the citadel, moved southward to Alhama with thirty thousand animals laden with provisions. Appointing Iñigo López de Mendoza, count of Tendilla, as *capitán mayor* with one thousand men, he began the return journey, burning and razing three hundred towers, granges, and farmhouses. Olive trees, orchards, wheat fields, and vineyards were destroyed and grains already harvested were burned. On 30 June he entered Córdoba.⁷⁰

The Release of Abū ‘Abd Allāh

There he pondered what to do with Abū ‘Abd Allāh. He was perplexed by Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī’s failure to oppose the invading army until he learned that the emir was fearful that if he left Granada the people would revolt and proclaim his son in his stead. With overweening pride and acting as though he were the more powerful monarch, the emir proposed that his son be exchanged for the count of Cifuentes and nine others. If Abū ‘Abd Allāh were handed over he would probably have been imprisoned or murdered. Pleading for his release, his mother, Fátima, and his other supporters promised that he would declare himself a vassal to Castile, pay an annual tribute of 12,000 gold *doblas*, liberate three hundred Christian captives, and guarantee his loyalty by giving hostages. In return, Fernando would assist him in overcoming his father. If he were not given his freedom, his adherents affirmed that they would renew their allegiance to Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī.⁷¹

Pulgar, perhaps reflecting his own views, summarized the contrasting opinions presented to the royal council by Alfonso de Cárdenas, master of Santiago, and Rodrigo Ponce de León, marquess of Cádiz, both with extensive experience of frontier warfare. Noting that the Moors had violated the truce by seizing Zahara, the master insisted that the war against that “pagan people” was not only just, but also holy and necessary. Whereas Castile possessed the resources in men, money, artillery, and equipment to prosecute the war, the

Moors were weak, as evidenced by their proffer of tribute and request for a truce. Fernando's principal aim, he argued, was "to make war and gain the emirate of Granada and not to desist until you achieve your goal." Rather than assist the imprisoned emir, whose promise of loyalty was tenuous, to regain rebellious territories, the king ought to conquer them for himself. Contending that war against Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī, an aging and infirm king, unloved by his people, was preferable to a struggle against the younger man in good health, he warned nevertheless that the two rivals might be reconciled and present a united front against Castile. He concluded that Abū 'Abd Allāh should not be set free.

By contrast, the marquess pointed out that, whereas the count of Cabra had gained honor by capturing the emir, there was no honor in keeping him in prison. As the Moors distrusted their rulers and easily disposed of them, he expected that they would give their allegiance to Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī and abandon his son. Castile benefited from the conflict between father and son prior to Abū 'Abd Allāh's capture but would lose that advantage by detaining him. If he were set at liberty, division among the Naṣrids would be promoted and they would be compelled to fight two wars, one against each other, and the other against Castile. Reasoning that once a man had the royal title, he was unlikely to give it up, he doubted that the rival monarchs would be reconciled. Even though Abū 'Abd Allāh, as a pagan, did not merit his freedom, it was worthy of the king, as a Catholic, to grant it, thereby demonstrating his magnanimity and power. He concluded that the emir should be released and granted a short truce, subject to the payment of tribute and the liberation of captives. At the same time, the war against Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī should continue until the expiration of the truce, when it would become clear whether Fernando should support the father or the son.⁷²

Considering these arguments, Fernando sought the opinion of Isabel, then in Vitoria. Inasmuch as many Naṣrids had been vassals of her ancestors, she advised him to liberate Abū 'Abd Allāh and accept him as a vassal, especially in order to secure the freedom of Christian captives. Therefore, the king, on 5 July 1483, released him, provided that he acknowledge his vassalage and respond to the royal summons whenever issued. In addition to providing seven hundred lances for royal service, he would owe a yearly tribute of 12,000 *doblas*, the equivalent of 14,000 ducats, and would liberate four hundred Christian captives at once, and sixty each year thereafter. His cities and towns had to allow the unimpeded passage and maintenance of Castilian forces at war with his father. Abū 'Abd Allāh was granted a truce for two years and his followers had to accept it formally within thirty days of his release. On his request, the king permitted Muḥammad b. Sarraj, who was in his service, to return safely from Morocco. As surety that he would observe this pact, Abū 'Abd Allāh promised to hand over his son, his brother, and ten sons of the chief Moorish nobles. A month after his discharge, he would begin releasing sixty Christian captives annually for the next five years. The treaty, though not

extant, likely conformed to earlier pacts providing for commercial interchange with restrictions on the export of war material and troops to the emirate.⁷³

In August Abū ‘Abd Allāh was brought from Porcuna, where he had been held captive, to Córdoba. The romance “Sobre el muro de Baena” described el Rey Chiquito, humiliated by his defeat at Lucena and enduring the sorrows of imprisonment, as he stood weeping on the walls of Baena, until the count of Cabra brought news of his deliverance.⁷⁴ According to the anonymous Muslim chronicler, Fernando received him with great honor because he realized that he now had in his hands the instrument needed to seize the emirate of Granada. Set free on 30 August, the emir and fifty of his knights received, as royal largesse, horses, clothing, brocades, silks, harnesses, and sufficient money for the journey home. The Castilian magnates demanded that he kiss Fernando’s hand as the traditional sign of vassalage, but the king replied, “I would give him my hand, for certain, if he were free and in his own kingdom but I will not give it while he is a prisoner in mine.” When the emir entered the palace on 2 September he knelt on the ground and asked to kiss Fernando’s hand as his vassal, but he refused and raised him up. Through an interpreter Abū ‘Abd Allāh expressed his deep appreciation, but Fernando interrupted him, saying, “I trust in his goodness that he will do everything that a good man and a good king ought to do.”⁷⁵

The Moors of Granada, fearing that Abū ‘Abd Allāh would open the gates to the Castilians, were not ready to give him a joyful welcome. Indeed, several Muslim authorities on the law issued a *fatwā* or ruling proclaiming that good Muslims should reject him as a rebel against God and Muḥammad and support Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī.⁷⁶ The latter, who had taken refuge in Las Alpujarras, by offering a pardon to his enemies, induced many to renew their allegiance and was able to return to the city. Thus, when Abū ‘Abd Allāh came back in October, he was unable to enter the capital and took up residence in Guadix, but the people quickly repudiated him.⁷⁷

During this time an enterprising squire falsely persuaded Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī that the king and queen were prepared to restore Alhama to him. Taking the bait, the emir promised to cede Zahara, liberate all Christian captives, make a gift of 30,000 *doblas*, accept a truce, and pay an annual tribute. The Catholic Monarchs, thinking that this offer was worth more than Alhama, authorized the squire to promise the surrender of Alhama once all the towns, castles, money, and captives were handed over. Without reading the royal document presented to him, the emir gave a large sum of money to the squire and released many captives. However, as soon as he realized that he had been tricked, he protested to the king and queen, who arrested the squire and compelled him to restore the *doblas* and pay the ransom for the captives.⁷⁸

A War of Pillage, Assault, and Siege

As the marquess of Cádiz predicted, the liberation of Abū ‘Abd Allāh fomented internecine war among the Naṣrids, who simultaneously had to defend themselves against Castile. Indeed, on 26 August in a letter to his sister, the queen of Naples, the king stated his intention to sow division and thereby bring Granada to perdition.⁷⁹ During the next several years the frontier captains, taking advantage of Naṣrid dissension, waged a war of pillage, assault, and siege. The land west of Granada was subject to annual devastation. Fortresses, often inadequately garrisoned, were assaulted, sometimes at night, and were usually taken within a day or so. Sieges of cities and large towns required more time, but in the end the Castilians, utilizing cannons and gunpowder, carried the day.

A band of Moors sent by Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī to raid near Jerez and Seville suffered a rout in mid-September 1483 near Utrera. A month later, the marquess of Cádiz, informed by spies that Zahara was poorly defended, dispatched men to scale the walls at nighttime; after a brief resistance the Moors surrendered on 29 October. That news gave great satisfaction to the king and queen, who remembered the Naṣrid seizure of Zahara in 1481. After a solemn procession through the streets of Vitoria, where they resided, a mass of thanksgiving was celebrated in the cathedral. They honored the marquess with the title duke of Cádiz and marquess of Zahara, though he always preferred to identify himself as marquess duke of Cádiz. Those successes were offset, however, by his failure to recover Cardela and the failure of the master of Calatrava to take Iznalloz northeast of Granada.⁸⁰

While the king and queen were preoccupied with Aragonese concerns, they ordered the master of Santiago, the duke of Medina Sidonia, the count of Cabra, the marquess of Cádiz, Alfonso de Aguilar, and Luis Puertocarrero, lord of Palma, to continue the campaign of destruction. Setting out from Antequera in March 1484 with six thousand knights and twelve thousand infantry, they methodically destroyed olive trees, vineyards, wheat fields, and almond and fig trees in the area northwest of Málaga. After traversing the Sierra de Cártama, they reached Churriana near the coast, where they were supplied by ships from Jerez and Seville. Ravaging the countryside, they returned to Antequera in April.⁸¹ The thrust of this campaign was to isolate Ronda from Málaga.

Meanwhile, the Catholic Monarchs convened the Cortes of Tarazona for the Crown of Aragón, but in April Isabel declared that it was time to attend to the war against Granada. She asserted, according to Pulgar, that the war was “such a just and holy enterprise” that it could not be more “honorable and worthy.” While acknowledging that the Moorish war was holy, Fernando argued that the recovery of Rousillon and Cerdagne from France was also just and ought to be given preference. On the contrary, she insisted that it was foolish to abandon the war against Granada that had been in progress for two years at great expense. While she admitted his concern and told him to remain in Aragón, she announced her intention to return to Castile to prosecute the war against the Moors.⁸²

The work of assembling an army and a fleet was complex. The great men of Andalucía gathered at Córdoba with their contingents as did one thousand archers, lancers, and *espingarderos*. There were carts laden with wood, iron, and stones, and artisans to build various types of artillery at the direction of engineers brought from France and Germany. Suárez Fernández remarked that “the war of Granada witnessed the creation of the artillery as an independent arm in Spain.” In order to transport war materials, besides thirteen thousand pack animals collected as a customary tribute, others were leased, for a total of thirty thousand. A fleet of sailing ships and galleys patrolled the strait to prevent Granada from receiving aid from Africa. Assuming that Fernando would continue dealing with Aragonese affairs, Isabel designated Pedro González de Mendoza, Cardinal of Spain, to command the army and pledged to provide the necessities for war.⁸³

The Fall of Álora and Setenil

As the Cortes of Tarazona refused to finance Fernando’s plan to repossess Rousillon and Cerdagne, he returned to Córdoba on 29 May. Ladero Quesada remarked that “the conquest of Granada was the price [he] had to pay before Castile could embark on his great European policy.”⁸⁴ Some royal councilors maintained that the general devastation carried out in recent years should be continued in the hope that famine would compel the Moors to submit. Contending that that was impossible and overly expensive, others insisted that a heavy artillery attack on a town would guarantee success. The marquess of Cádiz suggested Álora, “the key and the gateway” to Málaga and to Ronda. Any attempt to take either city without first having secured Álora would fail, he argued, because it was “a sword with two hands” that could inflict great damage on the Castilians. Acknowledging his lengthy military experience, the king and queen adopted his counsel. Meanwhile, the Moors, thinking that an attack would be launched against Loja, midway between Antequera and Granada, concentrated heavy forces there.⁸⁵

Setting out from Antequera on 9 June, the army initiated the siege of Álora two days later. While Castilian cannons bombarded the walls, the defenders responded with firearms (*espingardas*), shots of gunpowder, and poisoned arrows. In order to care for the wounded, Isabel dispatched six large tents with rope beds, as well as physicians and surgeons, a complex called the Queen’s Hospital. As heavy artillery knocked down two towers and a large section of the wall, the defenders urged their *alcaide* to ask for terms, but he chided their weakness and demanded that they fight to the death rather than be enslaved. Nevertheless, on 18 June 1484, he surrendered on condition that Fernando guarantee their safe departure with their lives and property. Royal banners and the banner of the crusade were raised on the towers and Christian captives

regained their liberty as the Moors departed. Entering the town, Fernando processed to the chief mosque, which was consecrated as a church. The towers and walls were repaired and a garrison was put in place.⁸⁶ The fall of Álora provided the Castilians with an advanced position from which to threaten both Ronda and Málaga and severed the link between Ronda and the rest of the emirate.

From Álora the king advanced into the valley of Cártama northwest of Málaga, where the Moors of Alozaina acknowledged his suzerainty. He intended to return to Córdoba, but the queen reminded him that, as it was still summer, he could continue the devastation of olive trees, vineyards, and wheat fields. Although he led his men up to the gates of Granada, the Moors refused to come out to fight. After provisioning Alhama, he closed his campaign of forty days and returned to Córdoba by 11 July.

The marquess of Cádiz then convinced the Catholic Monarchs to lay siege to Setenil, a few miles north of Ronda. On two different occasions Fernando de Antequera and the marquess had failed to take it. Leading an advance party, the marquess reached Setenil on 6 September and the king arrived six days later. Employing pikes and iron bars, workmen widened the road so that carts laden with supplies and siege machinery could pass. As before, Isabel assured an abundance of provisions, as well as the six tents known as the Queen's Hospital. After three days, heavy artillery (*lombardas gruesas*) broke down two towers and a section of the wall. Lighter and more mobile cannons (*cerbatanas*, *pasabolantes*, *ribadoquinas*) also contributed to the destruction. Beaten down by this bombardment, the Moors surrendered and were given safe-conduct with their movable goods to Ronda. According to Valera, the surrender took place on 18 September, but Palencia dated it two days later. After liberating twenty-four captives, repairing the walls, and providing a garrison, the king plundered the environs of Ronda before returning to Seville.⁸⁷

The Catholic Monarchs planned to resume the campaign on 15 March 1485. Knowing that the Moors were terrified by his artillery, the king ordered the construction of larger guns and increased their number. Meantime, the frontier captains continued to ravage enemy lands. Such was the devastation that Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī several times offered to pay tribute and declare his vassalage, but the king and queen, resolved to conquer Granada once and for all, turned him down. In order to foment discord among the Naṣrids they supported Abū 'Abd Allāh financially and encouraged the towns near his base at Almería to recognize him. Seeing him as a Castilian puppet, however, most Moors backed his father. In November royal officials informed the assembly of the Hermandad meeting at Orgaz near Toledo of the progress of the war and detailed the expense that had greatly surpassed the crown's ordinary revenues. New taxes were needed for the coming campaign, the maintenance of Alhama, additional artillery, and the replacement of horses killed in the war. Considering that this request was right and the war was holy, the procurators

approved a *servicio* of 12,000,000 *maravedies*, especially to pay for pack animals to transport provisions and war materials.⁸⁸

Although Fernando was now inclined to turn his attention to Italian affairs, Isabel insisted that the moment was propitious for the final conquest. From 1484 onward, Castile commenced an unremitting aggression aimed at destroying the emirate. Castile now executed a three-pronged offensive. In the southwest the objective was Ronda; once it fell in May 1485, the adjacent mountainous region was occupied and the road to Málaga, the economic center of the kingdom, was laid open. Castilian troops simultaneously laid waste the plain of Granada, the breadbasket of the kingdom, and seized Loja in May 1486.

Innocent VIII and the Crusade

Fernando and Isabel, engaged in “this holy enterprise of Granada,” hoped “to expel the infidel Moors from Spain and achieve a prompt and complete victory.” Needing money for “this holy war against the infidels,” they asked Innocent VIII (1484–92) to proclaim a crusade and grant the *decima*; otherwise the populace would not support the war.⁸⁹ For the pope, a Turkish crusade was paramount, but he noted that the papal treasury was depleted and a mountain of debt had accumulated. Nevertheless, the king and queen emphasized that the struggle against the Moors had great importance for the “Christian republic” and that to abandon it after the expenditure of so much effort, money, and men would bring great danger to the Spains. In light of those arguments, on 29 January 1485, the pope renewed, at least for a year, Sixtus IV’s crusading bull, which, in accord with papal practice, had lapsed upon his death. The pope also instructed his representative to send a third of the money collected to Rome.⁹⁰

Judging that the pope had not grasped their argument, Fernando and Isabel stressed that they were not striving solely to increase their dominions and revenues. Rather, moved by the desire to serve God and zeal for the holy Catholic faith, they had postponed other vital tasks and had refused money offered by the Moors to buy peace. It was their hope to propagate the faith and to deliver Christendom from the continuous danger that would ensue “if these infidels of the emirate of Granada are not expelled from Spain.” Previous pontiffs had granted crusading bulls but never demanded any of the money intended for the Moorish crusade. Even Nicholas IV, who imposed a *decima* on all of Christendom for the liberation of the Holy Land, ordered the money raised in Spain to be used in the war of Granada, which was “no less just and necessary” than the war in the Holy Land. Although Sixtus IV had attempted to take a third for the Turkish war, the king and queen believed that they could have convinced him to abandon that demand. Thus far, vast sums had been

expended to conquer and retain cities and towns and to pay the troops, but additional funds were required for soldiers, artillery, and an armada. Once the pope understood this, the Catholic Monarchs trusted that he would extend even greater favors for this “just and necessary war.” If he needed money, they suggested he should get it from other Christian kingdoms, which, save Hungary, did not have to face the Islamic menace. Concluding that potential donors would not contribute if they discovered that the pope was claiming a third of the *decima*, Fernando and Isabel refused to publish his bull. Stirred, therefore, by “zeal for the public good of the Christian religion, opposition to the infidels, and the increase of our holy Catholic faith,” they urged him to authorize the crusade as they had requested it, without financial restrictions. If he refused, the consequent cessation of the war would offend God, subject the Christian religion to opprobrium, dishonor the pope, and lay a burden on his conscience.⁹¹

The Fall of Ronda and Marbella

Meanwhile, ongoing Naṣrid dissension further weakened the dynasty. The aging sultan, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, no longer able to leave the Alhambra, entrusted the task of suppressing his rebellious son, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, to his younger brother, Muḥammad b. Sa’d. In February 1485 he seized Almería, where the rebel had taken refuge, and slaughtered his younger brother and other partisans. Abū ‘Abd Allāh, escaping the massacre, found refuge with the king and queen in Córdoba.⁹²

Although Fernando planned a surprise attack on Loja in January 1485, wintry weather forced him to abandon it. A grand army of magnates, knights, Military Orders, and infantry from the Basque Provinces, Old Castile, Asturias, and León, as well as cavalry and infantry from Andalucía, assembled at Córdoba in March. As the magnates, given the extravagance of their dress, retinues, and feasts, seemed ill-prepared for war, the king and queen urged greater moderation. Pack animals and drovers with one thousand carts transported cannons, gunpowder, ladders, mantles, cranes, and other siege equipment. Carpenters, ironworkers with their forges, artillerymen, engineers, and masons to make stones for firing accompanied the host. There were large quantities of wheat, barley, wine, and livestock. The Queen’s Hospital, with attendant physicians, surgeons, nurses, bed clothing, and medicines, was readied to take care of the wounded.⁹³

Preparing to besiege Málaga, the king left Córdoba on 15 April with twelve thousand cavalry and seventy thousand infantry (numbers that seem disproportionate). En route several fortresses just west of Málaga were attacked. Fernando assaulted Benamaquís near Coín, whose inhabitants in the previous year had submitted and promised to pay tribute, but threw off their

allegiance as soon as the Castilians departed. Determined to punish them as an example to others, he ordered the execution of 108 of the principal citizens, whose bodies were hung from the battlements. The terrorized defenders of Coín and Cártama, unable to withstand the bombardment raining down destruction upon them, surrendered on 29 April. Given safe-conduct for their lives and property, they were allowed to depart. The abandoned fortifications were demolished. The king entrusted the tenancy of Cártama to the master of Santiago, whose Order was founded to “make war against the Moors, the enemies of the holy Catholic faith.” Meanwhile, Isabel, from her post in Córdoba, made sure that the army received a steady stream of supplies and that the troops were well paid.⁹⁴

The emir, expecting an assault on Málaga, sent his brother, Muḥammad b. Sa’d, to strengthen its defenses. Fernando, however, after skirmishing with the Moors, realized that a siege would be protracted and altered his objective.⁹⁵ As the Moors had withdrawn troops from neighboring strongholds, including Ronda, he decided to take advantage of its weakened situation. Moving toward Antequera, he convinced the Moors that he intended to attack Loja, but he had already sent the marquess of Cádiz with three thousand knights and eight thousand foot to besiege Ronda. Intersected by the great gorge of El Tajo and the Guadalevín River, Ronda is situated in a mountainous region about sixty-two miles west of Málaga. The *alcázar*, defended by three walls, many towers, and the encircling town, which also was protected by extensive walls, lay on the southern side of the gorge. Pulgar thought it was impregnable. After the arrival of the marquess on 8 May and the king two days later, Ronda was blockaded on all sides. Moors from Málaga harassed the besiegers but could not relieve the town.⁹⁶

Heavy artillery bombarded the suburbs, breaking down walls and compelling the Moors to retreat into the town proper. Moving closer, Castilian cannons continued the barrage; missiles launching *alquitrán*, a mixture of tar and other combustibles, set fire to houses, causing panic among women and children. After ten days of unrelenting devastation the town fathers asked to parley. On 20 May the king gave them safe-conduct for two weeks to travel to Africa, Granada, or Castile. As some were plundered in violation of the safe-conduct, perpetrators were brought to justice and stolen property was returned to its owners. Moors opting to settle in Castile were assured of freedom of religion and the right to be governed by their law. When the *alguacil mayor* or chief magistrate of Ronda elected to settle in Seville or Alcalá de Guadaira, the king and queen provided his family with houses and maintenance, exempted them from tributes, and ordered them to be treated honorably. Fernando entered Ronda on Pentecost Sunday, 22 May 1485. About 417 Christian captives, shackled, nearly naked or in rags, their hair and beards reaching their belts, were released and sent to Seville, where they were warmly greeted by the queen, who ordered processions in thanksgiving. With great solemnity the principal mosque was consecrated as a Christian church. Reconstruction of the

walls and other damaged structures commenced and Christians began to settle there.⁹⁷

As news of the fall of Ronda spread, the Moors in the surrounding *serranía*, fearful of suffering similar destruction and aware of the favorable conditions accorded to Mudejars, submitted. In return for handing over every fortress and tower and paying tributes previously due to the emir, they were guaranteed security in their persons and property and the right to practice their religion and observe Islamic law. Fernando informed the pope that fifty-five villages acknowledged Castilian sovereignty, while Bernáldez listed sixty-eight.

Next, the king required the submission of the Mediterranean port of Marbella about thirty-seven miles south of Ronda, so that he could intercept Moroccan assistance to Málaga. Although the Moors recognized his authority, he commanded them to evacuate the town. Following their surrender on 15 June, Christian captives were released and a garrison was put in place. From Marbella he marched eastward along the coast to Fuengirola and Mijas, which both acknowledged his rule. As he approached Málaga, the inhabitants prepared for a siege, but, in view of the exhaustion of his army after an arduous march through difficult country and the lack of food and water, he returned to Córdoba on 24 June. Welcomed with great joy by the clergy in solemn procession and singing hymns, he offered thanksgiving in the cathedral. Among those acclaiming him was Abū ‘Abd Allāh, who found asylum there after being expelled from Almería. The irons used to restrain those delivered from captivity were affixed to the exterior wall of the church of San Juan de los Reyes in Toledo, where they can still be seen. Processions and other acts of thanksgiving were celebrated in the churches even as far away as Barcelona. The process of marking out boundaries in Ronda and Marbella and introducing Christian settlers was begun.⁹⁸

The fall of Ronda prompted Diego de Valera to remind the king that God brought about what had long been prophesied: “not only should you place the Spains under your royal scepter, but you should also subject the regions overseas to the glory and exaltation of our Redeemer, the increase of the Christian religion, and the great honor and excellence of your royal crown.” By making it possible for the king and queen “to destroy and suppress the perfidious Muslim sect,” God enabled them “to restore, reform, and defend these realms and to weaken and destroy all the enemies of the Catholic faith.”⁹⁹

With the capture of Ronda and Marbella, nearly the entire western sector of the emirate of Granada was now under Castilian control. Having broken the “iron ring” of fortresses protecting Málaga, Castile could now threaten that city directly.¹⁰⁰

Contention Among the Naṣrids

The Naṣrids, unfortunately, were unable to present a united front against the enemy. As popular opposition intensified, Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, once a formidable warrior but now a sickly old man, abandoned the capital for Almuñécar on the coast, where he died later in the year. The anonymous Muslim chronicler, who despised him, said that, as a punishment from God, he suffered from epilepsy, and loss of vision and feeling in his body. His brother, Muḥammad b. Sa‘d, al-Zaḡal, “the Valiant,” after routing a Castilian raiding party near Alhama, entered the capital, exhibiting, as trophies of war, eleven captives, ninety horses, and the bloody heads of eighty Castilian knights. During the next two years, al-Zaḡal, proclaimed as Muḥammad XII (1485–89), was the effective ruler of the emirate.¹⁰¹

If he expected help from Morocco, he was disappointed. There, Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā (1472–1504) overthrew the Marinids and founded the Waṭṭāsīd dynasty. Resolved to remain at peace with Castile, in 1485 he sent ambassadors to Seville with gifts of horses for the king and silks and perfumes for the queen. Anxious “to be their servant in everything that they might command,” he asked them to order their fleet in the strait not to attack his people. They replied graciously that they would do so provided that he interdicted the shipment of horses, arms, and supplies to Granada. Ignoring those guarantees, however, five hundred marines from El Puerto de Santa María raided the coast of Morocco and seized four hundred captives. Although volunteers from Africa known as *gomerēs* (*gumāra*) subsequently fought against the Castilians, it is not clear that he sent them.¹⁰²

In late August, Fernando, believing that Moclín, about fifteen miles north of Granada, was poorly defended, sent the count of Cabra to initiate a siege, but on 2 September, suffering heavy losses, he was driven off by al-Zaḡal. More than one thousand Castilians were killed and one hundred were taken prisoner. Their rich armament indicated that they would bring a high ransom. The emir ordered the heads of the dead warriors cut off and displayed in Granada so the people “would see what kind of king they had chosen.” Instead of continuing that campaign, Fernando turned to Cambil and Alhabar, castles set on rocky crags southeast of Jaén. The Castilians had seized both in 1315, but the Moors had recovered possession in 1365. Now, after a bombardment of three days they surrendered on 23 September.¹⁰³

The Catholic Monarchs, underscoring the ongoing division among the Moors, concluded a remarkable accord at Alcalá de Henares on 23 December 1485 with Yaḥyā al-Najjār, a grandson of the Naṣrid sultan Yūsuf IV ibn al-Mawl. Maintaining a semi-autonomous position in Almería, al-Najjār, perhaps hoping to gain the throne one day, generally adhered to Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī and al-Zaḡal in opposition to Abū ‘Abd Allāh. Claiming descent from Christians and enlightenment by the Holy Spirit, he expressed his desire, together with his son, to convert to Christianity and pledged to surrender Almería and Vera and their dependencies. The king and queen, acknowledging that such a signal service to God and themselves ought not to be without remuneration,

promised him a dukedom centered at Gandia south of Valencia. In addition, they agreed to give him Albolodúy and the adjacent district on the Nacimiento River about sixteen miles north of Almería. He would also be entitled to select thirty Moorish estates anywhere in the emirate and to receive two-thirds of the booty taken in Almería and Vera. As security for observance of this agreement, two of his children, a son and a daughter, would be married to the children of the frontier captain Juan de Benavides, who, with his descendants, would hold Almería and Vera on behalf of the crown. Yaḥyā's son Cidi al-Najjār would receive a lordship in the lands of Enix and Fenix near Vicar just west of Almería. The king and queen also extended their protection to al-Najjār and his descendants and their property.¹⁰⁴

Just as Abū 'Abd Allāh saved himself from disaster by becoming a royal vassal in 1483, so too did al-Najjār hope to secure a place for himself and his family as the Naṣrid realm came under Castilian rule. He went beyond Abū 'Abd Allāh, however, by declaring his desire to become a Christian. His motivation may have been fundamentally spiritual, but he surely realized that as Granada was absorbed by Castile, his status would be enhanced if he were a Christian. Although his baptism was postponed until he could hand over Almería and Vera, from this time on he worked secretly to facilitate the submission of the eastern sector of the emirate.

Innocent VIII Renews the Crusade

Pleased by news of "the victories that God had given [Fernando and Isabel] over the Moors, enemies of our holy faith," and their announced intention to subjugate Granada, Innocent VIII ordered public celebrations in Rome. Fernando commanded his ambassadors to remind the pope of this "victory of the Christians over the infidels" and how "we in Spain spend our time and money." Should the pope grant the crusading indulgence as his predecessors had done, Spain would be free of the Islamic presence and able to assist Christians threatened elsewhere by the infidels. The concession of the crusade and the *decima* was essential to the "continuation of this holy war of Granada."¹⁰⁵

Capitulating, the pope repeatedly described the efforts of the king and queen to "reduce [the Moors] to the Christian faith" as "a necessary task, acceptable to God," "a laudable work," "a most holy work." On 26 August he renounced his claim to a third of the *decima* and granted the crusading bull without conditions. The clergy were required to contribute a tenth of their income, and the Cardinal of Spain, appointed to oversee the process, indicated that 100,000 florins of Aragón had been raised. As a sign of their gratitude, the king and queen made a gift to the pope of 10,000 ducats.¹⁰⁶

In February 1486 the pope responded positively to further royal petitions.

While forbidding anyone to take part in the crusade unless he received the cross from the crusade commissioners, he also declared that those giving alms could be interred in sacred ground even if they died in land subject to interdict. To encourage participation from the northernmost region of the peninsula, he extended crusading benefits to Navarre. The Turkish crusade was still foremost in his mind, however; thanking Fernando and Isabel for the gift of 10,000 ducats, he urged them to prosecute the war against the Moors as quickly as possible so that they could join other Christian rulers in the Turkish crusade.¹⁰⁷

The Fall of Loja, Íllora, and Moclín

In April 1486 the king and queen prepared to resume the crusade. Joining the host were some Frenchmen and the Englishman Sir Edward Woodville, known to the Castilians as the earl of Scales, who brought one hundred archers skilled with the longbow and two hundred yeomen who fought on foot.¹⁰⁸ Setting out from Córdoba on 13 May, the army of twelve thousand knights and forty thousand infantry included archers, lancers, and *espingarderos*, men armed with primitive handguns; seventy thousand pack animals; two thousand carts to transport artillery; six thousand footmen armed with axes and picks to clear the roads; and carpenters to build wooden bridges over streams. Although some advised against it, the king targeted Loja, a stronghold dominating much of the area west of Granada, which he had besieged in vain four years before.¹⁰⁹

Much to Fernando's surprise, Loja was defended by Abū 'Abd Allāh, who had declared his vassalage to Castile in 1483. In March, attempting to dethrone his uncle al-Zaġal, he seized the Albaicín, a suburb of Granada. As a bloody battle raged in the streets, al-Zaġal rained down missiles from the Alhambra, forcing Abū 'Abd Allāh to retreat to Loja with five hundred lances and three thousand infantry. In May, through the mediation of Muslim jurists, he accepted the sultan's sovereignty.¹¹⁰ Although he pleaded with Fernando not to attack Loja, the king pointed out that many of the defenders acknowledged al-Zaġal. He also expressed amazement that Abū 'Abd Allāh, "paying little heed to what he had agreed to do and without giving . . . any reason," had repudiated the bond of vassalage.¹¹¹ As the siege began on 21 May, the Castilians overran the suburbs and gained entrance into the town, while heavy artillery knocked down walls and towers and fireballs sent houses up in flames. Abū 'Abd Allāh was wounded twice and taken prisoner. The earl of Scales, who distinguished himself by his valor, was struck with a rock and lost two teeth. More than two hundred Moors were killed.¹¹²

Realizing that no relief could be expected from al-Zaġal, the Moors surrendered on 29 May 1486. Abū 'Abd Allāh renewed the tie of vassalage and,

as a “good and loyal vassal,” pledged not to aid his fellow Moors or to make war against Castile. The Catholic Monarchs promised to name him duke or count with a lordship over Guadix, Baza, Vera, Vélez Rubio, Vélez Blanco, Mojácar, and their dependencies, but excluding seaports and beaches. If, within six months of the surrender of Loja, he failed to take possession of those places that still acknowledged al-Zağal he would be left empty-handed. If, in contrast, he wished to settle in Castile or Africa, he would be provided with safe passage. In effect, by establishing him in a vassal state the king and queen transferred to him the military and financial burden of subjugating a substantial segment of al-Zağal’s realm. Nevertheless, he had no assurance that he would eventually be installed as emir of Granada.¹¹³ Withdrawing from Loja on 30 May, the Moors were assured of safe-conduct for their persons and property and the right to settle in Castile, Aragón, or Valencia. Set at liberty were 140 captives. Two mosques were consecrated as churches and reconstruction of the walls was undertaken. In thanksgiving, Isabel ordered a solemn procession in Córdoba, distributed alms, and asked for continuous prayers for the victory. Several adjacent villages submitted as well. The king commanded Seville, Burgos, and other cities to carry out processions in thanksgiving.¹¹⁴

From Loja Fernando advanced to Íllora, about fifteen miles to the northeast, and began a siege on 4 June. The Moors, deafened by the noise of an incessant bombardment by eighteen *lombardas*, surrendered on 9 June. Allowed to leave with their personal property, except their weapons, they were escorted to Granada. Several neighboring villages also submitted. Three days later Isabel visited the royal encampment and, after receiving a joyous welcome, commended the troops for their valor.¹¹⁵

Carrying on “this holy conquest of Granada,” the king moved against Moclín, a strongly fortified castle set on a high escarpment about eight miles northeast of Íllora. In the previous year, the count of Cabra unsuccessfully attempted to capture it. Now, the Castilians bombarded the walls and towers. After a shot of flame blew up their magazine packed with gunpowder, sulphur, and saltpeter, the panicked Moors yielded on 16 June and were permitted to leave with their goods, except for their arms. The fall of Moclín, about six miles from Granada, left the capital, in the king’s mind, “in total perdition and disruption.” The inhabitants of the adjacent villages of Montefrío and Colomera were also given safe-conduct to Granada. After ravaging the plain about Granada and providing for the defense of the captured towns, the king returned to Córdoba on 29 June.¹¹⁶

A joyful procession led him to the cathedral. Dismounting, he knelt down and prayed before the cross and then advanced to the main altar, where the bishop blessed him. Soon preparations were begun for the resumption of the crusade in the following summer. Workmen made tools needed to cut roads through mountainous terrain. In order to assure security and curtail spying, *alfaques*, who regularly entered enemy territory to ransom captives, were

forbidden to do so. Moorish interpreters were similarly denied admittance to Castile. The fleet guarding the strait was provisioned. Inasmuch as their ordinary revenues could not meet the expenses incurred in prosecuting the war, the king and queen obtained loans (*emprestidos*) from certain individuals as well as gifts from others.¹¹⁷

The capture of Loja, Íllora, and Moclín in May and June 1486 gave new momentum to the crusade. The Castilian advance seemed inexorable and the Moors must have realized that, as the frontier was now within a few miles from the capital, the final destruction of their kingdom, barring any extraordinary circumstance, was at hand.

Innocent VIII Again Proclaims the Crusade

When Innocent VIII received word of these victories, he ordered the celebration of a mass of thanksgiving on 9 July in the Spanish church of Santiago in Rome; the king and queen were commemorated in a special collect. A few days later, he praised the queen for the great service being rendered to the Catholic faith.¹¹⁸

The new royal ambassador to Rome, Iñigo López de Mendoza, count of Tendilla, who had played a major role in the recent campaigns, was instructed to obtain an extension of the crusading bull and the concession of the *decima*. The Italian humanist Antonio Geraldini, presenting Tendilla on 19 September, exalted the triumphs of “our incomparable princes” and, linking the reconquest to the crusade, predicted that Innocent VIII would see “the great city of Granada restored to the cult and service of Christ” and that “the homeland of our Savior in Asia” would soon be recovered.¹¹⁹

Recognizing that “this war was holy and exalted the Catholic faith,” as Pulgar remarked, the pope, in return for again requiring the clergy to contribute a *decima* of 100,000 Aragonese florins, insisted on receiving 10,000 ducats as he had in 1485.¹²⁰ Yet he was reluctant to grant the crusade. His explanation was self-serving in the extreme. He made two points. First, the crusade would undermine “the authority of the Apostolic See.” That seems to mean that he had been compelled previously to allow the king and queen to divert ecclesiastical income to the war against the Moors, rather than taking it all for his own pet project, the war against the Turks. Second, in the past the crusade had caused great suffering to officials of the Roman curia, who complained daily that their emoluments were diminished. If he should extend the crusade, he believed that those protests would intensify. That seems to mean that members of the curia holding benefices in Spain, whether Spaniards or not, objected to having a portion of their income used to finance the crusade. Both the pope and his subordinates evidently placed their financial interests above the goal of exalting Christendom by conquering the Moors.

Eventually, however, he yielded to the insistence of the Spanish cardinal Rodrigo de Borja (Borgia), later Pope Alexander VI, and, on 26 February 1487, authorized the crusade for one year beginning on 1 September. Fernando emphasized on 27 March that “the war against these infidels fulfills the service of our Lord no less than the war against the Turks” and, on 7 April, ordered the preaching of the crusade throughout the realm.¹²¹

In recognition of Fernando and Isabel’s commitment to the struggle against the Moors, the pope conferred a signal honor on the count of Tendilla. In a solemn ceremony in St. Peter’s Basilica on Christmas Day 1486, he blessed a sword and presented it to the count with these words: “Accept this sword and act as defender of the faith and the Holy Roman Church.”¹²² That phrase reveals the pope’s belief, shared by most of his western contemporaries, that the Christian faith was identified with the Roman Church.

Renewed Conflict Among the Naṣrids

While Innocent VIII and his subordinates were lamenting their loss of revenue, civil war erupted again among the Naṣrids. Although Fernando and Isabel hoped that their puppet, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, by establishing himself in the eastern provinces, would split the allegiance of the Moors, the people of Guadix, Baza, and Almería remained steadfast in their loyalty to al-Zaḡal. The old emir sent his envoys to convince him to abandon his claims, but thinking that they came to kill him, Abū ‘Abd Allāh refused to receive them. Supplied with Castilian money and weapons, in mid-September he entered the Albaicín and during the next fifty days battled fiercely to oust his uncle from the capital. Fadrique de Toledo, whom the king and queen had appointed as captain general of the frontier, came to his aid and engaged al-Zaḡal’s men in furious combat. While some of the learned men of Granada condemned Abū ‘Abd Allāh for his supposed inclination to Christianity, others vainly attempted to reconcile the contending factions. As the Castilians plundered the plain of Granada, as well as about Málaga, Vélez Málaga, Baza, Guadix, and Almería, al-Zaḡal countered by sending troops to pillage near Jaén, Úbeda, Baeza, and Murcia.¹²³ By the end of April 1487 Abū ‘Abd Allāh had secured control of the *alcazaba* and used the three-year truce granted by the Catholic Monarchs as an inducement to other Moorish communities to accept him.¹²⁴

In the winter of 1486–87 while still trying to secure his position, Abū ‘Abd Allāh sent envoys to Istanbul to plead for help from the Turkish sultan, Bayazid II (1482–1512). The Mudejars of Játiva and Paterna in the kingdom of Valencia also appealed to him to deliver them from Christian rule. Nevertheless, Bayazid II was so preoccupied with affairs in the East that he could not realistically offer them any assistance.¹²⁵

The Fall of Vélez Málaga

During that winter, Seville, Córdoba, and other towns were commanded to prepare for the coming campaign. The master of artillery was required to have all cannons ready in Écija. Magnates, knights, squires, and town militias were summoned to appear at Córdoba on 25 March 1487. According to Pulgar, there were twenty thousand knights and fifty thousand infantry. Some proposed that the expedition be directed against Málaga, the most important city after the capital and a major Mediterranean port with a substantial Genoese trading community. Others argued, however, that it made more sense to attack Vélez Málaga, about eighteen miles to the east, for once it was taken Málaga would be isolated and the Moors would have great difficulty in relieving it. In February a delegation of Moorish leaders from Málaga and Motril visited the royal court at Arévalo, probably in the hope of securing a peaceful capitulation that would assure them of the status of Mudejars. For whatever reason, no agreement was reached.¹²⁶

Opting to attack Vélez Málaga, Fernando set out from Córdoba on 7 April, with thirteen thousand knights and forty thousand infantry, but the march southward was hampered by heavy rains. As streams filled, carpenters built bridges while others armed with picks, sledge hammers, and crowbars broke a path through rocky and uneven terrain. By Easter Sunday, 15 April, the army had reached Vélez Málaga. The arduous labor of widening roads was such that the artillery could only cover three miles a day, but ten days after the siege began fifteen hundred carts transporting lighter artillery (*lombardas medianas, pasabolantes, cerbatanas, ribadoquinas*) arrived. Moving more slowly, the heavy artillery came a few days later. While the army was slogging through mud and rocks, a fleet of four armed galleys and several sailing ships unloaded supplies on the coast. Situated about three miles inland between narrow defiles and sharply rising mountains, Vélez Málaga was dominated by a castle, set on a high peak overlooking the town. Strong walls made it formidable. Nearby, and linked with it by connecting walls, was Bentomíz, a smaller town. Fernando positioned his camp on the slopes between the two. A furious struggle for control of the suburbs lasted six hours until the Castilians finally overcame the Moors.¹²⁷

Meantime, the *alfaquí*s (*alfaḳīh, al-fuḳahā'*, men learned in the law) of Granada urged al-Zaḡal and Abū 'Abd Allāh to unite in defense of their coreligionists. Once more the old sultan urged his nephew to collaborate in repelling the Castilians, but he refused. Though fearful of leaving Granada, lest Abū 'Abd Allāh seize the Alhambra, al-Zaḡal, after persuading him not to undertake any hostile act during his absence, on 25–26 April vainly attempted to destroy artillery being brought to the siege. When Isabel heard that, she ordered all the male residents in Andalucía between the ages of twenty and sixty to arm themselves and join the king. As many disheartened Moors

dropped their weapons and fled, the people of Granada, blaming the sultan for this disaster, denied him admittance to the city and proclaimed his nephew as their sole ruler. Repudiated, al-Zagal withdrew to Almuñécar and eventually to Guadix.¹²⁸

Observing his retreat and dreading a Castilian bombardment, the defenders of Vélez Málaga surrendered on 27 April 1487. After yielding the *alcazaba*, they were allowed six days to evacuate the town. Leaving their weapons and artillery behind, they were given safe-conduct for themselves and their movable goods. If they wished to go to Africa, Castilian ships would transport them. Otherwise pack animals would be provided to facilitate their settlement elsewhere in the emirate or in Castile. Those who preferred to remain in the municipal district would have the status of Mudejars and be assigned to certain lands, except in coastal areas. All captives were released, including those who had been removed from the town in the previous twenty days.¹²⁹ The crusading cross, the royal banner, and that of Santiago were raised on the battlements. Entering the town in solemn procession on 3 May, the king advanced to the chief mosque, which, together with several other mosques, was consecrated as a Christian church. About 120 captives were liberated and sent to Córdoba, where the queen received them with honor, giving each one a florin.¹³⁰

The neighboring villages and fortresses also submitted and admitted Castilian garrisons. Their elders, appearing before the king, swore by the oneness of God and the words of the Qur'an given by God to his Messenger, Muḥammad, that they and their descendants would always remain faithful to the king and queen and their successors, obeying their commands to make war or peace, and paying the same tributes that they had owed to the emirs. Assured of security in their persons and property, they were permitted to live according to Islamic law. Certain restrictions were intended to prevent them from committing hostile acts against Christians. They were forbidden to bear arms in Castilian lands, unless summoned by the king; to journey to any Moorish place outside royal jurisdiction; to contact external Moors or receive them in their houses; or to remain in any Christian town or castle an hour after sunset. They were required to hand over escaped captives, whether Moorish or Christian, and to inform the royal *alcaide* of the presence of armed Moors and to seize them, if they could. The penalties for violation of this oath included death, imprisonment, and confiscation of property. The oath was similar to one required of Muslims in litigation with Christians by Alfonso X in the thirteenth century. The right to continue to observe their religion and be governed by Islamic law was typical of the status accorded in earlier centuries to Mudejars. The clauses relating to the use of arms, contacts with Muslims not under Castilian rule, and the condition of escaped captives seem to have been dictated by the peculiar circumstances of the war.¹³¹

A New Accord with Abū ‘Abd Allāh

An exultant Abuū ‘Abd Allāh, now ensconced in the Alhambra, dispatched the *alguacil mayor* of Granada to the royal encampment at Vélez Málaga to negotiate a new accord. At an unspecified future date, he agreed to surrender Granada and its dependent fortresses in exchange for a lordship centered at Guadix. His domain would extend eastward through El Cenete and Baza to Vélez Blanco and Vélez Rubio on the Murcian frontier and then reach southward to Vera and Mojácar near the coast. Also included were Val de Purchena and lands along the Almanzora River, and the districts of Ugíjar and Márjena in the eastern Alpujarras south of Granada. All seaports and beaches were excluded. His principal followers would be assigned lands in the districts of Andarax, Lúchar, Ferreira, Jubiles, and Cádiar in Las Alpujarras and allowed to retain their property in Granada. The inhabitants of the Albaicín were assured of the status of Mudejars with the right to continue in residence, retain their mosques, and be exempt from taxes for ten years. That meant that the city of Granada would not have to be evacuated. Hostages had to be given to guarantee observance of the pact and Christian captives had to be set at liberty. Abū ‘Abd Allāh also pledged to collaborate with the Castilians in bringing down al-Zaġal. Within six months the Moors had to affirm their acceptance of these terms.¹³² Pulgar explained that Abū ‘Abd Allāh argued that if the king and queen guaranteed the security of the people of the capital so that they could cultivate their fields and carry on commercial relations with Christians, other towns would accept his rule. Indeed, on 15 August it was reported that Baza had declared in his favor.¹³³ Accepting the inevitability of Castilian conquest, Abū ‘Abd Allāh effectively abandoned any claim to the Naṣrid throne, but as a royal vassal he would hold a goodly part of the eastern kingdom as a quasi-autonomous principality.

The Siege of Málaga

With Vélez Málaga subdued, the king moved westward to Málaga. While the *alcaide* attempted to secure a peaceful surrender, Aḥmad al-Ṭaġrī (Hamet el Zegrí), commanding the *gomer*es or Moroccan volunteers for the faith, resolved to die defending the city. Málaga was protected by strong walls with more than one hundred towers. The eleventh-century *alcázar*, built on the crest of a hill and defended by two walls, overlooked the city. Farther up the hill and linked by a wall to the *alcázar* was the castle of Gibralfaro, a fourteenth-century structure that seemed impregnable. Walls and towers also guarded the shipyards and surrounding suburbs. Near the shipyards was the Castillo de Genoveses, which had been erected by Genoese merchants. Málaga, a great mercantile emporium receiving ships from the entire Mediterranean,

brought great wealth to the emirate and filled the Naṣrid treasury with customs duties. Its loss would be a major blow to the economy and royal finances.¹³⁴

The siege of Málaga, initiated on 6 May 1487, proved to be the most arduous military enterprise yet undertaken by Fernando. For nearly three and a half months his military and naval forces encircled the city, whose formidable fortifications made obvious the difficult task confronting the Castilians. Cavalry could not easily maneuver in the mountainous landscape and even infantry found that it was not easy going. Prior to establishing the siege, the Castilians made several attempts to gain control of a hill opposite Gibralfaro; though beaten back more than once, they eventually were successful. Once that was done, the king assigned each of his captains to certain areas around the city, while ships unloaded artillery transported from Vélez Málaga. Two ships from Flanders brought heavy guns sent by Maximilian, a son of the Holy Roman emperor, Frederick III (1452–93). In addition to twelve thousand knights and fifty thousand infantry (according to Palencia), and hundreds of carts for transportation, a whole army of craftsmen was necessary to prepare siege machinery: ironworkers, carpenters, sawyers, woodcutters, smelters, masons, hoers, mat makers, ropers, coalmen, and a master of gun powder. The king even ordered stones used by Alfonso XI in the siege of Algeciras to be brought to the siege. After fierce combat the Castilians seized control of the greater part of the suburbs.¹³⁵

As the siege wore on, ships and wagon trains bringing supplies, especially food, were sometimes late, provoking grumbling among the troops. Some “wicked Christians” gave aid and comfort to the enemy by declaring that the army was discontented and would soon have to retreat. The Moors also took heart from reports that, as pestilence affected the neighboring area, Isabel appealed to her husband to move his headquarters. However, he persuaded her to come to the siege so the Moors would realize that their hope of a Castilian withdrawal was illusory. After her arrival, he informed the Moors of her presence and emphasized that with God’s help they were determined to remain until the city surrendered. Although the king and queen offered to allow the defenders to depart freely with their property for any place in Africa or Spain, they refused to capitulate. Convinced of the strength of the city, they expected that once heavy rains came, the fleet would have to withdraw, thus allowing ships from Africa to bring in reinforcements and needed supplies. Although some thought it made sense to accept the terms offered by the king and queen, many of them were killed by the *gomeres*, which terrified the rest.¹³⁶

The capture of the castle of Gibralfaro, which dominated the city, was a major priority, which the king entrusted to the marquess of Cádiz. After a bombardment brought down a portion of the walls, he moved closer to the castle, but in hand-to-hand combat his losses were such that he withdrew to his initial position. As cavalry could scarcely move in that area, the fighting

was done largely on foot. In order to terrorize the inhabitants, the Castilians fired *alquitrán*, a combustible mixture, into the city. As the bombardment continued, gunpowder was soon in short supply. Three ships were sent to Valencia, Barcelona, and Sicily to obtain additional quantities, and an appeal was made to João II of Portugal (1481–95). Nevertheless, as time went on the shortage worsened. The besiegers also suffered serious casualties from daily attacks by the Moors. The wounded were cared for in the Queen's Hospital. Although the elderly and women of Málaga, decrying the destruction and loss of life, suggested an accord with the Castilians, the *gomeres*, "inhuman people," according to Pulgar, killed or tortured them so that no one dared to speak up. As the barrage continued with scarcely any letup, the king advanced closer to the city, digging ditches and erecting palisades to defend his troops and tighten the blockade.¹³⁷

Although the Moroccans attempted to intercept ships bringing supplies, Castilian armed escorts prevented them. While renegade Christians informed the defenders that a shortage of provisions would soon compel the Castilians to abandon the siege, some Moors coming to the Castilian camp emphasized that the defenders were well-supplied and would fight on, while others said the contrary. With all of that, the king and queen remained firm in their resolve and ordered a more intensive effort. Scaling ladders and wooden towers that would hold one hundred men were built and leather mantles were used to protect soldiers assigned to undermine the walls.¹³⁸

As the plight of Málaga worsened, al-Zaġal, then in Guadix, dispatched a relieving force, but a contingent sent by Abū 'Abd Allāh drove them back. Notifying the king and queen, he declared himself to be their loyal servant ever ready to do whatever they asked. In his opinion, Málaga could not hold out much longer. Although some Moors in Granada were anxious to relieve Málaga, they did not challenge him because they enjoyed Castilian protection and were free to go about their daily business without fear of attack. Abū 'Abd Allāh, effectively abandoning the Moors of Málaga, counseled them to yield.¹³⁹

While Valencian and Catalan soldiers joined the besieging army, the Moors held on to the unlikely hope of relief from Baza. As the food supply dwindled, the *gomeres* went from house to house searching for food and killing anyone who objected. The Castilians, in contrast, had an abundance of wheat and barley, but, fearing that Mudejars in their midst might set it afire or poison the wells, the king and queen ordered their expulsion from the camp. As the Castilians worked to undermine the walls, the Moors rained down missiles on their heads and engaged in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. In July, Abū 'Abd Allāh IV, emir of Tlemcen (1468–1504), sent an embassy bringing horses and golden harnesses and cloaks for the king, and silk garments, golden rings, and perfumes for the queen. Declaring himself their servant, he asked them to guarantee the safety of his people against seizure by the Castilian fleet. While they were pleased to accommodate him and sent him a gold plate embossed with their arms, they stressed that no one could aid the Moors of Granada by

bringing in troops, weapons, or provisions.¹⁴⁰

Claiming to be a holy man inspired by God, one Moor decided to end the siege by assassinating the king and queen. When he gained access to the royal compound on 18 June Fernando had retired for the siesta and Isabel did not wish to meet him without her husband. Mistakenly thinking that Álvaro of Portugal, a brother of the duke of Braganza, and the queen's good friend, Beatriz de Bobadilla, marchioness of Moya, were the royal couple, the would-be assassin assaulted them but was soon cut to pieces by guards. As a lesson to the people of Málaga, his mangled body was launched into the city by a trebuchet. The Moors retaliated by killing a Christian captive and sending him to the enemy camp on a donkey's back. Henceforth greater precautions were taken to guarantee the security of the king and queen.¹⁴¹

As the weeks passed, Fernando and Isabel realized the need for additional forces. Enrique de Guzmán, duke of Medina Sidonia, who had not been summoned previously, now appeared and also made a loan of 20,000 gold *doblas* to finance the siege. In addition, one hundred ships laden with provisions arrived and the towns of Extremadura sent their militia forces. The king and queen offered to allow the Moors to leave securely with their goods if they surrendered, but they refused, even though many were on the verge of starvation. As the Castilians intensified their efforts to gain entrance into the city, the Moors resisted with equal determination.¹⁴²

Negotiations for Surrender

At length, some Moorish officials and merchants, putting aside their fear of the *gomeres*, decided that it was time to negotiate, rather than watch the people die of starvation. However, the military leaders, convinced by a holy man that God would soon deliver them, refused and, on his advice, sallied out to offer battle only to be badly beaten. Given that reverse, the city officials obtained safe-conduct to present their conditions for surrender to the king and queen. They demanded the right to remain in Málaga as Mudejars, secure in their persons and property. If any of them wished to settle in Coín, the king and queen would cede that town to them. Those desiring to go to Africa or other places in Spain would be able to do so safely in the same manner as the people of Vélez Málaga.

Responding on behalf of the king and queen, Gutierre de Cárdenas, the major commander of León of the Order of Santiago, and *contador mayor* or chief accountant, asserted that the time had passed for the Moors to dictate terms. If, like the Moors of Vélez Málaga, they had surrendered earlier, they would receive favorable treatment. As they were only compelled to negotiate because of hunger, they would be bound by whatever terms the conquerors wished to impose, including death and captivity. The Moors insisted, however,

that they would yield only if the security of their persons and property was guaranteed. Otherwise, they threatened to shut up five hundred Christian male and female prisoners in the battlements and the elderly, women, and children in the *alcazaba*, and then set fire to the city. Intent on dying to the last man, the soldiers would march out to give battle. Though Fernando and Isabel would emerge triumphant, their bloody victory and the destruction of Málaga would be remembered for all time. Fernando bluntly rejected these demands and warned the Moors that if any Christian captive were killed not one Moor would be left alive in the city.¹⁴³

While some Moors argued that they should make the grand gesture of choosing death rather than the humiliation of submission, wiser heads prevailed. Fourteen men representing the fourteen districts of the city and bearing a letter exuding humility and obsequiousness declared themselves servants and slaves of the king and queen. Kissing their feet and begging for mercy, they recalled the examples of Fernando III, conqueror of Córdoba, Alfonso XI, of Algeciras, and Infante Fernando, of Antequera, who assured the defeated Moors of security in their persons and property. Admitting their error and placing themselves in royal hands, they pledged to abandon the city and pleaded for safe-conduct elsewhere. Some royal counselors contended that, in revenge for the deaths of so many Castilians, the entire population should be put to the sword. Such a massacre would teach the Moors in other towns a lesson and facilitate the conquest.¹⁴⁴

Isabel, disavowing such cruelty, persuaded her husband to respond differently. Reminding the Moors that, unlike the people of Vélez Málaga, they had refused to submit when first commanded to do so and had persisted in their resistance until the very last moment, he stated that he was not inclined to admit their pleas. Full of consternation, they again debated whether to kill the Christian captives and burn the city. At last, however, they chose to yield the city and place all the people at the mercy of the king and queen, whom they begged not to punish innocent persons. In response, Fernando and Isabel guaranteed the security of those who had wanted to surrender but could not, and demanded twenty hostages as surety that the city would be given up. After a siege of more than three months beginning on 6 May, Málaga surrendered on 18 August 1487.¹⁴⁵

On that day, the major commander of León took possession of the city. The crusading cross, the banner of Santiago, and the royal standard were placed on the towers of the *alcazaba*. Seeing those signs of victory, the king gave thanks to God while the queen and her ladies offered prayers to God, the Virgin Mary, and Santiago. The bishops and clergy intoned the *Te Deum* and the *Gloria in excelsis Deo*. Officers were assigned to control the towers, gates, and fortifications and all the weapons and artillery were gathered and stored in the *alcazaba*. The Moors were compelled to leave their houses and, voicing loud lamentations, were herded into two great corrals in the *alcazaba*. Twelve Christians who had informed the enemy about the status of the royal army

were caned through the streets. Dead bodies were removed to free the city of the stench. Six hundred Christian captives, unshaven, yellow, and weakened from hunger, some of whom had been imprisoned for ten to twenty years, made their way in procession out of the city to the king and queen, who freed them of their chains and gave them fresh clothing and other necessities so that they could return to their homes. Among them was Heinrich Murer of Thurgau in Switzerland, who had been captured in battle four years before. Two days after the surrender of Málaga, Aḥmad al-Taḡrī, who had held out in Gibralfaro, finally gave up. Placed in irons, he still insisted that he would have preferred to die rather than be taken prisoner. The people of Mijas and Osunillas near the coast submitted and were brought to the corrals in Málaga.¹⁴⁶

After the city was cleansed, bishops and clergy processed to the principal mosque, which they purified and consecrated as a church. Fernando and Isabel, accompanied by the Cardinal of Spain, magnates, and knights, entered the city in procession and participated in a solemn mass in the newly consecrated church. A bishopric was established and a new bishop, subject to papal confirmation, was appointed. *Fueros* or laws for the governance of Christian settlers in Málaga were drawn up and the boundaries of the municipal district were determined. Lands and houses were apportioned among those opting to settle there. An *alcaide* was appointed to administer justice and defend the city; other municipal officials were also named. From Málaga the king and queen returned to Córdoba, where they were received in solemn procession and went to the cathedral to give thanks.¹⁴⁷

The Fate of the Moors of Málaga

Prior to their departure, however, the sovereigns made arrangements for the disposition of the population. Whereas in the capitulations of Ronda, Loja, and Vélez Málaga, the Moors were allowed to depart with their movable goods, the people of Málaga, who had put up such a strenuous resistance, suffered a harsher fate. Surrendering at the mercy of the king, they were to be held for ransom, according to terms outlined on 4 September. The ransom for each person and his or her movable goods was set at 30 gold *doblas* weighing 22 *quilates* or carats, to be paid in gold, silver, jewelry, pearls, or silk. No discount was given for those who died after they were rounded up in the corral; ransom had to be paid for them as if they were alive. Children born in captivity, however, were excluded. To facilitate payment, the property belonging to the captives would be sold at auction. Once a third of the ransom was paid, they could go free, provided that they left hostages for the balance to be paid in two installments in April and October 1488. If these terms were not met, the hostages would remain in captivity for life. All Christian captives had to be released, including those sold elsewhere after Christmas 1487. When the

ransom was paid, the Moors could go to Africa in Castilian ships or could settle securely anywhere in the dominions of the king and queen; but they could not reside in the Naṣrid realm. Excluded from this arrangement were Aḥmad al-Ṭaġrī and several of the more intransigent Moors.¹⁴⁸

The captive Moors were divided into three groups. Those in the first group were to be exchanged for Christian captives in Africa; the second group, divided into lots of fifty to one hundred, about three thousand in all, was handed over to nobles, knights, royal counselors and officials, and warriors from Aragón, Valencia, Portugal, and other nations who had participated in the siege. Members of the third group, about eight thousand in number, were sold to cover the expenses of the siege. One hundred of the *gomerēs* were sent to Innocent VIII on 11 September; the queen of Naples received fifty Moorish girls, and the queen of Portugal, thirty. Others were distributed among the ladies of the realm. As their Muslim coreligionists elsewhere in the emirate and overseas, citing their own needs, refused to ransom the captives taken at Málaga, more than eleven thousand (Bernáldez) or fifteen thousand (Valera) were sold into slavery.¹⁴⁹

Among those held for ransom were 450 Jews, in the amount of 10,000,000 *maravedíes*, which they were unable to raise. However, through the good offices of Abraham Seneor, a royal tax collector, twenty of their number were allowed to seek financial aid from the Jewish communities in Castile. As a consequence they were liberated and settled among their brethren in Castile.¹⁵⁰

Celebration of the Fall of Málaga

As news of the fall of Málaga was disseminated, victory celebrations were held in many places. In Cuenca, the cathedral chapter together with the clergy and knights commemorated the event with a solemn procession on 30 August. Fernando wrote to his illegitimate son, Alfonso, archbishop of Zaragoza, then seventeen, asking him to give thanks. João II ordered the city council of Lisbon to ring the bells and on the next day to hold a solemn procession in thanksgiving.¹⁵¹

The most elaborate commemorations took place in Rome. While the siege was in progress, a mass was celebrated on 9 July in the church of Santiago de los Españoles.¹⁵² All the church bells in the city were rung and festal bonfires were lit on 10 October and on the next day the pope presided at a mass of remembrance in Santa Maria del Popolo.¹⁵³ Ten days later the Spanish theologian Pedro Boscá addressed the papal consistory on the theme of the conquest of Málaga. Pointing out that the king and queen, prompted solely by zeal for the faith, were the only Christian monarchs then achieving victories over the enemies of the faith, he expressed his belief that Spain was entering a new golden age. The fall of Granada, soon to be expected, was a stage in a

broader crusade that would extend to Africa, where the king and queen would “uproot the filthiness of Muḥammad and propagate the name of Christ.”¹⁵⁴ Diego de Muros, dean of Santiago and secretary to Cardinal Mendoza, also exalted the royal triumph.¹⁵⁵

Then on 4 February 1488 the Spanish ambassador presented one hundred Moorish captives to Innocent VIII. Assigned to the cardinals, “they were all dispersed throughout Rome.” Recalling the triumphs of the ancient emperors, Bernáldez commented that the captives were paraded through the city and converted to Christianity.¹⁵⁶ The papal master of ceremonies, Pietro Marso, on 28 August, described the line of enchained captives with heavy iron rings about their necks and hailed Fernando and Isabel as “magnanimous, just, and pious,” fighting with “Herculean ardor” against “the most atrocious Moors,” who, “like the savage Turks,” menaced Europe.¹⁵⁷ On learning that their gift of the captives had stirred such excitement, the king and queen declared that if they had known that, they would have sent more.¹⁵⁸

The siege of Málaga was the most prolonged and expensive military operation thus far undertaken by the Reyes Católicos. Bernáldez noted that the imposition of taxes to cover the heavy expense exhausted the people and the clergy. In the last five years the emirate of Granada lost an extensive stretch of territory extending eastward from Ronda to Loja and Alhama and including the coastal region from Marbella to Málaga and Vélez Málaga. The city of Granada and an expansive area in the east reaching the borders of the kingdom of Murcia was subject to Abū ‘Abd Allāh, but the southeastern sector, including Guadix and Almería, was controlled by al-Zaḡal. The fall of Málaga did not result in the sudden collapse of the emirate, as one might expect, but rather, as Suárez Fernández remarked, strengthened al-Zaḡal’s determination to resist.¹⁵⁹

Chapter 7

The End of the Crusade: From Baza to Granada

The second stage of Fernando and Isabel's crusade began after the submission of Málaga and culminated nearly five years later with the fall of Granada. Once again, they benefited from Naṣrid dissension. Muḥammad XII, known as al-Zaḡal, contended for power with his nephew Abū 'Abd Allāh, who had been compelled to become a Castilian vassal and promise to surrender Granada on demand. A third member of the family, Yaḥyā al-Najjār, lord of Almería, assisted the Catholic Monarchs in reducing the eastern sector of the emirate. When Baza capitulated after a strenuous resistance, al-Zaḡal abandoned the struggle and yielded Almería and Guadix. Only Granada and its adjacent territory ruled by Abū 'Abd Allāh remained in Muslim hands. When he rejected the royal ultimatum to yield the city, the king and queen had to mount a full-scale siege. In the end, he had to yield and the emirate of Granada was annexed to their other dominions.

The Exploratory Campaign of 1488

While prosecuting the crusade, Fernando had neglected the affairs of the Crown of Aragón. Now, for the first time the Cortes in his Aragonese dominions provided financial assistance for the war. In January 1488 the Cortes of Zaragoza authorized the use of income from the *sis*a, a sales tax, amounting to 115,000 *libras* (about 41,055,000 *maravedíes*) for the previous three years. In March the Corts of Valencia approved a levy of 5,000 *libras* (about 1,785,000 *maravedíes*). Also in January the marquess of Cádiz planned an attack on Almuñécar about forty miles east of Málaga, but al-Zaḡal forced him to abandon his plan. Undeterred, the marquess urged the king and queen to persist in "this holy war against the Moors, enemies of the holy faith."¹ The exhaustion of men and resources, pestilence in Seville and other towns, and

preoccupation with France and other issues induced them, however, to plan a short campaign.

Indeed, they hoped that Yaḥyā al-Najjār, *alcaide* of Almería and Vera, could persuade the towns and fortresses in the eastern sector of the emirate to capitulate, thereby obviating a prolonged military operation. Several letters of safe-conduct issued in March and April to various Moors of Almería, including al-Najjār, indicated that he was prepared to open the gates within five days of the king's appearance; that interval presumably would be used to make a show of resistance and thus save face.²

Although troops were mustered on 5 May, military operations were slow to begin.³ The plan was to obtain the formal submission of places acknowledging Abū 'Abd Allāh and then to assess the relative strength of those held by al-Zaḡal. The campaign began on 9 June when the marquess of Cádiz and the *adelantado* of Murcia advanced toward Vera, south of Lorca and a short distance from the Mediterranean. The marquess believed that Vera and its territory would be taken "without much effort" and he soon persuaded the town officials to surrender when the king appeared on 10 June. Many of the people had already gone off to aid al-Zaḡal. Those remaining were allowed to keep their property or depart with their movable goods for Africa or elsewhere. Soon after, the officials of forty-nine other towns and villages in the valley of the Almanzora River surrendered under similar conditions. Those choosing to live under Christian rule as Mudejars pledged loyalty to the king and queen and agreed to pay the usual tributes.⁴

Intent on convincing Innocent VIII of the significance of the war, Fernando announced his acquisition of Vera and fifty other villages and fortresses, as part of "this holy enterprise against the Moors . . . , enemies of our holy Catholic faith, to the praise and glory of our Redeemer Jesus Christ." With considerable hyperbole, he argued that as much had been done "in this year to the service of our Lord and the increase of the Christian religion as in any of the years past." The pope, congratulating him on 14 July, expressed the hope that he would overcome "those barbarians, enemies of the Christian religion," but he also reminded him of the continuing Turkish threat.⁵


Meanwhile, al-Najjār and the chief men of Almería, the last great seaport under Naṣrid rule, came to Vera to pledge obedience to the king. Palencia remarked that because Fernando had entered secret negotiations for the surrender of Almería he had summoned an army much smaller than necessary. Although the marquess suggested that Almería could be taken after a siege of a few days, the king, following a brief skirmish, returned to Baza. He later explained to al-Najjār that he did so because of the inclement weather and reinforcements sent by al-Zaḡal. After occupying Huéscar, the king arranged for the transport of supplies overland or by sea to defend the frontier.⁶ Luis Puertocarrero, commander of Azuaga, who was appointed captain general of the eastern frontier, including the bishoprics of Jaén and Cartagena, the *adelantamiento* of Cazorla, and the adjacent lands of the Order of Santiago,

was instructed to continue the war against al-Zaġal. As Abū ‘Abd Allāh had renewed his truce with Castile for two years on 28 July, his lands were not to be harmed.⁷

Taking advantage of Fernando’s absence from the frontier, al-Zaġal raided as far as Alcalá la Real, while the Castilians threatened Almería. In August and September al-Zaġal recovered Níjar and the villages in the Sierra de los Filabres and the valley of the Almanzora River. Moving westward from Almuñécar, he seized several coastal villages before turning northward to occupy Alhendín and Padul, near the capital. In October the Moors of Gaucín south of Ronda revolted, but the marquess of Cádiz suppressed them and was rewarded with appointment as captain general of the western frontier.⁸

The Siege of Baza

Although the people of Andalucía were exhausted by the state of war prevailing since 1482, Fernando and Isabel were committed to finishing the crusade and issued the call to arms to magnates, knights, and urban militias. Abū ‘Abd Allāh, as a sign of his loyalty, sent them fifty Christian captives and many other gifts. The decision was taken to besiege Baza, about twenty-four miles east of Guadix, in the hope that after it fell Guadix and Almería would quickly surrender. Prior to the king’s departure on 27 May 1489, the banner of the crusade was blessed in solemn ceremonies in the cathedral of Jaén. Though hindered by heavy rains, thirteen thousand horse and forty thousand foot were mustered in more than twelve battalions. Advance contingents were sent to secure the routes leading to Baza. As he approached Zújar just north of Baza, Fernando offered to allow the defenders to go freely if they surrendered, but, confident of their ability to resist, they refused. The Castilian bombardment soon convinced them to change their minds, but the king now turned a deaf ear to their pleas. Pointing out that the siege distracted from Baza, the more important target, his counselors eventually persuaded him to allow the Moors to depart, leaving all their weapons behind. Several neighboring castles capitulated or were abandoned. The siege had taken twenty days.⁹



Map 3. The Conquest of Granada East, 1487–92

Baza lies in the shadow of Jabalcón Mountain, whose great ridges and ravines reach down to the plain, which is watered by small streams. Formidable walls and numerous towers closely placed protected the town. Standing on a height overlooking the town was the *alcazaba*. An extensive orchard, about three miles in circumference, densely packed with fruit trees and small towers erected by individual owners, and intersected by gorges and irrigation canals, stretched out beyond the town. As the mountain and the woods made Baza almost inaccessible for a large army, a siege was exceedingly difficult. In order to defend Baza, al-Zaġal summoned about ten thousand knights and foot soldiers already hardened by war. Vast quantities of food, weapons, and other war materials were brought in and the Naṣrid prince, Yaḥyā al-Najjār, lent his assistance. After Fernando withdrew from Almería, al-Najjār probably concluded that his pledge to surrender the city was no longer obligatory and that his best course was to support al-Zaġal.¹⁰

The siege of Baza, initiated between 15 and 18 June 1489, was the most grueling operation of the entire war. Pulgar provided a detailed account based on personal observation and the reports of participants. The king positioned each of his captains in different sectors in front of the town, but the advantage lay with the Moors, who could still go and come freely. Heavy thickets made it impossible to bring up artillery to bombard the walls. Knights could not

maneuver in the narrow passages of the woods, so the task of attacking fell mainly to infantry. Even though they had greater numbers, they could not maintain their ranks or rally round their standards or even remain with their captains because of constricted quarters and so had to fight individually. For twelve hours Moors and Christians battled back and forth amid the trees, shouting and firing arrows, *espingardas*, and *ribadoquines*, but, in the confusion, unable to distinguish friend from foe or to determine who was winning or losing. At last the Moors retreated to a palisaded area and the Castilians attempted to secure a portion of the orchard. Summarizing the day, Pulgar remarked that there were few battles such as this one, involving so many men in such a place in cruel and dangerous combat for such a long time, so that “neither the Christians could have the full glory of victory, or the Moors the great disgrace of being defeated.”¹¹

Moving his camp to a safer place, the king took counsel as to how to proceed. Some argued that, given Baza’s defensive position, he should not waste time, money, and men in a protracted siege that might not succeed. Rather, it seemed more advantageous to sever Baza’s contacts with other Moorish towns and increase pressure on Guadix and Almería by seizing Tabernas north of Almería, Purchena southeast of Baza, and other villages. A campaign of devastation in the following year would compel al-Zāgal to surrender. Although the king initially was inclined to agree, the troops murmured that, after so much effort, they should not withdraw and allow the Moors to claim victory. Other counselors contended that the failure of the siege would lengthen the war by encouraging more open resistance by Abū ‘Abd Allāh, who had quietly aided the defenders with a small number of soldiers and intelligence. Instead, they advised the king to destroy the orchard that had enabled the Moors to thwart the Castilian attack, even though that would require intensive labor and considerable expense. If he chose to continue the siege, Isabel guaranteed that he would have whatever was necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion.

Resolved to do so, Fernando established two encampments on either side of the city and threw up palisades and ditches to defend them. About four thousand soldiers were set to the task of uprooting the trees, while others guarded them against assault by the Moors. So thickly grown was the area that the workers made slow progress, clearing about ten feet each day over forty days. Although many obstacles were removed, the Moors, taking advantage of the hills and valleys, continued to harass the enemy. To protect against them, Fernando ordered a palisaded ditch filled with the trunks of downed trees to be dug from one encampment to the other. Waters flowing down the mountain were diverted to the moat for added defense. Soldiers guarding the area were stationed in fifteen earthen castles with towers and merlons (ramparts on the top with gaps for firing arrows or guns) placed about three hundred feet apart. In order to complete the encirclement of the city, another double-palisaded embankment extending about six miles was made on the mountain above the

city, but it took two months to finish it.¹²

Meanwhile, Moors brought news about the morale of the defenders and their ability to resist, but their information was so contradictory that it was impossible to know the truth.¹³ The defenders were encouraged to resist by the reports of renegade Christians on the perceived weakness of the besieging army. Hoping to sever the water supply, the king decided to seize a fountain on top of the mountain, but the Moors attempted to impede his efforts. As the siege dragged on, some Moors in Granada condemned Abū ‘Abd Allāh for causing division among the Muslims and for his alliance with Fernando and Isabel. Seizing the troublemakers, he had them beheaded, thereby quelling the uprising. Throughout this time, in view of his status as a royal vassal, he received a monthly stipend from Isabel. As the months passed, the queen ordered additional reinforcements and maintained a constant flow of supplies. There was an abundance of food, weapons, and craftsmen, as well as merchants from throughout the peninsula and even from Sicily, offering brocades, silks, linens, and tapestries for sale. No doubt with camp followers in mind, Pulgar added that there were “some other things that grind down men of war and do harm and are of no benefit to armies.”¹⁴

The Naşrid Appeal to the Mamlūks of Egypt

Two Franciscans from the church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem appeared in the royal camp in July, a year and a half after the Naşrid appeal for military aid to the Mamlūk sultan of Egypt, Qā’it Bāy (1468–95). Whether that entreaty was initiated by Abū ‘Abd Allāh or al-Zağal or by some of the leading men of Granada is unclear, but it apparently was prompted by the fall of Málaga. The Egyptian historian Ibn Iyās reported that the sultan ordered the friars to ask Ferrante, king of Naples, to persuade his cousin and brother-in-law, Fernando, to cease his attacks and withdraw from Granada. If he refused, the sultan promised to punish the clergy, deprive Europeans of access to the church, and demolish it.¹⁵

Replying to Ferrante on 5 September, the Catholic Monarchs emphasized that just as the sultan allowed Christians to reside in his dominions, so too the Mudejars dwelling in their realms were permitted to retain their property and to observe their religion. Nevertheless, ever since the Moors of Africa, without provocation, had invaded, a little more than seven hundred years ago, the kings of Spain, in peaceful possession of the Spains, including the land now called the emirate of Granada, had struggled to expel them. Even though the Moors were summoned many times to evacuate the country, they continued to kill, imprison, rob, and injure the Christians. If they wished to submit to Castilian authority, they would be permitted to retain their property and their mosques, and to live securely according to their law. If they wished to go to

Africa, they would be provided with ships and safe-conduct. Despite that, “the one who calls himself king of Granada”—an apparent reference to al-Zaġal—persisted in opposition and so the king and queen were justly conducting war against him. They urged the Mamlūk sultan to continue to govern the Christians fairly but pointed out that if he did not they would have to take comparable measures against the Mudejars.¹⁶

Without mentioning Ferrante, Pulgar related that the sultan dispatched the friars to urge Innocent VIII to admonish the king and queen to desist from their onslaught against Granada, to restore all places already taken, and to allow the Moors the freedom accorded to Christians in his domain. If they failed to do so, he would be forced to treat his Christians in the same manner as they treated the Moors. Although the text of their reply to the pope is unknown, Pulgar’s summary (he probably had a copy of their letter) emphasized the same points as their letter to Ferrante and used similar language. The whole world, they argued, knew that their ancestors possessed the Spains and that the Moorish occupation of Granada was tyrannical and not juridical. Therefore, the kings of Castile and León had always fought to “restore it to their dominion, according as it had always been.” As the Moors continually waged cruel war against the Christians, seizing towns, villages, livestock, and people, Fernando and Isabel had to recover what was theirs and defend their people. The Moors subject to their rule enjoyed a status equivalent to the Christians in the sultan’s lands, including personal liberty and ownership of property. Nevertheless, because of “the other rebels and those who tyrannically presume to hold land that is not theirs and to make war against the Christians,” the pope would understand that the king and queen had the right “to resist that tyranny and to wage war until they leave the land.” Giving the friars a rich veil that she had embroidered for the Holy Sepulcher, Isabel also offered their monastery an annual pension of 1,000 ducats.¹⁷

Alonso de Palencia, who was not an eyewitness, nevertheless reported the sultan’s demands and summarized the royal response. The king and queen asserted, according to Palencia, that the Muslims had violently occupied Spain, which the Christians held by hereditary right. Lands unjustly seized, therefore, could with justice be recovered by their legitimate lords, as the French had recovered a great part of France that had been overrun by the Saracens (an allusion to Charles Martel), and as the kings of Spain had been doing since the time of Pelayo in the eighth century. Supported by Africa, the Moors held out in Granada and, in contrast to the Christians, broke every pact. Even during truces the Moors pillaged Christian lands, capturing and killing people. Consequently, it was a matter of justice for the Christians to expel them from territory violently usurped. Although the sultan might destroy the Holy Sepulcher, he could not destroy the holiness of the site. The income he earned from pilgrims, however, would surely dry up. Should he kill the one thousand or so Christians in Jerusalem and elsewhere in his dominions, he could be certain that one thousand and more Muslims living peacefully in Spain,

“without paying the least tribute,” would also be executed with the king’s approbation. Despite Palencia’s statement, there were many more Christians under Mamlūk rule and the Mudejars in Spain were subject to regular tribute. As Palencia’s summary goes well beyond the letter sent by the king and queen to Ferrante, it may reflect comments made by royal counselors before a formal written reply was drafted.

The Castilian response stated the traditional concept of the reconquest that held that Spain rightfully belonged to the Christians, who had occupied it long before the Muslim invasion. The Moors had unjustly seized lands that were not theirs. Pulgar, by asserting that their occupation was tyrannical and not juridical, stressed that their presence was illegal and contrary to law. Given the injustice committed by the Moors in invading Spain, the Christians were engaged in a just war to recover what was originally theirs. Both Christian and Muslim historians minimized the actual menace presented by the sultan. Palencia remarked that there was little to fear from the sultan, who, faced with greater dangers (the Turks), would be amenable to reason. Noting that the embassy accomplished nothing, Ibn lyās summed it up: “The Franks seized Granada.”¹⁸

The “authentic” reason for the sultan’s embassy, according to José Enrique López de Coca Castañer, was provided by Andrés Bernáldez, who stated that in July the sultan sent two friars, one Castilian, the other Italian, to Spain. Without mentioning the war against Granada, Bernáldez commented that the sultan requested assistance for his wars from Fernando, as king of Sicily, with whom he enjoyed friendly relations. In 1488, for example, Fernando requested papal permission to sell Sicilian wheat to the sultan to relieve famine among his people. Acknowledging that one ought not to aid “enemies of our holy Catholic faith,” the king argued, nevertheless, that the profits could be invested in “the holy enterprise of Granada, to expel from there the perfidious Muḥammadan sect and place that kingdom in the service of God and thus exalt the holy Catholic faith.” The sultan’s demand that Fernando abandon the crusade was mere lip service intended to assuage the Naṣrids and to express solidarity with his fellow Muslims. Of much more immediate concern to him were the Ottoman Turks then menacing Syria. Before the siege of Baza in 1489, Fernando sent fifty caravels to him to use against the Turks. In sum, the principal objective of Qā’it Bāy’s embassy was to secure substantial aid against the Ottomans.¹⁹ If the Naṣrids expected any help from the Mamlūks, they were greatly disappointed.

The End of the Siege of Baza

The daily routine of skirmishes often lasting two to four hours continued, taking a toll in casualties, but not resulting in a decisive victory for either side.

Some Moors, unwilling to endure the increasing misery, gave themselves up. In the fall as cold and rainy weather approached, the king, as a sign of his tenacity, ordered his troops to build houses and huts of wood, mud, and branches, and plotted in streets. Heavy rains brought down some houses and also wiped out important supply routes, greatly impeding movement through harsh terrain. Isabel sent six thousand men to clear the roads so the uninterrupted flow of supplies could continue. In addition to purchasing wheat and other supplies, she provided fourteen thousand pack animals with drovers and guards to secure the roads. Over six months she expended 40,000,000 *maravedíes*. As funds dwindled, she borrowed 100,000,000 *maravedíes* from prelates, magnates, knights, ladies, and merchants, but even that was insufficient. So she leased or sold sources of royal revenue and pawned her jewels with the bankers in Valencia and Barcelona.

Thinking that the shortage of food and other necessities would compel the Moors to surrender, Fernando offered to allow them to depart freely with their movable goods, but they refused. They were confident that the Castilians, suffering from a similar shortage, would be unable to persist through the rainy season. Hoping that Isabel's presence would convince them of his determination to remain until he achieved victory, the king asked her to come to the siege. Some royal counselors, however, judged that the siege would fail and when the queen saw that her efforts to provide men, money, and materials were in vain, she would insist on withdrawal. Accompanied by her daughter, her ladies-in-waiting, and members of her council, Isabel arrived on 7 November. The humanist Pietro Martire d'Anghiera remarked that "she lifted up spirits . . . and took away all hope from the enemy." Astounded by her coming in severe weather, the Moors gathered on the walls of Baza to observe her reception. As they listened to the music of horns, Italian trumpets, flageolets, sackbuts or trombones, and drums, "it seemed that the sound reached to heaven." It must have been a stirring sight, but, for the Moors, one filled with foreboding.²⁰

Realizing that the Christians would not leave, Yahyā al-Najjār, the *caudillo general* of Baza and Almería, opened secret negotiations in October with the royal representative, Gutierre de Cárdenas. Al-Najjār's relationship with Fernando had worsened since the latter's failure to besiege Almería in 1488. Now, on 7 November, the king, acknowledging al-Najjār's complaint that he had not arrived at Almería at the appointed time, explained that heavy rains and al-Zaḡal's troops had slowed his advance. Although some attempted to incite enmity between them, the king, recalling the support given by Enrique IV to al-Najjār's father, Ibn Sālim, argued that he could best assure his well-being and that of his people by seeking royal favor. Meanwhile, Gutierre de Cárdenas assured al-Najjār that if the Moors surrendered they would be permitted to live according to their law, enjoying personal liberty and retaining their possessions. Expressing his satisfaction, al-Najjār consulted the people and informed al-Zaḡal of the state of affairs. On 15 November Fernando

thanked al-Najjār for his role in negotiating a settlement and conveyed his expectation that al-Zaġal, given the length of the siege and the deaths of so many people, would follow al-Najjār's counsel and surrender.²¹

Although some in al-Zaġal's council argued that he should appeal to Granada for help, others noted that the Moors of Granada were content to enjoy the peace and security guaranteed by Fernando and Isabel. Weighing these arguments, al-Zaġal concluded that he could no longer maintain his lordship and royal title and commanded the people of Baza to accept the terms offered. Thus, al-Najjār notified Gutierre de Cárdenas that not only would Baza surrender, but also Guadix and Almería, on condition that the Moors be permitted to live according to their law, to observe their religion, and to retain their houses and their property. The king and queen gave their consent.²²

The Capitulation of Baza

The capitulation concluded on 28 November 1489, as summarized by Pulgar, was as follows. All nonresidents of Baza had to return to their homes with their horses and arms. The inhabitants of Baza had to move to the suburbs or go elsewhere under safe-conduct with their movable goods. Moors settling in the suburbs had to swear fidelity to the king and queen and had to pay the tributes customarily owed to the emirs. They would be governed by Islamic law and were guaranteed royal protection against force, robbery, or injury. The city of Baza and the *alcazaba* had to be surrendered within six days; during that time the Moors had to depart. As assurance of the observance of these terms, the *caudillo* (al-Najjār) and the chief men had to hand over fifteen of their children as hostages. Finally, the *caudillo* and the *alcaide* were obliged to do reverence to the king and queen, pledging to serve them in whatever they commanded. As recompense, they would be given money, clothing, horses, and other goods.

After a siege of six months and twenty days, Fernando and Isabel made their triumphal entry into Baza on 4 December, thereby bringing to an end the costliest campaign. Five hundred and ten Christian captives, men, women, and children, regained their liberty. As many as 150 *jinetes* volunteered to serve the king as part of his Moorish guard. Pedro González de Mendoza, Cardinal of Spain, appointed a vicar to administer Baza, which had once been a suffragan see of Toledo. The mosque was dedicated as a Christian church. The Catholic Monarchs announced their victory to the kings of Naples, Bohemia, and England, the duke of Burgundy, the princes of Italy, and the city of Bruges. Suárez Fernández commented that the siege was "the hardest, the military operation was the longest, and the best proof of patience and force." Moreover, it showed the importance of Baza "in the formation of the Spanish army, which would soon undergo the ordeal by fire in the wars of Italy."²³

As news of the surrender spread, the Moors throughout the region hitherto subject to al-Zaġal sent deputations to offer their submission. Purchena, with the villages in the valley of the Almanzora River and the Sierra de los Filabres, capitulated on 7 December. The king and queen agreed to purchase at a fair price horses and provisions in the *alcazaba*, but the Moors had to turn over all their gunpowder. Ships would transport overseas various officials with their movable property and weapons, excepting gunpowder. The Moors who remained would have the status of Mudejars with the right to keep their possessions, including horses and arms, and to live according to their own law administered by their magistrates, provided that they paid the tributes previously owed to the emir. They would not be required to wear a distinctive sign. Litigation between Christians and Muslims would be settled by officials appointed by the crown. The *alguacil*, who was assigned an annual revenue of 20,000 *maravedies*, and the *alcalde* were confirmed in their posts. A ransom of 362,000 *maravedies* would be paid for 125 Christian captives. No one who had converted to Islam would now be pressured to accept Christianity. Purchena would not be alienated from the crown.²⁴

The Surrender of Almería and Guadix

After negotiating the surrender of Baza, al-Najjār journeyed to Guadix to encourage al-Zaġal to submit. In a capitulation signed on 10 December 1489 al-Zaġal abandoned all claims to the emirate and surrendered all the towns and fortresses under his control, including Almería, Guadix, Almuñécar, and Padul. According to the anonymous Muslim chronicler, he acted out of a desire to avenge himself on Abū ‘Abd Allāh, who was isolated in Granada. In compensation, al-Zaġal received a lordship in Andarax (Láujar de Andarax), Orgiva, Lecrín, and Lanjarón in Las Alpujarras, a mountainous area between the Sierra Nevada and the Mediterranean; half the revenue of the salt pits of La Malaha; a gift of 20,000 gold *castellanos* (about 9,600,000 *maravedies*); and ransom for the Christian captives in his custody. He and his partisans would enjoy security in their persons and property and exemption from all tributes, and they could retain their arms and horses. Christians were forbidden to enter his territory without his authorization. If he wished to settle in Africa, he would be provided with free transport and paid 30,000 gold *doblas* or *castellanos* (about 14,400,000 *maravedies*) for his estates.²⁵

Setting out from Baza, Fernando received the surrender of Almería from al-Zaġal, who came out to meet him on 22 December. Dismounting, he kissed the king’s foot and hand, but Fernando reached down from his horse, embraced him, and made him remount and ride with him. Seated side by side in the king’s tent, they ate a meal served with all the pomp and circumstance of the court. Palencia related that on that occasion, as a sign of sorrow, al-

Zağal wore a black silk mantle over his long military tunic of black camel's hair, a burnoose, and a linen turban covering his very white hair. This, Palencia declared, accorded with the law of Muḥammad requiring Saracen kings to wear black clothing, except when engaged in a pitched battle with their enemies, when they could wear clothing of varied colors adorned with gold. Al-Zağal was a tall man, well-proportioned, neither fat nor thin, with a grave and dignified face. With his permission the cross, the banner of Santiago, and the royal standard were raised on the tower of the castle. As the king entered the city, the *alfaquís* and elders approached to kiss his feet and hands. The mosque in the *alcázar*, "after being cleansed of the profanations of the Muḥammadan sect," was consecrated as a church and mass was celebrated with the chanting of sacred hymns. When Isabel and her daughter arrived on Christmas Eve, al-Zağal was among those who received them. The Moors of Almería and the surrounding area were assured that they could continue to practice their religion, retain their property, and be judged according to their law by their magistrates. In return they swore to be loyal subjects and to pay the annual tributes previously due to the emirs. The king and queen realized that if they expelled the Moors from all these places, the country would be depopulated. Palencia commented that the Castilians were surprised to note that the people of Almería gave no sign of sadness, but rather received the conquering army with happy faces.²⁶

The man, who, more than anyone else, brought about this chain of events was Yahyā al-Najjār. Now was the time to receive his reward. On Christmas Day Fernando made a secret pact with the "*caudillo y general de los moros* of Baza, Guadix, and Almería." Accepting him as his vassal, the king promised to provide him and his son with a salary (*acostamiento*) in his household, where he would be treated as "one of the great knights of my realms" and defended against his enemies. If any of his estates came under the control of Abū 'Abd Allāh, they would be restored to him. As al-Najjār wished to become a Christian, Fernando asked that he receive baptism secretly in the royal chamber so his troops would not abandon him and go over to the enemy. The king confirmed him in possession of his ancestral estates near Almería. No soldiers could be quartered there without his permission, except in time of great necessity. Al-Najjār, his son, and other relatives would be exempt forever from payment of the *alcabala* and other taxes. As a mark of honor, he was permitted to have a retinue of twenty armed men and, if he visited the royal court, to receive honorable lodging. If al-Zağal transferred to him a quarter of the salt pits of Guadix, that quarter being worth 400,000 *maravedies*, Fernando promised an additional 150,000 *maravedies* in other districts. Once Guadix was in the king's hands, he agreed to give al-Najjār, in remuneration of his services, 10,000 silver *reales* (about 310,000 *maravedies*).²⁷

Leaving Almería on 29 December, the king and queen entered Guadix on the following day. Shortly after, Almuñécar and Salobreña capitulated under terms similar to those of Purchena.²⁸ Al-Najjār obtained the submission of

other localities south of Guadix still obedient to al-Zaġal. Gonzalo Fernández of Córdoba, who later gained fame in the Italian wars as “the Great Captain,” advanced southward to occupy the secondary fortresses of Mondújar, Nieves, and Albondón, until he reached Castell de Ferro and La Mamola, on the coast east of Salobreña.²⁹

Reflecting on these events, Bernáldez remarked that the campaign had lasted seven months or more. The cost was incalculable, as cities and towns, churches and clergy were heavily taxed and subject to forced loans for “this holy war.” Although many grumbled, Bernáldez argued that God had allowed the people to endure the burden of taxes “in such a holy act of war” so they might be delivered from the suffering that had been inflicted by the Moors for so long. He stressed that the king could not make war using only his own resources but had to depend on the military and financial support of his vassals. As a positive outcome he noted that fifteen hundred Christians were liberated from the “Moors, enemies of our holy Catholic faith.”³⁰

Innocent VIII Renews the Crusade

After the fall of Málaga, which nearly coincided with the expiration of the papal concession of the crusade and the *decima*, the Catholic Monarchs sought an extension from Innocent VIII. The pope, however, pointing to offenses against ecclesiastical liberty, seemed reluctant to respond. In October 1488 royal ambassadors stated their belief that, in view of his increasing necessities, he hoped to secure more than the earlier royal gift of 10,000 ducats; a contribution of 15,000 would likely satisfy him. The envoys proposed that the king and queen assure him in honeyed language that they would correct whatever offenses were proved, but they should also express their exasperation that he had not yet renewed the crusade and the *decima*. Not only had Castile’s need doubled, but so also had the fruits of her labor. Therefore, his failure to extend even greater favors was cause for wonder. The ambassadors also inquired whether their sovereigns were willing to accept the concession of the crusade and the *decima* for one year with 10,000 ducats reserved for the pope, or whether they insisted on two years.³¹

The pope did not act for a whole year. Only on 9 October 1489 during the siege of Baza did he renew the crusade and the *decima* for one year.³² The bishops of Ávila and León were commissioned to preach the crusade not only in Castile and the Crown of Aragón, but also in Navarre.³³ A month later, on 13 November, the pope alerted Fernando and Isabel to several concerns. First, he demanded that the spiritual gifts of the crusade should be devoutly received and administered by God-fearing ecclesiastical persons. Second, he pointed to abuses in the collection of the *decima*, not only in Castile but also in Sicily. Palencia, citing the participation of nobles from Germany, France, and other

countries who wished to fight “against the enemies of Christ,” stated that there would surely have been many more if the pope had not suspended the indulgence in previous years.³⁴

Rejoicing in the news that almost the entire emirate of Granada was conquered and that the remainder would soon submit, the pope, on 9 February 1490, declared that the concession of the crusading indulgence and the *decima* should continue. He accepted the rationale presented by the king and queen, who argued that they were still obliged to pay off debts incurred during the siege of Baza and to expend additional funds to hold subjugated areas.³⁵ Two days later, in order to encourage contributions when people were financially strapped, he reduced the amount of the donation in poorer areas. Persons who failed to fulfill their crusading vow within the term required were threatened with ecclesiastical censure.³⁶ In March, as a sign of his admiration for Isabel’s work in extending the faith, he conferred on her the Golden Rose, a traditional papal honor.³⁷

The Demand for the Surrender of Granada

After celebrating Christmas and the New Year in Guadix, the Catholic Monarchs on 18 January 1490 informed Seville that “after so much effort, labor and expense, it has pleased the mercy of our Lord to put an end to the war of the emirate of Granada.” Abū ‘Abd Allāh was expected, as he had promised, to yield Granada within twenty days. Anticipating their triumphal entrance into that city, they summoned the prelates, magnates, knights, and towns of Andalucía to participate. Every man between eighteen and sixty was required to appear on foot or horse with his weapons and provisions for twenty days, because “it is right that those who have labored should have a share in the pleasure and honor gained by intervening in the end and termination of such a glorious war.”³⁸

Observing the collapse of al-Zaġal’s dominions, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, still secure in the Alhambra, had to contemplate his own future. Two years before he had vowed to surrender Granada on demand and accept a lordship in the newly conquered zone. In November 1489, after thanking Isabel for recent favors and pledging his continued service, he confessed his utter dependence on her, noting that he had not a single drachma that he did not receive from her. Although he surely knew that the day had come when he would have to yield Granada, he was reluctant to do so. Still set on affirming his rule, in mid-December, admitting that the fall of Baza had confounded the Muslims and greatly reduced their lands, he urged the people of Ugíjar and Picena, tiny villages about twenty-four miles south of Guadix, to put aside all division and acknowledge his rule. His letter suggests that he did not intend to give up Granada soon.³⁹

Hernando de Baeza related that after the fall of Baza Fernando and Isabel sent representatives to Granada, probably to request the surrender of the city. Abū ‘Abd Allāh, upon the return of his own envoy from the royal court, promised, on 22 January 1490, to send another representative with his oral reply. At the same time, he emphasized that he was prepared to do whatever the king and queen might require. Though he was astounded by his emissary’s account and wanted to go to war, his counselors persuaded him to dispatch a new embassy to the royal residence in Seville. His emissaries, Yūsuf b. Kumāsha, *alguacil mayor* of Granada, and a merchant, Ibrāhīm al-Caizi, brought back bad news and reported that what had been twice agreed upon would not be observed. At that, the city rose up and war between Moors and Christians erupted. Suárez Fernandez suggested that the negotiations may have failed because the king and queen refused to give Guadix or Alhama to Abū ‘Abd Allāh as the seat of his lordship.⁴⁰

Pulgar related that the king and queen, in accord with their previous agreement, demanded that Abū ‘Abd Allāh yield Granada to the count of Tendilla. Nevertheless, he declared that he could not do so in the time specified because of the division of opinion among the many Moors from subjugated areas who had taken refuge in Granada. Fernando and Isabel then promised him other lands provided that he deliver Granada within a certain period of time. They also demanded the surrender of all offensive and defensive weapons and of the strongest places in the capital for the security of the Castilian military garrison. Whereas some Moors, wishing to live in peace, were willing to accede to those demands, others strongly objected. Siding with the latter, Abū ‘Abd Allāh chose to go to war and recovered Padul, a fortress south of the city that the Castilians had recently occupied.⁴¹ Among those opting not to follow him was Abū l-Qasīm, *alguacil* of Granada under Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, and patriarch of the Bannigas (Vanegas) family, who submitted to the king and queen, and received security of his person and property.⁴²

The War Against Granada Resumed

As Moorish bands raided the countryside, the king and queen named Diego López Pacheco, marquess of Villena, as captain general of the frontier and prepared to take the offensive. While the duke of Medina Sidonia assembled cavalry, infantry, and pack animals, the count of Tendilla organized the defense of Castilian positions near Granada. In May Fernando, with 5,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, ravaged the plain of Granada. Al-Najjār, *caudillo* of Baza, with 150 knights, and the *alguacil* of Baza, as royal vassals, accompanied him, as did al-Zaḡal with 200 knights. Despite the devastation Abū ‘Abd Allāh rebuffed the latest Castilian demand that he cede Granada.⁴³

While Moroccan volunteers seized Adra between Motril and Almería, Abū

‘Abd Allāh in July occupied Alhendín, a few miles south of the capital, and, seeking an outlet to the sea, laid siege to Salobreña in August. However, he hastily retreated when Fernando relieved that port. When the Moors in the zone allotted to al-Zaġal rebelled against him, Abū ‘Abd Allāh hastened to take advantage. His capture of Andarax, Márjena, Albolodúy, and Purchena precipitated al-Zaġal’s departure from Spain. Fernando despoiled the plain of Granada again in September, destroying the fall harvest. Learning that Baza, Guadix, and Almería were secretly conspiring with Abū ‘Abd Allāh, he ordered the Moors to evacuate those towns and take up residence in the countryside or emigrate to Africa.⁴⁴

In mid-April 1491 Fernando advanced southward into Las Alpujarras, plundering and burning villages, before establishing his military headquarters about seven miles west of Granada on 26 April. For the next seven months his army of ten thousand knights and thirty thousand to forty thousand foot remained there, threatening the city. In early June Isabel and her children joined him. A fire broke out in her tent in mid-July and quickly spread to other tents but was eventually extinguished. Soon a new town, called Santa Fe, was developed there with streets laid out in an orderly manner and stone houses with tiled roofs, fortified walls, and four strong gates.⁴⁵ There was such an abundance of silks, cloths, and brocades that it seemed like a market fair. Looking westward at Santa Fe, the Moors of Granada saw a permanent sign of Castile’s determination to compel them to surrender. In the ensuing months the Moors sallied forth to skirmish or carry out nocturnal raids, but there were no major engagements and no heavy artillery bombardment.⁴⁶

As the struggle was drawing to a close, on 1 October 1491, Innocent VIII, who had always been slow to accede to royal requests for crusading privileges, promulgated the last crusading bull for the war, limiting it to one year.⁴⁷

The Capitulation of Granada

As the months passed and there was no prospect of aid from elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Moors faced the possibility of eventual starvation.⁴⁸ In August, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, accepting at last the inevitability of submission to overwhelming Castilian pressure, secretly opened negotiations. The principal negotiators were Fernando de Zafra, the Castilian royal secretary, and the Moors Abū l-Qāsim al-Mulīḥ, Ibn Kumāsha, and the *alfaquí* Muḥammad, known to the Christians as Hamete el Pequenni. At first Abū l-Qāsim proposed that Granada would surrender in May 1492, but when Fernando objected, he suggested the end of February. On 11 September when the king and queen told Abū ‘Abd Allāh to deliver on his repeated promise to give up the city, Hamete el Pequenni responded that time was needed to overcome popular opposition. Each of the three negotiators also wanted 10,000 *castellanos* apiece (about

310,000 *maravedies*). Moreover, the chief magistrates of Granada expected to continue in office.⁴⁹

At Santa Fe on the night of 25 November 1491, Abū l-Qāsim signed the document of capitulation in both Castilian and Arabic. The oldest Castilian text is extant in a copy from the royal archive preserved at Simancas.⁵⁰ Summarizing the terms of the Arabic text, the anonymous Naṣrid chronicler emphasized that the Moors were promised security in their persons and property with the duty to pay only the customary tributes of *zakat* (alms tax) and *'ushr* (tithe). If they opted to depart, they could sell their property and during the next three years would be provided with free transportation overseas. The chronicler remarked that the king pledged, on his “false religion,” to observe these terms. Al-Makkarī mentioned that the Arabic text had sixty-seven articles; the nineteen that he quoted generally conform, with some variations, to the Castilian version. His addition that the pope should be asked to accept these conditions and even sign the pact does not appear in the Castilian text.⁵¹

Although the Moors were required to hand over the city in sixty days, that is, 25 January, out of concern for possible popular opposition the date was advanced to the beginning of the new year. Kept in the dark about negotiations, the people of Granada had their first inkling of a significant alteration that would affect their lives when, on 1 January 1492, five hundred hostages, chosen from the leading families, were sent to Santa Fe to be held for ten days as assurance that the transfer of control would be carried out. So as to avoid a possible riot, troops sent to occupy the Alhambra would enter by gates that did not open directly into the city and were forbidden to mount the wall between the *alcazaba* and the Albaicín, lest they be seen by the Moors (arts. 1–2). Once the city was in Castilian hands, Abū 'Abd Allāh's son and others, who had been held hostage at Moclín since 1483, would be allowed to return to Granada unless they had accepted Christianity (art. 3).

After establishing conditions for the surrender of Granada, the Capitulation regulated the legal and social status of the Moors. The most important articles concerned the preservation of the identity and autonomy of the Muslim community, especially with respect to the right to freely practice their religion, to be governed by their own law and judged by their own magistrates, and to retain their property. The primary obligation of the emir and his family, the nobles, officials, and generality of the population was to declare obedience to the king and queen and promise to serve them as good and faithful vassals. Thereby they would enjoy royal protection and the several rights mentioned (arts. 1–4). As assurance that the Capitulation would be observed, the king and queen promised to appoint royal officials familiar with its terms and prepared to honor them (art. 39). The count of Tendilla, whom they named as *alcaide* of Granada, was such a person.

With respect to the practice of their religion, the Muslims were guaranteed the right to retain their mosques, minarets, and pious endowments. Although

their muezzins were assured that they would not be disturbed when they proclaimed the call to prayer (art. 4), in practice they were silenced. Their *alfaquís*, without royal interference, would continue to administer the revenues of mosques, charitable organizations, and schools (art. 20). Lest they be regarded as inferiors because of their religious beliefs, the Muslims would not be required to wear an identifying badge, as was the case with the Jews (art. 8). In order to minimize possible tension, Christians were prohibited from entering a Muslim house of prayer or a residence without permission (art. 12).⁵²

Among the more difficult issues was the status of converts. No one was permitted to insult or defame a Christian convert to Islam. If a Christian woman married a Moor and became a Muslim, she could not be compelled to revert to Christianity, though she might be asked in the presence of Christians and Muslims whether she wished to do so. Nor would her children have to abandon Islam. No Muslim could be forced to become a Christian. If a Muslim woman wished to adopt the religion of her Christian beloved, she had first to be asked and counseled. If she took jewels or other property from her parents or relatives, she had to return it; anyone attempting to hide it could be prosecuted (arts. 30–33).

In addition to retaining their property, the Moors were permitted to keep their arms and horses, but they had to turn over any stores of gunpowder (art. 5). Lest there be long, drawn-out litigation, no one could demand the return of plunder taken during the war (art. 34). No person or animal would be taken from the Moors without payment (art. 11). In recognition of the inviolability of the household, Christians were prohibited from forcibly entering a Moor's house (art. 17). Nor would the Moors be required to accept lodgers or provide clothing, birds, animals, meals, banquets, or hospitality without their consent (art. 16). The traditional right of inheritance as determined by their judges would be in force (art. 18).

The Capitulation acknowledged that the Moors would continue to be judged according to Islamic law by their own *alcaldes* (*al-qādī*, *al-quḍāt*) (arts. 4, 15), who, together with their *alfaquís*, would be paid their traditional salaries (art. 14). However, no one who had previously served al-Zaḡal was to have any official position (art. 41). Rejecting the idea of collective responsibility, the prosecution of an innocent Moor for a crime committed by a member of his family was forbidden (art. 21). Should a dispute arise between a Muslim and a Christian, it would be adjudicated by a mixed panel of a Muslim and a Christian judge, as had long been the custom (art. 42). In order to facilitate a peaceful transition, no previous action by the emir and the Moors of Granada would be subject to prosecution (art. 40) and certain groups were pardoned for killing Christians and Muslims (arts. 22–23).

As a conciliatory gesture, the Moors were exempted from every tax on their houses and estates for three years, except for a tenth (*diezmo*) on the wheat harvest and a tenth on livestock in April and May, as was customary

among the Castellans (art. 9). At the end of three years the tax would be comparable to that levied in other Castilian lands (arts. 36–37). With respect to other taxes, the Moors would be obliged to pay no more than the accustomed payment to the Naṣrid monarchs (art. 25). Although the kings of Castile had employed Jews as tax collectors and financial administrators, no Jew was permitted to collect taxes among the Moors or to exercise any jurisdiction over them (art. 13).

As previous truces and treaties had always provided for the free flow of trade, Muslim merchants traveling overseas or within the realms of the king and queen were guaranteed security for themselves and their wares and were subject only to the same tolls and customs duties as Christians (art. 29). Ships from overseas in ports of the emirate would not be requisitioned or confiscated and were free to sail, but they were prohibited to carry Christian captives, and prior to departure would be subject to inspection (art. 47).

Whereas the Capitulation concerned the city of Granada and its dependent villages, the possibility that other towns, especially those in Las Alpujarras, might wish to accept it was recognized. Those doing so within thirty days would enjoy all its benefits, except the three-year exemption from the property tax (art. 19). Jews native to Granada would enjoy this Capitulation, but Jews who previously were Christians had a month to go abroad (art. 38).

Unlike Málaga, where the Moors were forced to evacuate, they were allowed to remain in Granada. The Capitulation, however, recognized that many, in accord with Islamic law, might prefer to withdraw to Muslim lands. If they wanted to emigrate, they could sell their property freely and within seventy days ten large ships would transport them with their movable goods, free of charge, to the port of their choice. After three years, each person would have to pay a *dobla* for his passage (arts. 6–7). Moors native to Granada but living abroad would enjoy all the benefits of the Capitulation if they returned within three years (art. 26).

Of particular concern to the victors was the liberation of captives. All those held in Granada and Las Alpujarras had to be released without compensation (art. 10). If any captives had been sold overseas, however, the Moors would not have to return them or pay for them (art. 27). With an eye to a peaceful future, the Capitulation denied a newly released captive the right to punish an abusive Moorish owner (art. 35). Moors fleeing to Granada from their Christian captors were assured of their freedom, unless they were Negroes from the islands or Canarians (art. 24).

The Taking of Granada

The anonymous Naṣrid chronicler related that the Capitulation was read to the people of Granada, who acquiesced and sent their written acceptance to

Fernando, who then ordered the evacuation of the Alhambra.⁵³ The transfer of power, however, was more complex than that. Both Fernando and Isabel and Abū ‘Abd Allāh were concerned that the occupation take place without opposition. When the hostages were turned over on the evening of 1 January, a disturbance in the city prompted the emir to advance the date for yielding possession and to require that it be done in the utmost secrecy. Focusing on eyewitness accounts, María del Carmen Pescador del Hoyo has cleared away much of the confusion and embellishment arising from narratives by persons who were not present or contemporary with the event. In addition to Italian and French eyewitnesses, a letter addressed to the bishop of León on 8 January 1492 by an eyewitness identified only as Cifuentes is of particular value.⁵⁴

At midnight on 1–2 January 1492, Gutierre de Cárdenas, accompanied by various captains and guided by Abū l-Qāsim and Ibn Kumāsha, secretly entered the Alhambra. In the tower of Comares before dawn he received the keys to the fortress from Abū ‘Abd Allāh, who required him to sign a written receipt. While the emir descended to the city, Gutierre de Cárdenas placed guards in the towers and gates. Amid many tears, a cleric celebrated mass for the Castilians and the many captives they found there. Once the Alhambra was secured, word was forwarded to the king and queen to send Iñigo López de Mendoza, count of Tendilla, to whom they had assigned the tenancy of the Alhambra, to take possession. Cifuentes described the scene on Monday, 2 January, as the Castilian army massed before the city:

The Moorish king, with about eighty or one hundred very well- dressed knights went out to kiss the hands of their Highnesses. They received him with much love and courtesy and there handed over to him his son, the Infante, who had been a hostage since his imprisonment. As they stood there, about four hundred captives came out from the enclosure, with the cross and a solemn procession, singing *Te Deum Laudamus*. Their Highnesses dismounted to adore the cross amid the tears and devotion of the crowd. . . . There was no one who did not weep copiously with pleasure, giving thanks to our Lord for what they saw, for they could not hold back the tears. The king and the Moors who were with him could scarcely disguise the sadness and sorrow they felt on seeing the joy of the Christians; they surely had good reason, considering their loss, because Granada is the most distinguished and chief thing in the world, both in grandeur and power and the richness of its appointments. Seville is nothing but a peasants house compared to the Alhambra. . . . That was the most remarkable and fortunate day there ever was in Spain.⁵⁵

Bernáldez related that as Abū ‘Abd Allāh approached Fernando, he wanted to dismount and kiss his hands, but the king would not allow it. Instead, the emir kissed his arm and handed him the keys to the city. The king gave them in turn to the queen, who then handed them to Tendilla. With a troop of

soldiers, Tendilla entered the city. The cross, “which the king always had with him in this holy conquest,” the royal banner, and the banner of Santiago were raised on a tower of the Alhambra for all to see, while heralds performed the ritual customary on such occasions. While Bernáldez declared that they loudly proclaimed “Castile, Castile!” the Continuator of Pulgar had it as “Granada, Granada, for the monarchs Don Fernando and Doña Isabel!” Seeing the cross, Isabel’s chaplains intoned the *Te Deum*. “So great was the joy that everyone wept.” Bernardo del Roi, another eyewitness, affirmed that the herald shouted three times, “Santiago, Granada, and Castile!” Then he declared that the city and emirate had been subjected to the rule of Fernando and Isabel and the Catholic faith with the help of the Virgin Mary, Santiago, Innocent VIII, and the prelates, knights, nobles, towns, and people. Cannons and guns were fired and trumpets blared in jubilation. Following that ceremony, the king and queen returned to Santa Fe and Abū ‘Abd Allāh to Granada. All the weapons, except those that were hidden, were taken to the Alhambra. A madman went through the streets attempting to rouse the populace, but most people recognized that the inevitable had happened.⁵⁶

Fernando and Isabel made their triumphal entry into Granada on 6 January 1492. Fernando de Talavera, whom they designated as archbishop, celebrated mass in the chief mosque, now consecrated as a Christian church. All then took part in a sumptuous meal arranged by the count of Tendilla as *alcaide* of Granada. The king and queen remained there until 10 June in order to secure the city and to suppress revolts among the forty thousand inhabitants. Bernáldez concluded his account of the conquest with this comment: “Thus, they brought to a glorious end this holy and praiseworthy conquest and saw with their eyes what many kings and princes had wished to see, a kingdom of so many cities and towns, of such a multitude of places, situated in such powerful and harsh terrain, conquered in ten years. What was this, if not that God wanted to deliver it and place it in their hands?”⁵⁷

The romance “En la ciudad de Granada/Grandes alaridos dan”—“In the city of Granada great cries are heard”—described the great transition that took place:

Some prayed to Mū Mahomad,
 and others to the Trinity.
 Crosses entered on one side,
 while the Qasale filled the other.
 When the cries were heard,
 bell Campanas, oy sonar.
 The *Te Deum* in *al-hadans* is heard
 in praise of Allāh.⁵⁸

The Celebration of Victory

After taking possession from the Moors, Fernando communicated that news to his people, the pope, and the western world. On 2 January he announced, “After such great labor, expense, exhaustion of our kingdoms, deaths, and the bloodshed of so many of our subjects . . . it pleased our Lord to put a welcome end to the war” against the Moors who had occupied the emirate of Granada “for more than 780 years.” He urged Seville to give thanks to God for “this glorious victory” that exalted the Catholic faith and brought such honor to his realms and repose to his people, who served “with so much faith and loyalty in this holy conquest.”⁵⁹ As it had on receiving notices of previous victories, Seville celebrated the fall of Granada with “*alegrías*” that included a procession with the statue of Nuestra Señora de los Reyes and several bullfights.⁶⁰

Repeating that language, Fernando informed Innocent VIII, “With your help [the fall of Granada], so much desired and assisted by previous pontiffs, . . . has come about to the praise of God, our Lord, and the exaltation of your Holy Apostolic See.”⁶¹ Welcomed as partial compensation for the loss of Constantinople, the news was disseminated throughout Italy and celebrated in Rome. The bells of the Campidoglio were rung on 4 February, and the Vatican and Castel Sant’Angelo and other public places were brightly lighted at night. On the next day the pope and cardinals processed to the church of Santiago de los Españoles on the Piazza Navona to attend mass. On a more mundane plane, Cardinal Rodrigo de Borja sponsored a bull fight. A dramatic reenactment of the taking of Granada took place in the Piazza Navona on 19 February. After mass, another bullfight was staged there and warriors engaged in mock combat with the Moors. Recalling the ancient triumphs of the Roman emperors, Cardinal Raffaele Riario arranged a triumphal procession in which royal figures were crowned with laurel while Boabdil, bound in chains, lay at their feet. As the royal figures presented their banners in the church, the *Te Deum* was sung. Riario also organized a six-day tournament in the Piazza Navona. Various authors composed epic poems and orations praising the king and queen. Carlo Verardi’s Latin play, *Historia Baetica*, was performed on 7 March and again on 21 April. The poet Ugolino Verino composed a panegyric in honor of the royal couple and Antonio Suardi also commemorated the event.⁶²

Celebrations and processions also took place in Fernando’s kingdom of Sicily, the neighboring realm of Naples, and the duchy of Burgundy. In London, on 6 April, the archbishop of Canterbury commemorated the victory with a solemn procession, sermon, and chanting of the *Te Deum* in St. Paul’s cathedral. Venice sent an embassy to congratulate the king and queen.⁶³

In 1496, prompted by a complex of political considerations, the Borgia pope, Alexander VI (1492–1503), conferred the title of “Reges Catholici” on Fernando and Isabel. In addition to their personal virtues, he commended them for achieving the unification of their realms, the conquest of Granada, the suppression of heresy, and the expulsion of the Jews. His principal motivation,

however, was his expectation that Spain would deliver the papacy from the threat of French invasion. Nevertheless, by mentioning their pledge “to carry the war to the Africans, enemies of the Christian name,” he recalled the centuries-old belief that the kings of Spain ought to recover the old Roman province of Mauritania, thought to be part of the Visigothic inheritance.⁶⁴

The Fate of the Last of the Naṣrids

Three men played principal roles in the final collapse of Granada: Muḥammad XII, known as al-Zaḡal; Yaḥyā al-Najjār, lord of Almería; and the last sultan, Muḥammad XI or Abū ‘Abd Allāh, whom the Christians called Boabdil. Of the three, only al-Najjār remained in Spain.

After surrendering Baza, Almería, and Guadix in 1489, al-Zaḡal was assigned a lordship centered at Andarax in Las Alpujarras, but when the Moors rebelled against him he realized that his position was untenable. In 1490, after selling his estates to the crown for 5,000,000 *maravedies*, he crossed the strait and settled in Fez, where he was living in 1494 and probably died there not long after. Later legend had it that he was blinded by the emir of Fez.⁶⁵

Yaḥyā al-Najjār was assigned a yearly revenue of 550,000 *maravedies* in the districts of Márjēna, Dalías, and Albolodúy, where he lived. In 1490 he sold his father’s estates in the Almanzora valley for 200,000 *maravedies*. In January 1492 he was baptized as a Christian, taking the name Pedro de Granada, and the king and queen appointed him *alguacil mayor* of the city. He died in 1506. From his son Alfonso were descended the lords of Campotéjar.⁶⁶

When the surrender of Granada was negotiated a separate accord was reached on 25 November 1491 concerning the future of Abū ‘Abd Allāh. After repeating the clauses in the Capitulation, the pact granted him and his descendants a lordship consisting of Berja, Dalías, Marjena, Albolodúy, Láujar, Andarax, Jubiles, Ugíjar, Orgiva, Jubeyel, Ferreira, and Poqueira. Most of these lands, extending westward from just north of Almería through the Sierra Gador, had previously been allotted to al-Zaḡal. Abū ‘Abd Allāh, as a good vassal, was entitled to their revenues and the right to administer justice. His family would retain the estates they held before his accession. In addition, as soon as the Alhambra was surrendered he would receive 30,000 gold *castellanos* (about 14,550,000 *maravedies*). Fernando and Isabel reserved the port of Adra and other coastal fortresses directly south of his lands (arts. 3–10). If he wished to emigrate, he was permitted to sell his lordship, offering it first to the crown. If he could not do so before his departure, he could appoint procurators to complete the sale. Two Genoese carracks would be ready to take him wherever he wished to go (arts. 3, 11–12). He was permitted to trade freely with North African ports and was given six pack animals free of charge for

trade with the Castilian realms (arts. 13–14).⁶⁷

After yielding the city on 2 January, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, according to the Continuator of Fernando del Pulgar, refused to accept customary courtesies and, on returning to his quarters, wept bitter tears for what he had lost. His mother rebuked him, however, saying that “as he had not defended it like a man, he ought not to cry like a woman.”⁶⁸ Later legend transferred that scenario to a mountain pass about seven miles south of Granada, afterward known as the Puerto del Suspiro del Moro, “the Pass of the Moor’s Sigh,” where he stopped on 6 January to look back at Granada. The anonymous Naṣrid chronicler reported that, at some unspecified date, Fernando ordered Abū ‘Abd Allāh to leave Granada and take up residence in Andarax. In December 1492 the royal secretary Fernando de Zafra reported that, while he lived there, he spent much time hunting. Nevertheless, the king and queen, perhaps fearing that he might become a focal point for an uprising, were anxious to have him emigrate. Although he hoped to plead his case with them, they refused to meet him but did negotiate the sale of his estates on 15 April 1493. A month before his departure overseas he would receive 20,000 *castellanos* (about 9,700,000 *maravedies*).

Prior to leaving Spain he requested permission to settle in Morocco from Muḥammad al-Shaykh, the Waṭṭāsīd sultan, who indicated that he would be most welcome. The deposed emir also commissioned al-‘Uqaylī to compose a *risāla* or lengthy poem in which, in response to complaints that he had caused the fall of Granada, he excused himself on the grounds of being deceived and betrayed by the Christians.⁶⁹ He seems to have departed in mid-October.⁷⁰ About 6,320 persons sailed in twelve ships provided by the king and queen from the ports of Adra and Almuñécar to Melilla on the Moroccan coast. From there, according to al-Makkarī, he journeyed to Fez, where he died in 940 A.H. (1533/1534), leaving two sons. When al-Makkarī visited Fez in 1037 A.H. (1627/1628), he met some of his descendants, who, little more than beggars, were living on charity.⁷¹

The Achievement of Fernando and Isabel

The surrender of Granada in January 1492 brought to an end a centuries-long struggle between Christians and Muslims for ascendancy in the Iberian Peninsula. For Fernando and Isabel it marked the end of a difficult and strenuous campaign extending over ten years. During that time, as never before, they concentrated the military, naval, economic, and financial resources of their realms on the goal of conquering the emirate. While Fernando directed military operations as commander-in-chief, Isabel performed an equally essential service by organizing the troops, securing armaments and provisions, and caring for the wounded. The popes Sixtus IV

and Innocent VIII, though reluctant at times, provided necessary support in the form of the crusading indulgence and the *decima*.

Beginning with an advance from the west, Fernando and Isabel, in a series of lengthy sieges, displayed their determination and by brutal bombardments broke the will of the Moors to resist. One by one Alhama, Ronda, Loja, Íllora, Moclín, Vélez Málaga, and Málaga were compelled to capitulate. Then, turning attention to the east, they subjugated Baza after an exceptionally onerous siege. As a consequence, Almería, Guadix, and their dependencies submitted without a fight. Although the king and queen expected Abū ‘Abd Allāh, now isolated in the capital, to yield, his desperate but futile attempt to maintain his independence prolonged the war for two more years. Faced with overwhelming force, however, he had no choice but to give up.

Since the middle of the thirteenth century a succession of emirs had perpetuated the Naṣrid dynasty by bending to the superior power of Castile, pledging homage and promising to pay tribute, but never breaking until the very end. Ruling for about 250 years, the dynasty was surpassed in longevity only by the Umayyads, who dominated Spain for approximately 300 years. Discord among the principal Naṣrids in the late fifteenth century, namely, Muḥammad XII or al-Zaḡal, Muḥammad XI or Abū ‘Abd Allāh, and Yaḥyā al-Najjār, facilitated the final conquest. For a time, al-Zaḡal attempted to mount a vigorous defense against Castilian encroachment, but Abū ‘Abd Allāh undercut his efforts by cooperating with the enemy. No doubt disappointed that he could not secure the Naṣrid throne, al-Najjār also collaborated and apparently concluded that his interest could best be served not only by accepting the inevitability of Castilian conquest but also by accepting Christianity.

The great majority of Muslims living in the emirate were now incorporated into the Castilian realm with assurances that they could continue to worship freely and live according to Islamic law. Nevertheless, the certainty of those guarantees quickly dissolved. The Muslims soon discovered that there was no place for them in a unified kingdom of Spain that was professedly Christian. The Islamic presence in the peninsula was not eliminated, however, as hundreds of thousands of Moors remained in place, but now under Christian rule. In the past they would have been allowed to continue to practice their religion and to observe their law, but in the new monarchy coming into being there was no place for that. Their fate and the strenuous efforts of later generations to assimilate them by compelling their conversion to Christianity or expelling them from the country lie beyond the scope of this book.⁷²

Chapter 8

The Frontier in Peace and War

Though in abeyance for much of the late fourteenth century and carried on only intermittently during most of the fifteenth, the Castilian conquest of Granada was finally concluded by Fernando and Isabel. Their entrance into the Naşrid capital on 6 January 1492 fulfilled the aspirations of generations of Christians who had struggled to oppose the Muslims and destroy their kingdom. The achievement of that goal required the organization and maintenance of a powerful military force equipped with the most modern weapons, especially artillery, and the collection and disbursement of vast quantities of money. The papacy facilitated the enterprise by proclaiming crusades and providing financial support from ecclesiastical revenues.

Intervals of Peace

Notwithstanding their age-old hostility, Castile and Granada were at peace for long intervals in the late Middle Ages. As the frontier was not an impermeable barrier, Christians and Moors interacted every day on many levels, carrying on an active commerce, sharing pasturage grounds, and even developing close personal friendships. Some acquired facility in the other's language, and they borrowed one another's dress, military equipment, and practice.¹

For most of this period, despite frequent border clashes and occasional major campaigns, a succession of truces suspended hostilities. As a truce ordinarily expired on the death or ouster of either of the contracting parties, Y suf I, who had concluded a ten-year truce with Alfonso XI, negotiated an extension until 1357 with Pedro I that also included the Marinid sultan. Thereafter, Pedro I, preoccupied with Arag n and the opposition of his brother Enrique, maintained a series of truces with four successive Naşrid rulers.² In 1370 Enrique II, anxious to secure the throne against his Christian enemies, arranged a truce with Mu ammad V and the Marinids for eight years. That initiated an era of comparative tranquility lasting until the end of the century.

Given Juan I's interest in the Portuguese crown, he continued the truce throughout his reign.³ Notwithstanding many frontier incidents, Enrique III's regents, realizing the need for peace, renewed the truce. Before the ink on the treaty of 1406 dried, however, the Moors launched an assault that the Castellans took as justification for going to war.⁴ After the king's death his brother Fernando, as regent for the boy-king Juan II, carried on the war. Although he agreed to a truce for eight months in April 1408, financial necessities compelled him to extend it for a year and then another. Upon its expiration he commenced an offensive and captured Antequera in 1410. Intending to continue, he concluded a truce for two years, but his pursuit of the Aragonese throne led him to renew it in 1412 and annually until 1417.⁵

Early in the reign of Juan II the truce was extended every two years from 1417 to 1428 (in 1421 for three years).⁶ In 1429 when the Naṣrids requested an extension for four or five years, he initially refused. Although he consented in the following year, he went to war in 1431 and emerged victorious at La Higuera. Bitter warfare then ensued until a three-year truce was reached in 1439. Thereafter, despite the vicissitudes of the Naṣrid succession, the truce was renewed, usually every three years, until 1452 when it was prolonged to 1457.⁷ Continued disputes among the Naṣrids, however, enabled Enrique IV to plunder Granada. Several short-term truces from 1457 to 1460 briefly halted the war, but internal discord compelled him to renew the truce for varying terms of months or years. The final truce of 1472 would expire in 1475.⁸ By then Fernando and Isabel had come to power, but their need to counter Portuguese intervention caused them to extend the truce until 1482. During the next decade the war was waged without respite.⁹

Although only a few written texts of the truces are extant, they probably all dealt with the same issues, namely, vassalage and tribute, trade, pasturage, the liberation of captives, and the resolution of border disputes. In 1246 the first Naṣrid declared himself a Castilian vassal, promising military and court service and an annual tribute. Thereafter the tie of vassalage was often broken and the payment of tribute was interrupted. The Naṣrids acknowledged their vassalage to Pedro I and Enrique II, but they apparently failed to do so in the reigns of Juan I and Enrique III and the minority of Juan II. In the midst of the dynastic upheavals of the middle and late fifteenth century, various contenders for power acknowledged the suzerainty of Juan II, Enrique IV, and Fernando and Isabel.¹⁰

Both sides were concerned to guarantee the resumption of commercial interchange that benefited everyone. Merchants, whether Jews, Muslims, or Christians, were assured of secure passage for themselves and their goods in both realms, subject to the payment of customs duties. Merchandise included oil, honey, textiles, silk, spices, perfumes, almonds, sugar, sardines, and other fish. Castilian law prohibited the export of *cosas vedadas*, namely, gold, silver, horses, livestock, weapons, and grains, but many attempted to circumvent it. Those entering Castile had to pass through specified customs posts and pay the

diezmo y medio diezmo de lo morisco. The Moors levied a similar duty, *magran*, on imported goods. The usual ports of transfer were Antequera, Zahara, Alcalá la Real, Jaén, Baeza, Jódar, Quesada, Huelma, Hellín, Mula, and Lorca. Trade with North Africa was regulated in the customs houses of Seville, Jerez, Tarifa, and Cartagena.¹¹

The release of captives, whose condition will be discussed below, was also characteristic of these agreements. During peacetime quarrels inevitably occurred between Christians and Moors over violations of the truce, the use of pasturage, rustling of livestock, the recovery of stolen property carried off by escaping prisoners, and other matters. As early as 1310, certain good men were appointed to adjudicate these issues. In 1350 Yūsuf I, Pedro I, and Abū 'Inān Fāris, the Marinid sultan, agreed to name representatives to exchange prisoners and resolve disputes. The office of *alcalde mayor entre cristianos y moros* appeared in 1378 in Murcia and in Córdoba and Jaén in 1381 and subsequently in the archbishopric of Seville and the diocese of Cádiz. Ordinarily there were two *alcaldes*, a Christian and a Muslim, in each area. Complaints by Christians were resolved by the Muslim *alcalde* and the Christian *alcalde* handled Muslim grievances. They were assisted by *fieles del rastro*, policemen in each municipality who pursued criminals and brought them to justice. If the offender failed to make amends either by restoring property or offering financial compensation, the *alcaldes* could authorize reprisals.¹²

Defense of the Frontier

Even during peaceful interludes, Christians and Muslims had to protect positions along the frontier from possible attack. In the thirteenth century the Castellans assigned that responsibility to the *adelantado mayor de la frontera* and his counterpart, the *adelantado mayor de Murcia*. By the fifteenth century, however, that office had declined in importance and was chiefly honorary. The frontier was organized in several military districts, namely, the diocese of Cádiz, the archdiocese of Seville, the dioceses of Córdoba and Jaén, the *adelantamiento* of Cazorla held by the archbishop of Toledo, and the *encomienda* of Segura pertaining to the Order of Santiago on the Murcian frontier. In each zone defense was centered in base cities, such as Seville, Córdoba, and Jaén. Their strong walls not only enclosed residential areas but also a citadel (*alcázar* or *alcazaba*) that served as the last bastion of defense. Beyond the cities and towns a network of castles with garrisons of varying size functioned as the primary line of defense and offense. Smaller towers often set on rocky pinnacles watched over the surrounding countryside. Fires or smoke signals provided advance notice of hostile movements.¹³

The task of defending each sector was entrusted to a *capitán mayor*, *caudillo mayor*, or *capitán general*. In 1439, for example, Juan Ponce de León,

count of Arcos, replaced Pedro de Stúñiga, lord of Gibrleón, as *capitán mayor de la frontera* in Seville. Íñigo López de Mendoza, marquess of Santillana, held that post in Córdoba and Jaén. Several years later Gutierre de Sotomayor, master of Alcántara and *capitán mayor de la frontera*, had responsibility for Seville and Cádiz while Fernán Álvarez de Toledo was *capitán mayor de la frontera* in Córdoba and Jaén.¹⁴ During the reign of Enrique IV the title was changed to *capitán general* Juan Manrique, count of Castañeda, was *capitán general* in Jaén, and Pedro Girón, master of Calatrava, had a similar position in Seville. Alonso de Cárdenas, master of Santiago and *capitán general de la frontera* of Seville and Cádiz, with his base in Écija, had a major role in the final conquest of Granada.¹⁵

Individual fortresses were entrusted to *alcaldes* (*al-qā'id*), who had to maintain a properly equipped and paid garrison, secure essential supplies including food, arms, and armaments, and see to it that walls, towers, gates, and other defenses were in proper repair. In January 1432, Juan II pledged to use the Naṣrid tribute to repair fortress walls and towers. In 1480 Fernando and Isabel allotted these sums for the upkeep of fortresses: 60,000 *maravedíes* (Lorca), 100,000 (Antequera), and 150,000 (Carmona).¹⁶

Ladero Quesada estimated that after the fall of Alhama in 1484 the garrison consisted of a captain with 150 lancers, of whom 50 were mounted, and 200 foot soldiers paid 30 *maravedíes* daily and a monthly *fanega* or bushel of wheat. The annual cost was 7,928,000 *maravedíes*. When the count of Tendilla, the *alcaide*, ran out of money to pay his troops, he issued paper money with the guarantee that it could be redeemed later for gold and silver. In 1492, salaries for *alcaldes* of prominent fortresses ranged from 200,000 *maravedíes* (Moclín, Íllora, Ronda), to 250,000 (Loja, Salobreña), 365,000 (Vélez Málaga, Almería, Baza, Guadix, Almuñécar), and 500,000 (Málaga). *Alcaldes* of smaller fortresses received between 50,000 and 70,000 *maravedíes*. Garrisons of 20, 35, 50, 100, 150 men were paid such amounts as 108,000, 189,000, 270,000, 540,000, and 810,000 *maravedíes*. The garrison of 422 men in Almería received 2,200,800. The failure to maintain a garrison at full strength or to pay the *alcaide* and his men in a timely fashion could lead to the loss of a fortress, as Juan II observed in 1451.¹⁷

Military Organization

When the king went to war an army composed of various elements had to be organized. Besides the royal *mesnada* or retinue, prelates, magnates, the Military Orders, the towns, and the Hermandad provided contingents.

Following his defeat at Aljubarrota, Juan I, intent on creating a semi-permanent army, enacted a military ordinance in the Cortes of Valladolid in 1385. All men, both clergy and laity, between the ages of twenty and sixty

were required to bear arms. The type of weapons depended on one's annual income. Thus, anyone with a yearly income of 20,000 *maravedies* or more had to have a complete suit of armor, a sword, a battleaxe, and a dagger. Warriors in Andalucía, however, were permitted to be more lightly armed so that they could ride *a la jineta*. The armament required for other financial categories was also detailed: 3,000 *maravedies* and above, lance, short lance or dart, shield, coat of armor, helmet, sword, and knife; 2,000 *maravedies*, lance, sword, knife, helmet, and shield; 600 *maravedies*, a crossbow and three dozen arrows; 400 *maravedies*, lance, short lance, and shield; 200 *maravedies*, lance and short lance; less than 200 *maravedies*, lance, short lance, and sling.¹⁸

Given the exaggerations of the chroniclers, the size of royal armies is difficult to determine, but documents often specify numbers of those summoned or paid. The Cortes of Toledo in 1406, for example, proposed an army of ten thousand heavily armed cavalry, four thousand *jinetes*, and fifty thousand foot. The approximate numbers for the crusade against Granada are these:

Year	<i>Jinetes</i>	Foot
1482–84	6,000–10,000	10,000–16,000
1485	11,000	25,000
1486	12,000	40,000
1487	11,000	45,000
1489	13,000	40,000
1491	10,000	50,000. ¹⁹

The Royal Guard, Royal Vassals, and the Hermandad

The royal guard, composed of men-at-arms and *jinetes* or light cavalry, usually accompanied the king. Organized in 1406 in three captaincies of 100 lances each, by 1420 the number had increased to 1,000 lances and during the war of Granada it vacillated between 883 and 1,400. Guardsmen were equipped with artillery and firearms. Juan II and Enrique IV were also attended by a *guardia morisca* of several hundred knights, originally Muslims who had converted to Christianity. Enrique IV finally abolished it after the nobles accused him of Islamicizing tendencies. In 1481 the salary or *acostamiento* for most captains was about 63,000 *maravedies* each year and for *jinetes* between 14,400 and

18,000. The *acostamiento* of the royal guard between 1481 and 1492 usually approximated 20,000,000 *maravedies* annually.²⁰

Royal vassals settled about the realm received a stipend (*tierra* or *acostamiento*) requiring them to maintain horses and arms. In order to meet the Muslim challenge, Alfonso XI enacted ordinances in 1338 and 1348 that increased the number of royal vassals and regulated their service. Each vassal had to expend a third of his stipend on his horse and arms, and for every 1,100 *maravedies* of the remainder he had to recruit a knight and two foot soldiers, one a lancer, the other a crossbowman.²¹ Many attempted to defraud the crown by feigning illness or age or by failing to bring the required number of men-at-arms. In 1379 Enrique II demanded that they give an honest count.²² Responding to complaints of the undue expenditure of 14,000,000 *maravedies* on royal vassals, many of whom did not serve, Juan I, in the Cortes of Briviesca in 1387, ordered a list (*nomina*) to be drawn up. An annual stipend of 1,500 *maravedies* was assigned to each lancer and 1,300 to each *jinete*. Three years later, the Cortes of Guadalajara established a permanent force of four thousand lances and, in Andalucía, fifteen hundred *jinetes*, armed with a breastplate, round bacinet, and shield. The annual salary of lancers was increased to 2,500 *maravedies*, but the overall number was decreased in order to reduce expenditures to 8,000,000 *maravedies*. As a means of ascertaining their capability, royal vassals, properly equipped with arms, horse, and mule, had to attend an annual muster on 1 March. Although it was recommended that there should be one thousand crossbowmen (*ballesteros*) each with two crossbows, and paid 600 *maravedies*, no action was taken. That was a mistake, according to López de Ayala, because “lances without crossbowmen cannot make great war.” Royal vassals were also forbidden to serve other lords.²³

Repeating the obligation to attend the annual muster, Enrique III, in the Cortes of Segovia in 1396, ordered royal vassals from Villarreal southward to the frontier to serve as *jinetes* armed with a dagger and a bacinet. In the fifteenth century, royal vassals continued to be negligent in fulfilling their duties, but many complained that they were not paid in a timely manner. The Cortes of Burgos in 1430 and Zamora in 1432 calculated that if all those summoned responded, the king could raise ten thousand men-at-arms. The *acostamiento* for royal vassals ranged from 3,400,000 *maravedies* (1481) to 10,000,000 (1482).²⁴

The forces of the Hermandad were another key element in the royal army. In earlier centuries, towns often united in *hermandades*, or brotherhoods, to defend their liberties against royal encroachment, especially in times of crisis. Once the crisis passed, however, the *hermandades* usually ceased to function. As the civil wars of the late fourteenth century and the fifteenth encouraged lawlessness, *hermandades* were revived to maintain the peace. In 1476 Fernando and Isabel organized the Santa Hermandad with as many as two thousand mounted troops supplied and maintained by the towns to defend the frontier and to garrison castles and towns. After 1485 the soldiers had a

distinctive uniform of red trousers, white jacket with a red cross, a helmet, and a sword also marked with a red cross. The towns contributed about 34,000,000 *maravedíes* annually to it. After the Hermandad was abolished in 1498, its forces were transformed into royal vassals.²⁵

Prelates and Military Orders

The principal task of prelates and other clerics was to offer spiritual sustenance to the troops by celebrating mass, hearing confessions, and blessing the dead. Although the day of the warrior bishop was largely over, Sancho de Rojas, bishop of Palencia, commanded a division in the battle of Boca del Asno in 1410. Gonzalo de Zúñiga, bishop of Jaén who led many raids against the Moors only to be captured and beheaded in 1456, was remembered in a romance as “equipped with every arm, mounted on a red horse.” Cardinal Pedro González de Mendoza also had military experience and collaborated with Isabel in organizing support for the crusade.²⁶

Since the twelfth century, the Military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara served as a primary line of defense, originally in the zone south of the Tagus River. From the thirteenth century onward the Orders held important fortresses in Andalucía and Murcia and regularly engaged the Moors. In 1487 Santiago could muster 1,200 lances and 2,500 foot soldiers; Calatrava, 550 lances and 1,000 foot; and Alcántara, 755 lances and 400 foot. Those numbers included mercenaries and vassals dependent on the Orders. Alfonso de Cartagena lauded the Orders who continuously prepared for war and so rendered great service to the universal church. Among their notable leaders were Pedro Múñiz de Godoy, master of Calatrava and a signatory to a peace treaty with Granada in 1379; Martín Yáñez de Barbuda, master of Alcántara who, declaring that he was acting on God’s will, carried out a disastrous expedition in 1394; Pedro Girón, master of Calatrava who conquered Archidona in 1462; Alfonso de Cárdenas, master of Santiago and a leading general in the war against Granada; and Gutierre de Cárdenas, major commander of León and a principal negotiator for the surrender of Granada.²⁷

Given the Orders’ significant territorial and financial resources and their involvement in contemporary civil wars, the crown attempted to secure the election of loyal masters. In 1384, Clement VII authorized Juan I to appoint the masters of the three Orders whenever those offices fell vacant. Fernando de Antequera appointed his son Enrique as master of Santiago, but he was best known for disturbing the peace. After his demise, Juan II gave the post to Álvaro de Luna. Enrique IV named Beltrán de la Cueva as master, but he was ousted by the marquess of Villena. After the papacy granted Fernando and Isabel permanent administration of the three Orders (Calatrava in 1486, Santiago in 1493, and Alcántara in 1494), their resources were firmly under

The Nobility

The nobility was a professional warrior class for whom the defense of the realm was a major responsibility.²⁹ Alfonso de Cartagena, noting that the knight was a “defender of the republic,” lamented that the nobles did not always act “in a just war,” but often engaged in civil war. He added that he saw little hope of peace so long as the war against the Moors continued.³⁰ Several writers attempted to inspire the nobles by evoking the ideal of chivalry. Cartagena’s *Doctrinal de los caualleros* drew heavily on the sections of Alfonso X’s *Siete Partidas* concerning the nobility. Diego de Valera’s *Espejo de verdadera nobleza* and his *Tratado de las armas* commented on the knightly virtues and described coats-of-arms used by the nobility. In his *Tratado de la perfección del triunfo militar* Alonso de Palencia discussed the aptitude for war of Spanish knights.³¹ These authors offered little comment, however, on the struggle against the Moors.

Although the constable of Castile, an office created by Juan I in 1382 in imitation of the French model, had overall command of the troops below the king, the magnates or *grandes* who had immediate responsibility for the defense of the frontier were members of the Guzmán, Ponce de León, Aguilar, and Fernández de Córdoba families. The duke of Medina Sidonia (Guzmán), and the marquess of Cádiz (Ponce de León) especially distinguished themselves in the wars of the late fifteenth century. Other magnates whose estates lay farther north might serve personally, depending on circumstances, or send contingents. The magnates maintained their own retinues to whom they paid a salary (*sueldo* or *acostamiento*) with the obligation to respond to the summons to war with appropriate arms and equipment. The number might vary from one hundred to four hundred men.³²

Mounted *gentes de armas* or men-at-arms wore iron helmets (*capacetes*, *bacinetes*) shaped to turn aside blows to the head, visors, and protective armor for the breast, arms, and legs. During the fifteenth century a full set of body armor, weighing as much as forty-four pounds, provided maximum protection but severely limited mobility. The man-at-arms carried a lance about ten feet long couched in a leather bucket. Riding *a la brida*, that is, with legs fully extended from the stirrups, he was able to put greater power behind the thrust of the lance. Heavier and sharper maces and battleaxes were developed to penetrate armor while lighter, thinner, and more flexible swords gave greater dexterity. Horses wore iron armor over the buttocks, breast, neck, and face. The painting of the battle of La Higuera shows rows of knights in full body armor bearing lances and swords. Palencia remarked that the rout resulting in the capture of the count of Castañeda in 1456 was due in part to the bulky

woolen garments worn by his men under their cuirasses. The movement of their arms was impeded and they could not divest themselves without the help of others.³³

Unlike the man-at-arms, the knight riding *a la jineta* in the Moorish style had his knees bent high up in a short stirrup so as to have greater ease of movement. He was lightly armed with a short lance, a rounded buckler, and a dagger. Cartagena commented that “the *jinetes* using Moorish arms pursue the enemy with marvelous lightness, racing over his land, and, after destroying and ravaging it, return to the battle of the men-at-arms.” While acknowledging the great utility of *jinetes* in the border wars, Palencia emphasized that “the ancient discipline” prohibited Castilian kings, generals, and knights from riding *a la jineta*. He criticized Enrique IV for rejecting “royal pomp” and “the more noble apparatus” used by the Castilians and the Italians, choosing instead to ride *a la jineta*. For Palencia that was evidence of his Islamicizing tendencies.³⁴

The Municipal Militias

After the conquest of Seville, Córdoba, Jaén, and other frontier towns in the thirteenth century, the task of retaining possession necessitated the development of municipal militias. The components were urban knights, offered tax exemptions in return for their pledge to be properly equipped for war; crossbowmen; and lancers. Some were *homicianos*, criminals charged with murder and other major crimes except treason. By giving military service, usually for a year and a day, they could eventually gain pardon. An unruly crowd, they often disturbed the peace. Many were *almogáveres*, adventurers who raided the Moors at will, even during periods of truce. The Cortes of Toledo in 1480 persuaded Fernando and Isabel to abolish the privileges given to *homicianos*.³⁵

Urban knights, equipped with swords, daggers, and lances and riding *a la jineta*, were especially useful in raids. Infantry played a major role in sieges and in garrisoning captured fortresses. *Ballesteros* wielded the *ballista* or crossbow, a formidable weapon firing powerful iron bolts. Others carried lances or pikes, usually twenty feet long. In the fifteenth century infantrymen also used the *espingarda*, a relatively inexpensive handgun with as much impact as the crossbow. The painting of the battle of La Higuera depicted foot soldiers wearing rounded iron helmets with plates covering the side of the face and neck, but without other armor. Lancers carried rounded bucklers that gave them greater flexibility in hand-to-hand combat. During the war of Granada armor providing greater protection came into use, namely, metal breastplates (*coracinas*, *brigandinas*), armlets (*brazales*, *quijotes*), and helmets (*capacetes*). A muster was usually held on the feasts of St. John (24 June) and

Michaelmas (29 September). Anyone failing to appear or to respond to the summons could be fined. The crown paid the towns for their service and so could demand a certain number of soldiers properly equipped.

In 1451, the count of Arcos, as *capitán de la frontera*, could raise 83 lances and 73 *jinetes* from Seville, Marchena, Carmona, Écija, and Arcos, at a cost of 406,000 *maravedíes*. In 1457 he commanded 169 knights and 200 infantry divided equally between crossbowmen and lancers. A *cuadrillero* led every 9 or 10 men. In the following year, in addition to his 166 lances and 113 pages, several towns provided other contingents: Marchena, 185 *jinetes*, 131 pages, 250 *ballesteros*, 270 lancers; Arcos, 163 *jinetes*, 17 pages, 216 *ballesteros*, 222 lancers; Mairena, 17 *jinetes*, 2 pages, 55 *ballesteros*, 62 lancers; Écija, 65 *jinetes*, 22 pages; Carmona, 52 *jinetes*, 16 pages. The total cost to the crown was 150,953 *maravedíes*. The daily wage of a knight with a page was 19 *maravedíes* or 15 without. A *ballestero* earned 7 *maravedíes* and a lancer 6.³⁶

In 1407 Murcia could raise 250 to 300 *jinetes*, the same number of crossbowmen, and 500 foot soldiers; Seville provided 600 *jinetes* and 7,000 foot, and Córdoba 500 *jinetes* and 6,000 foot. In subsequent years Seville mobilized 400 to 600 *jinetes* and 3,000 to 4,000 foot. In 1459 Miguel Lucas determined that Jaén could raise 1,200 knights and 1,500 archers. Some persons, usually from the artisanal class, preferred to hire substitutes, often poorer persons. Contracts for service provided for payment in advance for a fixed number of days, but if the campaign continued the substitute would be paid for additional days.³⁷ Between 1482 and 1492 Écija usually raised 100 to 200 *jinetes* and 200 to 500 foot soldiers.³⁸ Seville's records are replete with information about the municipal militia. In March 1482, for example, Fernando alerted the towns to the loss of Alhama and three weeks later ordered Seville to send 100 knights and 1,000 foot, both archers and lancers, with bread and wine and equipment for 15 days to Écija. A week later he asked for 100 knights and 500 foot and shortly afterward for 2,000 additional *espingarderos*, crossbowmen, and lancers.³⁹

In 1431, Juan II ordered Jerez and neighboring towns not only to provide soldiers, but also bricklayers, meat, and other provisions. Municipal ordinances enacted in 1450 and 1482 detailed the process of assembling Jerez's militia to oppose "the Moors, enemies of our holy faith." At the sound of the bell signaling alarm, all able-bodied men gathered in the church of San Dionís. Knights and foot soldiers, crossbowmen, and lancers were organized in *cuadrillas*, usually parish units, each under its *cuadrillero*. A blacksmith with his tools, surgeons with their medicines and instruments, heralds, and a trumpeter accompanied the host. Anyone failing to appear or lacking the proper equipment was fined. Preceded by the town banner and commanded by the *corregidor*, the militia went on its way. Livestock in neighboring pastures was rounded up and smoke signals alerted people nearby. After the troops departed the clergy offered prayers and led a solemn procession asking God's help.⁴⁰

In addition to soldiers, towns also provided men equipped with pickaxes, hatchets, and other tools useful for cutting pathways through difficult terrain, and carters and drovers to transport provisions or artillery. Though many towns were obliged to provide *acémilas* or pack animals, the crown often hired them. Also essential were experts (*cavadores*) at undermining fortress walls.⁴¹

Foreign Crusaders

From time to time crusaders from northern Europe participated in the war against Granada. The ideal of crusading was firmly fixed in the northern European mentality, but following the loss of the crusader states in the Holy Land, many knights, hoping to emulate their ancestors, traveled to Spain to fight the Moors.

Among them were an anonymous French knight wishing “to serve God” who was killed during Enrique IV’s march to Marbella in 1456; the count of Strassbourg, who served at the siege of Alhama in 1483; Edward Woodville, Lord Scales; Hubert de Staunton from Ireland; the German Heinrich Murer of Thurgau, who was imprisoned by the Moors for four years; and others from Scotland, Switzerland, Holland, and Italy. Their contribution, while praiseworthy, was minimal. Of much greater utility were skilled artillerymen from Brittany, Burgundy, Germany, and Aragón, who manufactured cannons, manned them, and instructed the Castilians in their use. Masters of artillery; cannon makers; masters of gunpowder, fire, and saltpeter; and artillerymen played an essential role in the conquest.⁴²

Naval Forces

During the late thirteenth century and the early fourteenth the Marinid invasions necessitated the maintenance in the strait of a Castilian fleet, often commanded by Genoese mariners. Catalonia also provided naval assistance. As the Marinid threat receded after the middle of the fourteenth century, the need for a fleet lessened. Nevertheless, Fernando de Antequera commissioned Admiral Alfonso Enríquez to assemble a fleet of fifteen galleys, four to five *leños*, six *naos*, and twenty *valengueros* to blockade the strait from 1407 to 1410. *Leños* and *naos* were sailing ships; a *valenguero* was a *ballener* or whaling ship used in the Bay of Biscay. Thereafter the office of admiral was hereditary in the Enríquez family.⁴³

In 1425 Juan II proposed to build galleys in a newly developed shipyard in Santander. The budget of 1,395,532 *maravedíes* included 452,282 *maravedíes* for the structure to support the hull of a ship under construction; 265,000 for six

galleys; 253,250 for oars, clasps, and irons to be brought from Seville; 200,000 for oars, sails, rigging, masts, and tillers for galleys built in Santander; 90,000 for five thousand bushels of wheat to make biscuit in Seville for the galleys; 36,000 for biscuit for the oven master. Though the fleet probably was intended to guard the strait, no serious naval encounters with Granada or Morocco seem to have taken place.⁴⁴

Not until Fernando and Isabel initiated the war against Granada was the importance of a fleet raised again. Diego de Valera advised Fernando in 1482 to develop an armada that could accomplish three fundamental tasks: (1) transport troops from Galicia and Asturias that otherwise would have to make a protracted march to the frontier, inevitably losing men on the way; (2) carry needed food supplies, a good portion of which pack animals and drovers would consume during an overland journey; (3) blockade Málaga. If Málaga were conquered, the emirate would collapse. He proposed a fleet of sailing ships of varying size: two carracks of at least 500 tons, but if there could only be one, that should be 600 tons or more; two *naos* of 250 tons each; two *balleneres* of 70 to 80 tons each; and six caravels with lateen sails. That was sufficient for the winter, but in the summer, four *galeotas* or small galleys should be added. Full-size galleys were too expensive and of little use in the strait, especially during the winter, when the Moors had greater need to import food from Morocco. As their vessels were small and unable to carry much cargo, they depended on the Venetians, Genoese, Florentines, and Portuguese.

A ship's size determined the size of the crew. A vessel of 50 tons or more required one man per ton. For smaller ships, three men were needed for every 2 tons. Each mariner customarily was paid 2 *doblas* monthly; masters and pilots, 4; a boatswain, 2½; men-at-arms and cabin boys received a third less than a seaman. A daily ration of a pound of biscuit and about two liters of wine was given to each man; every three men received two pounds of meat and fish. At times they also had cheese, onions, and vegetables. Oil and vinegar were also essential. The captain general with supreme authority had to hire three or four capable pilots to serve in his flagship and provide necessary guidance, as well as experienced commanders for each ship. A trustworthy person in Seville or Jerez responsible for the fleet's stores and funds had to supply the ships and pay the crew every three months. A scribe recorded everything. To avoid confusion only one person should be appointed to take charge of booty. Despite Valera's recommendations, the king and queen opted to wage a land war against major inland fortresses and did not act on his advice until 1487, when they besieged Málaga by land and sea.⁴⁵

The principal function of the fleet was to guard the strait and to impede the transport of soldiers and supplies from Morocco to Granada. It was also necessary to intercept Venetian and Genoese ships transporting goods to Almería and Málaga. Trading with the enemy was a long-standing problem that had drawn repeated papal denunciations.⁴⁶ In order to carry out this mission the crown contracted for the service of various ships stationed in

Seville and Fernando also summoned vessels from Naples.⁴⁷ The war, however, was mainly a land war, so that the fleet played only a secondary role.

Naşrid Military Organization

In many respects Naşrid military organization resembled that of Castile. The army included soldiers from the emirate, volunteers of the faith, the palace guard, and Moroccan troops. Muḥammad V reorganized the recruitment of forces from al-Andalus and paid them in gold according to their rank. For centuries devout Muslims wishing to gain merit by participating in the *jihād* came to Spain to live in frontier fortresses (*ribāṭ*). Known as *murābiṭūn*, they alternated between prayer and combat. Most Muslim writers agreed that there was no better place in the world to serve in a *ribāṭ* than al-Andalus, “the land of the holy war” par excellence.⁴⁸ The palace guard was composed of renegades, that is, Christians taken prisoner in childhood or captive slaves converted to Islam. Called *mamālik* or *mamelukes*, or, by the Christians, *elches*, they were especially loyal to the emirs. Hernando de Baeza commented that in the late fifteenth century they numbered seven hundred. Some reached high position, such as Ridwān, vizier to Muḥammad IV, Yūsuf I, and Muḥammad V; Abū Surūr Mufarrij, who saved Yūsuf III from execution and installed him as emir; and the vizier Abū l-Qāsim Ridwān Bannigas, who helped al-Zaḡal gain power.⁴⁹

The *shaykh al-ghuzāt* commanding Moroccan troops in Granada was designated by the Marinid sultan and was often a member of the Marinid royal family. However, as Marinid intrusion into the peninsula ceased after the middle of the fourteenth century, Muḥammad V, judging Moroccan involvement in politics as a threat to the monarchy, abolished the office in 1381 and took direct command of all the troops. In the fifteenth century, Moroccan mercenaries, called *gomer*es from their origin in the mountains of Ghumāra, participated in the siege of Málaga.

Ibn Huḍayl (d. 1408), prompted by Muḥammad V, wrote a treatise on war that he later revised for Muḥammad VI. While offering useful counsel based on everyday experience, he also presented an ideal picture of the royal army. Each division of five thousand men was commanded by an *amīr*, a member of the Naşrid family. Within the division, a *qā'id* led each unit of one thousand men, a *naqīb* every two hundred, an *ʿarīf* every forty, and a *nāzir* every eight. Each commander had an appropriate banner or standard. Before setting out against the enemy, he had to determine the readiness of his men, their horses, and their equipment. The emir customarily reviewed his troops (*al-ʿarḍ*, Sp. *alarde*) every three months and frontier garrisons were closely inspected. In real circumstances, however, it is difficult to determine the size of any Moorish army. Like the Christians, the Naşrids relied on guides (*dalīl*, *adillā*, Sp.

adalid), men familiar with local terrain, and spies who were often merchants. Surgeons, workmen, and armorers performed essential tasks that enabled the army to function efficiently. Poets and orators endeavored to rouse the troops to heroic deeds by recounting past military glories and exhorting them to gain the merits of the *jihād*. Ibn Hudayl also discussed the importance of espionage, dissemination of false information, ambushes, and feigned retreat.⁵⁰

Both Castile and Morocco influenced the types of weapons and armor used by the Naṣrids. Wearing turbans, tunics with short sleeves, belts, and breeches, the infantry included archers, crossbowmen, and others armed with swords and shields. Crossbowmen usually wore helmets and a coat of mail. Cavalrymen were typically *jinetes*. Protected by helmets, breastplates, and leather bucklers, they wielded swords, long lances, and javelins. Following the red standard of the Naṣrids, they advanced into battle to the sound of trumpets and the “drums of God.” With great exaggeration al-Makkarī reported that in 1478 Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī reviewed his army, which had grown immensely. For a whole month he watched as his soldiers, mounted on horseback, wearing armor of polished steel and exquisite silken robes, and carrying swords, spears, and shields embossed with gold and silver, rode past.⁵¹

The Naṣrids did not maintain a fleet of any consequence. Even maritime commerce among Muslim states was dominated by the Christians. Ships were used for coastal communication or raids on exposed positions. Shipyards existed at Almería, Almuñécar, and Málaga.⁵²

The Army on the March

When the king resolved to go to war, he usually issued a preliminary summons (*apercibimiento*) often months in advance so that the recipients would have time to prepare. A second summons (*llamamiento*) specified the time and place of assembly.⁵³ Royal marshals and lodging masters directed the troops to appropriate housing while royal accountants, as paymasters, checked the presence of individual magnates, nobles, knights, royal vassals, and urban militias. A muster determined whether all those summoned were present. Next the army was organized into *batallas* or battles, each identified by its distinctive banner. Valera affirmed that the banner (*vandera*) of kings, dukes, counts, and other nobles should be displayed only in the presence of the enemy as a sign of readiness for combat. The royal banner was rectangular and larger than the square banners of the nobles. The Military Orders, cities, and towns carried a rectangular *pendón* with one semi-circular edge. Knights were distinguished by the triangular *grímpola*. In battle a square ensign (*guitón*) was placed next to the king so that his whereabouts would be known; in his absence it was flown near the constable or *capitán general*. Commanders of men-at-arms flew the *estandarte* (a flowing cloth divided in two) while

captains of smaller units used a triangular *gonfalon*.⁵⁴

Leading the vanguard was the master of Santiago or the *alcaide de los donceles*, usually a member of the Fernández de Córdoba family; the *donceles* were young nobles riding *a la jineta*. Next came the royal *batalla* flanked by the militias of Seville and Córdoba. The rearguard included the baggage train and artillery protected by a company assigned to that purpose. As the march through enemy territory required constant vigilance, *adalides* and *almogáveres*, frontiersmen acquainted with the countryside, determined the best route and pointed out potential dangers. When the army reached its objective an encampment (*real*) was established in an easily defensible place near a water supply, but which was also convenient for undertaking an offensive. Tents were raised, and, for defensive purposes, a palisade was thrown up or a ditch dug. Lines of supply and communication were secured. Royal officials maintained law and order and punished those committing crimes. During a lengthy campaign or siege musters were regularly conducted. As sieges such as Málaga and Baza dragged on over several months, desertion was inevitable. Fines imposed on deserters were used to care for the wounded and the families of those killed. When the campaign terminated the troops were given an official letter attesting to their service and permitting them to return home.⁵⁵

Raiding Expeditions

Typical military actions were raids, pitched battles, and sieges. Both Christians and Moors engaged in raiding even during a truce. According to Palencia, both sides agreed that raids and reprisals undertaken within three days of the signing of a truce did not constitute a violation. The most devastating incursions were those executed by the royal army. The purpose was to deprive the enemy of essential food supplies and demoralize him. Raids (*ṣā'ifa*, Sp. *aceifa*, *algara*, *cabalgada*), usually carried out in the spring or fall, destroyed harvests, uprooted orchards and vineyards, and carried off livestock and people. Occasionally a surprise attack was made against a fortress. Aside from winning renown, raiders were frequently enriched by substantial booty. "This permanent state of daily belligerence," according to Juan Carlos Doncel Domínguez, produced a "veritable fauna specialized in frontier warfare: *adalides*, *almocadenes*, *rastreros*, *almogávares*, *escuchas*, *atalayeros*, etc." They were men with an intimate knowledge of the countryside gained by searching out hidden places, scouting, spying, tracking, and watching. Raiding parties often encountered enemy contingents and fought skirmishes of greater or lesser consequence. The Castilians quickly learned characteristic tactics employed by the Moors, namely, ambushes, and feigned flight (*tornafuye*). As a sign of success, but also of the brutality of war, raiders sometimes returned

home with the severed heads or ears of enemy soldiers. In 1470 the heads of dead Moors were placed on lances and displayed throughout the streets of Andújar before being thrown to the dogs. According to Ibn Huḍayl, infidel heads should not be carried from town to town.⁵⁶

Convinced that systematic plundering over two or three years would force Granada to capitulate, Enrique II developed an elaborate plan of destruction. Three divisions (one of three thousand lances, five hundred *jinetes*, and ten thousand infantry; the other two of two thousand lances, one thousand *jinetes*, and ten thousand infantry), each operating in a different sector, would pillage the emirate every four months. However, his need to preserve his own throne and his death prevented him from executing his design. Enrique IV similarly initiated a series of forays that he hoped would subdue the Naṣrids in three years. Nevertheless, his strategy roused the opposition of his magnates and the turbulence of his later years made it impossible to execute his plan. Although some royal councilors proposed plundering expeditions as an alternative to lengthy sieges, Fernando and Isabel concluded that raids would never vanquish Granada.⁵⁷

Pitched Battles

Ever since Alfonso XI's triumph at Salado in 1340, the Moors were wary of pitched battles. Oftentimes a battle resulted when the Moors made a stand against a raiding expedition or tried to relieve a fortress under siege. Skirmishes frequently led to a full-scale combat, usually involving an advance by massed infantry and a cavalry charge. In December 1361 the Moors suffered a major reverse at Huesa, but in January 1362 they defeated and captured the master of Calatrava near Guadix. In April 1394 they routed and killed the master of Alcántara outside the gates of Granada. However, in May 1410 when Yūsuf III attempted to disrupt the siege of Antequera, he was overwhelmed at Boca del Asno.⁵⁸ The battle at La Higueruela near Granada in 1431 was the most important since Salado because of the participation of Juan II and the size of his army (reportedly ten thousand knights, and fifty thousand infantry). Pérez de Guzmán's estimate of two hundred thousand Naṣrid infantry is unbelievable. A cavalry charge dispersed the enemy, but ultimately the Castilians, other than the satisfaction of victory, had little to show for it, as they gained no territory and failed to reduce Granada.⁵⁹

In the second half of the fifteenth century frontier commanders, rather than the king, engaged in several battles. The count of Arcos, for example, defeated the Moors at Mataparda near Marchena in February 1452 and in the following March Alfonso Fajardo routed them at Alporchones near Lorca.⁶⁰ Ten years later Luis de Pernia, *alcaide* of Osuna, and Rodrigo Ponce de León overcame the Moors at Madroño outside Estepa.⁶¹ In March 1483, however, the

Moors emerged victorious in the battle of Al-Sharqiyyaa near Málaga. Yet in the following month they were badly beaten at Lucena and Abū ‘Abd Allāh was taken prisoner. Two years later the count of Cabra suffered a serious setback at Moclín, just north of Granada. In April 1487, al-Zaġal, attempting to relieve Velez Málaga, was driven from the field.⁶² Although these encounters gave victory to one side or the other and often hastened the end of a siege, none of them had the decisive impact of the great battles of the past, namely, Alarcos (1195), Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), and Salado (1340). Rather, the final conquest of Granada was achieved by the laborious and persistent process of besieging one important stronghold after the other.

Artillery and Siege Warfare

The most effective military operation was the siege. To defend against it, walls were strongly fortified, stores of food were gathered, and an alert garrison was provided. The besieging army attempted to intercept all outside assistance, to destroy nearby crops, to cut off access to water, or to poison wells. Skirmishes were frequent, but they did not determine the outcome. While trebuchets launched stones, wooden towers mounted on wheels were moved up to the walls so archers could fire arrows and flammable mixtures into the fortress. Sappers, working under protective leather mantles, attempted to undermine the walls so attackers could enter. Other soldiers using scaling ladders tried to climb over the walls and, if successful, engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. The defenders struggled to repel assaults by firing a barrage of arrows and missiles and pouring boiling oil down on the attackers. If the defenders had sufficient supplies and fortitude, they could resist until the besiegers, weary and perhaps ill, withdrew.

That changed in the fifteenth century with the increased use of artillery. Muḥammad IV of Granada seems to have used artillery in 1331 and Alfonso XI did so during the siege of Algeciras in 1342–44. Twenty years later Muḥammad V employed siege machines as well as naphtha and other inflammatory materials. There are other occasional indications of the use of artillery from the second half of the fourteenth century.⁶³

Early types of artillery were cannons (*bombardas*, *lombardas*) made of forged iron or bronze and about 10 to 11 feet long. The largest could weigh as much as 6 tons. Cords looped through several rings on the barrel fastened it to a wheeled carriage. Gunpowder (a combustible mixture of carbon, saltpeter, and sulphur) was ignited in the breech or firing chamber (*servidor*) to launch the projectile in the barrel (*caña*). Projectiles were usually stones (*bolaños*) weighing 5 to 150 kilograms (11 to 330 pounds), or iron balls (*pellas*, *bodoques*) as heavy as 250 kilograms (551 pounds). Bombarding walls and towers, cannons destroyed the main defenses of once formidable fortresses. They were

most effective at a distance of 100 to 200 meters (109 to 218 yards). Mortars (*cuartazgos*, *pedreros*) were shorter, about 3.75 feet in length. Heavy artillery dragged by oxen or horses to the site where it could be most effective could not be moved quickly to another location. Twenty pairs of oxen and two hundred men were needed to move huge *bombardas* to the siege of Antequera. Consequently, lighter types of cannons with longer barrels but smaller caliber such as the *cerbatana*, *ribadoquín*, *pasavolante*, and *falconete* were developed in the fifteenth century. Moved more easily, they could be employed in a greater diversity of places. The *falconete*, for example, was used mainly at sea. The *ribadoquín*, a small-caliber iron barrel, could be used by itself or linked with others on a cart to form an organ gun. Firing volleys of iron pellets, weighing between 1 and 3 pounds, the *ribadoquín* was especially useful as an anti-personnel weapon protecting supply trains.⁶⁴

Fernando de Antequera employed about three or four large *lombardas* in the sieges of Zahara (1407) and Antequera (1410). They were capable of propelling one or two stone balls weighing 3 to 5 *quintales* (300 to 500 pounds) every hour. However, artillery had a minimal impact on the outcome of either siege and had only a minor role in the campaigns of Juan II and Enrique IV. Artillery came into its own during the reign of Fernando and Isabel. As Pulgar remarked, "walls and towers built for a war of lances and shields" could not withstand artillery bombardment. Artillery was expensive, however, and in short supply. To meet the need royal foundries were established at Écija and Córdoba. By the end of the war Fernando had about 180 large and medium artillery pieces. In 1489 he created a permanent artillery corps divided into captaincies. Some of the *grandes* of Andalucía also had artillery.⁶⁵

In the siege of Ronda in 1485 heavy *lombardas*, mortars, and other siege engines were employed. Projectiles of hemp, tar, sulphur, and powder were ignited and shot into the town, where they set houses and other buildings afire. Round iron balls, both large and small, battered walls and towers. A year later Loja was subjected to a similar bombardment. As *lombardas* breached the walls, the besiegers fired *ribadoquines* through gunslits, knocking down houses and killing people. Incendiary missiles shot from mortars set the town ablaze. A month later eighteen *lombardas* firing simultaneously destroyed the walls and towers of Moclín. In turn, the Moors, using their own *ribadoquines* and *búzanos*, caused great destruction.⁶⁶

The transport of artillery to the siege of Vélez Málaga in 1487 was especially difficult, but when al-Zagal failed to intercept it, the Moors, blockaded by land and sea, surrendered rather easily. During the sieges of Málaga and Baza two encampments were established. Protective measures such as ditches, moats, walls, and the placement of sentries were undertaken. For the siege of Málaga middle and light artillery was brought from Vélez Málaga by sea while heavy artillery was moved overland from Antequera. To make that possible, roads had to be cut through rough terrain. Once in place, cannons broke down the walls of the castle of Gibralfaro, but a relentless

bombardment of the city resulted in a shortage of gunpowder. New supplies had to be shipped in from Aragón and Portugal. After enduring demolition for three months the Moors capitulated. As the thick growth of trees surrounding Baza made artillery access difficult in 1489, the king had the trees cut down. Palisades were erected around the city to halt outside assistance. As cold and rainy weather arrived, the king, determined to remain, built houses laid out in a regular pattern of streets known as *estancias*. After more than six months the Moors yielded. Following the submission of Almería and Guadix, only Granada remained. The siege commenced in April 1491. The devastation of the countryside cut off the food supply and the construction of the military town of Santa Fe emphasized the intention of the king and queen to complete the subjugation of Islamic Spain. The capitulation was signed in November 1491.⁶⁷ Fernando and Isabel's sustained campaign, characterized mainly by sieges of principal towns and fortresses, brought the centuries-long war of reconquest to an end.

Casualties and Captives

Warfare always entails casualties in greater or lesser numbers. The unremitting bombardment of Málaga and other strongholds caused indiscriminate devastation, not only of property, but also of people, many of them non-combatant men, women, and children. Though Ibn Ḥudayl reminded his fellow Moors that they should not kill women and children and the aged and infirm, it was inevitable that many were casualties of war. The number of killed or wounded was often exaggerated, but the war caused great loss of life among soldiers and civilians. In 1410 at Boca del Asno 15,000 Moors but only 120 Christians reportedly lost their lives. Other than conveying a sense of the magnitude of the Naṣrid defeat, those numbers are unbelievable. Somewhat more realistic figures are these: 1,400 Moors and 180 Christians lost at Madroño (1462); 1,000 Moors killed and 4,000 captured at Alhama (1482); 1,000 Moorish knights and 4,000 infantry captured or drowned at Lucena (1483).⁶⁸ Many thousands more were killed or wounded during the sieges of the late fifteenth century.

Among the myriad responsibilities assumed by Isabel was the care of the wounded. During the siege of Álora in 1484 she sent six great tents with bedding, physicians, and surgeons to attend the injured. That enterprise came to be known as the Queen's Hospital. In 1487 at the siege of Málaga she provided four hundred covered wagons or ambulances, as well as matrons of the highest character to nurse the casualties. At Baza in 1489 she supplied four "huge hospital tents" with physicians, apothecaries, surgeons, and other attendants. Contemporaries lauded not only her concern, but also her diligence in delivering essential medical assistance.⁶⁹

Men, women, and children caught up in military operations would likely be held for ransom or sold into slavery. A greedy Pedro I defrauded his own men by defaulting on his pledge to pay 300 *maravedíes* for each prisoner they captured. Among prominent captives were Diego de Padilla, master of Calatrava, who was soon released because he was the brother of Pedro I's mistress. When the daughter of Enrique II's butler refused the advances of her captor she was killed. A frontier captain, Juan de Saavedra, captured in 1448, regained his liberty after partial payment of ransom, but he had to leave his daughters as hostages until Seville and Juan II paid the balance. Although the romance "Rio Verde, Rio Verde" related that the emir beheaded Saavedra because he would not accept Islam, that story is false. The count of Castañeda endured captivity for seventeen months until his wife raised the ransom of 60,000 *doblas*. Pulgar wrote a letter consoling the count of Cifuentes, who was captured in 1483 and held for a heavy ransom. Attractive young women were often placed in the emir's harem. Both Muḥammad V and Ismā'il II, for example, had Christian mothers. Zoraya, a beautiful Christian slave who converted to Islam, was Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī's favorite wife. Settling in Seville after the fall of Granada, she returned to her early faith under the name Isabel de Solís. Her two sons were baptized with the names of their godparents, King Fernando and his son Juan. The most notable Moorish captive, Abū 'Abd Allāh, seized at Lucena, was liberated after declaring his vassalage to Fernando and Isabel and promising to surrender Granada.⁷⁰

Whether Christian or Muslim, many captives came from humble backgrounds. Shepherds and other countryfolk often had the misfortune of being seized in frontier raids. More distinguished was the poet 'Abd al-Karīm al-Qaysī, who grumbled "what bad luck is mine!" A dedicated student of the Qur'an, he now found himself, as "a servant of the adorers of idols and of the cross," compelled to dig ditches, demolish buildings, sweep up the mess, and "wash the pigsties of the dogs." Those were the Christians whose clothes he had to launder while his own were filthy. "Death," he declared, "is preferable to captivity." After selling his books to pay his ransom, he was eventually set free.⁷¹

In 1487, as a consequence of Málaga's stubborn resistance, Fernando imposed a heavy ransom on the entire population. An estimated eleven thousand to fifteen thousand persons, unable to pay it, were enslaved.⁷² While visiting the Alhambra in 1494, Hieronymus Münzer commented on the horrors suffered by the seven thousand Christians held captive there and another twenty thousand in the city.⁷³ As ransom was often quite high, captives were doomed to years of slavery in extremely harsh conditions. Truces customarily provided for the release of a certain number of captives, staggered over several years, and many regained their freedom when major strongholds were taken. The chroniclers described the piteous condition of emaciated men and women, who emerged from captivity dressed in rags and dragging heavy chains. Fernando and Isabel displayed irons used to control captives on the wall of San

Juan de los Reyes in Toledo. If prisoners were transported to Africa, their chances of recovering their liberty and returning home were greatly reduced. If a Christian accepted Islam, he could gain his freedom, but as an *elche*, a *tornadizo*, or turncoat, he was usually held in disdain. A Moor who converted normally would not be liberated.

Persons owning Moorish slaves were encouraged to exchange them for Christians. Sometimes a family would buy a slave in order to trade him or her for an imprisoned family member. Many likely emulated Enrique II, who bequeathed funds to ransom one hundred Christian women under forty years of age. In the Cortes of Toledo in 1462 Enrique IV tried to ease complaints that the cost of ransoming captives was excessive. Attempting to damage the Naşrid economy, in 1483 Fernando and Isabel prohibited the export of gold and silver and other goods to be used as ransom.⁷⁴ Traditionally the task of negotiating the ransom of captives was carried out by *alfaques*, men who knew Arabic and had experience in frontier trade. Overseeing their activity were *alfaques mayores*, one a Moor and the other a Christian. Fernando and Isabel, considering the office a form of espionage, suppressed it in 1486.⁷⁵

Funding the Crusade

The task of funding the crusade was formidable, especially after the Catholic Monarchs commenced the decade-long conquest of Granada. By then a more complex financial administration under the direction of royal accountants (*contadores mayores de hacienda* and *de cuentas*) facilitated the collection, administration, and accounting of ordinary and extraordinary revenues. Money was needed to pay the royal guard, the magnates, the rank and file of troops, and the castellans and garrisons of royal fortresses; it was needed to purchase supplies, acquire pack animals, manufacture cannons and gunpowder, care for the wounded, repair castles, and maintain the fleet. Ladero Quesada published extensive, but incomplete, financial documentation from the fifteenth century recording both income and expenditures, but a precise balance sheet is impossible.⁷⁶

A financial statement of 1429 showed that the most productive ordinary revenues were the *alcabala*, a sales tax, and the *tercias*, two-ninths of the third of the tithe. Among the other ordinary revenues were customs duties; the *diezmo y medio diezmo de lo morisco* collected on the Granadan frontier; imposts on migratory sheep (*servicio y montazgo*); *moneda forera*, a customary tribute due every seven years; levies on the Jewish and Mudejar communities; and the income from monopolies of mines and salt pits. The total was 62,000,000 *maravedies*.⁷⁷

The tribute paid intermittently by the Naşrids since the mid-thirteenth century, while notable, had perhaps a greater psychological value in that it

symbolized Granada's subordination. Although Yūsuf I promised it to Pedro I, as did Muḥammad V, neither the latter nor his immediate successors made that commitment to the early Trastámaras.⁷⁸ Naṣrid princes contending for power in the fifteenth century, however, sought recognition from Juan II by offering tribute. In 1421, for example, Muḥammad IX agreed to 13,000 gold *doblas* annually, but in 1430 rejected demands for more. Nevertheless, his opponent, Ibn al-Mawḥ, in 1432 promised 20,000 *doblas*. Recovering the throne, Muḥammad IX, in 1439, guaranteed 24,000 (8,000 a year for three years), and renewed that pledge for four years in 1443.⁷⁹ In 1457 Sa'd offered Enrique IV 12,000 per year and his rival, Ismā'il IV, probably paid the same amount in 1463–64. The truce of 1472, however, did not require any payment by Abū l-Ḥasan Alī.⁸⁰ Six years later when Fernando and Isabel demanded tribute, he spurned them. In 1483, however, Abū 'Abd Allāh promised 12,000 *doblas* annually as a condition of regaining his liberty.⁸¹

Servicios Granted by the Cortes

As ordinary income never sufficed to meet the costs of war, the crown had to ask the consent of the Cortes for extraordinary *servicios*.⁸² The Cortes of Toledo in 1406 approved Enrique III's request for 45,000,000 *maravedies*, but in the following year the Cortes of Segovia limited the grant to the war. Later in the year, the Cortes of Guadalajara, after first protesting that Infante Fernando's request for 60,000,000 *maravedies* was excessive, finally gave consent. After accepting a truce in 1408, the regents, yielding to the objections of the procurators, restricted that year's expenditures to 40,000,000 *maravedies*. In 1409 the Cortes of Valladolid authorized another 40,000,000 *maravedies* for the current year. Two years later, again at Valladolid, the Cortes consented to 45,000,000 *maravedies* for use only for the war and demanded an accounting of 48,000,000 *maravedies* spent over the last four years.⁸³

When Juan II came of age, the Cortes of Palenzuela in 1425 limited to military expenses the *servicio* of 38,000,000 *maravedies*. In succeeding years the Cortes of Valladolid (1429), Salamanca (1430), and Madrid (1433) granted 45,000,000 *maravedies* annually. If that were added to the 62,000,000 in ordinary income recorded in 1429, the total revenue for that year would be about 107,000,000. During Juan II's later years the Cortes approved varying amounts for the war: 20,000,000 (Madrigal 1447, 1448), 10,000,000 (Olmedo 1450), and 50,000,000 (Valladolid 1451).⁸⁴

While informing the Cortes of Cuéllar in 1454 that he would need funds for his projected crusade, Enrique IV did not request an exact amount. In the next year the Cortes of Córdoba, after asking to see a budget, authorized 70,000,000 *maravedies* for the present and following years. As most of that money was used for ordinary expenses, the Cortes of Madrid in 1458 restricted

the grant of 40,000,000 *maravedies* to the war. With the aim of impeding intervention from North Africa, the Cortes approved a further 32,000,000. Five years later the Cortes of Toledo granted 86,000,000 *maravedies* for the war and other expenses. Although the amount fluctuated throughout this period, it seems that larger sums were approved when the regent or the king personally participated in the campaign and lesser amounts when others were entrusted with that responsibility. Notwithstanding the insistence of the Cortes, kings spent the money on projects other than the crusade.⁸⁵

Fernando and Isabel convened the Cortes in 1476 and 1480, but not again until 1498. Between 1482 and 1490, in the absence of the Cortes, the annual assemblies of the Hermandad consented to extraordinary levies of 41,929,228 *maravedies*.⁸⁶

Tercias and Decima

The crown also derived substantial support from the church. An anonymous author commented that the vast riches of churches and monasteries served neither God, nor the faith, nor the people. Many ecclesiastical dignitaries wasted Christ's patrimony on "vain pomp, dogs, hawks, falcons, and other dishonorable expenses." He proposed that Isabel compel the prelates, who received their great wealth from the crown, to use it for the crusade.⁸⁷

Crusading bulls were usually accompanied by the concession of the *tercias* and the *decima*, two principal sources of ecclesiastical income. Since the mid-thirteenth century, the papacy had allowed the use of the *tercias* for the crusade. Although the grant was usually for a limited term, kings tended to think of it as a customary right. Juan I, for example, asserted his entitlement during the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. Nevertheless, in 1407, and again in 1410 and 1412, Benedict XIII authorized collection for three years. Martin V renewed the grant in 1421 provided the money was used only to subjugate the infidels. Lest the crown claim the *tercias* in perpetuity, he insisted that every twenty years half the amount should be rendered to the papacy and the remainder to the churches. That seemed to acknowledge that the crown would continue to enjoy the *tercias* for many years.⁸⁸

The *decima* or tenth of ecclesiastical revenues, also dating from the thirteenth century, was even more important, though references to it under the early Trastámaras are lacking. In 1437 Eugene IV authorized the fixed amount of 100,000 florins, but it was diverted to the struggle between Juan II and the nobility. Although Calixtus III intended to use the *decima* against the Turks, in 1456 he was persuaded to agree that half of the 100,000 florins raised should be employed in the Moorish crusade. Even so, most of the money was spent for other purposes. Pius II also wanted to direct the *decima* to the Turkish crusade, but in 1460 he allotted Enrique IV a third of the total.⁸⁹

Although Sixtus IV promised to grant the *decima* to Fernando and Isabel in 1477, he did so only in 1481 and then, much to their annoyance, set aside a third for the Turkish crusade. In the following year, Valera urged the king to request it again. Innocent VIII responded favorably in 1485, but again reserved a third for the Turks. After persuading him that no funds should be diverted from their crusade, the king and queen thanked him with a gift of 10,000 ducats. He renewed the grant in 1486, on condition of again receiving that sum. Complaining of abuses in the process of collection, he was hesitant to extend the grant in 1488, but did so in 1489 for one year. Despite his reservations, the *decima* was collected in the remaining years of the war.⁹⁰ Ladero Quesada estimated that during the war against Granada it amounted to more than 600,000 Aragonese florins or 159,000,000 *maravedies*.⁹¹

The *Cruzada*

The donations of the faithful (*cruzada*) were another significant source of funding. The crusading bull offered an indulgence and other spiritual benefits to those who participated personally in the crusade or supported it financially. Martin V appears to be the first pope to require a contribution of a fixed amount, namely, 8 ducats, or, according to Pedro Carrillo de Huete, 12 florins. As that was more than most people could afford, Eugene IV lowered it to 5 ducats in 1433 and Nicholas V to 3 ducats in 1448. Diego Arias, the royal accountant, suggested 15 silver *reales*. In 1455 and 1456 Calixtus III specified 3 florins of Aragón or 200 *maravedies*. The attribution of the indulgence to the souls in purgatory proved very attractive, so much so that over the course of four years the crown gained more than 100,000,000 *maravedies*. Palencia put the amount at 1,000,000 ducats or 800,000 gold *doblas*. Royal accounts for less than half the realm indicate that at least 35,000,000 *maravedies* were collected. Not much was expended, however, on the crusade.⁹²

Contributions made in accord with the bulls of Sixtus IV (1479, 1482) and Innocent VIII (1485, 1487) were also quite substantial. Donations of 2, 4, or 6 *reales*, 1 florin, 82 *maravedies*, and 4 *cornados* were recorded. In order to wear the crusader's cross one had to contribute at least 2 *maravedies*. After 1489, to encourage greater liberality, preachers commonly requested a donation of 2 *reales* (about 62 *maravedies*). Azcona calculated that preachers raised about 361,997,230 *maravedies* in 1484–85, 1487–88, and 1490–91. Aragón, Valencia, and Mallorca contributed an additional 66,637,839 *maravedies*; Catalonia, 32,508 *libras* of Barcelona; and Navarre, 658,946 *maravedies*. Using different royal accounts, Ladero Quesada put the figure at 450,000,000 *maravedies* for Castile, Aragón, and Navarre. That included a fifth of the inheritance of persons dying intestate, property whose owner was unknown, income from confraternities, bequests, money for the ransom of captives, and so forth.⁹³

Loans

At least from the thirteenth century Castilian kings were accustomed to demand forced loans (*empréstitos*) from wealthy individuals or communities. Refusal to contribute might result in the confiscation of one's property. Fernando de Antequera and Juan II exacted such loans, but the practice became especially common under Fernando and Isabel. In addition to borrowing from municipalities, they borrowed from the duke of Medina Sidonia (who contributed 12,000 *doblas* for the siege of Málaga), the marquess of Cádiz, Alfonso de Aguilar, the count of Benavente, the archbishop of Santiago, the bishop of Palencia, merchants in Burgos, Toledo, and Seville, Genoese merchants, Jews in various towns, and the Mesta or sheep owners' organization (on three occasions). During the siege of Baza in 1489 Isabel raised 100,000,000 *maravedies* in loans, leased or sold sources of royal income, and the pawning of her jewels.⁹⁴

During the final ten years of the crusade the crown borrowed about 300,000,000 *maravedies*; between 1489 and 1491 the total was 145,809,985. Initially repayment without interest was promised within a year, but that became more difficult as the need for funds increased after 1489. The Mesta was repaid in five annual installments from the levy on migratory sheep. Others were reimbursed from sums collected for the crusade. Still others received as recompense the right to a portion of royal revenues (*jueros*) or landed property. The marquess of Cádiz, for example, was given the town of Casares in payment of a loan of 10,000,000 *maravedies* and Alfonso de Aguilar received Montefrío. Some loans were never repaid.⁹⁵

Men, Armaments, Money, and Determination

During the century and a half following the death of Alfonso XI in 1350 truces between Castile and Granada facilitated many peaceful years marked by the interchange of goods and ideas and, to some extent, a willingness to coexist. However, religious differences remained as an almost insuperable barrier. Consequently, hostilities erupted from time to time until Fernando and Isabel resolved to put an end to the emirate of Granada.

In order to do so, resources in men, arms, armor, artillery, supplies, animals, carts, and ships had to be acquired and organized into an effective military machine at an enormous expense. Aside from ordinary revenues, the crown needed extraordinary grants by the Cortes and the Hermandad, the *tercias* and *decima*, the donations of the faithful, and extensive borrowing. Also essential was a firm determination to wage war without letup until the reconquest was finished. Raiding expeditions destroying harvests prepared the

way for battlefield confrontations and, most importantly, for the sieges that reduced, one by one, the major cities and towns of the Naşrid realm.

Chapter 9

A War of Religions

The Castilian struggle to vanquish the emirate of Granada was essentially a war of religions. In making that statement I do not mean to exclude other more mundane motives. Human nature being what it is, people act in given circumstances for a diversity of reasons. So it was with the people of medieval Spain. Kings and emirs fought over boundaries, the possession of castles and lands, and economic resources. The contrast between fertile areas in Naşrid Granada and barren lands in certain Castilian regions surely drew the attention of the Castilian monarchs. Access to the Mediterranean and control of the Strait of Gibraltar were also attractions. Greed and the desire for riches prompted border raids by both sides. Plunder in the form of livestock, jewels, and other goods, and people to be enslaved enriched both Christians and Muslims. All of those political and economic reasons are valid and were always in play.

Nevertheless, I contend that the struggle was ultimately a conflict between two societies, one permeated by Christianity, the other by Islam. Each was formed and infused by the spirit of a distinctive religion, the religion of the community, the religion of the state that kings and emirs were expected to defend and uphold against all others. In opposition were two realms, one professedly Christian, the other professedly Muslim. The identification of a religion as *ley* or law stressed the close relationship between religious doctrine and civil law. In Christian Castile only Christians were fully integrated into political and social life, just as only Muslims were fully integrated into the political and social life of Islamic Granada. Neither side thought that those fundamentally different religious cultures were compatible.

Religious minorities, whether Christian or Muslim, were tolerated and protected by the state. The majority, whether Christian or Muslim, clearly understood that those minority religions were essentially false and inferior to the state religion. Members of religious minorities did not enjoy equal civil status with those of the dominant religion. They were always peoples apart. Christians and Jews in Islamic Spain and Muslims and Jews in Christian Spain lived in accordance with a law that differentiated them from the prevailing

majority. Religious minorities were allowed to practice their religion, provided they did not proselytize among the majority, and they were subject to their own law administered by their own judges. Conversion to the professed religion of the state, whether Muslim or Christian, opened a new world to a convert as the old barriers to political, social, and economic advancement disappeared.

Both sides consistently denounced one another in religious terms. The phrase “enemies of our Catholic faith” recurs again and again in Castilian documentation and Muslims commonly referred to Christians as “infidels,” “idolaters,” or “polytheists.” The insistence that the struggle against the infidels, whether Muslim or Christian, was a holy war or *jihād* sanctioned by God underscores the point that this was a war of religions. In the closing decades of the Middle Ages as Castilians began to think of themselves as a nation, they identified that nation with Christianity. Thus, it was inevitable that the legal tolerance accorded to religious minorities for so many centuries should be brought to an end.¹

The Loss and Recovery of Spain

The justification of the war against Granada had its roots in the belief that the Moors were interlopers who unjustly occupied Christian lands. In 711 the first Muslim invaders crossed the Strait of Gibraltar from Morocco to Spain and quickly brought the Visigothic monarchy to ruin. In its stead the victors established an Islamic state centered at Córdoba that embraced nearly the entire peninsula, save for the northernmost periphery. While lamenting “the loss of Spain,” Christians maintaining their independence in the remote north expressed their belief in the eventual recovery of Spain from Muslim hands. Declaring themselves heirs of the Visigoths, the kings of Castile-León asserted their responsibility to reconstitute the Visigothic heritage by the reconquest of Moorish Spain.²

The title “emperor of Spain,” applied to the kings of León during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, emphasized their pretension to supremacy over the entire peninsula as well as Morocco, which many peninsular Christians believed to have once formed part of the Visigothic realm.³ Poets and publicists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries revived that expectation by exalting the Castilian monarch in imperial terms, declaring him worthy of being emperor or equal to the emperor. For example, the poet Gómez Manrique (d. 1491) linked the empire to the conquest of Granada when he foretold that Juan II, once he conquered Granada, would become emperor.⁴

The kings of Castile-León never accepted the idea that the emirate of Granada should continue to exist as another peninsular realm comparable to Aragón or Portugal; nor did they contemplate absorbing it by marital alliances,

as they did other Christian kingdoms. At a time when the state professed a unique religion whose ideals, rituals, and laws pervaded every aspect of daily life, the religious difference between Muslim Granada and Christian Castile was insurmountable. As “enemies of the Catholic faith” the Moors could not be part of the Hispanic nation that was professedly Catholic. The poet Alfonso Álvarez de Villasandino (d. c. 1424) emphasized that Granada should belong to Juan II and longed for the day when the king would “bring down and destroy the vile dog sect of the false Muḥammad and make mock of it.”⁵ The existence of the emirate could be tolerated so long as its rulers acknowledged their vassalage, but ultimately Castile planned to conquer Granada. In 1431 Juan II announced his intention to wage war against “the infidel Moors . . . enemies of our holy Catholic faith, so that in my time, with God’s help, in the name of God, I, a knight and *alférez* of the Apostle Santiago, might finish the task begun long ago by my progenitors, but never completed because of various obstacles.”⁶ Fernando del Pulgar also remarked that Fernando and Isabel always intended to subjugate Granada and to expel the Moors and the name of Muḥammad from Spain. Indeed, at the time of his marriage in 1469, Fernando pledged “to wage war against the Moors, enemies of the holy Catholic faith.”⁷

Yet, in the late medieval era Castilian efforts to subdue Granada were sporadic. Pedro López de Ayala bemoaned the fact that the knights of his day, preferring to fight among themselves, “have forgotten to make war on the Moors,” who took pleasure in the ongoing conflict among the Christians.⁸ In the minds of some, sinful Christians had only to blame themselves for the continued Moorish presence in Spain. That was God’s will. The *Libro de la consolación de España*, an anonymous tract written about 1434–49, put it this way: “On account of our sins our Spain was taken captive by the power of the Moors in the time of King Rodrigo, and not long ago the mercy of God delivered us from their power”—an allusion to Juan II’s victory at La Higuera in 1431—“although a small part still remains to them, and God consents to that because of our wicked life.”⁹ In an obvious allusion to the failure of Juan II and Enrique IV to destroy the Naṣrid realm, Fray Martín de Córdoba (d. c. 1476), addressing the Infanta Isabel before her accession to the throne, commented that her “ancestors had conquered the Spains and swatted the filthy flies of Muḥammad and pursued them with the sword as far as the emirate of Granada, where they are now because of the negligence of modern princes.”¹⁰ Similarly, Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, while arguing that the election of Fernando de Antequera as king of Aragón distracted him from the conquest of Granada, commented that “if the sins of Castile had not provoked the indignation of our Lord . . . this noble infante undoubtedly would have put an end to the said war and would have returned Spain to her ancient possession, expelling the Moors from it and restoring it to the Christians.” Lamenting the loss of Spain—*la perdición ispana*—by Rodrigo, the last of the Goths, the same author deplored the present situation, “a slap in the face” because “Granada not only defends itself against Spain, but offends it.”¹¹

Several writers took up the theme of loss and recovery. Alfonso de Cartagena reiterated the notion that the kings of Castile as heirs to the Visigoths, whose imperial seat was Toledo, and whose dominions extended into Africa, could lay claim to the title of emperor. Moreover, he argued that the conquest of Morocco and the Canary Islands belonged to them.¹² In like manner, Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo looked forward to the day when Enrique IV's power extended to the "fierce parts of Africa" and he "recovered those broad provinces which the famous King Theodoric and your progenitors peacefully held under the great monarchy of Spain."¹³ After declaring that the Visigoths had ruled not only Spain and Gallia Gothica, but also Ceuta, Tangier, and "a great part of Africa," Diego de Valera lamented the *perdimiento* of Spain by King Rodrigo and lauded the resistance of Pelayo, "this holy king" who "began to recover the land that the Christians had lost."¹⁴ Muḥammad, according to Valera, was a "false prophet" who brought into being "that damned sect of the Moors." Musa was the Berber leader "by whom all of Spain was subjugated, destroyed, and laid waste in the time of King Don Rodrigo."¹⁵ He concluded: "We should make war against the Moors so they cannot harm the Christians, and with that intention we should set out to acquire their goods and lands so that where God is now blasphemed he would be feared, adored and served."¹⁶

After so many years of civil war and royal ineptitude, hopes were high that Fernando and Isabel would bring the reconquest to a successful conclusion. Addressing Fernando, Valera predicted, "You shall have rulership over all the Spains and you shall reform the imperial throne of the noble race of the Goths whence you come." Encouraging the king to conquer the regions beyond the sea (probably Morocco and the Canary Islands), Valera expressed the belief that God intended Fernando "not only to restore, reform, and defend these realms, but also to undermine and destroy all the enemies of the holy Catholic faith."¹⁷ Fray Iñigo de Mendoza (d. c. 1507) also declared that Fernando would acquire "the inheritance lost by the Goths in the time of King Rodrigo, as punishment for his dissipation, leaving us without protection, subjected injuriously to the Muḥammadan fury." Just as Rodrigo's vices merited a worthy penalty, so Fernando would be rewarded: "not only would Granada be subjugated to Castile," but he would become "the true king of Spain." Recalling the legend that attributed the loss of Spain to Rodrigo's violation of Count Julian's daughter, the poet praised Fernando and Isabel for uniting what Rodrigo had divided and lost. On that account they were rightly called emperors.¹⁸

The Cry of the Moors

That Christian sense of loss was mirrored by Muslim writers, who, over the

centuries, witnessed the fall of their great cities. In the late thirteenth century the poet Ṣāliḥ b. Sharīf al-Rundī (d. 1285), who had been forced to emigrate to Ceuta, expressed their feelings of sorrow and despair:

Ask Valencia what became of Murcia,
And where is Játiva, or where is Jaén?
Where is Córdoba, the seat of great learning?
And how many scholars of high repute remain there?
And where is Seville, the home of mirthful gatherings
On its great river, cooling and brimful with water?¹⁹

Nearly two hundred years later the poet ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qaysī al-Bastī authored several elegies on cities lost to the Christians. Asked why the loss of Gibraltar in 1462 caused him such distress, he replied, “sadness is everyone’s duty” and “joy and happiness are forbidden while our hearts suffer the gravest of wounds.” Despite his sorrow, he trusted that God, who had allowed Gibraltar to fall, would restore it to Islam, and thus relieve the intensity of that wound. He saw the fall of Archidona a month later as a sign of destruction and humiliation at the hands of the Christians who subjected the Moors to death or imprisonment. While he prayed that God would restore Archidona, he faulted the Muslims for their lack of unity and their failure to observe the five pillars of Islam. With great urgency, he exhorted his people: “Wake up! Wake up! Abandon sleep! I’m telling you a true account! Whoever has only shed tears so far, will now weep red blood.” Distressed by the fall of Baza, his native place, he protested that “no human being remains there who has not suffered exile because of those who assail us, burning the harvest of our land.”²⁰

A few years later an anonymous poet wept at the news that Ronda, Málaga, Granada, Baza, Guadix, and Almería had fallen to the Christians. Sadness enveloped Granada and visitors seemed like stricken souls attending a funeral. The failure of the Muslims to observe God’s law was the cause of these calamities, the poet believed.²¹ Ibn as-Sabbah of Almería also attributed the downfall of al-Andalus to the sins of the Muslims.²² Describing the repression of Islam after the fall of Granada, the anonymous chronicler lamented: “Afterward no one dared to display the banner of Islam. Unbelief spread throughout all the towns and villages. Islam and the faith were extinguished in al-Andalus. On that account we cry and sob. Yet we are God’s and we return to him.”²³

A War, Necessary, Just, and Holy

During the last century of the Middle Ages commentators frequently

emphasized that the war against the Moors was not only necessary, but just and holy. The regency council for Enrique III in 1391 recognized the obligation “to defend the realm by war against the Moors, as was always the custom and is reasonable and lawful.” After the king’s death the poet Fray Diego de Valencia bewailed the disunity among the Castilians that impeded them from conquering Granada. Castile was cast down because her people did not wish to fight the Moors, to conquer or to die in a “war that was just, holy, and worthy”—“*en guerra tan justa, muy santa, tan dina*.” Yet he was pleased that the pope had proclaimed a crusade offering absolution of sins to those who died battling the “renegades, the infidel vassals of the king of Granada.”²⁴

In the Cortes of Segovia in 1407 Fernando de Antequera declared that the proposed war against “the enemies of our faith” was “just and reasonable” and would lead to the “exaltation of the Catholic faith, the service of our lord the king and the increase of his realms.” Therefore, he summoned the people “to undertake this holy work, with the help of God.” Describing the responses of the assembled procurators and of Fadrique of Trastámara, Fernán Pérez de Guzmán modified Álvaro García’s language so that the procurators lauded “such a holy and praiseworthy enterprise” and Fadrique extolled this “holy proposal” as “such a just and necessary war.”²⁵

Other statements underscored the religious character of the war. An assembly of theologians and canonists convened by João I prior to his assault on Ceuta, according to Zurara, applauded his “good and holy intention” and asserted that God would reward him for waging war against “any infidels who deny any of the articles of the holy Catholic faith.” That statement went well beyond the traditional arguments for opposing Islam, namely, Muslims’ attacks on Christians and their seizures of Christian lands. In 1416 Fernando praised João I’s “great, holy, and noble intention” to collaborate in the conquest of Granada “for the service of God and the extirpation of the enemies of the faith.” In similar language Pedro Carrillo de Huete described Juan II’s victory at La Higuera as “this holy act that occurred on this holy day.” Recounting the bombardment of Orteja by the marquis of Cádiz, his anonymous chronicler declared that “it was such a holy work and of such service to God and the royal crown.”²⁶

In his *Doctrinal de los caualleros*, Alfonso de Cartagena argued that “war waged in defense and exaltation of the faith is truly just and praiseworthy.” During the Council of Basel in 1435 he declared that the king of Castile rendered greater services to the church than other monarchs precisely because, in obedience to God’s mandate, he waged “divine war” against the infidels. In so doing he extended the boundaries of the church, exalted the Catholic faith, and destroyed the cursed sect of Muhammad. This, he said, conformed to the church’s desire “that the pagans and the barbarous nations and the infidels should be converted to the faith or destroyed.”²⁷

Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, lamenting “the unjust peace with the infidels,” voiced the hope that Enrique IV might “change a dishonest peace into a just

discord and praiseworthy war, acceptable to God and very much desired by the Catholic faith.” In his judgment a king was obliged not only to defend the common good but also “our holy Catholic faith and Christian religion, which otherwise might be destroyed by the barbarians and other infidels, enemies of our holy faith.” Commending the king’s efforts in “defense of the Catholic faith,” Calixtus III in 1457 encouraged “his holy plan.”²⁸

Other publicists in the court of Fernando and Isabel reiterated the desirability of participating in a just and holy war. Valera called upon the king to prosecute “this holy and necessary war,” “this famous and holy enterprise,” so that “the enemies of our holy faith may be diminished and the land that they have usurped may be taken, and where God is now condemned, blasphemed, and despised, he may be praised, adored, and loved.” Speaking of this “just and necessary war,” Palencia made the same point. In his view, it was incumbent on the people of Castile and León to fight against “the fierce enemy of Catholicism that had dominated such an extensive territory as Andalucía for so many centuries.” Bernáldez did not hesitate to speak of “this holy war.”²⁹

According to Pulgar, the king and queen, “recognizing that no war should be undertaken except for the faith and for security,” acknowledged the limitations on war-making. By implication a war in defense of the faith was both just and holy. He related that Alonso de Cárdenas, master of Santiago, argued that the king could conduct “a just war, indeed a holy war,” against the Moors, a “pagan people.” The master queried: “How much better is it for one to engage in such a just, such a holy, such a necessary war as the one you now have, in which one can gain honor in this life and glory in the next?” Isabel, again according to Pulgar, affirmed that the war against the Moors was “such a just and holy enterprise” that it could not be more “honorable and worthy.” The king also admitted that it was “a holy war.”³⁰ Although the words attributed to the master and the king and queen may be Pulgar’s, they no doubt reflect the sentiments of the royal court. Indeed, in 1482 the king and queen stated clearly that “this war is holy and just and for the exaltation of our holy Catholic faith.” Ever since the unprovoked Moorish invasion more than seven hundred years ago, the kings of Spain had battled to expel them. Now, the royal couple declared that they acted justly in making war against them. Seven years later, Palencia argued that “territories unjustly occupied could be recovered with justice by their legitimate lords.” Besieging Loja, the king declared his intention “to prosecute the enterprise of Granada,” and soon “with divine favor to subjugate it and restore it to the divine cult.” A few months later the king and queen asserted their resolve to conquer Granada and “expel from all of Spain the enemies of the Catholic faith and to establish it in the service of God.” Arguing the necessity of financial aid, the king asserted that “the holy war of Granada” was “no less just and necessary” than the eastern crusade.³¹

A necessary war would seem to be a war of obligation, that is, a centuries-old duty incumbent upon the kings of Castile. None of our authors cited St. Augustine’s conditions for a just war, but they likely believed that the war was

justified because the Moors had usurped Christian lands. The notion that Muḥammad was a false prophet preaching a false religion condemned by God and that God was on the side of the Christians probably lay at the root of their conviction that the war was holy. They ignored the possibility that God might favor the Muslims or lament the shedding of blood by both sides. Surely it was a war pitting one religion against another, but warfare, with its attendant destruction of human life and the other works of God's creation, can never be called holy. As Fernando and Isabel noted, the purpose of this war was to serve God and to exalt "our faith and Christian religion." That could be accomplished in various ways: by crushing the Moors, expelling them, or converting them to the Catholic faith. In that way, the aspiration to exalt the Christian religion, so often expressed, would be fulfilled.

The Goal of Conversion

In previous centuries Christian authors spoke of conquering or expelling the Moors, but neither kings nor bishops made any significant effort to convert them. In practice, when the Moors surrendered, they were recognized as Mudejars and guaranteed freedom of worship. Although there were exceptional cases of individual conversion, there were no mass conversions. Daily life on the frontier caused many people, after being taken captive, to convert to Christianity or Islam, but after liberation they usually reverted to their original faith. Still, renegades on both sides were usually viewed with scorn.

Since the time of John of Damascus (d. 749) Islam was regarded by many as a Christian sect or heresy, rather than a distinct religion. The initiative for missionary activity came from outside the peninsula. After taking part in the Fifth Crusade and failing to convert the Egyptian sultan, Francis of Assisi encouraged his friars to evangelize the Islamic world. Several friars preached briefly in Seville before traveling to Morocco, where they were executed in 1219 for public preaching. Alfonso X's *Partidas* (7,25,2) insisted that conversion should come about "by good words and suitable preaching" and not "by force or pressure." Juan Manuel (d. 1348) emphasized that point when he repeated a commonplace of Christian theology: "involuntary and forced services do not please God. . . . Jesus Christ never ordered that anyone should be killed or forced to accept his religion." The Catalan Ramon Llull (d. c. 1315) developed philosophical arguments to convince the Muslims to accept Christianity, but the impact of his work in Castile was limited. Occasional missionary efforts often ended tragically. In 1397 two Franciscans, who preached in Granada in defiance of the emir, were first whipped and, after they persisted, beheaded. A few years later a madman from Seville who tried to preach in Antequera was imprisoned.³²

Meanwhile, theologians, canonists, and popes developed the rationale for converting and dispossessing the infidels. When the Christians began to colonize the Canary Islands, they had to confront the question: by what right and under what circumstances could they legitimately seize lands inhabited by pagans? Pope Innocent IV (1243–54), a notable canonist, affirmed that infidels had legitimate rights to property and dominion, but could be expelled if they injured Christians or impeded the preaching of the gospel. In 1344 Clement VI declared that the propagation of the faith among the Canarians would be beneficial and in 1436 Eugene IV asserted that if they worshipped idols or sinned against nature or refused to admit Christian missionaries, they could be forcibly evicted.³³

The idea of converting the Muslims, rather than merely allowing them to continue worshipping freely as in the past, gathered strength during the fifteenth century. Three popes spoke of the possibility of converting them. In 1431 Eugene IV appointed Archbishop Alfonso Carrillo of Toledo as his legate for a projected crusade that would lead to the “reduction and conversion of [the Moors] to the true faith.” Sixtus IV was optimistic that the king and queen would “convert those infidels to the right faith.” Declaring it to be “a necessary task, acceptable to God,” “a laudable work,” “a most holy work,” Innocent VIII anticipated that the Castilians would “reduce them [the Moors] to the Christian faith.”³⁴

Several canonists and theologians also discussed the task of conversion. Presaging the ultimate fate of the Moors, Alfonso de Cartagena, during the Council of Basel, asserted that the church hoped to convert or to destroy them. In Cartagena’s judgment, Muḥammad synthesized all heresies and was guilty of a double rebellion against God and the Roman emperor. In that respect he emphasized a medieval commonplace, that is, that heresy was both a religious and a civil crime.³⁵

The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 evoked various arguments concerning the appropriate Christian response. The conciliarist Juan de Segovia (d. 1458), author of *De mittendo gladio Divini Spiritus in corde sarracenorum*, rejected the idea of a possible crusade against the Turks. Although he believed that wars undertaken to impose religious belief were unlawful, he adhered to the concept previously articulated by the popes, namely, that a war intended to recover from the Muslims lands formerly Christian was licit. He declared: “I do not condemn wars licitly executed against the Muslims for having invaded Christian lands or for other similar reasons, but not if they are undertaken for religious motives and for the purpose of conversion.” Stating what everyone knew to be true, he remarked that the wars conducted in the last forty years by Juan II and Enrique IV had achieved very little. Rather than attempt the forcible conversion of the Muslims, he argued for a reasoned approach based on a thorough knowledge of the Qur’an. Aware that existing Latin versions were inadequate, in 1455 he invited ‘Isā ibn Djābir (Içe de Gebir), an *alfaquí* from Segovia and the author of the *Breviario Sunni*, a compendium of Islamic

law published in 1462, to translate the Qur'an into Castilian, so that he could then turn that into Latin. The translation, however, does not seem to be extant. In any case, Juan de Segovia held that conversion could best be effected by honest discussion and persuasion. Contemporary preachers, in his opinion, lacked accurate knowledge and understanding of Islam and by their distortion of Muslim belief and their caricature of Muḥammad repelled Muslims. He, of course, believed that Islam was a heresy, a false religion propagated by a false prophet. Nevertheless, his views were quickly forgotten.³⁶

Contrary to Juan de Segovia, the Franciscan theologian Alonso de Espina (d. 1466) staunchly supported a Turkish crusade and the liberation of the Holy Land. In Book IV of his *Fortalitium Fidei* he developed arguments for preachers to use to refute Muslim teaching. He saw the succession of Christian victories over the Moors as a sign that Christianity would ultimately triumph. Until that day, he insisted that the laws already enacted against the Muslims should be enforced.³⁷ Juan de Torquemada (d. 1468), a Dominican theologian from a *converso* family and the uncle of Tomás de Torquemada, the famous inquisitor, also favored a Turkish crusade. In his *Tractatus contra principales errores perfidi Machometi et Turcorum sive Saracenorum*, he denounced Muḥammad as a false prophet and cited his forty principal errors, for example, the rejection of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ, the practice of polygamy, and the condemnation of wine. The practical impact of his work, however, was minimal.³⁸

In the everyday world, two conversions had a personal impact upon contemporaries. The poet García Fernández de Gerena married a Muslim woman and took up residence in Granada, where he embraced Islam. His fellow poet Alfonso Álvarez de Villasandino deplored his abandonment of “the very holy law for the evil sect of the false deceiver.” In doing so, Garcia “gained hell, dark torment,” and by adoring Muḥammad, “the false prophet,” “the vile ambassador,” he “could rightly be called a traitor.” On the other side of the religious divide, the *alfaquí* of Játiva became a Christian in 1487. Taking the baptismal name Juan Andrés, he was ordained to the priesthood and devoted himself to preaching among the Moors of Valencia and Granada. He refuted Muslim teaching in his *Confutación de la secta mahometana*.³⁹

Conversion was also the goal of a mock combat between two hundred Christian knights and two hundred others dressed as Moors in 1463. The affair was staged at Christmastime in Jaén in the presence of Miguel Lucas de Iranzo. Leading the pseudo-Moors were two knights, one impersonating the emir of Morocco and another Muḥammad. The faux emir announced that if God gave the Christians victory, he and his companions would renounce the Prophet and the Qur'an and be baptized. After jousting for three hours, the Moors acknowledged that Christianity was preferable to Islam and received baptism. Although this event was essentially a pageant, it revealed the Christian expectation that the Moors would eventually abandon their religion and accept Christianity.⁴⁰

The Muslim *jihād*

Muslims were equally firm in their conviction that the struggle against the Christians was a holy war sanctioned by God. Ibn Hudayl emphasized that the *jihād* or holy war was the purest of acts, a duty incumbent on all able-bodied Muslims, who gained immense merit by their participation. Proclaiming that the emirate was “the dwelling place of the holy war,” Muḥammad V in 1365 urged his people to prepare for that day when “we have unsheathed our swords, [when we] have bent down to drink the cup of death in the holy war, and have vowed our souls to God.”⁴¹

Before embarking on his campaign in 1367, he prayed to Almighty God to ready his men for the coming battle and to assure them of victory. Two years before he reminded his people of the fundamental precepts of Islam, namely, belief in God, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage, but he also stressed the necessity to prepare for the holy war against the Christians. “By merely taking arms,” he declared, “one comes close to God!” Although Granada was like a city under siege, he emphasized that with God’s help smaller nations had often overcome larger ones. Just as volunteers of the faith came from Egypt and Baghdad to reside in monasteries guarding the frontier, he urged his people, as descendants of the first conquerors of al-Andalus, to be ready to defend it.⁴²

In his correspondence with the Marinid sultans Muḥammad V often mentioned the holy war or “the divine duty of the holy war” waged against “infidel enemies” by “the blessed army” or “the armies of the holy war.” Victory or defeat was attributed to God and had to be accepted as the divine will. The Christian failure at the siege of Cañete in 1349 was explained by emphasizing a fundamental theological disagreement between Christians and Muslims: “Their Trinity feared to respond to the word of Unicity.” Just as Christians habitually dismissed Muslims as “enemies of the holy Catholic faith,” Muslims denounced Christians as infidels, “dogs of infidels,” and polytheists. Denouncing the “adorers of statues,” the emir voiced his desire to “strike at idolatry” and called on all Islam to unite with God against “the cult of the idols.” The Muslim sovereigns on both sides of the strait were described as champions of the holy war. By contrast, the Castilian ruler was consistently disparaged as “the infidel king” or cursed as “the enemy—may God cause him to perish,” or “the enemy—may God destroy him.”⁴³

Al-Makkārī alluded to the Christian usage of images when he spoke of the “idolaters.” Citing earlier authors, he described Pedro I as “an infidel dog” and a “tyrant,” Fernando as an “infidel king,” and his people as the “infidel enemy.” Muslim Spain became “an easy prey to the infidels, who surrounded it on every side like a pack of hungry wolves.” In the *fatwā* issued against Abū ‘Abd Allāh in 1483, the Muslim authorities, while calling on God to protect Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, routinely cursed the infidel king Fernando—“May God annihilate

him,” “May God ruin him.” They condemned Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s rebellion because it could “incite the infidel enemy to extirpate . . . the believers and to violate their most sacred things.”⁴⁴ The anonymous chronicler of Naṣrid Granada’s last days repeatedly asked God to annihilate the enemy, the usurper, and he also referred to the God-damned Christian knights. God gave victory to the Muslims, who trusted in God’s help, but in the fighting in 1490 and 1491 many were killed in “the holy affair.” In the end he accepted the Christian triumph as God’s will.⁴⁵

The Crusade

The religious character of the war against Granada was manifested in papal bulls granting a plenary indulgence and other spiritual benefits to those taking part in the crusade. In 1354 Pope Innocent VI proclaimed a crusade but Pedro I did not act on it. Given Enrique II’s need to defend his throne against his Christian enemies, he could not undertake a crusade, though he hoped eventually to do so. While the crusade remained on hold for many years, the division of Christian Europe caused by the Great Western Schism resulted in the anomaly of crusades directed by rival popes against the kings of Castile and Portugal. Despite that diversion, the master of Santiago emphasized the true purpose of crusading by persuading Clement VII to announce a crusade against the Moors in 1386.⁴⁶ The crusade was not an immediate concern of Juan I or of Enrique III during his minority. However, the latter supported the crusade proclaimed by Benedict XIII in 1403 to conquer the Canary Islands. Deciding to go to war with Granada in 1406, the king appealed again to the pope to authorize a crusade, but it fell to Fernando de Antequera to carry it out.⁴⁷ In 1413 after becoming king of Aragón, Fernando asked for a comparable crusading bull, but his preoccupation with his new kingdom prevented him from taking action against Granada. During that time John XXIII authorized the Portuguese crusade for the conquest of Ceuta.⁴⁸

Although Martin V announced a crusade in 1421, Juan II did nothing, but ten years later, armed with Eugene IV’s crusading bull, he achieved his triumph at La Higuera. The pope reissued the bull in 1435 but again the king neglected to implement it.⁴⁹ Nor did he do so when Nicholas V proclaimed a crusade in 1448, though he did take the cross. Despite the king’s inaction, the city of Seville in 1449 persuaded the pope to declare a crusade under the city’s auspices.⁵⁰ After the fall of Constantinople, the papacy was preoccupied by a possible Turkish crusade, but Enrique IV convinced Calixtus III in 1455 and again in 1457 to proclaim a crusade against the Naṣrids. Three years later Pius II renewed it, but continuing conflict with the nobility thwarted the king’s crusading efforts.⁵¹ Although Fernando and Isabel obtained crusading bulls from Sixtus IV in 1479 and 1482, they were not

immediately able to undertake a crusade. Given their persistence and their success, Innocent VIII, despite his discontent with their use of ecclesiastical revenues, promulgated a crusade in 1485, and renewed it in 1486, 1487, 1489, 1490, and 1491.⁵²

The crusading bull offered a plenary indulgence, that is, the remission of sins to all those who participated in the crusade or made a financial contribution to it. To advance the success of the crusade, Nicholas V revoked other plenary indulgences in 1448.⁵³ Crusaders enjoyed other benefits, including papal protection of themselves and their families, immunity from prosecution, and exemption from the payment of interest. On proclaiming a crusade, the pope usually appointed a legate, such as Cardinal Giordano, who had been named by Eugene IV in 1437, but there is little evidence that he participated in the campaign. The principal task of the nuncio Antonio de Venéris, named by Pius II in 1462, was likely financial, as he also served as collector of the *decima*. The pope also designated one or more prelates to preach the crusade. They in turn appointed preachers in each diocese. Preachers could confer the cross on prospective crusaders and absolve them from various crimes such as arson and commute vows of fasting and pilgrimage.⁵⁴ The process of collecting monetary gifts to support the crusade often entailed abuses by preachers who pocketed the money or by royal officials who diverted it to purposes other than the crusade.

Although no text of a crusading homily appears to be extant, the oration given by Sancho de Rojas, bishop of Palencia, during the Cortes of Segovia in 1407 probably touched on themes used by popular preachers. His key argument was that the Moors, as “enemies of the Catholic faith,” had unjustly occupied lands once belonging to Christians. Catalina de Lancaster made that point when she spoke of reclaiming lands taken by the Moors from her son, Juan II. Bishop Sancho also excoriated the Muslims as blasphemers who daily inflicted grave injuries on Christians.⁵⁵

Religious Manifestations in Warfare

Crosses, banners, war cries, prayers, and other rituals manifested the religious character of the war. Aside from the cross worn by each crusader, religious banners were carried into battle and placed on the battlements of captured fortresses. Pedro I asked Pope Innocent VI to send a banner for his projected crusade in 1354. When Infante Fernando set out for Antequera in 1410, his men carried a crucifix, banners honoring Santiago, St. Isidore (the *pendón de Baeza*), the Virgin Mary, and the Order of the Jar and the Griffin, and relics of saints. He also bore a sword taken from the effigy of Fernando III in the cathedral of Seville. The popes also favored kings by conferring other gifts. Calixtus III, for example, honored Enrique IV in 1457 for his defense of

Christendom by sending him a ceremonial sword and hat and authorized him to wear the cross and habit of the Order of Santiago. Throughout their crusade Fernando and Isabel displayed a cross given to them by Sixtus IV.⁵⁶ The Moors also carried their banners, entrusting them to the bravest men. Each corps had its distinctive banner, a rallying point, “the very soul of the army.”⁵⁷

Bishops and other clerics customarily accompanied armies and, before any major engagement, offered spiritual ministrations to the troops. Many clerics and friars in the royal encampment before Málaga said mass, preached to both the well and the ill, and by virtue of the “Holy Crusade” gave plenary absolution to all. Preachers reminded the troops that God was on their side against “the enemies of our holy Catholic faith” and that anyone who fell in battle would be accounted among the martyrs and welcomed into paradise. A banner described by the poet Juan Álvarez Gato (d. 1509) expressed that idea: “Whoever wins in the battles of love loses. The one who is killed and dies in this war is a winner.” During the battle of Boca del Asno, a Cistercian monk, raising high the crucifix, exhorted the troops: “Just as [Jesus] died for us, so we ought to die for him and for our faith, destroying the heresy and sect of the infidel Moors.”⁵⁸

The Moors, too, believed that their soldiers who died in combat were martyrs. Ibn Ḥudāyī cited many texts concerning the martyrdom of those killed in the holy war. Using language easily understood and appealing to religious law, he urged preachers to “demonstrate the excellence of martyrdom,” thereby inspiring the troops to make the supreme sacrifice.⁵⁹ Muḥammad V, when assaulting Jaén in 1368, shouted “Holy War! Holy War!” and pleaded with the Prophet to lead his people directly to paradise. Elsewhere he mentioned the “martyrs of the holy war” and “the waves of martyrdom.” In 1410, during the siege of Antequera, the *faqīh*, Abū Yaḥyā Muḥammad Ibn ‘Āṣim al-Ġarnāṭī, was cited as a martyr (*shahīd*).⁶⁰

Once battle was joined the Castilians called upon Santiago or the Virgin Mary to protect them and give them victory. Commanders encouraged their men by appealing to both religious and chivalric motives. Telling his men, “Our holy law is so much truer than their lying sect,” the *alcaide* of Alhama exhorted his men to fight “in defense of our faith,” and asserted that he preferred death to captivity among the Moors. At the battle of Lucena in 1483, the count of Cabra, after the celebration of mass, confession, and communion, again urged his men to defend the faith, knowing that God, the Virgin Mary, and Santiago would give them victory. Those who died battling the infidels would gain the reward of “praiseworthy fame and glory.” Failure to trust in God, according to Bernáldez and Pulgar, led to defeat at al-Sharqiyya in 1483.⁶¹ The Moors too, “as friends of God,” or “servants of God,” invoked divine assistance and in the din of combat recited the profession of faith: “There is no God but God and Muḥammad is God’s Prophet.” Poets tried to inspire their warriors by chanting the deeds of past heroes.⁶²

After a castle or fortress was taken, the victors, signifying the act of

possession, placed their banners on the walls. When Granada capitulated, the cross given to Fernando and Isabel by Sixtus IV was placed on the walls of the Alhambra. Clergy took custody of the chief mosque and gave it a ritual cleansing with salt and water and then dedicated it as a church. The mosque of Antequera was dedicated, for example, to San Salvador. When the Portuguese seized Ceuta, the clergy washed the great mosque and consecrated it for Christian worship. Two church bells that the Moors had taken from Lagos were found and hung in the mosque. Church bells transformed into lamps had also been hung in the mosque of Almería.⁶³ A particular devotion to the Marian feast of the Incarnation or Annunciation (25 March) apparently led Fernando and Isabel to dedicate the principal mosques of Alhama, Álora, Loja, Ronda, Vélez-Málaga, and Málaga to Santa María de la Encarnación.⁶⁴

The Muslims practiced similar rituals. The “standards of victory” were raised high on the ramparts of captured fortresses. After receiving four castles from Pedro I in 1369, Muḥammad V affirmed that God had cleansed their polluted state and exalted the Unicity above the Trinity. “We purified the houses of God of the profanation of the idols and we replaced the bells with the word of truth.” When Iznajar fell, “the banners of Islam” were unfurled, “the word of Unicity” was proclaimed, houses were purified, and the bells were cast down as objects of derision. At Utrera the bells were silenced and bits of statues were scattered about. Algeciras was “cleansed of its infidelity” and the call to prayer was heard again from tall minarets.⁶⁵

The conclusion of a successful campaign was cause for jubilation. Returning in triumph to Seville after seizing Antequera, Infante Fernando was greeted enthusiastically by the clergy, the city fathers, and the populace. A procession moved to the cathedral, where the clergy intoned the *Te Deum*; prayers of thanksgiving were offered and he replaced the sword of Fernando III that he had carried on campaign. He also commanded people throughout the realm to take part in solemn processions of thanksgiving. After the victory at La Higuera, the clergy, lifting crosses high and chanting the *Te Deum* and *Vexilla regis prodeunt*, greeted the victors, Juan II and Álvaro de Luna. Like his predecessor, the king ordered processions in all the cities and towns. Informed of the fall of Alhama in 1482, Fernando asked his clergy to chant the *Te Deum*, and in the following year, on receiving news of the capture of Zahara, he and the queen ordered a procession through the streets of Vitoria and the celebration of a mass of thanksgiving in the cathedral. After the surrender of Ronda in 1485 Fernando made a triumphal return to Córdoba and directed that processions in thanksgiving be held throughout his dominions. Similar acts of thanksgiving took place following the capture of Málaga and Granada.⁶⁶

The Fate of the Vanquished

With the occupation of Granada in 1492, Fernando and Isabel were faced with the task of settling Christians in their new kingdom, providing for its defense, and organizing its government. Although those topics are beyond the scope of this book, the fate of the vanquished is not. In earlier times Muslims were encouraged to withdraw from lands conquered by the Christians and many of the well-to-do emigrated to Granada or North Africa. Those remaining in smaller towns and villages were usually poorer people following traditional crafts such as carpentry and bricklaying or working in the fields. Their numbers were comparatively small, except in Murcia and Valencia. Known as Mudejars, a word derived from *mudajjan*, meaning “those allowed to remain,” they were permitted to worship freely, to be governed by their own laws and their own magistrates, and to retain their property. The Capitulation of Granada in 1491 guaranteed those rights to the approximately three hundred thousand people, religiously and culturally alien to the Christian majority, who were now incorporated into the Crown of Castile. Fernando and Isabel had to ask whether a unified monarchy could be forged if so many people were allowed to observe a law based on a religion inimical to the Christians for centuries. Royal policy did not envision the assimilation of the Moors into Christian society as a primary goal, but that circumstance changed quickly as a drive to convert them intensified and led to rebellion.⁶⁷

Why did that happen? Several factors may be cited. As financial necessities mounted, for example, in 1495 the king and queen, despite the misgivings of many, demanded 7,200,000 *maravedies* from the Moors and renewed it four years later. In doing so, they stirred up discontent among the Moors, who had endured arbitrary taxation by the Naṣrids. In addition, infractions of the Capitulation of greater or lesser importance built up tension between the subjugated population and their new lords. The anonymous Naṣrid chronicler accused Fernando of gradually violating the terms of the Capitulation when he realized that most Moors chose not to emigrate. A measure sure to rouse hostility was the ban on issuing the call to prayer from the minarets. Moreover, in order to transform Granada into a Christian city, the Moors were ordered to move to the suburbs and surrounding villages, so that Christians might settle in the city.⁶⁸

Surely the treatment of the Jews also influenced that changing attitude. For centuries, the Jews, residing chiefly in urban areas and engaged in trade and finance, had enjoyed a privileged status as they were permitted to practice their religion and obey their own law administered by their own magistrates. However, in 1391 fanatical preaching in Écija touched off an explosion of hostility. Assaulted by mobs in Seville and other cities and towns, the Jews were forced to accept baptism or suffer death. Known thereafter as *conversos*, outwardly they were Christians, but they were suspected of secretly adhering to Judaism. In 1412 Catalina de Lancaster promulgated an ordinance requiring Jews and Moors to live in restricted ghettos and, under the aegis of Pope Benedict XIII, the famous Disputation of Tortosa was held in an attempt to

convince the Jews to convert. In 1449 a popular uprising against them occurred in Toledo and around 1461 Fray Alonso de Espina composed his *Fortalitium Fidei*, a denunciation of Jews, *conversos*, and Muslims. The presence of such a large number of persons whose loyalty to Christianity and, by implication, to the Castilian monarchy was dubious roused such agitation that in 1478 Sixtus IV authorized Fernando and Isabel to establish the Inquisition. Under its direction inquisitors interrogated *conversos* suspected of the so-called judaizing heresy and, on conviction, relinquished them to the civil authorities to suffer the penalties of exile, confiscation, or death. Then, on 30 March 1492, just a few months after the surrender of Granada, the king and queen ordered all the Jews to accept baptism within four months or leave the country. Most opted for exile. Their departure, aside from the loss of talent and manpower, marked a significant step toward the imposition of religious uniformity.⁶⁹

The religious divide between Christians and Muslims also became more acute. Appointed by the king and queen as the first archbishop of Granada, Isabel's confessor, Fernando de Talavera (d. 1507), discovered that his tiny Christian flock was swallowed up by a massive Muslim population. Concluding that his responsibility also extended to the Moors, he learned Arabic so he could converse with them and lead them to Christianity. He achieved some success and, in response to his new converts, composed a summary of the obligations of their new faith. In addition to abandoning Muslim prayers and rituals, he exhorted them to learn the Our Father, the Hail Mary, and the Apostles' Creed; to make the sign of the cross; to venerate the cross and images; and to observe Sundays and feast days. Newborn babies ought to be baptized within a week; marriages should be solemnized in the presence of a priest; and the deceased, after receiving the last rites, should be buried in consecrated ground. Confraternities should be organized for mutual support and children should be sent to Christian schools. Lest they be held in suspicion by old Christians, he urged his converts to dress, eat, and speak like Christians, and to cease speaking Arabic. Realizing that that would take time, he provided them with Arabic psalms and prayers. Although Talavera was firm in his determination, a process based on persuasive discourse and dialogue was bound to be a lengthy one and perhaps ultimately unsuccessful.⁷⁰

The status of the Mudejars changed radically when Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, archbishop of Toledo (d. 1517), arrived in Granada in mid-November 1499 and, with royal approbation, initiated a campaign to convince the *elches*, Christians who had converted to Islam, to return to their earlier faith. The Capitulation, however, guaranteed their right to continue practicing their new religion and prohibited any effort to compel them to abandon it. Nevertheless, the Inquisition, claiming jurisdiction over them as former Christians, authorized Cisneros to try to win them back. Emphasizing that by adhering to Islam they were guilty of the most grievous sin, he persuaded many to return to Christianity; those who refused his overtures were imprisoned until they changed their minds.⁷¹

Compulsory conversions, whose sincerity was questionable, made a mockery of the longstanding theological principle that religion ought not to be imposed by force. Such tactics alarmed the Muslim community, who feared that they would also be coerced into accepting baptism. Matters came to a head on 18 December 1499 when a bailiff was assaulted and killed in the Albaicín, setting off a rebellion. The count of Tendilla quickly restored order, but in the next few days more than four thousand Moors, according to Cisneros, were baptized. Among them were the muezzins who summoned the faithful to prayer; they offered him their trumpets, which he received “as if they were handing over the keys to us,” and sent them to the cathedral of Toledo. Cisneros soon reported that the entire population of the city was now Christian, all the mosques were churches, and people in the surrounding countryside were also converted. Claiming more than fifty thousand neophytes, he expressed the hope that the remaining two hundred thousand Muslims would soon be converted.⁷²

Writing early in 1500, an anonymous Muslim poet protested forced conversions and the burning of holy books and urged the Mamlūk sultan of Egypt to visit reprisals on the Christians in Palestine. A more elaborate version of this poem was sent later to the Ottoman sultan.⁷³ The anonymous Naṣrīd chronicler movingly described the sadness as al-Andalus became Christian. No one dared publicly to proclaim the profession of faith; bells were hung in minarets where the call to prayer was wont to be heard; images and crosses were placed in mosques where once the name of Allāh was invoked and the Qurʾān was recited. Amid weeping and lamentation, parents watched helplessly as their sons and daughters adored crosses, bowed down before idols, ate pork, and drank wine. “O what bitter pain, what great evil, what misfortune!” Almighty God, he prayed, would perhaps relieve them from their distress.⁷⁴

While the suppression of the uprising in the city prompted mass conversions, a much more serious rebellion spread through Las Alpujarras to the south and in the mountains of Ronda, Málaga, and Almería. Soldiers deployed to suppress the insurgents completed their task more or less by May 1501. In order to facilitate submission, the king and queen declared that the rebels would not be compelled to become Christians.⁷⁵ Some chose to emigrate to North Africa, and thousands more received baptism, but the majority continued to adhere to Islam.

Reflecting the views of his coreligionists, al-Makkārī declared that, by compelling the Muslims to convert, the Christians violated the Capitulation of 1491. He specifically referred to the *elches*, who were told that, as their ancestors were Christians, they had to return to that religion. Following the uprising in the Albaicín, the rebels were required to become Christians or suffer death. Although the rebels in Las Alpujarras capitulated they were permitted to journey to Morocco under certain restrictions. Those Muslims remaining in al-Andalus, “although Christians in appearance, were not so in

their hearts; for they worshipped Allāh in secret, and performed their prayers and ablutions at the proper hours.”⁷⁶

The crown now had to face a major problem of integrating the neophytes into Christian society and preventing them from relapsing through contact with their Muslim relatives, friends, and neighbors. Although some may have converted with sincere conviction, the mass conversions described by Cisneros did not conform to the principles of modern catechesis. Whatever instruction these new converts received was superficial at best. The task of inculcating in them Christian teaching and practice would take many years and might not bear fruit until the next generation. Although the king and queen initially seemed to have opposed forced conversions, they accepted the fait accompli. Lest the faith of the new converts be contaminated by interaction with Muslims, on 20 July 1501 they decreed that no free Moor would be permitted to enter or reside in the kingdom of Granada. Under penalty of death and confiscation of property, visitors were required to leave the realm within three days of hearing this proclamation. That seems to refer to Muslims coming from abroad. At the same time captive Moors were forbidden to persuade converts to return to Islam. Doubting the sincerity of the neophytes, however, the king and queen prohibited them from bearing or concealing arms. In October, as a further measure intended to uproot all evidence of Islam, they ordered all copies of the Qur'an and other religious texts to be burned.⁷⁷

An even more far-reaching decree of 12 February 1502 aimed at the total eradication of Islam. Intent on preserving “this holy work,” namely, the conquest of Granada and the conversion of the Moors, the king and queen determined not to allow the adherents of condemned religions (*leyes reprovadas*) to remain in their dominions. Just as they had decreed the expulsion of the Jews, so now they required all free Muslims, males over the age of fourteen and females over the age of twelve, to leave Castile and León by the end of April. Certain restrictions, however, made the process difficult. The decision to allow them to take their movable goods, except for gold and silver and other traditional *cosas vedadas*, greatly subverted their financial well-being. Furthermore, the requirement that they depart only from ports on the Bay of Biscay set up a nearly impossible hardship, as it implied that several hundred thousand people would have to journey from one end of the Iberian Peninsula to the other. Forbidden to enter the Crown of Aragón, they were also prohibited from traveling to North Africa or the lands of the Turks, with whom the king and queen were at war, though they could go to Egypt. Once they left they could not return.⁷⁸ Although this edict did not demand that the Muslims accept Christianity, its terms were such that conversion seemed the only realistic alternative. Consequently, most, rather than abandon their ancestral lands, elected to receive baptism. Known thereafter as *moriscos*, these converts were never fully trusted. The task of assimilating them seemed intractable and was resolved, at least in theory, by their expulsion in the seventeenth century.

The Conquest of Africa

Whereas the conquest of Granada ended Muslim rule in Spain, some argued that the reconquest would only be complete when the Castilian kings, as heirs of the Visigoths, planted their flag in North Africa. Alfonso de Cartagena, for example, asserted that the Visigoths had ruled the ancient Roman province of Tingitana or Morocco, and, by extension, the Canary Islands. He expected that, in due time, Castile would control those regions. Sánchez de Arévalo hoped that Enrique IV would recover the province of Africa that his Visigothic predecessors had once possessed and Valera commented that the Gothic King Wamba had ruled Ceuta and Tangier and a goodly part of North Africa.⁷⁹

These theoretical aspirations encountered a real challenge, however, when the Portuguese seized Ceuta (1415) and Tangier (1471) and explored the west coast of Africa. Opposing Portuguese claims, in 1475 Isabel declared “that the conquest of Africa and Guinea” belonged to Castile. Four years later, however, in the treaty of Alcáçovas Afonso V yielded all claims to the Canary Islands while Fernando and Isabel acknowledged Portuguese rights in West Africa.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, the king and queen reserved the right to intrude into Mediterranean Africa. In her last will of 1504 Isabel reminded her successors of the obligation to defend the faith and never “to cease from the conquest of Africa and to fight for the faith against the infidels.” Realizing the role that Gibraltar might play in that struggle, she revoked her brother’s concession of Gibraltar to the duke of Medina Sidonia and ordered her successors never to alienate it.⁸¹ In the expectation of dominating North Africa, the Castilians seized Melilla directly opposite Almería in 1497 and occupied the port of Mazalquivir on the Gulf of Oran in 1505. Inspired by crusade propagandists of the late thirteenth century, Cisneros dreamed of launching a crusade to the Holy Land from bases in North Africa and occupied Oran in modern Algeria in 1509. As their value declined, however, both Mazalquivir and Oran were sold to the bey of Algiers in 1792.⁸²

Meanwhile, Columbus’s voyages to the New World shifted attention from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and further intervention in North Africa was intermittent and the dream of conquering Morocco gradually faded from view. Even so, the hope of controlling the ports on both sides of the strait remained alive. Thus, after annexing Portugal in 1580, Spain acquired Ceuta and retained possession by treaty in 1668 after Portugal recovered its independence. In 1860 Spain seized Tetuán about forty miles southeast of Tangier, but it was recognized as an international zone in 1923. In some measure, a centuries-old ambition was satisfied when an international agreement of 1906 gave Spain a protectorate over the northern provinces of Morocco; the southern provinces were assigned to France. The kingdom of Morocco, after securing its independence in 1956, demanded the restoration of Ceuta, Tetuán, and Melilla. Still, Ceuta and Melilla remain under Spanish rule.

On the Spanish side of the strait, Gibraltar, recovered from the Moors in 1462, fell to England in 1704 and, despite Spanish insistence on its restoration, it continues in British hands. Spaniards fleeing from Gibraltar gradually brought the neighboring port of Algeciras, seized by the Naṣrids in 1369 and abandoned about ten years later, back to life.

The Last Word

This is the third volume of a trilogy that I began several years ago in an attempt to trace the history of the struggle for dominance in the Iberian Peninsula between Islam and Christianity, two disparate religions and cultures, from its inception early in the eighth century until the end of the fifteenth. In the first volume, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, I described the Muslim destruction of the Visigothic kingdom and the creation of an Islamic state dominating the greater part of the peninsula. The Muslim failure to occupy permanently the northernmost regions enabled small bands of Christians to create tiny, independent kingdoms. Spurred on by the idea of reconquest, from the late eleventh century onward they gradually gained ascendancy, despite the Almoravid and Almohad invasions. The papacy, acknowledging that the battle against Islam in Spain was as important as the struggle to recover the Holy Land, elevated it to the status of a crusade. By the middle of the thirteenth century Portugal and Aragón had reached their fullest extent and only Castile-León, the largest of the Christian states, had a frontier contiguous with Naṣrid Granada and thus the possibility of further peninsular expansion. In order to preserve their autonomy, the Naṣrids promised to pay an annual tribute as a sign of their vassalage.

In the second volume, *The Gibraltar Crusade: Castile and the Battle for the Strait*, I maintained that the epic struggle for control of the Strait of Gibraltar waged by Castile, Morocco, and Granada from the middle of the thirteenth century to the middle of the fourteenth has often been overlooked as a major chapter in the history of the reconquest. After the Castilian conquest of Seville in 1248 and the submission of Naṣrid Granada as a vassal state, the Moors no longer loomed as a threat and the reconquest seemed to be over. Nevertheless, the Castilian kings, prompted by ideology and strategy, attempted to dominate the strait. As the self-proclaimed heirs of the Visigoths, they tried to establish a foothold in Morocco as part of the Visigothic legacy. Moreover, they recognized the strategic importance of securing the ports long used by successive bands of Muslims to gain access to the peninsula, namely, Algeciras, Gibraltar, and Tarifa. The conquest of Tarifa in 1292, however, was their only permanent acquisition. As before, the papacy responded positively to royal requests for crusading bulls. The battle for control of the strait reached its culmination when Alfonso XI, aided by the Portuguese, routed the Marinid

invaders and their Naṣrid allies at Salado in 1340. That victory effectively ended the threat of Moroccan invasion that had menaced Castile for seventy-five years.

For more than one hundred and fifty years thereafter, as we have seen in this third volume, the Castilian monarchs, diverted by civil war and rivalries with their Christian neighbors, put aside the struggle to expel the Moors. From time to time, however, they carried out abortive campaigns against Granada that usually had the character of crusades. Although Infante Fernando's capture of Antequera in 1410 seemed to presage a sustained drive against Granada, that was not to be. Neither Juan II's victory at La Higuera in 1431 nor Enrique IV's incursions contributed substantively to the destruction of the emirate. Only Fernando and Isabel's persistent effort over eight years resulted in the final conquest.

Over the span of more than seven hundred years, at immense cost in men, women, and children killed, wounded, or enslaved, harvests and houses burned and destroyed, and vast quantities of money expended, Christians and Muslims waged war in the name of God. Now one must ask: what was accomplished?

In the political sphere an Islamic state was erased from the peninsula and the entire population was subjected to Christian rule. The war that had consumed the resources of both sides for so many centuries was over. Socially and legally, the old system that permitted religious minorities to worship freely and to be governed by their own laws and their own magistrates was soon terminated. Two factors helped to bring about the end of that regime of tolerance founded on the essential inequality of persons depending on their religious status. First, Castilians began to develop a sense of being an inherently Christian nation. That mind-set did not admit that non-Christians were true Castilians. Second, the emerging idea of the modern state stressed the commonality of one body of law and one set of institutions governing everyone. That left no room for privileged groups living in accordance with a private law. As a consequence, the Jews were compelled either to accept Christianity or to depart from the realm in 1492. Ten years later the Muslims were given the same choice. While many went into exile, many more remained, now officially Christian and endowed with all the rights of Christians of ancient lineage. The use of force fundamentally effected what centuries of preaching and living the Gospel had failed to bring about. The sincerity of the *conversos* or *moriscos*, however, was always suspect and the distinction between New Christians and Old Christians underscored that fact.

In bringing this history to a close, one may ask whether the centuries-long struggle between Christians and Muslims for ascendancy in the Iberian Peninsula has any meaning for us today. The efforts of both sides to maintain a theocratic state that consigned religious minorities to a permanently subordinate status can be understood in the context of the age but seems quite alien in today's Western world. Several hundred years would elapse before the

theocratic state that prevailed from ancient times to the early modern world gave way to the western secular state. Founded on the principle of separation of church and state, the secular state in theory professes no religion and favors no religion over another. Religious freedom is assured to everyone and all religions have equal opportunity to disseminate their beliefs. Nevertheless, the task of preserving the secular state against attempts to impose a dominant religious creed is ever ongoing. The secular state does not exist in certain parts of the world. Recent events are a reminder that the intensity of belief, rhetoric, and action that gave birth to crusade and *jihād* in medieval Spain remains a powerful force in the twenty-first century.

Abbreviations

- ACA *Arca de la Corona d'Aragó*
AEM *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*
AGS *Archivo General de Simancas*
AMC *Municipio de Cuenca*
AMS *Archivo Municipal de Sevilla, Actos Capitulares*
AV *Archivo Vaticano*
BAE *Biblioteca de autores españoles*
BHA *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*
CA *Crónica anónima de Enrique IV de Castilla (1454–1474) (Crónica castellana)*, ed. María Pilar Sánchez Parra
GAL *Galindo Chacón, Crónica de don Álvaro de Luna*, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo
PÉL *Pedro López de Ayala, Crónica del rey don Enrique II*, BAE 68
CEH *Crónica del rey don Enrique Tercero*, BAE 68
PÉL *Pedro López de Ayala, Crónica de Enrique III*, ed. Constance L. Wilkins and Heanon M. Wilkins
ALP *Alonso de Palencia, Crónica de Enrique IV escrita en latín*, tr. Antonio Paz y Meliá
LGG *Galíndez de Carvajal, Crónica de Enrique IV*, ed. Juan Torres Fontes, *Estudio sobre la “Crónica de Enrique IV” del Dr. Galíndez de Carvajal*
CEH *Crónica de Enrique IV de Diego Enríquez del Castillo*, ed. Aureliano Sánchez Martín
FL *Fernão Lopes, Chronica de el-rei d. Fernando*
PÉL *Pedro Carrillo de Huete, Crónica del halconero de Juan II*, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo
PÉL *Pedro López de Ayala, Crónica del rey don Juan I*, BAE 68
JL *Crónica de El-Rei d. João I*
ÁJM *Álvaro de Santa María, Crónica de Juan II de Castilla*, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo y Arroquía
ÁJM *Álvaro de Santa María, Crónica de Juan II de Castilla, años 1420–1434*, ed. Antonio Paz y Meliá, CODOIN 99–100
FG *Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, Crónica de Juan II*, BAE 68
CR *Crónicas de los antiguos reinos de León y Castilla*
COD *Compilación de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, ed. Martín Fernández de Navarrete et al.
PÉL *Pedro López de Ayala, Crónica de Pedro I*, BAE 66

PDL López de Ayala, *Coronica del rey don Pedro*, ed. Constance L. Wilkins and Heanon M. Wilkins
 FRC del Pulgar, *Crónica de los reyes católicos*, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo
 RPD de Pina, *Chronica d'el-rei d. Duarte*
 FRC del Pulgar, *Crónica de los señores reyes católicos don Fernando y doña Isabel de Castilla y Aragón*, BAE 70
 GTE Eanes de Zurara, *Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta*, ed. Francisco Maria Esteves Pereira
 DAG Abellán Pérez, *Diplomatario del reino de Granada: Documentos de Juan II de Castilla (1407–1454) del Archivo Municipal de Jerez de la Frontera*
 DRD de la Torre, *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*
 EHM España Medieval
 ETF Facio, Tiempo y Forma
 HMG de los hechos del marqués de Cádiz, ed. Juan Luis Carriazo Rubio
 HIO Historia, Instituciones, Documentos
 PEM de Escabias, *Hechos del Condestable Don Miguel Lucas de Iranzo (Crónica del siglo XV)*, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo
 MDH (C) Valera, *Memorial de diversas hazañas*, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo
 MEAE Mélanges de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos
 MEIVorias de don Enrique IV de Castilla, ed. Real Academia de la Historia
 Mh Monumenta Henricina
 MEH Memorial histórico español
 MML Mélanges Medieval Murciana
 Kūṭub al-Nabḍasna (Müller) *ahbar mulūk Banī Naṣr aw taslīm ġarnāta wa nuzūl al-Andalusiyyīn ilā l-Magrib*, in Marc Müller, ed., *Die letzten Zeiten von Granada*
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Notes

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 5

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CHAPTER 6

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148. CODAIN 8:399–402.

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CHAPTER 7

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CHAPTER 8

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Torquemada, Tomás de, inquisitor
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Verino, Ugolino, poet

Vidal Castro, Francisco

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Zurara (Azurara), Gomes Eanes de, chronicler

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